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UNIVERSITY OF 

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The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2034 



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January 1980 




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The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2034 



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January 1980 










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The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2034 



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January 1980 




UNITED STATES ^ 



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Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 80 / Number 2034 / January 1980 



Cover Photo: 

U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations Donald 
F. McHenry in the 
Security Council just 
before he addressed the 
Council on December 1, 
1979. Seated behind him, 
from left to right first 
row, are Senator Frank 
Church and 

Congressman Clement J. 
Zablocki; in the second 
row are Congressman 
William S. Broomfield 
and Ambassador 
William vanden Heuvel, 
Deputy U.S. 
Representative to the 
United Nations. 

(United Nations photo 
by M. Grant) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1981. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature. 



For sale by the Superintendent of 

Documents, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 

Price: 

12 issues plus annual index— 

$18.00 (domestic) $22.50 (foreign) 

Single copy— $1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 






9r> 



CONTENTS 



o/i ' ij^/jTI/ 






SPECIAL (See Center Section) 

AFGHANISTAN: President Carter's Address to the Nation, January 4, 1980 

Ambassador MeHenry's Statement in the U.N. Security Council, January 6, 1980 
Text of the Draft Security Council Resolution S/13729 of January 7, 1980 

IRAN: World Opinion on the Holding of U.S. Hostages in Iran 



The President 

1 News Conference of November 

28 



Canada 

4 Report on the Transport of Air 

Pollutants 



East Asia 

5 Mrs. Carter Visits Thailand 

(President Carter, Mrs. 
Carter, Reverand Theodore 
Hesburgh) 
7 Pacific Basin (David D. 

Newsom) 
> 8 World Efforts to Aid Kampu- 

cheans 

9 U.S.-China Trade Agreement 

( Wa rren Ch ristopher) 

10 Agreements With Taiwan 

(Warren Christopher) 
12 Accounting for MI As (Richard 
C. Holbrooke) 



Economics 

14 Flexible Exchange Rates After 6 
Years' Experience (Richard 

N. Cooper) 



Europe 

17 Identifying U.S. Security Inter- 
ests in U.S. -Soviet Rela- 
tions (Marshall D. Sh al- 
ma h ) 

20 Continuity and Commitment 
(Matthew Nimetz) 

24 CSCE Semiannual Report and 

1980 Madrid Meeting (De- 
partment Statement) 

25 Helsinki Agreement on Human 

Rights (President Carter) 
25 Visit of Irish Prime Minister 

Lynch (White House State- 
ment) 



Human Rights 

26 Four Treaties Pertaining to 
Human Rights (Warren 
Christopher, Patricia M. 
Derian, Roberts B. Owen) 

32 President Carter Receives 
Human Rights Award 
(President Carter) 

32 Implementing the Human 
Rights Policy (Warren 
Christopher) 



International Law 

35 Political Asylum (Warren 
Christopher) 



Middle East 

37 U.S. Takes Case Against Iran to 
the International Court of 
Justice (Department An- 
nouncement, Secretary's 
Letter, Application to the 
Court, Request for Interim 
Measures of Protection, 
Response From ICJ) 

42 U.S. Embassy Marine Security 
Guards 

42 International Court of Justice 

42 Situation In Iran (Message to 
the Congress, White House 
Announcement , State- 
ments) 

44 Chronology of Events In Iran, 
November 1979 

46 The Challenge of Peacemaking 
(Harold H. Saunders) 



United Nations 

49 Security Council Meets on Ira- 
nian Situation (Donald F. 
McHenry, Text of Resolu- 
tion) 

52 Agenda of Global Economic Is- 
sues (Howard T. Rosen) 

54 Arms Control (George M. Seig- 
nious II) 

56 International Year of the Child 
(Jean Young) 



Western Hemisphere 

58 Central America at the Cross- 
roads (Viron P. Vaky) 

65 Inter-American Institute for 

Cooperation on Agriculture 
(Message to the Senate) 

65 Chile (Department Statement) 



Treaties 

66 Current Actions 

Chronology 

68 November 1979 

Press Releases 

69 Department of State 

69 U.S. U.N. 

Publications 

70 GPO Sales 



A*« 



B** 



Index V 










Ambassador McHenry confers with Ambassador Kaiser of Bangladesh before the U.N. Security Council meeting on November 



27. 



Department of State Bulletin 



The President 



News Conference of November 28 



For the last 24 days, our nation's 
concern has been focused on our fellow 
Americans being held hostage in Iran. 
We have welcomed some of them home 
to their families and their friends. But 
we will not rest nor deviate from our 
efforts until all have been freed from 
their imprisonment and their abuse. We 
hold the Government of Iran fully re- 
sponsible for the well-being and the 
safe return of every single person. 

I want the American people to un- 
derstand the situation as much as pos- 
sible, but there may be some questions 
tonight which I cannot answer fully be- 
cause of my concern for the well-being 
of the hostages. 

First of all, I would like to say that 
I am proud of this great nation, and I 
want to thank all Americans for their 
prayers, their courage, their persist- 
ence, their strong support and pa- 
tience. During these past days, our 
national will, our courage, and our 
maturity have all been severely tested 
and history will show that the people of 
the United States have met every test. 

In the days to come our determina- 
tion may be even more sorely tried, but 
we will continue to defend the security, 
the honor, and the freedom of Ameri- 
cans everywhere. This nation will never 
yield to blackmail. 

For all Americans our constant 
concern is the well-being and the safety 
of our fellow citizens who are being held 
illegally and irresponsibly hostage in 
Iran. The actions of Iran have shocked 
the civilized world. 

For a government to applaud mob 
violence and terrorism, for a govern- 
ment actually to support and, in effect, 
participate in the taking and the hold- 
ing of hostages is unprecedented in 
human history. This violates not only 
the most fundamental precepts of in- 
ternational law but the common ethical 
and religious heritage of humanity. 
There is no recognized religious faith on 
Earth which condones kidnapping. 
There is no recognized religious faith on 
Earth which condones blackmail. There 
is certainly no religious faith on Earth 
which condones the sustained abuse of 
innocent people. 

We are deeply concerned about the 
inhuman and degrading conditions im- 
posed on the hostages. From every 
corner of the world, nations and people 
have voiced their strong revulsion and 
condemnation of Iran and have joined 
us in calling for the release of the hos- 
tages. 



Last night a statement of support 
was released and was issued by the 
President of the U.N. General Assem- 
bly, the Security Council, on behalf of 
all of its members. We expect a further 
Security Council meeting on Saturday 
night, at which more firm and official 
action may be taken to help in obtaining 
the release of the American hostages. 

Any claims raised by government 
officials of Iran will ring hollow while 
they keep innocent people bound and 
abused and threatened. We hope that 
this exercise of diplomacy and interna- 
tional law will bring a peaceful solution, 
because a peaceful solution is prefera- 
ble to the other remedies available to 
the United States. 

At the same time, we pursue such a 
solution with grim determination. The 
Government of Iran must recognize the 
gravity of the situation which it has it- 
self created and the grave consequences 
which will result if harm comes to any 
of the hostages. 

I want the American people to 
know, and I want the world to know, 
that we will persist in our efforts, 
through every means available, until 
every single American has been freed. 
We must also recognize now, as we 
never have before, that it is our entire 
nation which is vulnerable because of 
our overwhelming and excessive de- 
pendence on oil from foreign countries. 
We have got to accept the fact that this 
dependence is a direct, physical threat 
to our national security. And we must 
join together to fight for our nation's 
energy freedom. 

We know the ways to win this war: 
more American energy and the more 
efficient use of what we have. The U.S. 
Congress is now struggling with this 
extremely important decision. The way 
to victory is long and difficult, but w.e 
have the will and we have the human 
and the natural resources of our great 
nation. However hard it might be to see 
into the future, one thing tonight is 
clear: We stand together. 

We stand as a nation unified, a 
people determined to protect the life 
and the honor of every American. And 
we are determined to make America an 
energy secure nation once again. It is 
unthinkable that we will allow our- 
selves to be dominated by any form of 
overdependence at home or any brand 



of terrorism abroad. We are deter- 
mined that the freest nation on Earth 
shall protect and enhance its freedom. 

Q. The Ayatollah Khomeini said 
the other day — and I'm using his 
words — he doesn't believe you have 
the guts to use military force. He puts 
no credibility in our military deter- 
rent. I'm wondering how do we get 
out of this mess in Iran and still re- 
tain credibility with our allies and 
with our adversaries overseas? 

A. We have the full support of our 
allies, and in this particular instance we 
have no adversaries overseas. There is 
no civilized country on Earth which has 
not condemned the seizure and the 
holding of the hostages by Iran. It 
would not be advisable for me to 
explore publicly all of the options open 
to our country. As I said earlier', I'm 
determined to do the best I can through 
diplomatic means and through peaceful 
means to insure the safety of our hos- 
tages and their release. Other actions 
which I might decide to take would 
come in the future after those peaceful 
means have been exhausted. 

But I believe that the growing con- 
demnation of the world community on 
Iran will have a beneficial effect. 

Q. Why did you reverse your pol- 
icy and permit the Shah to come into 
this country when, one, medical 
treatment was available elsewhere; 
two, you had been warned by our 
Charge that the Americans might be 
endangered in Tehran; and three, the 
Bazargan government was so shaky 
that it was questionable whether he 
could deliver on the promise to pro- 
tect our Embassy; and last of all, in 
view of the consequences do you re- 
gret the decision? 

A. No, the decision that I made 
personally and without pressure from 
anyone to carry out the principles of 
our country, to provide for the means of 
giving the Shah necessary medical as- 
sistance to save his life, was proper. At 
the same time we notified the Govern- 
ment of Iran. We were assured by the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minis- 
ter that our Embassy would be pro- 
tected, and it was protected for several 
days, in spite of threats from outside. 

Then peremptorily, after Khomeini 
made an aggravating speech to the 
crowds in the street and withdrew pro- 
tection from the Embassy, it was at- 
tacked successfully. The Embassy was 



January 1980 



The President 



protected by our people for the length 
of time possible without help from the 
host government. No embassy on Earth 
is a fortress that can withstand con- 
stant attacks by a mob unless a host 
government comes to the rescue of the 
people within the embassy. 

But I took the right decision. I 
have no regrets about it nor apologies 
to make because it did help to save a 
man's life, and it was compatible with 
the principles of our country. 

Q. We appear to be in a rather 
dangerous period of international 
tension and volatility, especially in 
the Islamic world, and it comes at a 
time when we're about to embark on 
our quadrennial election campaign, 
with all that that will bring. Have you 
given any thought to whether, fol- 
lowing examples of other national 
emergencies, it may be wise to try to 
mute the political fallout of this by 
trying to bring opponents in and out- 
side of your party into some kind of 
emergency coalition for this purpose? 

A. We have attempted to keep the 
political leaders in our nation informed, 
both publicly and through other chan- 
nels. We have given frequent briefings, 
for instance, on the Hill, both to the 
Members of the Senate and to the 
House. We have encouraged all of those 
who have become announced candidates 
for president to restrain their com- 
ments which might be misconstrued 
overseas and to have a maximum de- 
gree of harmony among those who 
might be spokesmen for our country. I, 
myself, in order to stay close to the 
scene here where constantly changing 
events could be handled by me as 
President, have eliminated the major 
portion of political oriented activities. 

I don't think the identity of the Is- 
lamic world is a factor. We have the 
deepest respect and reverence for 
Islam and for all those who share the 
Moslem faith. I might say that so far as 
I know, all the Islamic nations have 
joined us in condemning the activities 
and the actions of the Government of 
Iran. So I don't think religious divisions 
are a factor here at all. 

But I will have to continue to re- 
strict my own political activities and 
call on those who might be opposing me 
in the future for president to support 
my position as President and to provide 
unity for our country and for our nation 
in the eyes of those who might be look- 
ing for some sign of weakness or divi- 
sion in order to perpetuate their abuse 
of our hostages. 

Q. What can the United States do 
now; what can it do to prevent future 



incidents of the nature of Iran? How 
can you satisfy the public demand to 
end such embarrassment? 

A. This is an unprecedented and 
unique occurrence. Down through his- 
tory, we have had times when some of 
our people were captured by terrorists 
or who were abused, and they have ob- 
viously been instances of international 
kidnapping which occurred for the dis- 
comforture of a people or a govern- 
ment. So far as I know, this is the first 
time that such an activity has been en- 
couraged by and supported by the gov- 
ernment itself. And, I don't anticipate 
this kind of thing recurring. 

We have taken steps already, in 
view of the disturbances in the Middle 
East and the Persian Gulf region, to 
guard our people more closely, to pro- 
vide them with a higher degree of secu- 
rity, and to make arrangements with 
the host government to provide assist- 
ance if it's needed in the fastest possi- 
ble way. 

Many other nations have reduced 
severely the number of persons over- 
seas. I think one of the points that 
should be made is that a year ago, we 
had 70,000 Americans in Iran— 70,000. 
There were literally thousands of 
people who were killed in the Iranian 
revolution, from all nations. 

We were able to extract Americans 
from Iran safely. It was a superb dem- 
onstration of cooperation and good con- 
duct on the part of the State Depart- 
ment and other American officials. 
There will be disturbances in the fu- 
ture, but I think we are well protected 
as we possibly can be without with- 
drawing into a shell from protecting 
American interests in nations overseas. 

My own experience, so far, has 
been that the leaders of nations have 
recommitted themselves to provide se- 
curity for embassies of all countries. I 
think we've learned a lesson from this 
instance. But, because it is so unique, 
in the high degree of irresponsibility of 
the Iranian Government leaders, I don't 
believe that we'll see another reoccur- 
rence of it any time soon. 

Q. Former Secretary of State Kis- 
singer has criticized your Administra- 
tion's handling of the situation in 
Iran. He has suggested that it came 
about because, partly because of the 
procedure — a weakness in American 
foreign policy and that it has further 
damaged America's image as a result. 
How do you respond? 

A. I would rather not respond. 
There's no reason for me to get into a 



public debate at this time with former 
Secretary Kissinger about who is or 
who is not responsible for the events 
that took place in Iran. Obviously, what 
has occurred could not have been pre- 
dicted. And for 30 years, our country 
has had a relationship with a fairly sta- 
ble government there. The changes 
took place very rapidly. So far as I 
know, no one on Earth predicted them. 
And, I think it's not becoming at this 
moment, and not conducive to better 
American understanding, to get in- 
volved in answering allegations that I 
or someone else may have been culpable 
and may have caused a further aggra- 
vation of a very difficult situation. 

Q. What role did the former Sec- 
retary play in your decision to permit 
the Shah into the country? 

A. None. I did not hear at all from 
the Secretary — former Secretary Kis- 
singer nor did he contact Secretary 
Vance at any time during the days 
when we were deciding that the Shah 
should come into the United States for 
medical care to save his life. In pre- 
vious weeks and months, since the Shah 
was deposed, Secretary Kissinger and 
many others let it be known that they 
thought that we should provide a haven 
for the Shah. But Secretary Kissinger 
played no role in my decision to permit 
the Shah to come in for medical treat- 
ment. 

Q. Speaking of the Shah, if he is 
well enough to travel, would you like 
him to leave the country? 

A. That's a decision to be made by 
the Shah and by his medical advisers. 
When he decided to come to our coun- 
try, with my permission, I was in- 
formed then, and I have been informed 
since, that as soon as his medical 
treatment was successfully completed, 
that his intention was to leave. And I 
have not encouraged him to leave; he 
was free to come here for medical 
treatment, and he will leave on his own 
volition. 

Q. The consequences of the crisis 
in Iran is drifting the United States in- 
to almost a cold war with the Islamic 
countries. Watching TV news for 25 
days, Americans soon will believe the 
whole Moslem world is hating them. 
Moreover, they are not told that the 
Shiites are a very minor minority 
among the population of the Islamic 
world, because the most majority is 
Sunni. Don't you think you get any 
help from any Islamic country, and 
what will your policy be toward the 
Islamic countries under these circum- 
stances? 



Department of State Bulletin 



The President 



A. The premise of your question is 
completely wrong. We are not ap- 
proaching any sort of cold war with the 
Islamic countries. So far as I know, 
every Islamic country has condemned 
Iran for its capture of our hostages and 
has been very supportive. 

This includes Moslem nations 
which, in the past, have not been close 
friends of ours — Iraq, Libya, and 
others. So I don't see this as a confron- 
tation at all between our nation and the 
Islamic world. It's certainly not part of 
the Islamic faith to condone, as I said 
earlier, blackmail or the persecution or 
harm of innocent people or kidnapping 
or terrorism. 

So I think that we have a very good 
relationship with the people and the 
governments of the Islamic world, and 
I don't think it's deteriorated in this in- 
stance. In some ways we've been drawn 
closer to these people, because they see 
what has occurred in Iran as something 
of a disgrace for their own religious 
faith, and they don't see this as typical 
of what Moslems believe. 

I might add also that this is not 
typical of the Shiite faith either. It's the 
misguided actions of a few people in 
Iran who are burning with hatred and a 
desire for revenge, completely contrary 
to the teachings of the Moslem faith. 

Q. There's a feeling of hostility 
throughout the country toward Iran 
because of the hostages. Senator 
Long said that the taking of our Em- 
bassy in Iran, in his words, is an act 
of war. There are rumors, since de- 
nied, that our Navy has been called up 
for service. I ask you, as our Com- 
mander in Chief, is war possible? Is 
war thinkable? 

A. It would be a mistake for the 
people of our country to have aroused 
within them hatred toward anyone; not 
against the people of Iran and certainly 
not against Iranians who may be in our 
country as our guests. We certainly do 
not want to be guilty of the same viola- 
tion of human decency and basic human 
principles that have proven so embar- 
rassing to many of the Iranian citizens 
themselves. 

We obviously prefer to see our hos- 
tages protected and released com- 
pletely through peaceful means. And 
that's my deepest commitment, and 
that will be my goal. The United States 
has other options available to it which 
will be considered, depending upon the 
circumstances. But I think it would not 
be well-advised for me to speak of those 
specifically tonight. 



Q. We have had 55,000 Iranian 
students in this country. We've been 
very good to them, very hospitable. 
Even the new Finance Minister of 
Saudi Arabia was a student who once 
demonstrated in Washington against 
law and order. Shouldn't we be very 
careful in letting any of these stu- 
dents come in here? Shouldn't we 
screen them in the future and make 
them agree that they will not demon- 
strate? 

A. It's very difficult for an Iranian 
citizen or a student to get a visa at the 
American Embassy in Iran at this time. 
[Laughter] And I think the influx of 
Iranians to our country now would be 
minimal. 

I'm determined to enforce the law 
about Iranian students. Some of them 
have violated the law; they are now 
being screened, they are being assessed 
in their commitment and the legality of 
their presence here. We have already 
finished this procedure with more than 
22,000. About 17,000 have proven to be 
here completely legally and are, indeed, 
full-time students. Among the other 
5,000, about several hundred have al- 
ready departed. Others are now having 
to prove that, contrary to the earliest 
evidence, they do, indeed, have a right 
to be in our country. If they are here 
illegally, they will be expelled. 

There is one exception to that rule. 
If a citizen of Iran can prove that if he 
or she returned to Iran that they would 
be executed or abused because of their 
political beliefs, they can seek asylum 
here. And if that asylum, in our judg- 
ment, is justified, we will provide it for 
them. But this procedure is going for- 
ward in accordance with American law, 
in accordance with American fairness, 
in accordance with the full principles of 
the U.S. Constitution. 

Q. Can this crisis go on indefi- 
nitely or ought the Ayatollah Kho- 
meini understand that at some point 
the American people may demand and 
other nations may expect that you 
move forward to resolve it by what- 
ever means you find necessary? 

A. It would not be possible or even 
advisable for me to set a deadline about 
when or if I would take certain action in 
the future. This is an ever-present con- 
sideration on my mind. I'm carrying out 
all of the duties that normally fall on a 
President's shoulders, which are 
adequate, but I never forget one mo- 
ment that I'm awake about the hostages 
whose lives and whose safety depend on 
me, and I am pursuing every possible 
avenue to have the hostages released. 



Any excessive threats or any ex- 
cessive belief among the Iranians that 
they will be severely damaged by mili- 
tary action as long as these negotiations 
are proceeding and as long as legalities 
can be followed might cause the death 
of the hostages, which we are com- 
mitted to avoid. So that's one of the 
questions that I cannot answer, to set 
down a certain deadline beyond which 
we would take extra action that might 
result in the harm or the death of the 
hostages. 

We are proceeding, I guarantee 
you, in every possible way, every pos- 
sible moment, to get the hostages freed 
and at the same time protect the honor 
and the integrity and the basic princi- 
ples of our country. That's all I can do. 
But I'm doing it to the best of my abil- 
ity, and I believe we will be successful. 

Q. Many Americans view the Ira- 
nian situation as one in a succession 
of events that proves that this coun- 
try's power is declining. How can you 
assure Americans tonight that our 
power is not declining abroad, and 
how are you reassessing priorities for 
the 1980s in terms of foreign policy? 

A. The United States has neither 
the ability nor the will to dominate the 
world, to interfere in the internal af- 
fairs of other nations, to impose our will 
on other people whom we desire to be 
free, to make their own decisions. This 
is not part of the commitment of the 
United States. 

Our country is the strongest on 
Earth. We're the strongest militarily, 
politically, economically, and I think 
we're the strongest morally and ethi- 
cally. Our country has made great 
strides even since I've been in office. 
I've tried to correct some of the defects 
that did exist. We have strengthened 
the military alliances of our country, for 
instance. NATO now has a new spirit, a 
new confidence, a new cohesion, im- 
proving its military capabilities, much 
more able to withstand any threat from 
the East — from the Soviet Union or the 
Warsaw Pact — than it was before. 

We've espoused again the princi- 
ples that unite Americans and make us 
admired throughout the world, raising 
the banner of human rights. We're 
going to keep it high. We have opened 
up avenues of communication, under- 
standing, trade with people that for- 
merly were our enemies or excluded 
us — several nations in Africa, the vast 
people and the vast country of the 
People's Republic of China. 






January 1980 



CANADA 



In doing so we've not alienated any 
of our previous friends. I think our 
country is strong within itself. There is 
not an embarrassment now about our 
government which did exist in a few in- 
stances in years gone by. So I don't see 
at all that our country has become 
weak. We are strong and we are get- 
ting stronger, not weaker. 

But if anybody thinks that we can 
dominate other people with our 
strength — military or political strength 
or economic strength — they are wrong. 
That's not the purpose of our country. 

Our inner strength, our confidence 
in ourselves, I think, is completely 
adequate. And I believe the unity that 
the American people have shown in this 
instance, their patience, is not at all a 
sign of weakness. It is a sign of sure 
strength. 

Q. Serious charges have been 
placed against the Shah concerning 
the repression of his own people and 
the misappropriation of his nation's 
funds. Is there an appropriate vehicle 
to investigate those charges, and do 
you foresee a time when you would 
direct your Administration to assist 
in that investigation? 

A. I don't know of any international 
forum within which charges have ever 
been brought against a deposed leader 
who has left his country. There have 
been instances of changing govern- 
ments down through the centuries in 
history, and I don't know of any in- 
stance where such a leader who left his 
country after his government fell has 
been tried in an international court or 
in an international forum. This is a mat- 
ter that can be pursued. It should be 
pursued under international law, and if 
there is a claim against the Shah's fi- 
nancial holdings, there is nothing to 
prevent other parties from going into 
the courts in accordance with the law of 
a nation or internationally and seeking a 
redress of grievances which they claim. 

But as I said earlier, I don't think 
there's any forum that will listen to the 
Iranians make any sort of claim, jus- 
tified or not, as long as they hold 
against their will and abuse the hos- 
tages in complete contravention to 
every international law and every pre- 
cept or every commitment or principle 
of humankind. ■ 

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Dec. 3, 1979. 

For other documentation pertaining 
to the situation in Iran, see p. 37. For 
Ambassador McHenry's statements 
and the text of the Security Council 
resolution, see p. 49. 



Report on the Transport of Air Pollutants 



The Department of State on Oc- 
tober 15, 1979, announced the release of 
the first annual report of the U.S.- 
Canada Research Consultation Group 
on the long-range transport of air pol- 
lutants. 1 The release was simultane- 
ously announced in Ottawa by the 
Canadian Department of External 
Affairs. 

In recognition of its increasing sig- 
nificance, the two governments re- 
quested the group to provide them with 
a clear and concise statement of the na- 
ture of the pollutants problem, as well 
as of its impact on the environment of 
eastern North America. Such a report 
was to provide a synthesis of existing 
scientific information which would 
make it accessible and understandable 
to the nonspecialist community of in- 
terested persons. It was also recog- 
nized that such a report would be of as- 
sistance in the ongoing discussions on 
transboundary air quality. 

Research programs in both coun- 
tries are at an early stage and have 
benefitted from the coordinating efforts 
of the group. The data in the report and 
the conclusions which it advances are of 
a preliminary nature. The governments 
are providing this information to the 
public to encourage discussion of this 
important bilateral environmental 
issue. Further reports from the Re- 
search Consultation Group are expected 
in the future. 

The bilateral Research Consulta- 
tion Group was formed in October 1978 
through an exchange of letters between 
the Embassy of Canada and the U.S. 
Department of State. The group is to 
consult on ongoing research efforts in 
Canada and the United States and to 
facilitate a full exchange of technical 
information on the long-range transport 
of air pollutants. Among the respon- 
sibilities of the group are: 

1. Analysis of currently instituted 
programs and those under development 
to determine where gaps may exist in 
the information base relating to the oc- 
currence and effects of long-range 
transport of air pollutants; 

2. Promotion of measures neces- 
sary to insure the intercomparability of 
data generated by programs in both 
countries; 

3. Promotion of the dissemination 
of appropriate data and research infor- 
mation; 

4. Tendering advice and recom- 
mendations to the appropriate agencies 
in the two governments with respect to 



modification of existing research pro- 
grams and/or development of new re- 
search programs; and 

5. Preparation of a yearly status 
report to both governments and other 
reports as deemed necessary. 

The group is cochaired by a repre- 
sentative of Environment Canada and 
of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency and is comprised of representa- 
tives of a number of Canadian and U.S. 
agencies with research interests related 
to pollutants. The group has had two 
plenary meetings since its formation, as 
well as frequent contact between re- 
searchers in particular specialties. ■ 

Press release 264. 

1 Copies of the report may be obtained 
from Mr. Conrad Kleveno, Environmental 
Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 
20460. 



Department of State Bulletin 



EAST ASIA 



Mrs. Carter Visits Thailand 



At the request of the President, 
Mrs. Rosalyrui Carte)- visited Thailand 
November 7-10, 1979, to observe first 
hand the plight of refugees there, par- 
ticularly the conditions of Kampuchean 
refugees. Following are remarks made 
by the President, Reverend Theodore 
M. Hesburgh, Chairman of the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Ref- 
ugee Policy, and Mrs. Carter at a 
White House meeting on relief efforts 
and Mrs. Carter's trip. 1 



PRESIDENT CARTER 

I'm very grateful that all of you 
have come to the White House to talk 
about one of the most important issues 
that faces humanity and will face it in 
our lifetime. It's a rare occasion in 
human memory when there has been a 
possibility of holocaust, threatening to 
destroy an entire race of people. It 
happened, perhaps, in the time of the 
Armenians, earlier in this century, and 
later, of course, among Jews and others 
in the time of Hitler, and now among 
the people of Cambodia, or Kampuchea, 
as it's presently known. 

There also is a rare occasion when 
in the life of a great nation, its govern- 
ment and its people can react in an un- 
selfish, dynamic, and effective way to 
alleviate extraordinary human suffer- 
ing, such as the case, again, with the 
refugees and the starving people of the 
Cambodian region. 

I was very pleased that the three 
Senators, then my wife and Dr. 
Richmond [Julius B. Richmond, Assist- 
ant Secretary for Health and Surgeon 
General, Public Health Service], Mrs. 
Young [Jean Young, Chairperson, U.S. 
Commission on the International Year 
of the Child] and her group, and now a 
group of Congresswomen and others 
have been to that region to dramatize 
the need for action, and also to bring 
back tangible recommendations on how 
the suffering might be alleviated more 
effectively. 

It's a difficult issue to resolve. 
There are major obstacles to overcome: 
obstacles of war, over which we have no 
control in that long-troubled part of the 
world; the issue of diplomatic bridges 
that are very hard to cross; and also, of 
course, the very serious problems in 
administration, in dealing with the 
bureaucratic needs, to derive help from 
those eager to give and actually to de- 
liver it effectively to those who are 
most in need. 



January 1980 



Rosalynn and Senators Danforth, 
Baucus, and Sasser, Dr. Richmond, and 
others have brought back very specific 
recommendations on what might be 
done. 2 I'm not going to try to preempt 
their reports to you. They can make 
their reports much better than can I. 
I'm one of those who is listening, and, 
like you, I am eager to act in accord- 
ance with the best interests of those 
who are crying out for assistance. 

There are three basic areas of re- 
sponse: One is the U.S. Government 
itself — and the Congress has reacted 
very well in approving almost $70 mil- 
lion worth of aid. And I will go to the 
Congress for additional aid if it's neces- 
sary. 

Second is an appeal to private or- 
ganizations, volunteer organizations of 
all kinds, represented by many of you 
here. That's a resource of assistance 
which is eager to be tapped and which 
has already done yeoman's work, even 
before governmental help could be 
effective. 

And the third recommendation is 
concerning international relationships. 
And I would like to caution you about 
that: This is a judgment and a decision 
that we can't make in this room. 
One of the vivid reports that 
Rosalynn brought back to me was that 
quite often a U.S. initiative is counter- 
productive in the eventual carrying out 
of a recommendation. If the initiative 
comes from one of the less developed 
nations of the world or comes directly 
from the United Nations or, perhaps, 
comes from other countries than we, 
it's much more effective. 

So, I would like to urge you to re- 
strain your own inclinations to give 
public condemnation or public advice on 
what the Vietnamese ought to do, what 
the warring parties in Kampuchea 
ought to do, what the United Nations 
ought to do. Let that be handled 
through diplomatic channels. I can as- 
sure you that I will not permit these 
efforts to be abandoned or ignored. But 
I think that the public calling for action 
might be the very thing that would 
prevent that action being carried out. 
That's my only caution to you. 

I have a second one — I forgot. I 
think the more all of us forgo credit for 
action to be taken, the more effective 
the effort will be. There is a great 
yearning, I know, within the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, within the Red Cross, within 
UNICEF, within Catholic Charities, 
within the Protestant churches, within 
benevolent groups, to want to give aid 
and then have that assistance be pub- 



licly acknowledged and recognized. 
That is a human trait, but the more we 
can subjugate those natural, human de- 
sires for quiet giving and close coopera- 
tion with others, with a minimum of 
jealousy and a minimum of grasping for 
recognition, the more effective we'll all 
be. 

I'm sure that's a cautionary word 
that you don't need, because there's an 
overwhelming unselfishness and be- 
nevolent attitude among this group. 
And you've taken the initiative, and 
there's been no evidence of a grasping 
for recognition. But in the future, this 
is going to be a long, slow, tedious 
process, and that needs to be recog- 
nized and avoided. 

The last point I'd like to make is 
this: The Thai people and the Thai Gov- 
ernment both deserve every possible 
recognition, expression of gratitude, 
and thanks. They are a poor country. 
Many of the Thai people suffer terribly 
from poverty, disease, and hunger. It's 
not a popular political thing to bring in 
enormous numbers of refugees from an 
alien and antagonistic country, who's 
been historical enemies on occasion, 
and still not arouse the condemnation of 
the Thais, who themselves suffer. 

This has been a very great demon- 
stration of both kindness and also cour- 
age, political courage. I know that this 
is something that you'll want to help 
with. The Thais are not able to accept 
literally hundreds of thousands of refu- 
gees into their country and feed those 
refugees on their own. We've got to be 
especially generous to the Thais in our 
thanks and in our direct help and the 
recognition of what they are contribut- 
ing. 

I look forward with great eager- 
ness to the summary of your recom- 
mendations. I will be getting it through 
the National Security Council, and 
through my wife, who always has easy 
access to me. And I think that her in- 
volvement is one that can be of help to 
you as well. She'll be working with the 
wives of Senators and other Members 
of Congress, and female Members of 
Congress. She will also be working with 
any of you who want her to help, in 
providing an avenue to the public and 
also an avenue directly to me. 

But I'm very grateful to all of you 
for being willing to come. I think this 
will be one of the most important 
meetings ever taking place in the White 
House. And I'm grateful that I am 
President of people like you. 






East Asia 



REVEREND HESBURGH 

Just short of 3 weeks ago, on Oc- 
tober 24, this same group of leaders 
from our various religious faiths and 
from the various private voluntary or- 
ganizations met in Washington to dis- 
cuss what we might do together and in 
concert to meet the tragedy in Cam- 
bodia. The purpose was to consult how 
the American people, how the Ameri- 
can Government, and how the United 
Nations might best respond to avoid 
what appeared to be a growing 
holocaust, already half accomplished, if 
you will. 

We called on the voluntary agen- 
cies, first of all, to increase their efforts 
and to work together to help the Cam- 
bodians. We urged Americans to pro- 
vide them all with financial support, 
and in a special letter to the President 
we urged greater U.S. Government ef- 
forts in order to assist, as quickly and 
as effectively as possible, this people in 
great need. 

We met that same day at the White 
House with the President, and never 
was a letter answered more quickly. 3 
Hardly before the letter was in his 
hands, he granted us all of the various 
requests we had for increased aid and 
said he was willing to do whatever else 
might be necessary to do to avert this 
holocaust. 

I think today, in the light of the 
appeal made by United Nations Chil- 
dren's Fund— UNICEF — the Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross, the 
appeals by all of our various voluntary 
agencies for more than $300 million for 
Cambodian relief, and after the gener- 
ous and immediate response of the 
President of the United States voiced 
by our Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, 
at the pledging conference of the 
United States on Monday, November 5, 
when many of you were present, and I 
too, it seemed to us that the time was 
now appropriate to update our October 
24 meeting in an effort to relieve the 
growing misery of the Cambodians. 

It was again against this same 
background as our last meeting that I, 
as chairman of the Overseas Develop- 
ment Council, and cochaired by the 
Reverend Paul McLeary, who is chair- 
man of the American Council on Volun- 
tary Agencies, that we invited this 
group again, on very short notice, to 
this second consultation to exchange 
information on the situation in Thailand 
and Cambodia after other relief is tak- 
ing place there. 

In this second consultation we have 
four things we would like to do: first, to 
find out what the various agencies are 
now doing; second, what they are plan- 



ning to do for the near term future; 
third, what fundraising efforts have 
been undertaken to date; and fourth, 
what are the various bottlenecks and 
needs that we have to move forward 
quickly and efficiently. There is, of 
course, a fifth topic which I'm sure will 
emerge from our discussion with Mrs. 
Carter, and that is how can we improve 
and institutionalize exchange of infor- 
mation among ourselves and coordina- 
tion of the various activities — 
governmental and nongovernmental 
and intergovernmental — here and 
overseas. 

It seems to me that the vigor of the 
pluralistic American response to this 
Cambodian tragedy is most welcome, 
but it does raise for all of us a great 
challenge to work together and, as the 
President just said, to work together 
without seeking praise in so doing. 

I would like to say that the visit to 
Cambodia and Thailand in October by 
Senators Danforth, Sasser, and Baucus, 
who are here with us this morning, on 
my left, your right, and also the various 
Governors and the Congresswomen 
and, most particularly, of our First 
Lady, Mrs. Carter — all of this has 
heightened and increased the con- 
sciousness of Americans for the need of 
all of the generous action we might put 
forward to alleviate this growing 
tragedy. 

May I say, Mrs. Carter, in intro- 
ducing you, that we are looking forward 
to hearing the report from you and your 
colleagues on the situation with respect 
to Cambodian refugees in Thailand, and 
any other recommendations or ques- 
tions you may have of this group, which 
represents, I think, the cream of the 
private voluntary effort. After your 
comments we will be hearing from all of 
these various agencies active in Cam- 
bodia on the questions posed earlier, 
and we are looking forward later in the 
day to discussing our conclusions fur- 
ther with you. 

Mrs. Carter, it's with real pride 
and great satisfaction that I'd like to 
present you. 



MRS. CARTER 

Thank you very much. I'm very 
pleased to have you all here today. I 
welcome you. 

I did go to Cambodia, and I'm very 
happy to have this opportunity to re- 
port to you about my trip, and also to 
thank you for what you have done al- 
ready and for what you continue to do, 



and to work with you on ways that we 
can better help those who are suffering 
in this area of the world. 

As the President has said, I went 
to Thailand on his behalf to express the 
profound concern of the people of our 
country for the tragedy that is unfold- 
ing in Indochina. My visit was very 
brief, but I think I can say positively 
that it was one of of the most significant 
events of my life. I came away filled 
with admiration for the representatives 
of your organizations who are there 
struggling with this massive problem of 
relief for thousands and thousands of 
human beings who are starving and 
homeless and ill and bereaved. And I 
came away also, as Jimmy said, filled 
with gratitude for the efforts of the 
people of Thailand and for the Govern- 
ment of Thailand. 

And I'm sure that every person in 
this room knows what faces us in the 
coming weeks. The problem is one that 
is not going away any time soon. We 
will be faced with it for a long time. 
While our international efforts have 
brought vast improvements — and I saw 
in the refugee camp at Sakeo some be- 
ginnings of hope for those few who have 
been brought back from the very edge 
of death. The camp, since the time that 
the Senators were there, has really 
made progress; in fact, some people 
told us that a miracle had happened in 
the last few weeks. The camp is only 
about 3 weeks old, but people are being 
fed and are being taken care of in that 
camp now. You will have a further re- 
port on that from some of those who 
went with me. 

But the picture in the near future 
looks very bleak, because a wave of 
new refugees is expected to come 
across the border into Thailand from 
Kampuchea — a number estimated any- 
where from 100,000 to 250,000, maybe 
300,000 — that are now right at the bor- 
der, that are expected to come now that 
the dry season is here and the fighting 
has begun again. They will be pushed 
over into Thailand. 

And for those of us who have seen 
with our own eyes the dimension of the 
problem and the terrible suffering and 
starvation, the thought of so many 
more people in the same situation who 
will be coming into Thailand is almost 
more than you can bear, when you are 
there and look at it. 

I'd like to tell you briefly about my 
trip. I was accompanied by some of 
those here that are here at that head 
table, who will be reporting to you also. 
Some of us worked together; some of us 
dispersed so that we could gather more 
information, because we were only 
there for a few hours, a day, 2 days. 



Department of State Bulletin 



East Asia 



We went to the refugee camps in 
Thailand, Kampuchea, that I have al- 
ready talked about, Sakeo. We wit- 
nessed the disease, the dislocation of 
persons, suffering, starvation. We saw 
many, young and old. We saw children 
separated from their parents, afflicted 
with malaria and malnutrition. 

In the camp at Ubon, for refugees 
from Laos, conditions were substan- 
tially better. There are approximately 
37,000 persons there. That camp is 4 or 
5 years old. They eat well, but they 
don't go out of the camp. They have 
been there, some for 3 or 4 years, 
waiting to resettle abroad. And al- 
though the living conditions are so 
much better than Sakeo, they are still 
not anything that you would call good. 

It is sad to see them with no pur- 
pose. They at first thought they might 
go back into Laos. Now they know they 
won't, or don't want to. And they're 
waiting to be resettled, some of them 
feeling that they've been forgotten by 
the world, because the focus has been 
on the Kampucheans, the focus has 
been on the boat people. And these 
people really feel forgotten. I was 
touched by them. And one of the girls 
that worked with me said that one of 
the main problems they have with these 
people is mental depression, just 
existing day to day for 4 or 5 years, 
waiting to see what happens to them. 

At the transit center, the refugee 
transit center in Bangkok, we saw 
overcrowded and humiliating conditions 
which refugees awaiting final process- 
ing for immigration must endure. These 
were things that I don't think I'll ever 
forget. These were people who have al- 
ready been chosen to go to other coun- 
tries and have to wait in an unbelieva- 
ble place, some for a month and a half 
or 2 months. We try to process ours, 
the ones that are coming to the United 
States, much earlier, but still the condi- 
tions are unbearable. 

While we were there in Bangkok, 
we had candid discussions with repre- 
sentatives of the international volun- 
teer organizations to discuss their 
goals, their frustrations, and the need 
for better coordination. We did have a 
very good meeting, and everybody, I 
think, vented their frustrations, and 
everybody decided that there was a 
great need for coordination. 

We met with the King and Queen of 
Thailand to discuss the whole spectrum 
of the refugee problem and the need for 
further sites, because we must have 
further sites for this 200,000-300,000 
that are expected to come into Thailand 



from Cambodia — and they're expected 
to come in in the next 3 or 4 weeks. The 
situation is urgent. 

We had a long discussion with 
Prime Minister Kriangsak, a fruitful 
discussion, about the political and 
foreign policy risks that are facing the 
Thai Government because of their 
policies. It is important that the inter- 
national community provide visible and 
demonstrable political, economic, and 
security support to the Thais. 

As we flew back to Washington, we 
got together on the airplane and 
worked on our report for the President, 
which stresses the urgency of the situa- 
tion, and we did lay out some specific 
recommendations. We will give you 
that report this morning. In fact, you 
have in your brochure a folder with our 
recommendations in it. 

We need your careful consideration 
of our recommendations. We need your 
creative ideas for how to implement 
them, your support, and your consen- 
sus. I do not know when I have ever 
felt a sense of urgency more about cut- 
ting redtape and unblocking logjams 
and moving ahead. 

I think I can say with some assur- 
ance that the American people are 
ready to help. They are already 
mobilizing help as you here indicate, 
and as I have seen and heard through 
my mail and telephone calls and with 
people in the whole country concerned 
about this problem. But they need to 
know how to help, and they need to 
know now. They need to know where to 
turn; they need to know that now. They 
need to know what is needed, and it's 
our responsibility to give the people of 
our country specific information about 
ways they can reach out to their fellow 
man. We cannot lose time. Time is — the 
situation is urgent. 

I understand that most of you who 
are here have prepared briefing papers 
about your programs and your prob- 
lems. I know that you will be address- 
ing yourselves to this issue throughout 
the day, and I look forward to being 
with you again at the end of the after- 
noon so that I can have a report for the 
things that you talk about during the 
day. 

But now I want to call on the mem- 
bers of my traveling party, who've 
brought back new information which 
might be helpful to you. Then I would 
like to share — after we get through 
with the reports we will look at the rec- 



ommendations, and I can tell you then 
some of the steps that we are already 
taking to implement some of these rec- 
ommendations. ■ 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979. 

2 For text of the Senators' report, see 
Bulletin of Dec. 1979, p. 4. 

3 For text of the President's an- 
nouncement on Oct. 24, see Bulletin of 
Dec. 1979, p. 7. 



Pacific Basin 



by David D. Newsom 

Excerpts from an address before 
the Pacific Basin Economic Council in 
Los Angeles on May 15, 1979. Ambas- 
sador Newsom is Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs. The full text of this 
address may be obtained from, the Pub- 
lic Information Service, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 1 

"... the Pacific Basin [is] a part of 
the world where, for the United States, 
at least, the positive elements out- 
number the negative. In this area, an- 
cient protagonists appear prepared to 
talk to each other — with mediators. 
Clearly, regional cooperation is more 
than a slogan. The problem in many 
countries of the region is not how to 
stimulate growth but how to control it 
and direct it. 

"[Normalization of relations with 
the People's Republic of China] is of 
major significance not only for our two 
countries but for the longer term peace 
and stability of Asia. Already we are 
well into a large agenda of trade, legal, 
and cultural discussions with the 
Chinese. Of equal importance, we are 
moving into a better understanding of 
others' points of view on global issues. 

"In the satisfaction of our renewed 
communication with China, we should 
not forget that we continue to be two 
nations quite different in character and 
with often different perceptions of 
events in Asia and around the world. 
We should not be surprised if occasional 
problems and disappointments arise. 

"We have rough spots in our rela- 
tions with Japan but almost exclusively 
in the economic field. . . . We are both 
mindful that the United States and 
Japan are now the world's two largest 
non-Communist economies. . . . Con- 
sidering the breadth of economic con- 
tacts and some basic differences in the 
way the two economies work, it is not 



January 1980 



East Asia 



unnatural that we should have prob- 
lems." 

"The Soviet Union, after the col- 
lapse of its major effort in Indonesia in 
the 1960s, had relatively little impact 
on Southeast Asia. The active Soviet 
support for the Vietnamese invasion of 
Kampuchea threatens to change that. 
Soviet naval vessels have called at 
Vietnamese ports. A Soviet airlift has 
brought extensive supplies to Vietnam. 
The possibility of greater use by Soviet 
air and naval forces of facilities in Viet- 
nam would be disturbing, not only to us 
but to the Japanese and other nations in 
the area concerned both about the secu- 
rity of sealanes and about preventing 
major power confrontation in Asia."B 

1 Press release 132. 



World Efforts To Aid Kampucheans 

International Appeal — launched Nov. 5, 1979, at U.N. pledging conference 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)-UNICEF 

Relief for 2.5 million Khmer in Kampuchea for 1 year 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

Relief for Khmer fleeing to Thailand for 8 months 

Estimated Pledges 



$251,000,000 

$60,000,000 
$311,000,000 
$210,000,000 



ICRC-UNICEF 

From mid-October to November 22, ICRC-UNICEF operated a daily airlift from 
Bangkok to Phnom Penh and received additional flights which brought in 886 metric tons 
(MT) of relief supplies. By November 18, ICRC-UNICEF, working through the World 
Food Program (WFP), landed food supplies at Kompong Som port, which, combined with 
Oxfam shipments, totaled 10,030 MT. Phnom Penh authorities agreed November 4 to open 
the Mekong River to relief supplies. An Oxfam barge and a French barge, He de Lumi- 
nere, were able to land 2,510 MT at Phnom Penh via the Mekong route. ICRC-UNICEF 
projects it will reach a monthly goal of 34,500 MT of food supplies during January 1980. 
Relief efforts are particularly impeded by political restrictions on the radius of distribu- 
tion and quantity of relief agency personnel. Further, ICRC-UNICEF advises that de- 
spite pledges made at the U.N. conference, a critical need for cash funding for the relief 
effort now exists. 



U.N. Response 

Currently estimated U.S. contribution 

$ 925,000 

25,000,000 

5,000,000 

15,000,000 

30,000,000 

30,000,000 

Total 



(FY 1979 funds) 

(PL 480 food commodities) 

(cash grant to ICRC-UNICEF) 

(UNHCR for Khmer in Thailand) 

(new funds) 1 

(reprograming authority) 



$105,925,000 

As of late November, the U.S. Government had expended $20,257,830 and had either 
shipped or is in the process of preparing $25,000,000 worth of PL 480 commodities in 
response to WFP requests. Detailed breakdown follows: 



Date 

10/79 
11/13 



Amount To/For 
Kampuchea $5,000,000 ICRC-UNICEF for start-up costs 
2,000,000 UNICEF for rice purchases 
25,000,000 WFP request for PL 480 commodities. Ac- 
tivity to date: 

Kampuchea — U.S. Department of Ag- 
riculture purchases 10,000 MT rice; 2,500 MT 
en route, remainder arrives late December; 
3,781 MT nonfat dry milk (NFDM) to arrive 
December; 1,000 MT vegetable oil to arrive 
December. 
Thailand^5 MT instant corn-soya-milk (ICSM) 
arrived Bangkok 11/12; 2,000 MT corn-soya- 
milk to arrive December; 1,000 MT vegetable 
oil; 1,000 MT NFDM-2 shipments arriving 
November/December. 
Thailand $ 300,000* ICRC grant for border feeding 

625,000* Catholic Relief Services, border feeding 
9,000,000 UNHCR for care and maintenance of Khmer 
100,000 Thai Red Cross, donation by Mrs. Carter 
450,000 UNHCR for 800 tents 
290,000 WFP grant for leasing trucks 

2,500 WFP grant to pay for engineer 
500,000 Catholic Relief Services, border feeding 
407, 830 3 Special airlift medical/relief supplies per Presi- 
dent's 11/13 decision; arrived Bangkok 11/20 
168,000 Air transport cost for 11/12 airlift of ICSM to 

Bangkok 
27,000 ICRC for two field labs 
250,000 U.S. Embassy Bangkok for emergency 
funds for Khmer relief 
95,000 UNHCR for communications equipment 
512,500 WFP for food processing 

20,000 Medical survey team for Khmer camps in Thailand 
600, OOP 3 Airlift cost for cranes — UNICEF 
Total $45,347,830 



Press release 312, Nov. 30, 1979. l Not yet appropriated. 2 FY 1979 funds. 3 Estimated 
cost. 



6/79 
6/79 
11/20 
11/11 
10/79 
11/79 
11/79 
10/79 



11/19 
11/20 

11/79 
11/28 
11/79 
11/28 



Department of State Bulletin 






East Asia 



U.S.-China Trade 
Agreement 

by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Trade of the Senate 
Finance Committee on November 15, 
1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Sec- 
retary of State. 1 

I am pleased to have this opportu- 
nity to testify on behalf of the Agree- 
ment on Trade Relations that we signed 
with the People's Republic of China 
July 7 and which the President trans- 
mitted to the Congress for approval Oc- 
tober 23. 2 

The establishment of diplomatic 
relations January 1 opened a new era 
for U.S.-China relations, based on 
equality, mutual interest, and respect. 
Diplomatic recognition alone, however, 
does not automatically insure the de- 
velopment of a normal and mutually 
beneficial relationship. Thus our task is 
clear: to build a new relationship in 
tangible and practical ways. 

Barriers to trade pose one hin- 
drance to a fruitful relationship with 
the P.R.C. The trade agreement you 
have before you, by reducing these bar- 
riers and creating incentives to trade, 
will go a long way toward cementing 
the bonds between China and the 
United States. Nondiscriminatory 
treatment, credits, insurance, a favora- 
ble investment climate, and business 
facilitation are the lifeblood of trade. 
Without them, trade with China would 
wither. With them, we can forge the 
stable and constructive ties with China 
that we seek and that will guide us into 
the 1980's and beyond. 

Our new ties with China are of fun- 
damental importance to the United 
States and to the prospects for a 
peaceful and prosperous world. We 
want to encourage China to play a con- 
structive and stabilizing role in Asia. 
We want to see a prosperous China, a 
China that can feed and fuel itself. 

Every long-term global problem — 
economic development, population, 
food, natural resources, or the envi- 
ronment, to cite just a few examples — 
can benefit from positive contributions 
from both China and the United States. 
The trade agreement not only sym- 
bolizes our mutuality of interest in pro- 
moting closer ties but also our support 
for a modern China, secure and out- 
wardlooking, which will be part of the 
solution to such problems. 



Failure to approve this agreement 
would, unfortunately, be viewed as a 
sign that the United States is not in- 
terested in moving toward such a con- 
structive, mutually beneficial relation- 
ship with the Chinese. It is in our 
interest for China's next generation of 
leaders to look back in 1990 upon the 
relationship we are now building with a 
sense of satisfaction and to view the 
United States as a reliable partner in 
development. 

The First Year 

Beginning with the January visit 
here by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 
we began building the framework of our 
new relationship. We signed agree- 
ments in science and technology, cul- 
tural, and consular affairs. 

In March former [Treasury] Sec- 
retary Blumenthal initialed a claims- 
assets agreement which removed a sig- 
nificant obstacle to the development of 
economic and commercial relations be- 
tween the United States and China. We 
also established a joint economic com- 
mittee with China to help coordinate 
the development of our economic ac- 
tivities. This committee will hold its 
first meeting early next year under 
Treasury Secretary G. William Miller. 

In May Secretary [of Commerce 
Juanita] Kreps signed the claims-assets 
agreement and initialed the trade 
agreement. During this same period, 
high-ranking Chinese officials visited 
this country at the invitations of the 
Departments of Energy and Commerce 
in cooperation with private industry. 
And a number of U.S. oil companies 
signed contracts to assist China's 
offshore oil development. 

In August Vice President Mondale 
capped this extraordinary period by 
signing a hydropower and water con- 
servation agreement, by opening the 
first U.S. Consulate General on the 
Chinese mainland in 30 years, and by 
stating our readiness to extend Exim- 
bank credits and Overseas Private In- 
vestment Corporation guarantees to 
China, as well as giving a boost to 
bilateral civil aviation and maritime 
discussions. 

Clearly, we have come far in the 
past year in developing our ties with 
China. Until this agreement is ap- 
proved, however, we will remain the 
only major trading partner that does 
not have some form of trade agreement 
with China and that suffers from the 
competitive disadvantage that lack of 
nondiscriminatory treatment of com- 
merce entails. 



Benefits of Trade 

Although small in world terms, our 
trade with China is expanding rapidly 
again this year after more than tripling 
in 1978 to $1.1 billion. Our trade bal- 
ance with China continues to weigh 
heavily in our favor. 

Trade with the West is critical to 
China's modernization. Its imports of 
capital equipment and industrial mate- 
rials are expected to continue increas- 
ing faster than its export earnings. For 
China the trade equation is simple: It 
must sell more in order to buy more. 
Extending most-favored-nation (MFN) 
trading status to China is fundemental 
to this equation. 

Of course, this agreement will 
benefit the United States as well as 
China. The foreign exchange that China 
earns from sales to the United States 
will allow it to purchase more goods 
from us, thereby benefiting U.S. 
exporters, helping our balance of pay- 
ments, and reducing, through competi- 
tion, inflationary pressures. Without 
this agreement, the United States 
penalizes its exporters, who will have 
to face their European and Japanese 
competitors supported by governments 
that have already extended lines of 
credit and MFN to China. In a market 
with limited foreign exchange, this rep- 
resents an appreciable advantage for 
our competition and a disadvantage to 
us. 

I would now like to focus the re- 
mainder of my remarks on the political 
perspective with which this agreement 
should be viewed. 



Political Perspectives 

I know that questions have been 
raised about the implications that sub- 
mission of this agreement may have for 
our policy toward the Soviet Union. I 
want to be clear on this matter. We 
want to improve economic relations 
with both countries. But we do not feel 
that we should make every move with 
one country dependent on making the 
same move at precisely the same time 
with the other. Such a rigid policy 
would fail to recognize relevant differ- 
ences in the factual situation with re- 
spect to the two nations as well as rel- 
evant matters of timing. 

We signed a trade agreement with 
the Soviet Union in 1972. We have not 
yet submitted it to Congress. When we 
do — which I hope will be soon — it will 
be because it is warranted by the fac- 
tual situation, because it is consistent 
with our policy toward the Soviet 
Union, and because the timing is 



January 1980 



East Asia 



right — and not because of our policy 
toward China or some other third coun- 
try. 

In the last 3 years China's eco- 
nomic, political, and cultural policies 
have undergone substantial change. 
There is greater diversity in almost all 
aspects of Chinese life. Economic de- 
centralization, interaction with the 
West, and experimentation with new 
ideas and concepts have been matched 
by an increased openness and a willing- 
ness to admit problems. The Chinese 
leadership publicly has committed itself 
to raising the living standards of the 
people. 

These new developments should be 
kept in perspective. We cannot ignore 
China's long authoritarian tradition, 
but neither should we turn our back on 
what is beginning to happen. It should 
be a source of satisfaction to us that the 
Chinese Government is determined to 
develop a legal system that would pre- 
vent the unchecked exercise of official 
authority. 

China's emigration policies, which 
have undergone substantial change in 
the last 3 years, are of particular im- 
portance to this subcommittee. Under 
the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment, MFN treatment of Com- 
munist nations that restrict emigration 
is prohibited. That prohibition, how- 
ever, may be waived if the President 
concludes and reports to Congress that 
the amendment's requirements per- 
taining to a country's emigration prac- 
tices have been satisfied. The Trade 
Act vests in the President the respon- 
sibility to determine whether these re- 
quirements have been met. In his re- 
port to the Congress the President set 
forth his conclusion that in the case of 
the P.R.C., these requirements have, 
indeed, been met. 

The President's conclusion was 
based upon an analysis and weighing of 
three factors. These include China's 
current emigration performance, public 
statements by Chinese officials, and our 
confidential diplomatic discussions with 
Chinese officials. 

On the first element, emigration 
from China has increased dramatically 
over the past 2 years. In 1978, 71,000 
persons emigrated from Hong Kong, 
the major exit point from the P.R.C. 
This figure is three times the number 
who emigrated in 1977. This trend con- 
tinued in 1979 with 28,000 emigrants 
entering Hong Kong in the first 3 
months alone. The number has slowed 
somewhat since April due primarily to 
protests by the Hong Kong Govern- 
ment. Nevertheless, 4,000-5,000 emig- 
rants continue to enter Hong Kong each 
month. 



The U.S. Consulate General in 
Hong Kong received over 10,000 appli- 
cations from P.R.C. emigrants between 
November 1978 and April 1979. Chinese 
emigrants and visa applicants now far 
exceed the available immigrant visa 
numbers chargeable to China. There- 
fore, several thousand have been ob- 
liged to wait in China and in Hong Kong 
until visa numbers become available. 

That the P.R.C. has liberalized its 
emigration policy is confirmed by public 
statements of Chinese officials. Mr. 
Liao, the Director of the Office of Over- 
seas Chinese Affairs, stated on January 
4, 1978: "We should provide . . . for 
foreign nationals of Chinese descent to 
visit their relatives in China or make a 
tour of the country as well as for 
Chinese citizens to go abroad for re- 
union with their kinfolk of foreign na- 
tionality, simplify the procedure for 
getting permission to enter or leave 
China, give warm reception to those 
entering China, and improve our serv- 
ice." China has followed this theme 
consistently since this instruction was 
issued. 

Mr. Liao elaborated on this policy 
in December 1978 when he stated that 
Chinese who had received visas from 
other countries should be granted exit 
permits "immediately." During his visit 
to the United States in January 1979, 
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping reiterated 
this policy publicly before the U.S.- 
China People's Friendship Association. 
Adding weight to the Vice Premier's 
remarks, the consular agreement con- 
cluded during his visit contains a com- 
mitment by China "... to facilitate the 
reunion of families and [to] process all 
applications as quickly as possi- 
ble .. . ." 

On the final element, U.S. and 
Chinese officials conducted confidential 
conversations in which the Trade Act's 
emigration requirements and Chinese 
emigration policy came to be mutually 
understood. The conversations indicate 
that the P.R.C. is liberalizing its emi- 
gration rules and intends to continue 
this policy. 

We have examined China's emigra- 
tion record, we have studied the public 
statements made by their officials, and 
we have had discussions with the 
Chinese on their emigration policy. 
Based upon all of these factors, we are 
confident, as the President has re- 
ported, that the requirements of Sec- 
tion 402 of the Trade Act have been 
satisfied. 



In closing, I seek your support and 
urge that you give this agreement 
speedy approval. We are now building 
the structure of our relationship with 
China for the 1980's. This relationship 
is and will continue to be very impor- 
tant to us. Your approval of this trade 
agreement is a critical step in the proc- 
ess. I am confident of your support. ■ 

'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 For texts of the agreement and the 
President's message to the Congress, see 
Bulletin of Dec. 1979, p. 33. 



Agreements With 
Taiwan 

by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on November 16, 1979. Mr. Christo- 
pher is Deputy Secretary of State. 1 

I am pleased to appear today before 
the committee to review our experience 
with the unofficial arrangements that 
we have established with Taiwan. 

For years the United States, alone 
among the major nations of the world, 
refused to accord recognition to the 
People's Republic of China (P.R.C). 
This anomaly hindered our diplomacy in 
Asia and thwarted the development of 
economic relations with a country that 
is the home of one-fourth of the world's 
population. 

Following 6 months of intense dis- 
cussions both here and in Beijing, 
President Carter announced almost a 
year ago that the United States would 
henceforth recognize the P.R.C. as the 
sole legitimate Government of China. 
At the same time the President an- 
nounced our intention to sever official 
relations with Taiwan. 

The development of our relations 
with the P.R.C. over the past year 
stands as testimony to the wisdom of 
the President's decision. As this com- 
mittee is aware, the Administration has 
recently submitted to the Congress the 
Agreement on Trade Relations that 
would extend most-favored-nation non- 
discriminatory trade status to the 
P.R.C. 2 

While our improved relations with 
China have been gratifying, I am 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



East Asia 



equally pleased by the fact that the 
severing of our diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan has not adversely affected 
the welfare of the people nor has it 
breached the practical ties that exist 
between Taiwan and the United States. 

Taiwan's economy today is even 
more vigorous than it was before we 
normalized relations with the P.R.C. 
Taiwan's GNP is growing robustly, and 
industrial production is increasing at 
9% per year. Projected U.S. -Taiwan 
trade for 1979 is $10 billion compared 
with $7.5 billion in 1978. This repre- 
sents an increase of 33%. U.S. private 
investment in Taiwan, a very good indi- 
cator of confidence in the island's fu- 
ture, was $68.7 million in the first half 
of this year compared with $27.1 million 
during the same period in 1978 — a 
striking increase. 

AIT and CCNAA 

I do not mean to suggest that the 
transition from official to unofficial re- 
lations has been problem free. But the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the basis for our 
new relations, has afforded us the 
flexibility to deal with problems co- 
operatively and imaginatively. In par- 
ticular, the unofficial instrumentalities 
of our new relationship — the American 
Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the 
Coordination Council for North Ameri- 
can Affairs (CCNAA) — have proved 
their effectiveness during the transi- 
tion. 

In accordance with the Taiwan 
Relations Act, the President issued an 
Executive order that, among other 
things, delegates to the Secretary of 
State the authority to extend functional 
privileges and immunities on a recip- 
rocal basis to the CCNAA. 

AIT provided CCNAA a copy of a 
draft agreement on privileges and im- 
munities on September 20, 1979, to 
which CCNAA has responded. Differ- 
ences are minimal, and agreement be- 
tween the parties should soon result. In 
the meantime, the two sides have ex- 
tended functional privileges to allow for 
effective operations of the two organi- 
zations. To conduct its affairs, the 
CCNAA has opened nine offices in our 
country — a number that is appropriate 
for our new relationship with Taiwan. 

Although our unofficial relations 
with Taiwan are coordinated through 
the AIT, we have recognized that is- 
sues could arise which are beyond the 
technical competence of the AIT. We 
have made it clear that, to the extent 
necessary and appropriate, we would 
arrange for technical contacts with 



U.S. Government employees through 
AIT. Such instances have, in fact, 
arisen, and the appropriate contacts 
have been arranged. 

I would now like to address for the 
record some of the issues regarding 
agreements in an attempt to clarify the 
Administration's intentions and, I hope, 
to dispel any misunderstandings. 

Existing Agreements 

When we normalized our relations 
with the P.R.C, we made crystal clear 
our intention to maintain, on an unoffi- 
cial basis, trade, cultural, and other 
relations with Taiwan. We believed it 
essential that our existing agreements 
with Taiwan would continue to have 
legal validity, despite the withdrawal of 
recognition. The President, therefore, 
issued a presidential memorandum on 
December 30, 1978, which stated that: 
"Existing international agreements and 
arrangements in force between the 
United States and Taiwan shall con- 
tinue in force . . . ." 3 The Administra- 
tion welcomed the addition of Section 
4(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which 
approved the continuation in force of 
such agreements "... unless and until 
terminated in accordance with 
law . . .," because that provision fur- 
ther removed any doubt about their 
continuing validity. This treatment of 
existing agreements by the Administra- 
tion and Congress stands in contrast to 
that of most other nations which abro- 
gated their agreements with Taiwan 
upon recognizing the P.R.C. 

Our relationship with Taiwan is not 
static. It has not been frozen in the 
status quo that existed at the moment 
we recognized the P.R.C. Some of our 
agreements with Taiwan will expire, 
perhaps calling for replacement with 
new agreements; some will require 
changes or updating; and others, having 
completed their purposes, will become 
obsolete. However, I want to em- 
phasize that we do not have a policy to 
convert or terminate all of the treaties 
and agreements we maintain with 
Taiwan. Each agreement, as the cir- 
cumstances require, will be considered 
on its own merits, on a case-by-case 
basis. 

In that context, we have 
undertaken a review of these agree- 
ments with Taiwan and I will share 
with you our preliminary views on 
them. There are five agreements that 
require current attention. 

Scientific Cooperation. First, our 
agreement on r ^ientific cooperation, 
which both sides have found beneficial, 
expires in January 1980. Negotiations 
for a new agreement will soon begin be- 



tween the AIT and CCNAA. Under the 
Taiwan Relations Act, agreements con- 
cluded by these unofficial instrumen- 
talities have full force and effect under 
U.S. law. 

Air Transport. Second, the air 
transport agreement, concluded in 
Nanjing [Nanking] in 1946, has become 
a hindrance to development of aviation 
relations with the P.R.C. It was only 
after Vice President Mondale, during 
his trip to China in August, informed 
Beijing that we planned to replace the 
Nanjing agreement with a new agree- 
ment between the AIT and the CCNAA 
that the Chinese Government agreed to 
begin negotiations for a U.S. -P.R.C. 
civil aviation agreement. In any event, 
a new basis for air links with Taiwan 
would be useful in improving U.S.- 
Taiwan air services. Negotiations cur- 
rently are underway between AIT and 
CCNAA on a civil air agreement. Good 
progress is being made in the talks and 
we would hope to have a new agree- 
ment soon. 

Textiles. Third, our textile agree- 
ment with Taiwan requires some im- 
plementing modification. These are 
being handled by AIT-CCNAA letters 
of understanding. 

Nuclear Cooperation. Fourth, 
pursuant to the Nuclear Nonprolifera- 
tion Act of 1978, we are reviewing the 
nuclear cooperation agreement. 

Trade. Fifth, on October 24, 
CCNAA and AIT exchanged letters 
implementing multilateral trade 
negotiations-related reductions in tariff 
and nontariff barriers. 

Having mentioned these five 
categories that require action, no other 
agreements appear to require current 
attention. 

Active Programs 

A second group of 29 agreements 
concerns active programs or contains 
provisions of continuing relevance. For 
example, this group contains agree- 
ments on active programs in the fields 
of education, fisheries, investment, 
postal affairs, and the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga- 
tion. 

Two agricultural sales agreements, 
on the other hand, contain provisions of 
continuing relevance. They relate to 
commodities which have previously 
been furnished but for which payment 
is still being received by the United 
States. We see no reason at this time to 
take any action with respect to these 
agreements. 

A third category includes the 
mutual defense treaty and six agree- 
ments in the military field. The Presi- 






January 1980 



11 



East Asia 



dent has given notice that the mutual 
defense treaty will terminate on 
January 1, 1980, and we are committed 
to taking the steps necessary so that 
the termination will occur as scheduled. 
Accordingly, all related military 
agreements will also terminate with 
the mutual defense treaty at the end of 
the year. 

In addition, two nonmilitary 
agreements have been rendered moot 
by normalization. One agreement calls 
for entry-free privileges for consular 
officers, and the other concerns the 
status of the American Embassy lan- 
guage school. We no longer have con- 
sular officers on Taiwan and the Ameri- 
can Embassy school in Taiwan ceased to 
function on February 28. We plan to 
delete these agreements from the 
January 1980 Treaties in Force. 

It is appropriate here to dispel a 
notion that arises from time to time. 
There is no substance to the rumor that 
we are planning an additional 1-year 
moratorium on new arms sales to 
Taiwan. When the mutual defense 
treaty terminates at the end of this 
year, we shall continue to provide 
Taiwan access to selected defensive 
weapons. 

The final group concerns 14 agree- 
ments that appear to be either fully 
executed or inactive. These include five 
agricultural commodities agreements, a 
fully executed agreement for provision 
of nuclear research and training equip- 
ment, and two agreements relating to 
our economic aid program to Taiwan. 
We wish to take more time to review 
these agreements. AIT will discuss 
them with CCNAA to assure that they 
contain no active provisions before de- 
ciding on their disposition. 

After further review and as 
changing circumstances warrant, we 
may want to take further action with 
respect to certain of our agreements. I 
want to assure you that we intend to 
maintain close contact with Congress on 
this subject. We will, of course, notify 
Congress of any agreements concluded 
between the AIT and CCNAA as pro- 
vided in the Taiwan Relations Act. 

Although our new relationship with 
Taiwan has required creativity and 
flexibility on the part of officials on 
both sides, the experience of the past 
year has demonstrated the viability of 
that new relationship. Recognition of 
the P.R.C. has not resulted, as some 
feared, in the interruption of our rela- 
tions with Taiwan. Avoiding a dogmatic 
approach, we have sought to promote 
those ties with Taiwan that are consist- 
ent with diplomatic relations with the 
P.R.C. 



I believe that the evidence 
demonstrates the success of the transi- 
tion. At the same time that U.S. trade 
and investment in Taiwan have in- 
creased dramatically, we have suc- 
cessfully preserved the terms upon 
which we normalized relations with the 
P.R.C. ■ 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 For text of agreement, see Bulletin 
of Dec. 1979, p. 33. 

3 For full text, see Bulletin of Feb. 
1979, p. 24. 



Accounting for MIAs 



by Richard Holbrooke 

Excerpts from a statement before 
the Subcommittee on East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on October 17, 1979. 
Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 1 

I'm pleased to have this opportu- 
nity to appear before the subcommittee 
today to discuss with you the efforts 
this Administration has made through 
the Department of State to obtain an 
accounting of Americans lost in South- 
east Asia. You will recall Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary [for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Robert B.] Oakley's ap- 
pearance before your subcommittee this 
past May, in which he reviewed the re- 
sults of our efforts up to that time. 2 I 
would like to . . . bring you up to date 
on developments since then. 

Vietnam's attitude toward the 
question of an aid commitment and to- 
ward normalization with the United 
States evolved over the summer of 1978 
and officials of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam (S.R.V.) hinted broadly to 
other governments that they were on 
the verge of dropping the precondition. 
We met with the Vietnamese in New 
York for direct discussions on issues of 
mutual concern during the fall of 1978. 
The Vietnamese indicated officially and 
clearly they were no longer demanding 
U.S. aid as a quid pro quo for normali- 
zation. Discussion on missing-in-action 



(MIAs) was also positive, and we ex- 
pected an agreement on normalization 
might emerge before the end of the 
year. However, progress was halted 
due to the emergence in October and 
November of new Vietnamese policies 
toward the region, especially on refu- 
gees and Kampuchea. 

Although progress toward normali- 
zation has been suspended, we have 
continued our efforts to obtain a full 
accounting. 

In February Secretary Vance sent 
a personal message stressing our con- 
tinuing strong interest in obtaining 
Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/ 
MIA issue. 

During May our Embassy in Paris 
reiterated to the Vietnamese Embassy 
there our government's continuing deep 
concern over the fate of those still 
missing in action. The Vietnamese Em- 
bassy said that Hanoi was aware of the 
humanitarian need to make every effort 
in this regard. 

During the refugee meeting in In- 
donesia, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Oakley made the same point in strong 
terms directly to Vu Hoang, the S.R.V. 
official with responsibility for POW/ 
MIA matters. 

In response to a suggestion by you, 
our Embassy in Moscow approached the 
Soviet Government in May to request 
that it impress upon the Vietnamese 
the importance the United States at- 
taches to the MIA issue and urge them 
to provide us the fullest possible ac- 
counting of our missing men. Our Em- 
bassy noted that we had contacted the 
Vietnamese directly on this matter on 
numerous occasions and that our ap- 
proach to the Soviets reflected our de- 
sire to explore every possible avenue to 
resolve the MIA issue. A Department 
of State officer also made a similar ap- 
proach to a Soviet Embassy officer here 
in Washington. The Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Southeast Asia de- 
partment chief, agreed to pass on our 
request to his superiors but indicated 
the "surer" route remained direct con- 
tact with the Vietnamese. 

In June our Joint Casualty Resolu- 
tion Center (JCRC) liaison officer in 
Bangkok again met with his counter- 
part in the Vietnamese Embassy to 
provide further specific information 
which we believed might assist the 
Vietnamese in resolving certain indi- 
vidual cases. In addition, he drew at- 
tention to the continuing, strong 
American public interest in arriving at 
an MIA accounting and in this connec- 
tion cited the National League of 
Families of American Prisoners of War 
and Missing in Southeast Asia. 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



East Asia 



Mr. Oakley reiterated in his meet- 
ings with the Vietnamese in New York 
in June and July the intense interest 
which the Administration, the Con- 
gress, and the American people retain 
in the MIA issue and in obtaining the 
fullest possible accounting of our miss- 
ing men. He noted that the cooperation 
which the Vietnamese had provided 
earlier in helping to provide such an ac- 
counting had had a direct bearing on 
the evolution of our relationship and 
that it was extremely important for 
Vietnam to make good on its promise to 
continue to provide information on 
MIAs. He also urged that your con- 
gressional delegation be given the full- 
est possible cooperation on this matter 
when it visited Hanoi. 

The major recent event on the 
POW-MIA issue was the visit of your 
congressional delegation to Hanoi Au- 
gust 10-12. As you know, Mr. Vu 
Hoang, Chief of Consular Affairs of the 
S.R.V. Foreign Ministry, reviewed the 
work of his committee but stated that 
Vietnam had reduced manpower, funds, 
and material devoted to recovering 
MIA remains. He indicated that 
"periodic" visits by JCRC representa- 
tive Lt. Col. Paul Mather might be pos- 
sible and also agreed to discuss with 
Foreign Minister Thach possible ways 
of approaching the Lao People's Demo- 
cratic Republic to arrange talks on 
MIAs. 

We followed up Vu Hoang's indica- 
tion to you of flexibility on visits by Lt. 
Col. Mather by sending a message in 
mid-August via the S.R.V. liaison offi- 
cer in Bangkok asking for Vietnamese 
views on the timing and scope of such 
visits and expressing the U.S. desire to 
begin them as rapidly as possible. Re- 
ceiving no reply to this message, Em- 
bassy Bangkok raised the issue again 
on September 5, and we sent a followup 
message September 10 reiterating our 
desire to begin such visits at an early 
date and stressing the interest and im- 
portance that the Administration, the 
Congress, and the American people 
place on making demonstrable progress 
in accounting for missing Americans. 

On October 3, an officer of the 
S.R.V. Embassy in Bangkok delivered 
an oral response to our earlier mes- 
sages on the proposed visit by JCRC 
personnel. He stated that a visit by Lt. 
Col. Mather had initially been discussed 
during the August visit of the U.S. 
congressional delegation. Although 
Vietnam was under conditions of war 
and threat of invasion, he said, Hanoi 
had maintained the MIA office and con- 



January 1980 



tinued to devote scarce resources to re- 
solve MIA cases. Hanoi, he claimed, 
had always shown goodwill in this mat- 
ter and has thus far returned the re- 
mains of more than 70 MIAs. With re- 
gard to the visit of Lt. Col. Mather, he 
stated that Hanoi will inform the 
United States later when the time is 
convenient. 

During the discussion which fol- 
lowed, the S.R.V. officer assured us 
that such visits could take place but at 
some unspecified future date. He made 
no attempt to back away from the 
agreement in principle for such visits. 

In response, the U.S. Embassy of- 
ficer stressed: 

• The importance of the MIA issue 
to the United States and to our bilat- 
eral contacts; 

• The disappointment that the 
Congress, particularly the members of 
your delegation, would feel over the 
delay; 

• Our interest in keeping the MIA 
issue separated from other issues on 
which progress is currently not possi- 
ble; 

• Our appreciation of Hanoi's past 
cooperation, and our desire to acceler- 
ate these efforts; and 

• Our belief that resolution of the 
MIA issue is in the interest of the 
S.R.V. as well as the United States. 

The conditions of war and threat of 
invasion that Hanoi cited are real, but 
they are conditions that the S.R.V. has 
brought upon itself by its invasion of 
Kampuchea. And this should not be 
used as an excuse to stall on exchanging 
information on MIAs. We hope that 
progress can resume shortly; we note 
that the Vietnamese position does not 
rule this out. 

We raised the subject of Lt. Col. 
Mather's visit also at the United Na- 
tions with the Vietnamese mission 
there, stressing the importance of the 
issue and our hope for a resumption of 
progress. 

Also at the United Nations, as re- 
quested by this committee, we formally 
transmitted the text of House Concur- 
rent Resolution 10 and Senate Concur- 
rent Resolution 17 to Secretary General 
Waldheim. We are consulting with 
other delegations there to see if there is 
any sentiment for general action. We 
have contacted the International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in New 
York, and they have agreed to consult 
with their headquarters in Geneva to 
determine how they can support this 
resolution. We will also continue to 
work with the U.N. High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with 
the ICRC and other governments which 



have representatives in Vietnam in 
support of our efforts to gain an 
accounting. 

Since your previous hearings on 
this subject, we have also again ex- 
pressed directly to the Lao 
Government — via a letter to the em- 
bassy here and approaches by our em- 
bassy in Vientiane— the continued 
interest of the U.S. Government in 
MIA matters and the importance of 
making progress on accounting for 
MIAs. We noted our approaches to the 
S.R.V. in this regard, recounted Viet- 
namese statements of willingness to be 
forthcoming, and asked if Laos could 
also actively do more to resolve this 
issue. We repeated the standing invita- 
tion for a Lao delegation to visit the 
JCRC in Hawaii and requested that 
they consider a visit to Laos by Lt. Col. 
Paul Mather, or any other group which 
would be mutually satisfactory, in 
order to advance the accounting process 
and increase the exchange of informa- 
tion. Subsequently, as you know, the 
Lao charge met informally September 
26 with a small group of congressmen, 
including many of you, and passed in- 
formation related to the four sets of 
remains the Lao provided last year, 
giving crash site, approximate date, 
and plane type associated with each set. 
On October 4, I met with the acting 
Lao Foreign Minister Khamphai 
Boupha in New York. I expressed our 
appreciation for the information that 
the charge had provided Congress and 
our hope that this would be the first in 
a series of such actions by the Lao Gov- 
ernment. I emphasized the importance 
of this issue to the American people, 
the Congress, and the Administration. 
Our new charge in Laos, Leo J. Moser, 
is talking with Lao officials about this 
matter during his initial calls in Vien- 
tiane and will continue to do so 
throughout his assignment there. 

As you can see from my remarks, 
we have consistently addressed the 
MIA accounting issue in our contacts 
with the Vietnamese and Lao au- 
thorities. There is no doubt that they 
understand its importance to us. We 
will continue to work toward eliciting 
from the Vietnamese and Lao forth- 
coming and satisfactory cooperation in 
accounting for our missing personnel. ■ 

'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 1979, 
p. 39. 



13 



ECONOMICS 



Flexible Exchange Rates After 6 Years' Experience 



by Richard N. Cooper 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council of Philadelphia and the Uni- 
versity of Pennsylvania on October 31, 
1979. Mi-. Cooper is the Under Secre- 
tary for Economic Affairs. 

The title of this conference, 
"Achieving Stability in the Interna- 
tional Monetary System," suggests that 
our hosts may feel that the present in- 
ternational monetary system, with 
flexible exchange rates at its center, is 
not stable. There are also those who 
feel that the flexible exchange rate sys- 
tem has caused a marked deterioration 
in the overall performance of the world 
economy, that exchange rate move- 
ments have been excessive, and that 
flexible rates have not made a major 
contribution to the external adjustment 
process. 

In contrast to this widely held 
view, I want to take this opportunity 
today to indicate my judgment that the 
system of flexible exchange rates works 
reasonably well, that is to say, it has 
made a significant contribution to the 
external adjustment process and, in- 
deed, that it has worked just about as 
one would expect, given the disturb- 
ances the world economy has endured 
the past 3 years. 

Macroeconomic Performance — 
1973-79 

In making this judgement, I have 
tried to abstract from the week-to-week 
exchange market turbulences which we 
have seen at times during the past 6 
years. Let us adopt the perspective of 
looking back on this period from, say, 
1982. Equally important, I have tried to 
avoid confusing the effects of flexible 
rates themselves with our overall eco- 
nomic performance during the period of 
flexible rates. By almost any compara- 
tive measure, our macroeconomic per- 
formance during the period 1973-1979 
was worse than our performance during 
the last several years of the adjustable 
peg system. For example, if we com- 
pare some of the most important meas- 
ures of economic performance of the 
major industrial countries during 
1973-79 to the previous period, we see 
a significant difference: Real economic 
growth was only 60% as fast; unem- 
ployment rates were 50% higher; and 
inflation rates were more than double. 

These developments, however, 
cannot be attributed to the flexible rate 



system. Post hoc does not imply propter 
hoc. To appreciate this, we only need to 
remind ourselves of two other factors 
which affected economic performance 
during the period of flexible rates: the 
quadrupling of world oil prices in 
1973-74 and the further doubling of 
those prices since then, and the tre- 
mendous expansion of international li- 
quidity in 1970-73 associated with the 
breakdown of the fixed exchange rate 
system. These factors have forced us to 
deal simultaneously with high unem- 
ployment and high inflation, a task to 
which our tools of economic manage- 
ment are not well suited. 

Movements in Exchange Rates 

When we look at the entire 6 years 
of flexible exchange rates, we find that 
the broad movement of exchange rates 
has not been surprising; nor has it been 
as great as the newspapers have led us 
to believe. From the viewpoint of 
balance-of-payments adjustment, what 
is important is the movement of each 
country's currency against some aver- 
age of the currencies of its trading 
partners, not its movement against 
another single currency. When the cur- 
rencies of all industrial countries are 
weighted by their importance in U.S. 
trade (which implies, for example, that 
the Canadian dollar is given a weight of 
about one-fifth), the U.S. dollar is vir- 
tually unchanged today from March 
1973, when major currencies were al- 
lowed to float against one another. 

Moreover, the year-to-year move- 
ments during those 6V2 years have been 
relatively modest and have followed a 
pattern which textbook theory would 
lead us to expect: The dollar ap- 
preciated when U.S. economic activity 
increased less rapidly than elsewhere 
(or declined), and the dollar depreciated 
when U.S. economic activity was more 
vigorous than that elsewhere. The ac- 
tual percentage changes in the U.S.- 
trade weighted value of the dollar rela- 
tive to other OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] currencies were as follows: 

March 20, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973, 
+ 1.5 percent; 1974, -1.4 percent; 
1975, +4.9; 1976, +0.7; 1977, -3.5; 
1978, -5.4; 1979 through Oct. 26, 
+3.1; or, for the total period March 
1973 to October 1979, +0.4). 

Neither have the movements in ex- 
change rates been surprising if we 
adopt a perspective across countries. If 
we had forecast accurately in December 



1976, for example, the current account 
imbalances which in fact emerged, we 
would also have forecast quite accu- 
rately the changes in exchange rates 
which have taken place. At least we 
would have forecast accurately the rank 
ordering of exchange rate changes; we 
might have been off on the exact mag- 
nitude, which is a more complicated 
question. 

The Swiss franc is at one extreme. 
It appreciated 34% against the U.S. 
dollar between December 1976 and De- 
cember 1978. But we must also observe 
that by mid-1978 Switzerland had a 
current account surplus equal to 6% of 
its GNP. By any standard, this is an 
enormous surplus, and it is not at all 
surprising under a system of flexible 
exchange rates that the Swiss franc ap- 
preciated sharply relative to other cur- 
rencies. 

Japan's surplus in 1978 was much 
larger in absolute terms, but was 
smaller relative to its economy. As with 
the Swiss franc, it is not surprising that 
the yen increased in value during this 
period. The yen is followed by the Ger- 
man mark and the other European cur- 
rencies that are linked to it. Again, 
there is a clear relationship between 
the value of the mark and Germany's 
current account surplus. 

Even the appreciation of the 
British pound can be readily explained 
in these terms. Recall that in 1976 the 
pound was under severe external pres- 
sure, and Britain ran a large current 
deficit. By 1978 Britain's financial situ- 
ation and the current account had both 
improved substantially and the pound 
appreciated. Comparable developments 
took place in Italy. 

In contrast, the United States 
moved from current account surplus in 
1976 to a very large deficit in 1978, and 
Canada also showed a deterioration. 
Under these circumstances, is it sur- 
prising that the U.S. dollar depreciated 
relative to European currencies and the 
yen and that the Canadian dollar depre- 
ciated relative to the U.S. dollar? The 
rank order of movement in exchange 
rates relative to movements in current 
account positions is almost perfect. 
France is an exception. The French 
franc was especially depressed in late 
1976 by the prospect of a Socialist- 
Communist victory in the French elec- 
tions of March 1977. The election re- 
sults differed from those expected, and 
the French franc recovered accord- 
ingly. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



Economics 



This pattern of observations is 
exactly what we would expect of ex- 
change rates if they are to function as a 
key element in the external adjustment 
process. Deficits lead to depreciation 
and surpluses lead to appreciation. I 
should also note, however, that it is not 
only actual current account balances 
which cause changes in exchange rates. 
When a country's economic policies are 
judged to be inadequate to correct ex- 
pected current account imbalances, an 
expectation about future exchange 
rates is created. As often happens in 
any financial market, these expecta- 
tions about future prices have an effect 
on present prices as well. Long-term 
capital flows must also be entered into 
the calculation. 

If my judgment that the pattern of 
exchange rate changes is what we 
would expect if they are to function as a 
key element in the adjustment process 
seems at variance with the popular im- 
pression of an unstable exchange rate 
system, the difference is due to the fact 
that the financial press exaggerates the 
economic importance of changes in ex- 
change rates by typically reporting the 
widest movements in bilateral rates. 
What is relevant from the point of view 
of the adjustment process is a trade- 
weighted average movement in ex- 
change rates for each country's cur- 
rency. 

As I noted above, these movements 
have been very much less than press 
reports would lead us to believe. For 
example, Germany is Switzerland's 
largest trading partner, so movements 
in the Swiss franc-U.S. dollar rate 
greatly exaggerate the effective move- 
ment of the Swiss franc. Similarly, 
Canada is the largest trading partner of 
the United States, so movements be- 
tween the dollar and the German mark 
do not capture adequately the effective 
movement of the U.S. dollar. 

Trade and Service Flows 

Of course, if movements in ex- 
change rates are to be a key element in 
the adjustment process, trade and 
service flows must respond to these 
movements in exchange rates. I have 
argued that exchange rates moved in 
response to imbalances in goods and 
services. But will trade and service 
flows in turn respond to movements in 
exchange rates? I think the answer is 
affirmative, provided it is clear that we 
are talking about real, rather than 
nominal, exchange rates changes and 
that we are talking about the long-run 
effect rather than the short-run effect. 



Those who take the view that flexible 
exchange rates do not work have mis- 
takenly focused on nominal exchange 
rate changes or have, against all evi- 
dence, expected a quick response in 
current account positions. 

The changes in exchange rates that 
we have observed between major cur- 
rencies have been influenced by differ- 
ential rates of inflation between coun- 
tries. A country's competitive price 
position is, of course, not affected to 
the extent that movements in nominal 
exchange rates only compensate for 
differential movements in price levels. 
The movements in exchange rates we 
have seen in the last 6 years can be only 
partially explained by differential rates 
of inflation among the industrial coun- 
tries. They are, therefore, largely 
"real" and may be presumed to account 
for some part of the shifts in current 
accounts we are now seeing. 

Long-Run vs. Short-Run Effects 

In judging the efficacy of the flexi- 
ble exchange rate system, it is also im- 
portant that we look at the long-run 
effect rather than the short-run effect. 
Formal studies generally show that 
price elasticities of demand in virtually 
all industrial countries are statistically 
significant and reasonably large over 
the long run, defined as 2 years or 
more, but are much smaller in the short 
run. If one looks only at the short-run 
effects of exchange rate changes, it 
would be possible to conclude that the 
adjustment process does not work. In 
the short run, import prices (in domes- 
tic currency) increase more rapidly 
than import volume decreases, result- 
ing in a worsening of a country's trade 
balance. In the long run, however, this 
trend is reversed, producing the J- 
curve effect, and the trade balance im- 
proves. Changes in real income also 
have an important impact, and mac- 
roeconomic policy must be used to 
reinforce changes in exchange rates. 

When we adopt a long-run perspec- 
tive, we find that trade flows seem to 
be responding to the changes in real ex- 
change rates which have taken place. 
The Japanese and German surpluses 
are declining and the American deficit 
is also declining. We now expect that 
the U.S. current account deficit in 1979 
will be under $4 billion, compared with 
about $14 billion in both 1977 and 1978. 
Furthermore, we expect a surplus next 
year of over $5 billion. This is strong, if 
still incomplete, evidence that flexible 
exchange rates have worked well. But 
we need patience for the relevant fac- 
tors to work themselves out. If we are 
not patient, we may well find that we 



cannot function with a system of flexi- 
ble exchange rates, not because it does 
not work in economic terms, but be- 
cause in a world of instant gratification, 
we find the delays psychologically 
intolerable. 



Effects of Domestic Economic 
Policies 

A complete analysis of the flexible 
exchange rate system must also ask 
how the large current account imbal- 
ances arose in the first place. An analy- 
sis of domestic economic policies may 
seem inappropriate for a conference fo- 
cused on the international monetary 
system, but it is an essential part of the 
picture. What we find is that current 
account imbalances were closely related 
to domestic economic policies. Again, 
take the case of Switzerland. 

Switzerland adopted a medium-run 
policy, historically the only case of 
which I am aware, of negative growth. 
From 1974 to 1977, Switzerland's labor 
force fell by about 9%, through the re- 
duction of foreign workers by 25%. 
Since industrial capacity did not shrink 
correspondingly, but domestic demand 
fell, it is not surprising that the export 
surplus grew to enormous (relative) 
proportions. 

In the United States, we had ex- 
perienced a long recession which put 
great strain on the world economy and 
on the international financial system, 
especially in terms of its effects on de- 
veloping countries. By late 1976, the 
world economy was in a very precarious 
situation. Unemployment was high in 
the United States; it was high and ris- 
ing in Europe. Many countries, includ- 
ing some of the large industrialized 
countries as well as many developing 
countries, found themselves with a very 
large burden of external indebtedness. 
Those countries had to engage in eco- 
nomic and financial retrenchment. Yet 
that alone would have aggravated and 
prolonged the world recession, making 
corrective actions in all countries more 
difficult. Under these circumstances, 
for both domestic and foreign policy 
reasons, the United States undertook a 
program of economic expansion to end 
the recession. 



Balanced Expansion 

It would have been desirable for 
the world economic recovery to have 
been led by a balanced expansion in the 
leading industrial economies and most 
notably in the United States, Japan, 
and Germany. These countries all had 



January 1980 



15 



Economics 



excess capacity and relatively strong 
external positions. The London eco- 
nomic summit in May 1977 represented 
an effort to achieve such a coordinated 
expansion by the leading countries, but 
it failed in that respect. The United 
States went ahead anyway. 

Largely as a consequence, the U.S. 
payments position deteriorated relative 
to that of other major countries. It was 
recognized at the time that vigorous 
economic expansion in the United 
States without concomitant expansion 
in other countries would worsen the 
U.S. trade position, and it could have 
been expected that the emerging im- 
balance in turn would lead to the depre- 
ciation of the dollar relative to some 
other currencies. A balanced expansion 
among the leading countries would have 
avoided this. 

Balanced expansion would certainly 
have been preferable to the actual de- 
velopment, but it was apparently unat- 
tainable at the time. Under these cir- 
cumstances, I believe it was desirable 
for the United States to go ahead alone, 
even though that would predictably 
lead to some depreciation of the dollar. 
Not to have done so, in my judgment, 
would have courted far graver dangers 
for the world economy — extreme finan- 
cial difficulties for a number of coun- 
tries and increasing protectionist 
actions in most of the industrialized 
countries. Indeed, the highly successful 
international economic system which 
was so painstakingly established in the 
preceding 25 years was in jeopardy. 
The U.S. external deficit relieved the 
financial pressures on many countries, 
and it also reduced protectionist pres- 
sures abroad. Still, it would have been 
preferable to have had in 1977 the kind 
of concerted action and coordinated ex- 
pansion which was finally achieved in 
1978. Through it, we could have 
avoided the emergence of such great 
imbalances in payments and at least 
some of the consequent turbulence in 
foreign exchange markets. 

Expected Account Imbalances 

I mentioned earlier that changes in 
exchange rates are caused not only by 
emerging current account imbalances 
but also by expected imbalances. I want 
to return briefly to the role of expecta- 
tions before concluding this discussion 
of our experience with flexible ex- 
change rates, because the fragility of 
exchange rate expectations is one of the 
most disturbing features of our experi- 
ence during the last 6 years. As I have 
indicated, the broad direction and mag- 
nitude of exchange rate changes are 
fully explicable by underlying move- 



16 



ments of payments positions. Yet there 
were clearly several occasions — briefly 
in the fall of 1977 and more notably in 
October 1978 — when exchange rates 
moved too far, too rapidly. It is difficult 
to explain the developments in October 
1978 in terms of the underlying eco- 
nomic developments I have been em- 
phasizing. Contrary to what was as- 
serted at the time differential inflation 
rates — actual or reasonably 
expected — can only go a small distance 
toward explaining the exchange rate 
movements during this period. I think, 
therefore, that we have a problem with 
highly fragile, easily moved expecta- 
tions in exchange markets. As a result, 
governments must be prepared to 
intervene heavily as stabilizing 
speculators even in a system of floating 
exchange rates. 

Ten years ago, Federal Reserve 
Governor Henry Wallich divided 
mankind — or at least international fi- 
nancial specialists — into four 
categories: those who advocate fixed 
exchange rates; those who advocate 
freely floating exchange rates; those 
who prefer fixed rates but are nervous 
about it; and those who prefer floating 
rates but are nervous about it. I am a 
nervous floater. We have a floating — or 
flexible — exchange rate system which 
works reasonably well. The experience 
of the last 6 years indicates that ex- 
change rates will change in response to 
external imbalances, that changes in 
relative prices caused by changes in 
real exchange rates have a strong influ- 
ence on the volume of both exports and 
imports, and that, therefore, flexible 
exchange rates can make a significant 
contribution to the external adjustment 
process. We must remember, however, 
in judging the flexible exchange rate 
system that the short-run impact is not 
the same as the long-run impact, that 
exchange rates are not the only deter- 
minant of a country's external balance, 
and that exchange rate changes them- 
selves can be caused by expectations as 
well as by actual economic 
developments. 

For these reasons, we have to be 
patient for the equilibrating results of 
exchange rate changes. From time to 
time, monetary authorities will have to 
intervene heavily in exchange markets 
in order to break bandwagon move- 
ments which develop because of the 
fragility of expectations and the ease 
with which they are moved around. 



The U.S. Dollar 

Now let me turn from the recent 
past to the more distant future. I be- 
lieve that the U.S. dollar will be the 
world's leading currency for a long time 
to come. Very likely, the Japanese yen 
and German mark, and perhaps other 
currencies, will grow in relative impor- 
tance; and diversification out of the 
dollar into other currencies by both 
private and official holders will take 
place. Moreover, the diversification will 
probably not take place smoothly but in 
fits and starts that create periodic tur- 
bulence in exchange markets. Despite 
these developments, the U.S. dollar 
will remain the most important cur- 
rency used internationally. 

I can imagine, however, that by the 
first or second decade of the next cen- 
tury, the international role now played 
by the dollar could be assumed to a 
great extent by a different asset. 
Gradually over the next 30 years; the 
economic dominance of the United 
States will continue to decline, as it has 
done during the past 30 years. The U.S. 
share both of world production and of 
world trade have fallen, (e.g., from 
16% of world exports in 1960 to 10% in 
1978), and they will continue to fall — 
not because the United States is doing 
badly, but because other countries of 
the world are doing well. 

Incomes in many other countries 
will rise relative to incomes in the 
United States. Over time, this will re- 
duce the relative attractiveness of the 
dollar as an international currency. No 
other national currency will offer a 
clearly preferable substitute. We 
should, therefore, begin to explore the 
possibility of developing an effective 
alternative. 

Feasible Alternatives 

These discussions are presently 
centered on the creation of a substitu- 
tion account, whereby dollars and other 
official reserves would be deposited in a 
new account managed by the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) in ex- 
change for assets denominated by spe- 
cial drawing rights. The substitution 
account has two basic purposes. The 
first is to inhibit exchange market dis- 
orders which can be associated with 
periodic switches in assets from one 
currency to another, especially diver- 
sification from dollars to other major 
currencies, and to channel this diver- 
sification outside of exchange markets. 
The second purpose is to enhance the 
role of the special drawing rights and to 
provide an alternative international fi- 
nancial vehicle to those denominated in 
national currencies. 

Department of State Bulletin 






EUROPE 



Conclusion 

Let me close by making four obser- 
vations about the substitution account 
and the longer run evolution of the in- 
ternational monetary system. 

First, it is not a short-run dollar 
support operation. That point can 
perhaps be most effectively emphasized 
by considering a realistic timeframe for 
the substitution account to emerge. 
There must first be an extended period 
of discussion — several differing concep- 
tions of substitution accounts must be 
aired — followed by a period of negotia- 
tion, followed by a period for ratifica- 
tion. An optimistic scenario would not 
yield a substitution account in place 
before 1982. 

Second, consideration of the sub- 
stitution account in the near future will 
stimulate further official discussion of 
the broader aims and character of the 
international monetary system, some- 
thing which has not taken place for- 
mally since 1974. This will be a useful 
contribution even if the substitution ac- 
count itself fails to materialize. 

Third, success in making the spe- 
cial drawing rights an international 
monetary medium would enable the 
United States and other reserve cur- 
rency countries to divorce, or at least 
greatly attenuate, the responsibility of 
managing reserve currencies from the 
responsibilities of sensible national eco- 
nomic policy. 

Fourth, to accomplish this ambi- 
tious result would require, in my 
judgment, that special drawing rights- 
denominated assets be traded exten- 
sively in private markets. And this in 
turn surely has implications for how a 
substitution account aimed at this ulti- 
mate result must be set up. 

In the long meantime, between 
now and a reformed monetary system, 
we must live with what we have; which 
as I suggested earlier is not that bad 
compared with the feasible alterna- 
tives. But living with the present sys- 
tem does require looking beyond to- 
day's headlines and next week's money 
supply figures. ■ 



Identifying U.S. Security Interests in 
U.S.-Soviet Relations 



by Marshall D. Shulman 

Address before the International 
Studies Association at the University 
of Pittsburgh on October 4, 1979. Am- 
bassador Shulman is Special Adviser 
to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs. 

Those of you who work in the field 
of U.S.-Soviet relations know that in 
describing the interrelationship of these 
two countries, one needs to deal not 
only with their foreign policies and the 
domestic determinants of foreign policy 
but with a third element that some- 
times is of paramount importance. That 
third element in the relationship is the 
terrain of international politics on 
which the countries meet and to which 
each of them is reacting. There are 
many aspects of the international politi- 
cal scene that are relevant, but I would 
like to speak of two in particular that 
seem to me to put the stamp on this 
period and to have a determining influ- 
ence on the character of U.S.-Soviet 
relations. 

The first and obvious one is the 
revolutionary development of military 
technology in our times, which has ob- 
viously changed the relationship be- 
tween war and politics and has also 
created the major imperative in foreign 
policy of trying to work our way 
through the minefield of problems and 
conflicts with which we are confronted, 
without its leading to a general nuclear 
war. 

The second aspect of the current 
international political scene is the ex- 
traordinary turbulence and upheaval 
that characterize every part of the 
world. We have come in only two gen- 
erations from the prolonged stability of 
international politics that characterized 
the scene at the opening of World War 
I. We have seen the rapid collapse of 
political institutions, the weakening of 
the European states that had driven 
and dominated international politics, 
and the emergence on the international 
scene of the United States as a major 
world actor together with the Soviet 
Union and China. Also in the recent 
past we have seen the consequences of 
some three decades of rapid, chaotic, 
turbulent decolonization and the trans- 
forming effect this has had and is hav- 
ing on international politics. We have 
also witnessed the effect of upheavals 
within industrial societies, including 
our own, which have resulted in 
weakening the fabric of these societies, 



January 1980 



weakening the traditional sources of 
authority of the state, the family, and 
the church — or perhaps I will have to 
amend that as a result of the visit of the 
Pope. 

But nevertheless, it has clearly 
created a time of disorientation within 
societies. An age of irascibility tends to 
influence the domestic climate for 
foreign policy. In the developing world, 
you see the desperate effort of new na- 
tions to create necessities for the 
people and to face the manifold sources 
of conflict arising out of tribal, reli- 
gious, and ethnic border disputes. And 
most recently you have seen the added 
spurt that has been given to this tur- 
bulence in Africa as a result of the pre- 
cipitous collapse of the Portuguese 
position. 

As these elements enter on the 
scene and these various sources of con- 
flict throw up perturbations to which 
the United States and Soviet Union, 
among other nations, find themselves 
responding — ofttimes without any 
planning or anticipation — these become 
perturbations in the Soviet- American 
relationship. Since we must expect this 
will continue for a long time, it is quite 
likely, in my judgment, that we shall 
not, in the foreseeable future, see any 
substantial easing of the Soviet- 
American relationship. We shall not see 
recreated, I think, in the near term 
what was by many people called de- 
tente as it was thought to exist in 1972. 

Against this background, I turn 
now more directly to the topic of iden- 
tifying U.S. security interest in U.S.- 
Soviet relations. First of all, it is evi- 
dent that what we are talking about is 
predominantly a competitive relation- 
ship between the two countries that 
emerged on the scene to a leading posi- 
tion among nations by reason of their 
resources and by virtue of the fact that 
they are each embarked upon a period 
in which they have had a surge of na- 
tional development. 

A Competitive Relationship 

In seeking to respond to this situa- 
tion, we need to ask ourselves not 
whether to respond but how to respond 
effectively. The first element here is to 
face the fact that a military equilibrium 
is a prerequisite in the relationship. 
There can be no serious questioning of 
this necessity, but there is a question 
about what kind of military equilib- 
rium, and I will return to that point in a 
moment. 



17 



Europe 



The second primary necessity is to 
deal effectively with the kinds of issues 
I have mentioned as thrown up by in- 
ternational political developments. We 
need to respond to them in their local 
terms, i.e., with an awareness of their 
local significance, local politics, local 
cultures, and not purely in the game 
theory projection of the East- West 
encounter. 

One of the vulnerabilities we have, 
I think, in our recent experience is that 
we have not done so in these terms. We 
have been inclined to see these manifold 
problems primarily in their East- West 
context without a sufficient apprecia- 
tion of the local factors. Partly I think 
this is the result of our own insularity 
or lack of knowledge, lack of sensitivity 
and familiarity with the cultures, the 
languages, and histories of the peoples 
who have been only names in an atlas 
one day and then front-page preoccupa- 
tions the next day. 

In putting those two elements to- 
gether, it seems to me they point to our 
interest in finding ways of regulating 
the competitive aspects of this relation- 
ship and of conducting it effectively. 
The United States has an interest in 
regulating the competition and mod- 
erating it so that it does not operate at 
the higher end of the tension scale. It 
seems evident to me — and I should 
think it is beyond dispute — that every 
problem in which we are concerned 
would be more difficult and more 
dangerous if the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. were locked into a high con- 
frontation relationship instead of one of 
moderated tension. 

I would add another general point 
and that is the necessity of recognizing 
that though this is — and we should not 
disguise the fact — primarily a competi- 
tive relationship, it is not without sig- 
nificant elements of overlapping inter- 
est between the two countries. Such an 
interest exists, especially in regard to 
the effort to pass through this period of 
international politics without having it 
lead to a general nuclear war which 
clearly neither the Soviet Union nor the 
United States can rationally desire. 

Finally, a fourth general point — it 
is necessary not only to conduct this 
relationship with an eye toward the 
crisis of the month, the day-to-day 
problems, but also with some sense of 
where we would like to see it go over 5 
years or 10 years, within our capacity 
to influence this. What are our inter- 
ests in the longer term relationship 
with the Soviets? How would we like to 
see the Soviet Union evolve, to the ex- 
tent that we can exercise some influ- 



ence over the process of evolution, both 
in its domestic characteristics and in its 
role in the world? 

This question ought not to be lost 
sight of at a time when the Soviet 
Union clearly is on the threshold of a 
wholesale generational turnover of its 
entire upper structure of leadership. 
This may bring the Soviet Union into a 
period of grave uncertainties — a period 
that is very difficult for us to extrapo- 
late from the past, a period when ele- 
ments among the secondary and ter- 
tiary levels of leadership may become 
ascendant. 

There are many questions that we 
cannot answer about that process. We 
do know something about the ascendant 
generation. We know that, by and 
large, it is better educated than the 
present leadership. We know that it is 
more familiar with the outside world, 
but beyond that it is clearly not 
homogeneous in its view of the world. 
We are not in a position to influence 
choices that will be made, but we are, I 
think, in a position to influence the way 
in which the successor leadership views 
us, whether there is a series of transi- 
tions or something more incisive. We 
can affect the way in which that lead- 
ership examines its options and makes 
its determinations as to how it sees 
Soviet self-interest in the world. We 
have to conduct ourselves now in such a 
way that if there should be, among the 
successor leadership, some behind-the- 
scene appreciation for the Soviet self- 
interest in responsibility and restraint 
in the world, they will not feel that op- 
tion is closed to them by the actions we 
are taking. 

It is necessary for us, I think, to 
hold out what might be called a twin op- 
tion policy to them at all times — that is 
to say, a policy which at the same time 
makes it clear to them what our re- 
sponse would be if they conduct them- 
selves with restraint and responsibility 
and also makes them aware of the 
measures that we would feel it neces- 
sary to take if they do not, or if actions 
on their part have the effect of exacer- 
bating the many sources of conflict. 
This is related, I think, to a problem 
that should be dear to your hearts — 
that of our own self-interest in this 
strengthening of the international 
system. 

Therefore, one of our objectives 
has to be to try to do what we can to 
bring the Soviet Union to the point 
where it sees self-interest in a coopera- 
tive and constructive role in dealing 



with local issues that confront us all and 
in participating in the international sys- 
tem in a way it does not at the present 
time. To some extent the cooperative 
programs that we have developed — the 
dozen or so bilateral areas of coopera- 
tion in agriculture, transportation, 
space, health, in the problems of indus- 
trial societies, etc. — are tokens of that 
future intent. They do not go to the 
centrality of our relationship now. They 
are not likely to influence the conduct 
of the Soviet Union in present prob- 
lems, but they are there as a signal of 
our intent over the long term. 

And now what follows from this? In 
any effort to move in this direction, 
there are clearly impediments on both 
sides to working toward some sensibly 
regulated relationship against the 
background of a frank recognition of 
our differences. 



In the Soviet view there is no 
inconsistency between support 
for what the Soviet Union calls 
"national liberation move- 
ments" and "peaceful coexist- 



ence," or detente. 



Impediments on the Soviet Side 

On the Soviet side, it is evident 
that a major impediment in moving in 
this direction is the Soviet view of what 
coexistence means, what it includes. In 
the Soviet view there is no inconsist- 
ency between support for what the 
Soviet Union calls "national liberation 
movements" and "peaceful coexist- 
ence," or detente. There is no inconsist- 
ency, in their view, in the exploitation 
of local conflict situations in order to 
advance Soviet interests and the de- 
velopment of better relations with the 
United States. There is no inconsist- 
ency, in their view, between their 
arming and transporting of Cuban sol- 
diers to participate in combat in African 
conflicts and their relations with us. 

But to us there is an inconsistency, 
and we have not yet reached the point 
where we are able to work out with the 
Soviet Union anything like a Marquis of 
Queensbury understanding about the 
terms within which we will conduct this 
competition — what the limits will be 
on the flow of weapons into troubled 
areas or on the exacerbation of local 
conflict. 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 






Europe 



To some extent there have been 
tacit understandings that have de- 
veloped. There were such understand- 
ings, for example, at the time when the 
Ogaden conflict was at its height. There 
were communications between the two 
governments in which our respective 
concerns were expressed, and there 
were responses that were helpful in in- 
suring against the widening of that 
conflict. The question is whether we 
can carry that a step further — whether 
it is possible to have a clearer under- 
standing between us on the boundaries 
within which we will act in the prosecu- 
tion of our respective interests in these 
conflict situations. 

A second obvious impediment to 
the improvement of relations in the way 
I suggested has been the Soviet mili- 
tary buildup in the recent period, both 
in the development of strategic 
weapons systems and in the develop- 
ment of its military capabilities that 
bear on the European theater. In both 
respects these have been of concern to 
us and to our allies. They seem to us to 
have gone beyond a reasonable, pru- 
dent concern with legitimate Soviet 
defense requirements. 

From the Soviet perspective, no 
doubt, they may see themselves as still 
seeking to catch up with the United 
States, to come out from under the 
burden of the strategic inferiority 
under which they labored for so many 
years. And it may be that one of the 
problems here is that they and we as- 
sess differently the different attributes 
of the central strategic balance and are 
inclined to give different w r eight to 
those fields in which the other side has 
an advantage. There may be, therefore, 
what a reporter recently called the 
roshomon effect of the difference in our 
respective perspectives on what the ac- 
tual state of the central strategic bal- 
ance may be. Nevertheless, this ques- 
tion of the strategic balance has been a 
source of particular sensitivity to us as 
a result of the sequelae to our experi- 
ence in the Vietnam war and the ap- 
prehensions that, as a result of that ex- 
perience, we may have become or may 
be perceived as becoming weaker or 
less resolute. 

Finally, among the impediments on 
the Soviet side there is the Soviet sys- 
tem itself and the repressive aspects of 
that system which are repugnant to 
those of us who cherish the values of 
individual freedom and dignity. This 
has been, of course, an abrasive factor 
in the recent past as a result of the 
emergence of the human rights issue as 
a significant element in U.S. foreign 
policy, and it is quite likely that it will 



continue to be an element of disruption 
in the relationship. 

The issue here, I think, is not 
whether we should seek to express in 
our foreign policy the basic values of 
our own society; the issue rather is to 
learn how to do that in a way that can 
have productive results. This, I think, 
we have been learning to do, somewhat 
imperfectly, as a result of our recent 
experience. But we have to recognize 
that there are limits of feasibility 
within which we can expect to see sig- 
nificant change in the Soviet Union and 
in the Soviet system. These limits arise 
from the enormous strength of the 
political police bureaucracy and the 
party bureaucracy. The party is deter- 
mined not to let power slip from its 
hands, which might be the consequence 
of a further diffusion of political power 
within the society. 

Impediments on the U.S. Side 

From the U.S. side there are also 
impediments to the development of 
what one might call a sensibly regu- 
lated relationship. First of all, there 
has been a lack of clarity in perceiving 
our own interests in this relationship 
and of even describing to ourselves 
where we want to go with it, what we 
would like it to be. This is perhaps in 
part a result of our own recent political 
experience — the result of changes in 
our society which have widely sepa- 
rated the experience of one generation 
from the next. These changes have oc- 
cured at a very rapid rate and have in- 
volved us in traumatic experiences in 
the world, the consequence of which 
has been to heighten the disorientation 
and anxieties which characterize this 
period. 

Some of these anxieties, whether 
appropriately or not, have clearly fo- 
cused upon the Soviet Union as the 
symbol of our hostilities and made it 
more difficult to follow a measured 
course in this relationship. Sometimes 
in reading the papers one has the im- 
pression that the determination of our 
policy toward the Soviet Union is like 
ordering an egg at breakfast. It should 
be either hard or soft. But in truth 
neither hard nor soft is really very good 
advice for us in this relationship. 
Neither extreme is very sensible or is 
truly in our interest. Either appease- 
ment on one side or bellicosity on the 
other quite evidently would be likely to 
encourage a more militant policy on the 
part of the Soviet Union. 

What makes better sense, although 
it makes less convenient headlines, is a 
policy of firmness, clarity, and civility 
in the relationship. We would seek in 



pursuing such a policy to conduct the 
relationship in a way that protects and 
advances our interests but strives at 
the same time to moderate the level of 
tension and pays due attention to those 
areas in which there is an overlapping 
of interest between the two countries. 
Civility, I stress, and perhaps I sur- 
prised you with the word because there 
is in our society an evident difference of 
judgment about how to encourage the 
Soviet Union to move in the directions 
we would like to see it move. There are 
some who feel that the only language 
the Soviet Union understands is that of 
a two-by-four across the forehead. It is 
quite evident from our recent experi- 
ence that the net effect of an approach 
to the Soviet Union in these terms is 
about the same as a similar approach 
would be to us — causing us to stiffen in 
our determination to resist movements 
toward their position. 

Rather it seems to me that the 
model to be followed is that which was 
followed by President Kennedy in the 
Cuban missile crisis, i.e., while paying 
attention to the elements of power re- 
quired in the situation, nevertheless to 
leave a way open for the Soviet Union 
to move without a sense of humiliation. 
The ultimate folly in the conduct of this 
relationship would be to take on the 
Soviet style in determining our re- 
sponse to the Soviet Union, instead of 
speaking in terms that truly reflect our 
own values, our own civility in our soci- 
ety. 

Secondly, the issue has come to the 
fore in recent days, as Dean Funari 
said, about linkage of SALT to other 
issues — in this case to the issue of the 
Soviet brigade in Cuba. It seems to me 
that those who would make the ratifica- 
tion of SALT dependent on the Soviet 
brigade in Cuba, or any other actions of 
the Soviet Union in the world rather 
than on the security of the United 
States, suffer from a terminal case of 
myopia. It would not advance our 
interests to do so' it would have the ef- 
fect of weakening U.S. security; and we 
would lose an opportunity to operate in 
an international environment in which 
it was possible to regulate the strategic 
military confrontation. Instead, we 
would face the unknown of an unregu- 
lated strategic military confrontation. 
We would, in effect, be making a choice 
about which way lies U.S. security — 
whether our security is best advanced 
through the effort to stabilize strategic 
military competition or whether it is 
better advanced by the effort to attain 
a superiority which, in fact, it is not 
possible to attain and which can only 



January 1980 



19 



Europe 



have the effect of plunging the world 
into development of more weapons, 
more widely dispersed, more complex, 
more difficult to regulate, and all the 
uncertainty that goes with that. 

This is not in any way to diminish 
the importance of those measures which 
have been proposed for strengthening 
the U.S. defense program where it is 
now not adequate, but it is important to 
bear in mind that the measures re- 
quired to deal with those deficiencies 
would have to be substantially larger in 
the event there were no effective SALT 
agreement. In this connection I think it 
is important to say that the effect of 
postponing SALT — and we should not 
deceive ourselves on this — would be to 
kill the treaty; if we were to seek, 1 
year from now, 2 years, 3 years from 
now to pick up the pieces and try to 
bring the treaty to realization at that 
time, we would not be able to start 
where we left off. The military envi- 
ronment will not stand still; we and the 
Soviet Union will be moving into sys- 
tems that will be more difficult of reg- 
ulation, and we shall have to begin 
again. No one can foresee the terms 
that such an effort at regulation might 
require under those circumstances. 

The effect of postponement or of 
nonratification would be more im- 
mediately felt, I think, on Soviet pro- 
grams than on our own, because most of 
the programs now being proposed and 
discussed for rectifying our strategic 
posture are not prohibited to us under 
the treaty, whereas many of the meas- 
ures before the Soviet Union would be. 
The Soviet Union's practice in recent 
months of taking out of circulation 
submarines to offset newer systems as 
they come into service would no longer 
be required if the Interim Agreement 
were not regarded as being in force. 
Without the SALT II Treaty, there 
would be no limits on the number of 
warheads on strategic missiles, which is 
a matter of great concern to us. The 
ban on interfering with national techni- 
cal means of verification would also not 
be in force. Encryption of Soviet telem- 
etry would then not be barred, in the 
absence of a treaty. Moreover, I think 
it is important that we not lose sight of 
concerns our allies have unanimously 
expressed about the situation in which 
they would find themselves should the 
treaty fall. 

Behind many of these concerns is 
the need for greater rationality in our 
defense policy. It is evident to all of us 
that there is a certain accidental quality 
in the determination of our defense 
capabilities. It is a resultant of the 
interplay of pressures and interests 
having to do with particular systems, 



rather than the result of an overarching 
plan which takes account of our needs 
and at the same time integrates into 
our defense planning the undoubted se- 
curity interest we have in trying to 
stabilize the military competition 
wherever we can. And it must be, I 
think, an objective for those of us who 
work in this field to try to move toward 
that greater rationality. 

In conclusion, we have to bear in 
mind that the Soviet Union is obviously 
not our only problem, and except for 
this one aspect — the danger of nuclear 
war — it is not the main problem in our 
foreign policy. In many of the problems 
we deal with, the Soviet Union is a 
complicating factor rather than a prime 
cause of our troubles. It is essential for 
the effectiveness of our response to the 
competitive aspects that we should ad- 
dress the real needs of the Third 
World — the nations of Africa and Asia 
and elsewhere — so that we are seen as 
having interests that are not in conflict 
with theirs and that we help to bring 
them too into the framework of the in- 
ternational system which is important 
to us. 

It is clear that if we are not suc- 
cessful in doing this, the situation may 
roll on in its own unguided way toward 
a disintegrative development of the in- 
ternational system, leading to anarchy 
and chaos in which the values to which 
our own society is dedicated shall not 
flourish and may not survive. B 



Continuity and 
Commitment 



by Matthew Nimetz 

Address before the leadership con- 
ference of the National Interreligious 
Task Force on Soviet Jewry in New 
York City on October 30, 1979. Mr. 
Nimetz is Coimselor for the Depart- 
ment of State. 

My purpose today is to speak to 
you about one of the most important 
ways in which we are trying to improve 
the situation for human rights in the 
East- West context. I speak of the Hel- 
sinki process, the dialogue which was 
formalized in 1975 by the leaders of the 
35 nations who signed the Helsinki 
Final Act. I would like particularly to 
address my remarks to the thinking of 
the U.S. Government about where we 
are and where we ought to go with re- 



spect to this process and also to give 
you the flavor of our thoughts on how 
to improve the dialogue in the future. 

This audience certainly under- 
stands the fundamental difference be- 
tween the Western system of 
democratic society and the competing 
Soviet system. The Helsinki process 
seeks to address our basic foreign pol- 
icy dilemma: How can these two com- 
peting and largely antagonistic systems 
coexist in a manner that protects our 
security and at the same time create 
opportunities to increase areas of 
cooperation? 

The Final Act goes beyond dealing 
with interests of diplomats for it also 
seeks to address the universal desire of 
all peoples for basic human rights and 
freedoms. For this reason, we do not 
conceive of the Helsinki process as a 
bloc-to-bloc confrontation, although we 
have no illusions that the problem of 
the East is at present our central con- 
sideration. By taking account of the 
various wishes and hopes of the signa- 
tory nations, the Helsinki process helps 
to keep open channels of communication 
on many sensitive issues in a way which 
shows great promise for the improve- 
ments we seek. This process, however, 
can only be kept alive through our 
commitment to make it work and to use 
its potential continuously to attain our 
objectives. 

Background of the Final Act 

Before I continue with my main 
theme, let me briefly review the 
genesis of the Final Act in order to 
place in perspective my later remarks 
about the continuity of its application. 

We are all familiar with the post- 
war situation as it developed in Europe 
following the victory of the allies over 
Nazi Germany. The nature of the post- 
war division of territory, people, and 
value systems is still more than a gen- 
eration later, at the heart of the cur- 
rent political strains in Europe. 

In the period after the Soviet 
Union consolidated its control over 
Eastern Europe, Moscow devoted its 
efforts to legitimize its postwar sphere 
of domination. To achieve this end, and 
to exclude the United States from 
Europe, the U.S.S.R. sought a confer- 
ence solely of European states to 
finalize the frontier arrangements 
which had existed de facto since the 
end of World War II.' The West stood 
firm against these Soviet desires since 
we had no interest in unilaterally 
granting legal recognition to the 
U.S.S.R.'s territorial gains. The 
United States and our allies, in addi- 
tion, saw that such a Soviet-sponsored 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



Europe 



European conference would be used by 
them to weaken the relationship among 
the United States, Canada, and West- 
ern European nations, as in- 
stitutionalized in the NATO alliance. 

In the late 1960s, as a part of the 
general relaxation of tensions, a Euro- 
pean conference became of greater 
interest throughout the West. The 
NATO alliance expressed cautious 
interest in such a conference, provided 
the United States and Canada took 
part. Simultaneously during this 
period, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many introduced its Ostpolitik in part 
to ameliorate various intra-German 
problems, and the United States was 
working directly with the Soviet Union 
on a number of specific questions such 
as improvements in the Berlin situa- 
tion, SALT I, nonproliferation, and 
various other issues. 

The policy of Western nations in 
the early 1970s was to work toward a 
relaxation of political tension and a re- 
duction of the all too real risks of nu- 
clear war. This effort, of course, is now 
known by the short-hand term — 
detente. Someone has said that there 
must be something wrong with a con- 
cept that cannot be described in Eng- 
lish. Nevertheless, one of the concrete 
and continuing results of detente was 
the Conference on Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe, which we commonly 
refer to as CSCE. Preparatory talks 
opened in Helsinki in late 1972, and 
negotiations continued there and in 
Geneva to work out the outlines of the 
Final Act. 

Since security concerns such as 
SALT, the mutual and balanced force 
reduction negotiations, and other such 
specific topics were being handled 
separately in their own restricted 
forums, the concept of security which 
the Final Act of Helsinki embodied was 
understood to be a much broader one. 
The Helsinki negotiators sought to en- 
hance the sense of security among all 
the participating nations by expanding 
cooperation among them, especially be- 
tween Eastern and Western nations, in 
a wide range of areas including eco- 
nomic, humanitarian, educational, and 
cultural. 

The practical expression of this or- 
ganizational concept resulted in the di- 
vision of the Final Act into three basic 
areas which have commonly been called 
baskets. Basket 1 contained a declara- 
tion of principles of interstate behavior, 
such as sovereign equality and restraint 
from the use of force, principles which 
were consistent with the U.N. Charter 
and other declarations of international 
law. 



Basket 1 also contained a very im- 
portant affirmation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including reli- 
gious practice, as one of the 10 princi- 
ples governing the relations among the 
participating states. The inclusion of 
this principle was a difficult achieve- 
ment and was accomplished by careful 
drafting which produced wording simi- 
lar to, and consistent with, earlier 
statements in such documents as the 
U.N. Charter, the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights, and the U.N. 
convenants on human rights. In re- 
stating this principle, the Helsinki sig- 
natories not only affirmed their com- 
mitment to such freedoms, they also 
specifically reaffirmed the earlier and 
more basic documents. More impor- 
tantly, perhaps, the signatories im- 
plicitly affirmed the principle that true 
detente — and true security — rested in 
the final analysis upon respect for 
human rights. 

Also included in basket 1 is an in- 
novative and important security com- 
ponent, called confidence-building 
measures. 

Realizing that the building of trust 
is an important component of security, 
the Final Act provides for the prior 
notification of certain troop maneuvers 
and movements and the exchange of ob- 
servers among the signatories at mili- 
tary maneuvers. 

Baskets 2 and 3, you will recall, 
deal with economics, science, and tech- 
nology, and with cooperation in cul- 
tural, humanitarian, and other fields. 
In these baskets, specific areas of coop- 
eration were outlined which nations 
could pursue to strengthen interchange 
and provide for the betterment of the 
conditions of life in specific ways for 
their populations. 

A great deal more could be said 
about the elements included in the 
Final Act, but I suspect you are all 
quite familiar with them. Among the 
many who talk readily about the Final 
Act, few have actually read it and, I 
further suspect, a significant proportion 
of that exclusive group is present in 
this room. For that reason, you are all 
aware that the Helsinki act is not ac- 
tually a treaty. It is instead a solemn 
agreement among the signatories to 
seek the political objectives outlined in 
the act. Inherent in the Final Act's 
provisions was the desire to reduce the 
level of confrontation between East and 
West and to contribute to the spirit of 
detente. Also implicit in the provisions 
was a commitment to increase the 
dialogue among the parties, especially 
between Eastern and Western nations. 



The negotiators created a deli- 
cately balanced document; it contained 
items of importance to each participant. 
All of the participants were, quite ob- 
viously, interested in a strengthened 
sense of security in Europe. For the 
Soviet Union, CSCE implied a certain 
degree of acceptance of the post- World 
War II territorial frontiers in Europe, 
since the signatories agreed to seek no 
change in frontiers except by peaceful 
means. For many of the East European 
states, it established a framework that 
permitted greater interaction with 
Western countries than was previously 
possible. 

For the neutral and nonaligned 
states, CSCE provided a forum in 
which to pursue European-wide inter- 
ests. Thus Switzerland, which is not a 
member of the United Nations, plays a 
creative political role in Europe; the 
Vatican pursues its important moral 
and institutional goals; while Malta ex- 
presses its interests in Mediterranean 
issues. 

For the West, the Final Act gave 
us a means to promote the exchange of 
people and ideas and to seek peaceful 
evolution in the systems that govern 
the populations of the U.S.S.R. and the 
countries of Eastern Europe and pro- 
vided as well a concrete affirmation of 
the right of states to raise humanitarian 
concerns in a diplomatic context. In our 
view, the Final Act achieved an enor- 
mous success of making quite explicit 
the notion that improved human rights 
would be a permanent factor in the de- 
tente equation. This may have been an 
unexpected turn of events for the 
Soviet Union, but it quickly became 
plain that the inclusion of the human 
rights concept was to be essential to the 
CSCE process. 

Perhaps the most important aspect 
of Helsinki is that it is more than a 
document; it is a document that was 
converted into a vital process. It 
created a process for continuous 
dialogue between the East and West, a 
platform from which the signatory na- 
tions legitimately could talk about sen- 
sitive concerns with their neighbors, 
concerns that previously were difficult 
to voice in a diplomatic context. This 
was accomplished through the estab- 
lishment of a unique system of follow-on 
meetings which allows — or more accu- 
rately, requires — the signatory nations 
to review with each other on a con- 
tinuing basis the progress being made 
toward the implementation of the Final 
Act's provisions. By placing in the text 
of the act itself the requirement to re- 
view the implementation of the political 
objectives to which they had agreed, 
the Helsinki signatories initiated a 




January 1980 



21 



Europe 



process that is as important as the text 
of the Final Act itself. 



U.S. Policy Toward the CSCE 

At this point let me try to give you 
an idea of how the U.S. Government 
views the current status of the Helsinki 
CSCE process. 

First of all, we think the process is 
reasonably healthy given the nature of 
the Soviet system and the state of 
East- West relations today. The Bel- 
grade meeting of 1977 showed our seri- 
ous commitment to implementation and 
to the process itself. Under the distin- 
guished leadership of Ambassador Ar- 
thur Goldberg, the U.S. delegation 
made a strong effort to enhance im- 
plementation of the Final Act by all 
signatories. Although some may have 
preferred a more anodyne approach to 
the meeting, we believed that it was 
important, at the first Helsinki fol- 
lowup meeting, to articulate our deter- 
mination that the commitments made at 
Helsinki be taken seriously. Our de- 
termination has not diminished. 

Since the Belgrade meeting, there 
have been numerous bilateral and mul- 
tilateral talks among the signatories as 
called for in the Final Act. In 1978 and 
1979, our government held CSCE con- 
sultations with nearly all the members 
of the Warsaw Pact, with all of our 
NATO allies, and with most of the neu- 
tral or nonaligned signatories such as 
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Yugoslavia. We have also met on sev- 
eral occasions with the Spanish, given 
their important role as hosts for the 
next review conference in Madrid. Our 
experience in the bilateral discussions 
with Eastern countries has been mod- 
erately encouraging. Like all diplomatic 
interchange, they were confidential, 
but I can assure you they were frank, 
extensive, and specific. 

We intend to continue the process 
in the next 12 months with the hope 
that progress can be made in the period 
before the Madrid meeting. These reg- 
ular and extensive bilateral meetings 
are an important development since 
Belgrade, and the existence of these in- 
tensive talks has caused the Helsinki 
process to take on greater vitality. 

Another productive Helsinki activ- 
ity was the work of the expert groups 
established by the Belgrade meeting to 
discuss concrete ways to enhance spe- 
cific CSCE implementation. A scientific 
forum under CSCE auspices will take 
place in Hamburg in February, with 
Dr. Philip Handler, President of the 
National Academy of Sciences, as head 
of the U.S. delegation. 



22 



Moreover, the Helsinki Final Act 
has permeated the day-to-day inter- 
change between nations and within 
states as well. We find, for example, 
that CSCE topics now tend to become 
key agenda items during state visits, 
and we note increasing references in 
speeches by the leaders of the signatory 
nations to the value of the CSCE proc- 
ess and to the need to make a deeper 
commitment to it, and even an effect on 
domestic legislation such as that in- 
volving our visa laws. 

As a result of all this activity, ef- 
forts by the signatory nations to create 
the necessary atmosphere for improved 
compliance with the Final Act's provi- 
sions have been enhanced. I would not 
tell you that all is well, however. The 
harsh sentences recently imposed on 
Charter '77 members 1 by Czechoslovak 
authorities shocked the world and made 
a mockery of that country's commit- 
ments to its obligations under the Final 
Act, not to mention its obligation to 
fundamental concepts of human rights. 

American policy toward CSCE re- 
mains unchanged. We are committed to 
the continuity of the Helsinki process 
and we seek to deepen the commitment 
of others to this process as well. We are 
committed to fulfill our obligations 
under the Final Act, and in this regard, 
we have been seeking to improve our 
domestic implementation of the Final 
Act's provisions. I might mention at 
this point that the CSCE Commission, 
under the able and effective leadership 
of Representative Dante Fascell, is in 
the process of finalizing a report on this 
subject which will be released shortly 
to the public. 

Naturally we also continue to re- 
view and seek improved implementa- 
tion of the Final Act's provisions by all 
parties since it is indisputable that the 
Helsinki process can be viable only 
when all signatories honor their com- 
mitments. As an adjunct to this desire, 
the United States continues to search 
for new ways to build cooperation 
within the CSCE context and will be 
working with other governments on 
ways to enhance implementation 
through specific proposals for the 1980 
CSCE review conference in Madrid, 
some of which I will talk about shortly. 

Lastly, the United States continues 
to maintain its unflagging interest in 
the human rights provisions of the 
Final Act. It is here most of all that we 
seek the evolutionary change in the 
East which will result in a true reduc- 
tion in the political tensions dividing us 
and which will, in the long run, allow 
our relations with the East to take on a 
more normal character and contribute 
to the betterment of life not only in 
those countries but throughout the 
CSCE area. 



Current Status of Implementation 

Now let me address our view of the 
current status of implementation. I 
mentioned earlier that the Heksinki 
process was causing the signatory 
nations to make efforts to enhance 
implementation of the Final Act's pro- 
visions. Although this has, indeed, 
happened, and although the Helsinki 
process may to some extent be respon- 
sible for this happening, it is obvious 
that not all aspects of the Final Act are 
being implemented satisfactorily. 

In this regard, the United States 
remains quite unsatisfied with the level 
of CSCE implementation by the East in 
the human rights area. The Final Act 
has provided a yardstick to measure the 
implementation of human rights in the 
East and, by all measures, implementa- 
tion is insufficient to meet the stand- 
ards expected when the Final Act was 
signed. We are continuing by all feasi- 
ble means, and especially in the bilat- 
eral and multilateral talks which I men- 
tioned earlier, to make our views 
known on human rights implementation 
and the ways we think it can improve. 

The U.S. Government has been in 
the forefront of this effort on human 
rights; yet at the same time, we recog- 
nize there are limitations to what we 
can accomplish. Being a government 
engaged in an intense security competi- 
tion with the Soviet Union, we will al- 
ways be open to the charge that our 
human rights concerns are politically 
and ideologically motivated. For this 
reason, the U.S. Government continues 
to believe that private citizens and 
their organizations in all CSCE coun- 
tries necessarily play a very important 
role to encourage CSCE implementation. 
The very nature of private groups, such 
as those you represent, puts beyond 
dispute the humanitarian concerns to 
which they — and you — are devoted. 
You are not required to balance com- 
peting interests as governments must 
do. Your concerns are direct and spe- 
cifically focused. You have an enormous 
advantage in many respects in bringing 
to public attention, in a believable and 
effective way, the areas in which 
human rights implementation can and 
must be improved. 

For this reason, the U.S. Govern- 
ment, from President Carter on down, 
is very pleased with the interest and 
involvement in the Helsinki process 
which private citizens and their organi- 
zations have shown. We feel, fur- 
thermore, that your efforts very use- 
fully complement the government's and 
that the overall result has been to 
deepen this nation's commitment to the 
continuity of the Helsinki process. 

Department of State Bulletin 






Europe 



The Final Act, we believe, specif- 
ically encourages relevant private ac- 
tion by providing that individuals shall 
know, and have a right to act upon, 
their rights and duties. For this reason, 
the establishment of CSCE monitoring 
groups in Eastern countries was a wel- 
come sign, and it is difficult to see how 
the United States will be able to speak 
positively about the Eastern perform- 
ance so long as CSCE monitors con- 
tinue to languish in detention and are 
otherwise harassed. 

Future Directions 

Let me turn to another aspect of 
the Helsinki process and inform you 
about our government's current thinking 
on the future directions it believes the 
process should take. First of all, as I 
have already said, the United States is 
committed to deepening the involve- 
ment of all Helsinki signatories in the 
CSCE process. 

It is quite clear to us that a bal- 
anced implementation of all aspects and 
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act is a 
crucial factor in the deepening commit- 
ment to the CSCE process. We know 
this is so because various signatories 
often have specific interests in different 
areas of the Final Act. I mentioned be- 
fore that the genius of the Final Act 
was that it contained something of im- 
portance for each participant. 

In the implementation process, we 
must apply this genius practically by 
promoting implementation across a 
broad spectrum. Some nations, such as 
ours, tend to place priority on the hu- 
manitarian provisions as we seek bal- 
anced progress in all CSCE areas. 
Others, while interested in these con- 
cerns, give greater priority to security 
and economic aspects of the Final Act 
for geographic, historical, or other rea- 
sons. A successful process, and a suc- 
cessful meeting at Madrid, will see 
progress in a broad range of areas, in 
which the humanitarian and the secu- 
rity fields must be included. 

We have also come to understand 
that an uneven manner of implementa- 
tion can damage the entire Helsinki 
process. Nations whose interests are 
neglected or whose values are given 
short shrift will lose interest in the 
process. There are already Americans 
who have suggested that we abandon 
CSCE because progress has been slow 
in humanitarian fields. There have been 
some Europeans who have shown irri- 
tation over the failure of rapid progress 
in other fields — for example, the exten- 
sion of more advantageous trading 
terms, increased attention to security 
measures, or extensive Mediterranean 
discussions. 



Based on our experience to date, 
we must recognize that balanced im- 
plementation of the Helsinki Final Act 
has not been achieved. The United 
States and its friends among the Hel- 
sinki signatories have been emphasizing 
implementation of the humanitarian 
provisions of the Final Act. Given the 
nature of the Eastern response so far, 
we have been, at best, exploring the 
fringes of the Eastern nations recep- 
tivity to progress in these areas. We 
know, however, that the East is not 
monolithic and that their internal re- 
gimes and societies differ. Their rela- 
tions among themselves and with us are 
distinct, and their record of implemen- 
tation in the human rights area reflects 
these differences. 

In our discussions, we have 
achieved some progress in connection 
with family reunification, a major 
priority for us. In several countries re- 
ligious freedom and intellectual diver- 
sity are somewhat greater now than 
before. Advances have been made in 
greater cultural interchange with a few 
countries. But the free flow of people 
and ideas — which CSCE envisions — is 
certainly far off. 

The economic provisions of the 
Final Act have not been pursued as 
vigorously as they might have — 
although it should be noted that other 
forums exist for this purpose. U.S. 
legislation links the trade status of the 
Soviet Union and most nonmarket 
countries to the emigration question, 
and this has placed limits on economic 
relations with several of them. Fulfill- 
ment by many Communist countries of 
Helsinki commitments to provide busi- 
ness information and adequate working 
conditions for our businessmen has not 
been satisfactory. Because the com- 
merce of Communist countries is con- 
ducted by the state, political consid- 
erations often affect economic activity. 
Despite these difficulties, however, 
trade with the Soviet Union and East- 
ern Europe has grown over the last few 
years and has produced a large and 
rising trade surplus. 

At present, many of the Helsinki 
signatories look to the security provi- 
sions of the Final Act as an area that is 
ripe for improved effort at implementa- 
tion. 

The confidence-building measures 
presently in the Final Act have worked 
rather well and thus have proved to be 
worthy precedents for possible further 
expansion. There have been several 
proposals for security enhancement, 
and the U.S. Government has been 



closely examining them. Among the 
most important and creative of these 
proposals was forwarded by the French 
a year or so ago for a conference on dis- 
armament in Europe. The proposal was 
intended to widen the area for conven- 
tional arms control by establishing a 
conference, the first stage of which 
would develop confidence-building 
measures to enhance the sense of secu- 
rity among nations. 

Another proposal was put forth by 
the Warsaw Pact states. In their 
Budapest proposal made earlier this 
year, they called for a European con- 
ference on military detente which 
would discuss confidence-building 
measures as well as other Eastern 
ideas. 

These initiatives are currently 
under active consideration and discus- 
sion. The United States and its allies 
have a deep interest in enhanced secu- 
rity for all states in Europe, and there 
are aspects of these and similar propos- 
als that may be of interest to us. But 
three things should be clear. 

First, neither we nor our allies will 
have any interest in arms control exer- 
cises that are motivated by a desire to 
achieve propaganda victories and one- 
sided advantages or to delay our NATO 
modernization programs without prop- 
erly addressing the underlying 
realities. 

Second, we do not want to estab- 
lish new forums or procedures that 
might interfere with or endanger the 
goals we seek through currently estab- 
lished channels of arms control negotia- 
tions. 

Third, we will not permit the 
CSCE process to become distorted and 
its balance lost through excessive 
weighting in one area at the expense of 
others. 

Thus, we return to our theme of 
balance since this notion seems to us to 
provide the best chance of making 
long-term progress in basic areas. We 
will not lessen our emphasis on human- 
itarian concerns, and we expect that 
other Western nations will stand firmly 
beside us in demanding better im- 
plementation. And, at the same time, 
we should find a way to deal in a posi- 
tive fashion with the desire of Euro- 
pean states for enhanced security 
within the CSCE context. Therefore, 
we are rededicating ourselves to the 
pursuit of a positive, as opposed to a 
negative, balance in CSCE — that is, a 
balance based on greater movement 
toward implementation in all CSCE 
areas. 

There are several ways in which we 
can enhance balance in the implementa- 
tion process. First, perhaps, we should 






January 1980 



23 



Europe 



explore more systematically the rela- 
tions between trade and economy and 
security and human rights so that we 
can see the interdependent factors in 
each of these areas. Second, when we 
consult bilaterally and multilaterally 
with the Helsinki signatories, we can 
widen the scope and expertise available 
on all areas of the Final Act. Third, we 
can suggest that, in the interim be- 
tween regular CSCE review confer- 
ences, there could be more experts or 
high-level meetings on specific and con- 
crete CSCE subjects, such as we have 
seen in a limited way after the Belgrade 
meeting. There would be fruitful areas 
for intensive work in the coming years, 
for example in the areas of security, 
family reunification, freer travel, and 
emigration. 

All of these suggestions offer ways 
to implement the Final Act in an 
evenhanded manner and to give us the 
tools we need to seek greater commit- 
ment to the implementation of those 
concerns in which we have a specific 
interest. 

Preparations for the 
Review Conference 

Now that I have given you an idea 
of our current thinking about the CSCE 
process, I would like to say a few words 
about our preparations for the followup 
review conference in Madrid and the 
period beyond. 

Our policy is to have the Madrid 
meeting be a constructive one which 
will review compliance, seek to enhance 
implementation in the future, and 
explore concrete ideas for improving 
cooperation. In the area of human 
rights, there is absolutely no doubt that 
we will continue vigorously to seek full 
implementation, particulary of princi- 
ples seven and basket 3. I have men- 
tioned earlier the high level of interest 
in this area, and given your own con- 
tinuous involvement in these concerns, 
I am sure our commitment to effective 
human rights implementations will 
deepen. 

In this regard, among the many 
areas which we will be examining at 
Madrid, we will do our utmost to en- 
courage Eastern countries to accord re- 
spectful and humane treatment to the 
courageous individuals who have estab- 
lished citizens' committees to monitor 
and stimulate compliance with the Hel- 
sinki Final Act. Related to this will be 
efforts to alleviate the suffering and ob- 
tain freedom for those who have been 
imprisoned because of their political 
and religious beliefs and for espousing 
compliance with the Final Act. 



Of specific concern to this lead- 
ership conference will be our continuing 
interest in a more humane approach to 
emigration and improved emigration 
procedures, with special emphasis on 
and continuing sympathy for the plight 
of Soviet Jews and other religious ad- 
herents who wish to emigrate, as well 
as for the elimination of harassment of 
those who have been refused exit visas. 
We remain concerned about implemen- 
tation of the provisions involving the 
freedom of journalists to pursue their 
work without interference. 

We see no reason why there could 
not be substantial progress in these 
areas in the period before Madrid; posi- 
tive developments here would be a 
powerful stimulus to making the Ma- 
drid meeting the type of success we all 
wish it to be. 

For the sake of balance, and to en- 
hance our ability to obtain compliance 
with all aspects of the Final Act, we 
will be working with other signatories 
to improve implementation of the secu- 
rity provisions of the Helsinki agree- 
ment by looking at ways to heighten the 
effect of the confidence-building meas- 
ures written into the Final Act. Since 
the Final Act also encourages the par- 
ties to make further efforts which could 
lead to developing and enlarging meas- 
ures aimed at strengthening confi- 
dence, we will be willing to explore 
ways to implement these provisions in a 
manner that accommodates some as- 
pects of the French proposal and War- 
saw Pact proposal within the CSCE 
context in the period after the Madrid 
meeting. 

In the economic fields, we will also 
look for ways to facilitate trade and 
other forms of economic cooperation. 

The scientific forum, which will be 
held in Hamburg this coming winter, 
will allow distinguished private scien- 
tific figures, as well as the CSCE sig- 
natories, to see where further efforts 
can be made in this important field. In 
Geneva in November we will sign the 
Convention of Transboundary Air Pol- 
lution worked out in the CSCE context 
under the auspices of the U.N. Eco- 
nomic Commission for Europe. We will 
also try to see where other environ- 
mental problems of common interest 
can be cooperatively examined. We in- 
tend to further cooperation and ex- 
changes in the fields of science and cul- 
ture as well. These questions will be 
taken up bilaterally and multilaterally 
as we prepare for the Madrid review 
conference. 



What I have attempted to do in 
these remarks is to describe for you the 
U.S. Government's continuing interest 
in the well-being of the Helsinki proc- 
ess and our deepening commitment to 
the implementation of all Final Act 
provisions agreed to by the signatories. 
Of all the methods we have for dealing 
with the East, of all the concrete means 
established to work out the parameters 
of detente, and of all the forums that 
have been constructed to improve what 
is, at best, a tense relationship with a 
strong and determined adversary, the 
Helsinki process is by far the broadest 
and most politically workable. 

For the long-term, however, the 
Helsinki process can lead us beyond the 
bloc-to-bloc relationship and dissemi- 
nate understanding for the concepts of 
openness, pluralism, and humanity in 
the world. For this reason, the United 
States remains deeply committed to the 
Helsinki process and to the effort being 
made by all 35 signatories to improving 
their relationships by means of this 
unique diplomatic and public process. ■ 



l A private group in Czechoslovakia es- 
tablished to monitor compliance with the 
Helsinki Final Act. 



CSCE Semiannual 
Report and 1 980 
Madrid Meeting 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 5, 1979 1 

On behalf of President Carter, Sec- 
retary Vance on December 4, 1979, 
transmitted the seventh semiannual re- 
port on implementation of the Helsinki 
Final Act to Chairman Dante Fascell of 
the Commission on Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe. These reports are 
submitted to assist the commission in 
its function of monitoring implementa- 
tion of the Helsinki accords. The pres- 
ent report covers the period June 1- 
November30, 1979. 2 

The next followup meeting of the 
Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (CSCE) will start in Ma- 
drid on November 11, 1980. A major 
feature of that meeting will be a review 
by the signatories of implementation of 
the Final Act. The United States in- 
tends to speak frankly and honestly 
about successes and failures in im- 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 






Europe 



plementation. Our comments will re- 
flect the record of progress at that 
time. 

Thus far, the record has been un- 
even. Advances in some areas have 
been coupled with serious failures with 
respect to other aspects of the Final 
Act. For example, during the period 
covered by the report, there have been 
encouraging developments in the 
reunification of divided families and the 
general area of human contacts but con- 
tinued repression of individuals seeking 
to exercise rights which their govern- 
ments have pledged to respect. 

The Final Act recognizes respect 
for human rights as an integral part of 
the basis for the development of secu- 
rity and cooperation among the 35 par- 
ticipating states. It is in the area of 
human rights that certain states have 
had the most difficulty in meeting the 
commitments which they voluntarily 
made at Helsinki. The United States, 
during the coming year and at the Ma- 
drid meeting, intends to continue to en- 
courage all signatories to implement 
the Final Act in its entirety. B 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 

2 Copies of the report may be obtained 
from the Public Information Service, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Helsinki Agreement 
on Human Rights 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 30, 1979 ! 

My Administration is deeply com- 
mitted to the cause of human rights 
both here and abroad. As a means to 
promote respect for fundamental free- 
doms and the development of a more 
peaceful, stable world, the United 
States attaches great significance to the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
This document, signed in 1975 at Hel- 
sinki by the leaders of 33 European na- 
tions, Canada, and the United States, 
pledges its signers to work toward low- 
ering barriers and improving coopera- 
tion between East and West. Each na- 
tion made solemn promises to take 
steps to improve the lives of its citi- 
zens. These obligations required some 
adjustments in the foreign and domestic 
policies of all 35 nations. 



I am extremely pleased that the 
U.S. Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe has taken the 
lead in assessing U.S. implementation 
and identifying areas where American 
performance can be improved. The 
commission's report, "Fulfilling Our 
Promises: The United States and the 
Helsinki Final Act" — released on 
November 8 — is the first comprehen- 
sive review by any CSCE signatory 
which takes into account criticism from 
other Helsinki states as well as domes- 
tic observers. 

CSCE signatory states which sup- 
press human rights cannot, in good con- 
science, justify their record of com- 
pliance. But I believe our record of im- 
plementation has been second to none, 
even among the other democracies 
among the 35 participating states. 
American political history is testimony 
to the firm foundation of civil liberties 
enshrined in our own Constitution with 
its Bill of Rights, long before Helsinki. 

As this report points out, our work 
is never complete. Our own traditions, 
reinforced by the Helsinki Final Act, 
pledge us to strive constantly for im- 
provement in both domestic, civil, and 
economic rights and in the expanded 
cooperation with other participating 
states. This report should go far to per- 
suade other CSCE governments that 
the United States is serious about its 
obligations under the Helsinki accords. 

I also hope that it will stimulate 
other Helsinki countries to undertake 
similar public assessments of their 
performance. Implementation of the 
Final Act is critical to peace and secu- 
rity in Europe and for our own nation. 
We cannot permit the Helsinki agree- 
ment to become meaningless words on 
parchment. We must bring it to life, 
and I believe the CSCE Commission 
has made a major contribution to that 
end. n 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979. 



Visit of Irish Prime 
Minister Lynch 



Prime Minister Jack Lynch of 
Ireland made an official visit to the 
United States November 7-15, 1979. 
While in Washington (November 8-10), 
he met with President Carter and other 
government officials. Following is the 
press statement issued at the conclu- 



sion of his meeting with the President 
on November 8. 1 

The President met today with 
Prime Minister Jack Lynch of Ireland. 
Prime Minister Lynch, in addition to 
being the Head of Government of Ire- 
land, is for the last half of 1979 also the 
President of the European Council of 
Heads of State or of Government of the 
nine countries of the European Com- 
munity. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister reviewed the close relations 
between their two countries and dis- 
cussed a number of key world issues 
which are of particular concern to the 
European Community, with which the 
United States enjoys close cooperation, 
based on common interests and values. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister also discussed at length the 
tragic communal problems in Northern 
Ireland. They condemned support for 
organizations engaged directly or indi- 
rectly in campaigns of violence which 
only delays the day when peace and 
reconciliation can come to Northern 
Ireland. They noted with interest the 
proposal of the British Government to 
convene a conference of the principal 
political parties in Northern Ireland 
and shared the hope that progress could 
be made toward a form of administra- 
tion acceptable to both parts of the 
community there. The President reaf- 
firmed his statement of August 1977 
looking to support for American in- 
vestment in Northern Ireland when the 
violence is ended. 

The official visit of Prime Minister 
and Mrs. Lynch to Washington and to 
several other American cities demon- 
strates the great friendship between 
the two nations and also the great re- 
spect of the American Government and 
people for a country which in recent 
years has enjoyed rapid economic 
growth and taken its place among the 
industrialized nations of the world. The 
Prime Minister spoke of the contribu- 
tion of American investment to this 
growth and reiterated his government's 
continuing support for such investment. 

The Prime Minister invited the 
President to visit Ireland at a mutually 
agreeable date and the President ac- 
cepted the invitation with pleasure. ■ 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 12, 1979, 
which also carries the texts of President 
Carter's and Prime Minister Lynch's re- 
marks made at the welcoming ceremony on 
Nov. 8, their remarks to reporters follow- 
ing a meeting on Nov. 8, and their dinner 
toasts that evening. 



January 1980 



25 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights 



Following arc statements before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on November lit, 11)79, by Deputy Sec- 
retary of State Warren Christopher, 
Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State Roberts B. Owen, and Assistant 
Secretary for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs Patricia M. 
Derian. 1 



DEPUTY SECRETARY 
CHRISTOPHER 

I am grateful for this opportunity 
to appear before the committee in sup- 
port of the four multilateral treaties on 
human rights transmitted to the Senate 
by President Carter in 1978: the Inter- 
national Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; the International Cov- 
enant on Economic, Social and Cul- 
tural Rights; and the American Con- 
vention on Human Rights. 2 

A fifth human rights treaty, the 
genocide convention, has already 
undergone extensive hearings before 
this committee and is, therefore, not 
before you today. I want to emphasize, 
however, that ratification of that con- 
vention remains one of the most impor- 
tant goals of this Administration's 
human rights policy. As President Car- 
ter said in a message to the Senate 
[May 23, 1977], the genocide convention 
". . . protects the most fundamental of 
all human rights — the right to live. ..." 
And as this committee well knows, its 
ratification is very long overdue. 

In addressing the United Nations 
about the treaties [March 17, 1977] be- 
fore you today, President Carter noted 
that: "The basic thrust of human affairs 
points toward a more universal demand 
for fundamental human rights." The 
treaties — all of which have been signed 
by large numbers of countries and have 
already entered into force — are a re- 
flection of that "basic thrust." Our his- 
tory, and our vital national interests, 
require that we be a full and active part 
of it. 

In my remarks this morning, I will 
concentrate on the compelling interests 
— both foreign and domestic — that call 
for U.S. adherence to the treaties. 
Later today Bob Owen, the Legal Ad- 
viser of the Department of State, and 
our colleagues from the Department of 
Justice will discuss in detail the legal 
dimensions of the treaties, as well as 
the reservations to them that we rec- 



ommend. Patt Derian, the Assistant 
Secretary for Human Rights and Hu- 
manitarian Affairs, will address the 
relationship between the treaties and 
other aspects of our human rights pol- 
icy. 

At the outset, however, I would 
like to describe very briefly the con- 
tents of the four treaties. 

Contents of the Treaties 

The racial discrimination conven- 
tion was signed by the United States in 
1966. Its purpose is to define racial dis- 
crimination, to condemn and prohibit 
the practice of racial discrimination by 
governments, and to encourage the re- 
moval of institutional obstacles to the 
ending of racial discrimination. 

The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, signed by the 
United States in 1977, is a more com- 
prehensive document. It commits par- 
ticipating states to respect many of the 
rights enshrined in our own Constitu- 
tion: freedom of speech, religion, as- 
sociation, and movement; the right to 
vote in secret elections; the right to 
stand equal before the law; the right to 
self-determination and to nondiscrimi- 
nation; the presumption of innocence 
for those accused of a crime; the right 
against self-incrimination; and the pro- 
tections of due process of law. 

Unlike the other U.N. treaties, the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, which was 
signed by the United States in 1977, 
looks to the future. It commits states to 
take steps toward the future realization 
of certain economic, social, and cultural 
goals for the individual. These goals are 
ones to which the United States has 
long been committed, including the 
right to work, to social security, to 
physical and mental health, to educa- 
tion, and to freedom from hunger. 

The one non-U. N. treaty being 
considered here — the American Con- 
vention on Human Rights — was 
adopted by the Organization of Ameri- 
can States in 1969 and signed by the 
United States in 1977. It seeks to 
guarantee for the peoples of this hemi- 
sphere rights similar to those guaran- 
teed by the civil and political covenant. 

All four of the treaties before you 
today also contain reporting procedures 
and provide for review by independent 
experts of progress in achieving the 
treaties' goals. 



Domestic Interests 

As I suggested earlier, the Ad- 
ministration urges Senate approval of 
these treaties because adherence to 
them is so clearly in our national inter- 
est. Concern for human rights is one of 
the foundations of our greatness as a 
nation. Our observance of human rights 
contributes profoundly to our lead- 
ership in the international community. 
But to preserve and enhance that lead- 
ership role, we must demonstrate our 
willingness to make human rights a 
matter of international commitment and 
policy and not solely a matter of domes- 
tic law. 

As President Carter noted in his 
letter to the Senate transmitting the 
treaties [February 23, 1978], the 
United States is one of the few impor- 
tant nations in the world that has not 
yet become a party to the U.N. 



Unless the United States is a 
party to the four human 
rights treaties we will be un- 
able to contribute fully to this 
evolving international law of 
human rights. 



treaties. In the eyes of the world, our 
failure to do so reflects adversely upon 
our own impressive accomplishments in 
the human rights field. Even more im- 
portantly, our nonadherence to the 
treaties prejudices U.S. participation in 
the development of the international 
law of human rights. 

This is not only unfortunate, it is 
also unnecessary. In essence, the 
treaties create an international com- 
mitment to the same basic human rights 
that are already guaranteed to citizens 
of the United States by our own laws 
and Constitution. U.S. ratification 
would not endanger any rights that we 
currently enjoy. On the contrary, 
ratification would encourage the exten- 
sion of rights already enjoyed by our 
citizens to the citizens of other nations, 
and it would allow the United States to 
participate in this process. 

The fundamental rights enjoyed in 
this country are a product not only of 
our Founding Fathers' drafting but also 
of two centuries of practice and in- 
terpretation. Similarly, the rights 
enunciated in these treaties will be 
molded by the actions of the states 
party to them in future years. Unless 
the United States is a party to the 
treaties, we will be unable to contribute 
fully to this evolving international law 
of human rights. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



Human Rights 



International Interests 

Moreover, ratification of the 
treaties will remove a troubling compli- 
cation from our diplomacy. Govern- 
ments with which we raise human 
rights concerns will no longer be able to 
blunt the force of our approaches or 
question the seriousness of our com- 
mitment by pointing to our failure to 
ratify. I have personally observed that 
quiet person-to-person diplomacy pro- 
vides the primary and, in many in- 
stances, the best means to obtain im- 
provements in human rights. But I 
have also observed personally that our 
effectiveness can be compromised by 
our own failure to ratify these treaties. 

Ratification also gives the United 
States an additional international forum 
in which to pursue the advancement of 
human rights and to challenge other 
states to meet the high standards set 
by this nation. We should not deny our- 
selves this opportunity to help shape 
the developing international standards 
for human rights and to encourage the 
extension to others of the rights we 
have long enjoyed. 

While the treaties are not subject 
to legally binding sanctions, they do in- 
crease the political costs attached to 
violations of human rights. The commit- 
tees established to review compliance 
with the treaties provide a mechanism 
through which human rights practices 
throughout the world can be evaluated, 
compared, and publicized. These com- 
mittees will develop a sort of human 
rights caselaw — a body of precedent 
that can give shape and substance to 
the basic standards enunciated in the 
treaties. 

It is toward this goal — the opera- 
tion of the rule of law in the interna- 
tional human rights field — that we 
should strive. Ratification of these four 
treaties would be an important step to 
that end. 

U.S. adherence to these treaties 
would unquestionably promote the in- 
ternational recognition of fundamental 
human rights. But it would also un- 
questionably advance the national 
interests of the United States. As 
President Carter suggested on the 30th 
anniversity of the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights, the two are inex- 
tricably linked. As he said on that occa- 
sion: 

. . . human rights are not peripheral to the 
foreign policy of the United States .... 
Our pursuit of human rights is part of a 
broad effort to use our great power and our 
tremendous influence in the service of 
creating a better world — a world in which 
human beings can live in peace, in freedom, 
and with their basic needs adequately met. 



For these reasons, I respectfully 
urge that advice and consent be given 
to the ratification of these human rights 
treaties. 



MR. OWEN 

I feel pleased and privileged to ap- 
pear before this distinguished commit- 
tee in order to testify in support of the 
four treaties on human rights now 
before you. Deputy Secretary Christo- 
pher has already presented the compel- 
ling case, in terms of U.S. foreign 
policy and our domestic system of val- 
ues, for ratification of these treaties. I 
shall only reiterate that considerations 
of the effectiveness of our moral and 
economic leadership in the world com- 
munity today, and a deep commitment 
to the just treatment of men and 
women everywhere, underlie this Ad- 
ministration's vigorous espousal of 
ratification. 

Everyone here today agrees that 
every person should have the benefit of 
freedom from arbitrary and inhumane 
treatment at the hands of his or her 
government. Such freedom takes the 
form of legal rights within the constitu- 
tional system of the United States. We 
cherish these rights and have made 
great progress in promoting their ad- 
vancement. 

I am here today to support ratifica- 
tion of these treaties as a means for the 
United States to participate in the fur- 
therance of similar rights in the inter- 
national sphere. They were drafted 
under the close scrutiny of representa- 
tives of our government at the United 
Nations and the Organization of Ameri- 
can States. We have had them under 
careful review for a good many years 
and are satisfied that any problems 
they still present can be satisfactorily 
resolved through a reasonable number 
of reservations, understandings, and 
declarations. I wish to assure this 
committee that these treaties will in- 
sure a more widely accepted legal 
framework in which the United States 
can pursue internationally the values of 
human freedom and justice under law 
that we all share. 

Since these treaties are extensive, 
I propose to review their provisions 
only briefly and then to discuss at some 
length certain aspects of the treaties 
and of this Administration's approach 
to them that some perceive as obstacles 
to ratification. 



Provisions of the Treaties 

The racial discrimination conven- 
tion defines "racial discrimination" to 
include distinctions and preferences 
based not only on race, but also on "col- 
our, descent, or national or ethnic ori- 
gin" whose purpose or effect is to im- 
pair the enjoyment of human rights on 
an equal footing. The substantive pro- 
visions of the convention require states 
parties to undertake to pursue a policy 
of eliminating such discrimination by 
refraining from discriminatory prac- 
tices, by guaranteeing equality before 
the law with respect to a variety of 
substantive rights, and by providing for 
remedies against discriminatory treat- 
ment. These undertakings are in keep- 
ing with the legislative and judicial 
strides taken in this country in the last 
100 years through the adoption of the 
14th amendment and the Civil Rights 
Acts of the 1960s. 

The other three treaties under con- 
sideration today range far more widely 
over the spectrum of rights which an 
individual may enjoy. 

Under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the 
American Convention on Human 
Rights, states parties undertake to re- 
spect and insure a series of rights of in- 
dividuals that largely coincide with 
fundamental rights built into our demo- 
cratic tradition and guaranteed by our 
Bill of Rights. These treaty rights in- 
clude the right to vote, to free expres- 
sion, to freedom of religion, to freedom 
of association and assembly; rights of 
the family and of children and a right to 
nationality; rights to freedom of move- 
ment and of residence; and a whole 
series of procedural rights of the ac- 
cused to a fair trial, to representation by 
counsel, and other procedural rights. 
Each treaty requires that the states 
parties respect the enumerated rights 
without discrimination as to race, sex, 
national origin, or other status. 

Special importance attaches to ar- 
ticle 4 of the covenant which addresses 
the need to distinguish, in accord- 
ance with internationally agreed stand- 
ards, between emergencies that war- 
rant reasonable derogations from the 
covenant's requirements and unwar- 
ranted claims of emergency, and be- 
tween those rights from which reason- 
able derogation is permissible and those 
from which no derogation is allowed. In 
the latter category are such fundamen- 
tal rights as freedom from torture, from 
slavery, and from retroactive applica- 
tion of statutes defining criminal of- 
fenses. 



January 1980 



27 



Human Rights 



Unlike its partner covenant, the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights looks not to 
the recognition of present rights but to 
the future. It commits states to take 
steps toward the future realization of 
certain economic, social, and cultural 
goals for the individual, much as many 
of our domestic enactments and policy 
statements look toward aspirational 
goals of full employment, universal 
health care, and the like. Article 2 re- 
quires that ratifying states undertake 
"to take steps . . . with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realiza- 
tion of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant . . . ." 

These rights include the right to 
work and to enjoy just and fair condi- 
tions of work; the right to social secu- 
rity, to the enjoyment of a high stand- 
ard of health, and to an adequate 
standard of living; the right to the pro- 
tection of the family and of children; 
and the right to primary education. 

The desirability of realizing these 
rights is clear and in keeping with 
policies fostered in the United States 
for some 50 years at least. It is worth 
reiterating that no ratifying party 
thereby commits itself to the present 
implementation of these rights. Nor 
does any party commit itself to distrib- 
ute the benefits foreseen by the cove- 
nant to individuals directly. Rather, the 
covenant obliges governments to work 
toward the eventual achievement of the 
minimum standards it sets out. To em- 
phasize that this constitutes an obliga- 
tion to promote rather than an im- 
mediate legal commitment to perform, 
the Administration has suggested ap- 
pending a declaration to this effect. 

Implementation Procedures 

All four of these treaties contain 
provisions for their enforcement. There 
are four essential ways by which im- 
plementation of these treaty rights may 
be overseen. 

First, common to the racial dis- 
crimination convention, the economic 
and social rights covenant, and the civil 
and political rights covenant is a re- 
porting procedure requiring states par- 
ties to submit reports on the measures 
they have adopted to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the treaties. These 
three treaties call for such reports 
within 1 year of their entries into force 
and periodically thereafter. 

The reports required by the eco- 
nomic and social rights covenant are to 
be submitted to the Economic and So- 
cial Council of the United Nations 
through the Secretary General; those 
required by the racial discrimination 



28 



convention and the civil and political 
rights covenant are to be submitted, 
again through the Secretary General, to 
independent committees established by 
the treaties. The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
and the Human Rights Committee each 
contain 18 members who are persons of 
"high moral standing" and "character" 
and competence, elected by secret bal- 
lot from nominees by states parties and 
who act in an individual capacity. 

The American convention reconsti- 
tutes a similarly independent seven- 
member commission called the Inter- 
American Commission on Human 
Rights. The respective bodies review- 
ing the reports are authorized by the 
treaties to make general comments 
based upon examinations of the reports. 

The second route of implementa- 
tion consists of an interstate complaint 
and conciliation procedure. 

Under the racial discrimination 
convention each state party subjects it- 
self to the interstate procedure, but 
under the civil and political rights cov- 
enant and the American convention, a 
state party does not so subject itself 
unless it makes a declaration to that 
effect. Such a declaration would state 
that the state party recognizes the 
competence of the appropriate inde- 
pendent committee to receive and 
examine allegations from other states 
parties that it is not fulfilling its obliga- 
tions under the treaty. The appropriate 
committee or commission is authorized 
to examine the complaint and to issue 
reports with nonbinding recommenda- 
tions. 



The rationale behind the reser- 
vations is . . . that we take our 
international legal obligations 
seriously and . . . commit 
ourselves to do by treaty only 
that which is constitutionally 
a?id legally permissible within 
our domestic law. 



The economic and social rights cov- 
enant has no comparable provision for 
interstate complaints and conciliation 
procedures. 

The third type of implementation 
procedure allows individuals and 
groups to lodge complaints with the ap- 
propriate commission or committee 
against states parties to the treaties. 



Under the racial discrimination 
convention, a state party subjects itself 
to such complaints only if it makes a 
declaration to that effect; under the 
civil and political rights covenant, a 
state would be so subject only if it 
ratifies an optional protocol. 

The American convention provides 
that any individual, group, or organiza- 
tion may lodge complaints of violations 
by states parties; submission to this 
procedure is not optional for a ratifying 
state. 

The economic and social rights 
covenant contains no comparable provi- 
sion. 

The fourth and last means of im- 
plementation is set forth only in the 
American convention: that is, judicial 
proceedings before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. This court, 
composed of seven judges elected in an 
individual capacity, has jurisdiction to 
hear cases submitted by states parties 
and the commission only if the in- 
terstate complaint procedures 
described above have already been 
completed and only if the states parties 
involved have declared themselves 
subject to the court's jurisdiction. This 
court provides the only enforcement 
mechanism that would produce deci- 
sions legally binding the states parties 
concerned. 

As is evident from a summary of 
the substantive provisions of these four 
treaties, they do not concern them- 
selves solely with the behavior of one 
state toward another. One of their prin- 
cipal objects and purposes is to subject 
the behavior of a government toward 
its people to international legal 
scrutiny, not generally, but only where 
that behavior does not meet certain 
minimum standards of justice and hu- 
manity as reflected in the treaties. 

As Deputy Secretary Christopher 
has pointed out, the United States has 
always striven to conform its treatment 
of those under its jurisdiction to our 
constitutional standards and the proc- 
esses of law; on the whole, we do for 
our own citizens what the drafters of 
these treaties contemplated as neces- 
sary for the citizens of all countries. 

Criticisms of Opponents 

But because these treaties do con- 
cern themselves with the relations be- 
tween governments and individuals 
rather than solely with those between 
states, objections have been raised to 
them. It is feared by some that these 
treaties could be used to distort the 
constitutional legislative standards that 
shape our Federal and our State gov- 
ernments' treatment of individuals 

Department of State Bulletin 






Human Rights 



within the United States. These criti- 
cisms deserve response. 

Such objections tend to fall into 
three categories. 

First, it is said that the human 
rights treaties could serve to change 
our laws as they are, allowing individu- 
als in courts of law to invoke the treaty 
terms where inconsistent with domestic 
law or even with the Constitution. 

The second type of objection is that 
the treaties could be used to alter the 
jurisdictional balance between our Fed- 
eral and State institutions. Since these 
first two objections will be addressed 
during these hearings by the Depart- 
ment of Justice, I will go into them only 
briefly. 

The third type of objection is that 
the relationship between a government 
and its citizens is not a proper subject 
for the treatymaking powers at all but 
ought to be left entirely to domestic 
legislative processes. This last point I 
shall address in somewhat more detail. 

Inconsistencies With Domestic 
Laws. As others have noted, the 
treaties do diverge from our domestic 
law in a relatively few instances. Crit- 
ics fear that this divergence will cause 
changes in that domestic law outside 
the normal legislative process, or at 
least will subject the relations between 
the government and the individual to 
conflicting legal standards. 

This fear is not well founded, in our 
judgment, for two reasons. First, the 
President has recommended that to 
each of the four treaties there be ap- 
pended a declaration that the treaties' 
substantive provisions are not self- 
executing. A treaty is self-executing, 
and thus automatically the law of the 
land upon entry into force, or non-self- 
executing, requiring implementing 
legislation before it becomes a rule for 
the courts, depending upon its terms 
and the intention of the parties adher- 
ing to it. 

It is the Administration's view that 
the treaties are, on their face and ac- 
cording to their terms, not self- 
executing and, thus, are not enforce- 
able directly by the courts. A Senate 
declaration would simply clarify the in- 
tention of the United States in this re- 
gard. This does not mean that vast new 
implementing legislation is required, as 
the great majority of the treaty provi- 
sions are already implemented in our 
domestic law. It does mean that further 
changes in our laws will be brought 
about only through the normal legisla- 
tive process. This understanding as to 
the non-self-executing nature of the 
substantive provisions of the treaties 
would not derogate from or diminish in 



any way our international obligations 
under the treaties; it touches only upon 
the role the treaty provisions will play 
in our domestic law. 

A second reason why we need not 
fear a confusion of standards due to 
possible conflicts between the treaty 
provisions and domestic law rests in 
this Administration's recommended 
reservations and understandings. In 
the few instances where it was felt that 
a provision of the treaties could rea- 
sonably be interpreted to diverge from 
the requirements of our Constitution or 
from Federal or State law presently in 
force, the Administration has 
suggested that a reservation or under- 
standing be made to that provision. 

In our view, these reservations do 
not detract from the object and the 
purpose of the treaties — that is, to see 
to it that minimum standards of human 
rights are observed throughout the 
world — and they permit us to accept 
the treaties in a form consonant with 
our domestic legal requirements. 

Jurisdictional Balance Between 
Federal and State Institutions. As I 

have previously noted, a second objec- 
tion raised by critics to the ratification 
of these human rights treaties is that 
they might upset the existing allocation 
of jurisdiction between our Federal and 
State institutions. Some of these critics 
feel that certain matters addressed in 
the treaties lie exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of the several States within 
our Federal system and that subjecting 
these matters to regulation by treaty or 
by congressional legislation will in- 
fringe upon that State jurisdiction. 

Although most of the matters dealt 
with in the treaties are governed by 
Federal law at this juncture in our his- 
tory, the Administration is sensitive to 
this concern. We have, therefore, rec- 
ommended a reservation to the racial 
discrimination convention and the two 
covenants, stating that the United 
States shall implement the treaty pro- 
visions over whose subject matter the 
Federal Government exercises jurisdic- 
tion and shall encourage State au- 
thorities to take appropriate measures 
with regard to the provisions over 
whose subject matter the States exer- 
cise jurisdiction. 

The content of this reservation is 
already built into article 28 of the 
American convention. There need be no 
apprehension that the ratification of the 
human rights treaties will invade the 
field of those matters which are prop- 
erly left to states jurisdiction. 



Relationship Between Govern- 
ment and Its Citizens. The third objec- 
tion that has been raised is that the 
subject matter of these treaties lies be- 
yond the scope of the treatymaking 
power. The text of the Constitution, of 
course, gives no guidance as to what 
may or may not be the subject of a 
treaty. The Supreme Court has said a 
number of times that "[t]he treaty- 
making power of the United States is 
not limited by any express provision of 
the Constitution, and, though it does 
not extend 'so far as to authorize what 
the Constitution forbids,' it does extend 
to all proper subjects of negotiation be- 
tween our government and other na- 
tions." (Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 
341 (1923); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 
258, 266 (1899); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 
199 (1796)) Although the Court has not 
elaborated upon what a "proper subject 
of negotiation" might or might not be, 
it has come to be commonly accepted 
that the treaty power extends to any 
"matter of international concern." (See 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. 
(§40, comment b at 117 (1965)) 

Although there have in the past 
been differences of opinion as to what is 
and is not a matter of "international 
concern," it seems clear today that no 
matter how widely or narrowly the 
boundaries of "international concern" 
be drawn, a treaty concerning human 
rights falls squarely within them. 
States have entered into such treaties 
since the 17th century. 

For example, in 1648 the treaty of 
Westphalia established the principle of 
equality of rights for those of the 
Catholic and Protestant religions. The 
Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878 both pro- 
vided for the free exercise of religion 
by individuals. Numerous treaties in 
the 19th century had as their goal the 
suppression of the slave trade; the 
United States became party to one of 
them in 1862. The peace treaties in cen- 
tral Europe following the First and 
Second World Wars assured protection 
of life and liberty to all inhabitants 
without regard to birth, nationality, 
language, race, or religion and included 
provisions for the protection of 
minorities. 

In the 20th century, the United 
States has become party to a number of 
treaties that address the rights of the 
individual as against his government, 
including international labor conven- 
tions, the constitution of the Interna- 
tional Labor Organization, the 1926 
slavery convention, the 1945 peace 
treaties, the U.N. Charter, and, more 
recently, the Supplementary Conven- 
tion on Slavery in 1967 and the Conven- 






January 1980 



29 



Human Rights 



tion on the Political Rights of Women in 
1976. 

The United States is party to the 
Charter of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States, which addresses the eco- 
nomic and social rights of the indi- 
vidual, and we are, of course, party to 
the U.N. Charter, under which mem- 
bers are pledged to take action to 
promote "... universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms for all without dis- 
tinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion." The growth of the U.N. sys- 
tem of reporting, review, and 
treatymaking arising from this 
provision — touching on matters from 
terrorism to the status of refugees — 
reflects a universal judgment that 
human rights are properly a matter of 
international concern and foreign policy 
interest. 

A reporter's note to the Second 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 
states in part as follows. 

Proposed treaties dealing with human rights 
have raised questions in the U.S. and, in- 
deed, in other countries as to whether or not 
they deal with matters that are appropriate 
for settlement by agreement between na- 
tions . . . Although such conventions gener- 
ally specify standards already observed in 
the U.S., it has an interest in seeing that 
they are observed by as many states as pos- 
sible, not merely to protect its own stand- 
ards, but to promote conditions abroad that 
will foster economic development and demo- 
cratic institutions that are conducive to 
prosperity in the U.S. and achievement of 
its foreign policy objectives. It cannot effec- 
tively urge other states to adhere to such 
conventions without doing so itself. (Re- 
statement (Second) of Foreign Relations 
Law, §118, Reporter's note at 375). 

In sum, it seems now beyond dis- 
pute that human rights are properly a 
matter of international concern. 



Criticisms of Supporters 

Thus far I have discussed criticisms 
heard from opponents of ratification of 
these treaties on human rights. Let me 
turn now to criticisms heard from sup- 
porters of ratification. Some of these 
supporters — including some of the 
treaties' most distinguished 
proponents — are critical of what they 
perceive as the Administration's efforts 
to insulate our own domestic system 
from the impact of the human rights 
treaties' terms by means of reserva- 
tions. 

It is asserted that the essential 
object or purpose of these human rights 
treaties is to change the domestic law of 
the ratifying states in order to conform 



with the precise dictates of the treaties' 
terms. That being the case, it is said, 
the Administration's recommended res- 
ervations violate the purposes of the 
treaties, because the reservations are 
designed to harmonize the treaties' re- 
quirements with our existing domestic 
law. 

We think it appropriate to suggest, 
however, that these critics have not 
fully appreciated the purpose of these 
human rights treaties. The primary 
objective is the fostering of interna- 
tional commitments to erect and ob- 
serve a minimum standard of rights for 
the individual as set forth by the 
treaties. This standard is met by our 
domestic system in practice, although 
not always in precisely the same way 
that the treaties envision. By ratifica- 
tion, we would commit ourselves to 
maintain the level of respect we already 
pay to the human rights of our people; 
we would commit ourselves not to 
backslide; and we would be subjecting 
this commitment and our human rights 
performance as a whole to international 
scrutiny. 

Our main goal in suggesting the 
reservations that I have described is, 
thus, not to evade the minimum stand- 
ards imposed by the treaties whenever 
they touch our system. The rationale 
behind the reservations is, rather, that 
we take our international legal obliga- 
tions seriously and, therefore, will 
commit ourselves to do by treaty only 
that which is constitutionally and le- 
gally permissible within our domestic 
law. 

In this respect, it should be noted, 
we are in good company. This has been 
the approach taken by other countries 
which share with us the democratic 
traditions from which these treaties de- 
rive their content. Specifically, a 
number of Western European countries 
have appended extensive substantive 
reservations to these treaties. I might 
add that the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights, which 
is similar to the civil and political cove- 
nant in content, explicitly provides for 
the making of reservations to allow par- 
ticipating countries to make their in- 
ternational commitments by treaty con- 
sistent with their domestic legal sys- 
tems. At least five nations have availed 
themselves of this opportunity. 

Another reason why the Adminis- 
tration has proposed a number of res- 
ervations, understandings, and declara- 
tions is pragmatic. We believe these 
treaties to be important and necessary, 
and we are anxious to secure the advice 
and consent of the Senate to their 
ratification. It is our judgment that the 
prospects for securing that ratification 



would be significantly, and perhaps de- 
cisively, advanced if it were to be clear 
that, by adopting these treaties, the 
United States would not automatically 
be bringing about changes in its inter- 
nal law without the legislative concur- 
rence of the Federal or State govern- 
ments. 

How Enforcement Has Proceeded 

Let me turn to a brief examination 
of how enforcement of the treaties has 
proceeded in practice up to this time, 
for that will give some indication as to 
whether ratification would unduly ex- 
pose the United States to unwarranted 
or unfair attack pursuant to the 
treaties. 

The reporting procedures for the 
racial discrimination convention and the 
civil and political rights covenant have, 
thus far, been the principal enforce- 
ment mechanisms. The Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimina- 
tion has been meeting to consider re- 
ports submitted by states parties since 
1970; the Committee on Human Rights 
since 1977. Each has begun to build its 
own set of practices and procedures in 
that time. 

The Racial Discrimination Commit- 
tee requires the states parties to sub- 
mit an itemized account of the "legisla- 
tive, judicial, administrative or other 
measures" adopted with regard to each 
of the substantive obligations of the 
convention. The committee has no in- 
dependent factfinding authority, but in 
practice committee members have also 
gathered outside information in their 
capacity as "experts." The utilization of 
such additional information has given 
the committee the opportunity to raise 
meaningful questions as to a state's 
claims of compliance. 

The Racial Discrimination Commit- 
tee has never issued a formal determi- 
nation of noncompliance with the con- 
vention in response to a state's report. 
On the other hand, it has invited each 
state party to send a representative to 
reply to questions of the committee as 
it considers the state's report, and this 
practice has given the committee the 
opportunity to convey to that state its 
opinion that compliance with the con- 
vention's obligations is unsatisfactory, 
albeit without issuing a formal ruling to 
that effect. 

The attendance of a state represen- 
tative affords the state a forum in 
which its practices in the area of dis- 
crimination can be directly defended 
against deserved or undeserved attack. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



Human Rights 



(There is no provision for cross- 
examination of the answers to commit- 
tee questions given by these represen- 
tatives.) 

The system I have just described 
has generally worked fairly toward 
those whose compliance has been ques- 
tioned. On a few occasions, however, 
particular states have attempted to use 
the committee to further other political 
aims. For example, in two cases a re- 
porting state has used its report on its 
own compliance with the convention as 
a way of charging another country, not 
party to the convention, with human 
rights violations; in one of those cases 
the United States was the wrongly 
charged party. Not being a party to the 
convention, however, the United States 
had no opportunity to refute the 
charges before the committee through a 
state representative of its own choosing 
or to question the competence of the 
committee to address what was in sub- 
stance an interstate complaint through 
the reporting procedure. 

The Committee on Human Rights, 
charged with implementing the civil 
and political rights convenant, also 
avoids formal rulings against states and 
makes use of state representatives' ap- 
pearances, just as does the Racial Dis- 
crimination Committee. In its shorter 
history the Human Rights Committee 
has managed to steer clear of political 
confrontation, and the questioning of all 
state representatives — whether from 
the developing world, Eastern Europe, 
or Western Europe — has been uni- 
formly tough and searching. British 
treatment of prisoners in Northern 
Ireland has come in for severe criticism 
as have Soviet restrictions on freedom 
of movement. 

The committee members are taking 
seriously their position as impartial, in- 
dependent jurists. Although its record 
is still quite brief, the committee ap- 
pears to have great potential for shap- 
ing attitudes toward, and the language 
of, human rights standards as they de- 
velop over time; participating coun- 
tries, through their reports, their re- 
sponses to questioning, and through the 
individuals they nominate to serve as 
members will have the opportunity to 
have a hand in such future develop- 
ments. 

The conclusions we draw from the 
early practice of the implementing 
committees are twofold. 

First, to the extent that they re- 
main impartial mechanisms for the 
monitoring of states' compliance with 
the human rights treaties, as they 
largely have been so far, the United 
States would do well to participate and, 



thus, have a role in the development of 
an international jurisprudence of 
human rights. 

Second, to the rare extent that the 
committees do lapse into political con- 
frontation, the United States cannot 
afford not to be represented so as accu- 
rately to set forth its human rights rec- 
ord. 

The United States has historically 
maintained a strong tradition of com- 
mitment to the cause of the rights of 
the individual at home and abroad. The 
ratification of these four treaties before 
this committee today would provide a 
mechanism for upholding this fine tra- 
dition internationally. President Carter 
has described these treaties as a 
beacon — a guide to a future of personal 
security, political freedom, and social 
justice. In order to enhance our contri- 
bution to the achievement of such a fu- 
ture, I urge this committee to report 
favorably on these treaties. 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN 

I want to thank the committee for 
this opportunity to speak about the four 
human rights treaties: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
the International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 
International Convention on the Elimi- 
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimi- 
nation; and the American Convention 
on Human Rights. 

My message today is very simple. 
It concerns the connection between 
these treaties and the human rights 
policy of the United States. Our failure 
so far to ratify them has had a signifi- 
cant negative impact on the conduct of 
that policy. Ratifying them in the near 
future will substantially improve our 
ability to pursue human rights objec- 
tives in foreign affairs. 

By adhering to these treaties, we 
strengthen the international legal basis 
for the protection of basic human 
rights; we can participate fully in the 
machinery established by the treaties 
for their implementation; and we in- 
crease the credibility and effectiveness 
of our own human rights efforts. 

Strengthening International Law 
on Human Rights 

These treaties embody the funda- 
mental tenet that international law 
creates obligations which all govern- 
ments owe to their citizens. Together 
with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, they create an interna- 
tional legal structure for the protection 
of human rights. They set standards for 
the world community which reflect the 



same vision that inspired our own Bill 
of Rights. 

Ratification by the United States 
will significantly enhance the legitimacy 
and acceptance of these standards. It 
will encourage other countries to join 
those which have already accepted the 
treaties. And in countries where human 
rights are generally not respected, it 
will aid citizens to raise human rights 
issues. 



Our failure to ratify so far 
lias become confusing to our 
friends and may be exploited 
by our adversaries. 



I would like to elaborate for a mo- 
ment on this last point. In countries 
where citizens have few domestic rem- 
edies for human rights abuses, they can 
point to these international standards. 
Today, dissidents throughout the world 
are monitoring their own governments' 
compliance with this body of interna- 
tional law for the protection of human 
rights. It is cited by wall posters in 
China, on manifestos of Soviet dissi- 
dents, and by families of the disap- 
peared in Latin America. Ratification 
of the treaties will support their ef- 
forts. 

Participation in Implementation 

The four treaties establish interna- 
tional machinery for monitoring their 
implementation. The United States has 
taken a strong position in favor of such 
machinery. This is because, over the 
long run, greater respect for human 
rights depends on the creation of inter- 
national institutions. Yet because it has 
not ratified these treaties, the United 
States cannot participate in the work of 
these implementing bodies. The United 
States does not review the reports 
submitted by states parties on their 
compliance with the treaties, and it 
does not have a voice in their 
interpretation — interpretations which 
may affect the course of the law of 
human rights for decades to come. 

I would like to describe some of the 
activities of the monitoring bodies for 
you. Ratification will enable us to par- 
ticipate in them. 

• A U.N. committee on compliance 
with the covenant on civil and political 
rights is reviewing reports on Czecho- 
slovakia, the U.S.S.R., Chile, and 
Uruguay. By ratifying the covenant, 
we can participate in this review proc- 
ess. 



January 1980 



31 



Human Rights 



• In the Western Hemisphere, an 
Inter-American Human Rights Court 
has been established to hear disputes, 
and an Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission has been established to 
conduct investigations of abuses. By 
ratifying the American Human Rights 
Convention, we will be eligible to nomi- 
nate and vote for their members. 

• The racial discrimination conven- 
tion applies not only to discrimination 
on account of race but also on account of 
ethnic origin. Ratification would enable 
us to participate in the implementation 
committee's monitoring of such dis- 
crimination around the world. 

Credibility and Effectiveness 
of the U.S. Human Rights Policy 

Our human rights policy has raised 
significantly the priority of human 
rights in U.S. foreign policy. It has 
contributed to an increasing level of in- 
ternational consciousness about human 
rights and to a climate in which im- 
provements have taken place in a 
number of countries. We can be proud 
of these achievements. But it is also 
essential for our nation to ratify the 
instruments establishing the interna- 
tional legal framework for their observ- 
ance. Ratification will enhance our 
ability to remain in the forefront of 
those who are struggling for the full 
enjoyment of human rights. 

Our failure to ratify so far has be- 
come confusing to our friends and may 
be exploited by our adversaries. In his 
latest report to the Congress on the 
Helsinki accords, President Carter 
noted the criticism directed against this 
country for not yet ratifying the inter- 
national human rights agreements. 

Ratification of the human rights 
treaties is also important for U.S. par- 
ticipation in the reviewing process 
under the Helsinki Final Act. The Hel- 
sinki accords, themselves, call on par- 
ticipating states to fulfill their obliga- 
tions under international human rights 
declarations and agreements, including 
the international covenants. 

The United Nations last summer 
established a working group to examine 
the "circumstances" preventing gov- 
ernments from ratifying the treaties. In 
my own work, I am asked constantly by 
representatives of foreign governments 
why the United States has failed to 
ratify these agreements, given our fine 
human rights record, our human rights 
policy, and our previously active role in 
drafting these agreements. I have not 
yet found an acceptable response. 

The United States has a long tradi- 
tion of seeking to fully implement the 
human rights enshrined in our Con- 



stitution and Bill of Rights. Our history 
has been one of struggle for universal 
suffrage, for the abolition of slavery, 
for women's rights, for racial equality, 
for trade union rights. That struggle 
continues. To date, the United States 
has ratified international human rights 
treaties on slavery, women's rights, 
and refugees. Ratification of these ad- 
ditional human rights agreements 
would emphasize our determination to 
work for a world in which the rights 
enjoyed by our own citizens are univer- 
sally respected. 

The treaties before the Senate ex- 
press values in which the people of the 
United States have believed for a long 
time. They give expression to human 
rights that coincide with our own laws 
and practices. 

I join the Deputy Secretary and 
other witnesses in urging that the ad- 
vice and consent of the Senate be given 
to the four human rights treaties. ■ 

•The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

2 For texts of the two international 
covenants, see Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1967, 
pp. 107 and 111; for text of the American 
convention, see Bulletin of July 4, 1977, 
p. 28; the convention on racial discrimina- 
tion was not printed in the Bulletin. 



President Carter 
Receives Human 
Rights Award 



Following are excerpts from re- 
marks President Carter made on Oc- 
tober 2U, 1979, upon accepting an in- 
ternational human rights award from 
the Synagogue Council of America. 1 



Human rights takes on a broad 
range of meanings. And we've had some 
notable successes in the last 2V2 to 3 
years: Prison doors have opened to re- 
lease literally tens of thousands of those 
who've been incarcerated for years, 
even decades. We've seen a massive 
shift in countries around the world and 
particularly, I think, in this hemisphere 
toward giving people the basic human 
right of shaping their own future, of 
choosing their own leaders, of modify- 
ing and establishing the policies of their 
own government. 



It has not always been easy, even 
in this country, to maintain a strong 
commitment to human rights. As Patt 
Derian [Assistant Secretary for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs], sit- 
ting in the front row, responsible for 
this position in the State Department, 
so well knows, there are always delega- 
tions who come to me or to her or to 
Secretary Vance and say: "This par- 
ticular dictator has been a valuable ally 
of ours, and when the United States 
makes a critical remark about political 
prisoners who are being restrained or 
in jail or punished or executed, it tends 
to shake our relationship with that 
country." We've had to withstand those 
kinds of pressures, and I believe that in 
many instances we've been successful in 
that effort. ■ 



•For full text, see Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Oct. 29, 1979, 
p. 2009. 

Implementing the 
Human Rights 
Policy 

by Warren Christopher 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
May 2, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Dep- 
uty Secretary of State. 1 

May I begin by congratulating you 
on your new position as head of the 
House Subcommittee on International 
Organizations [Don Bonker of Washing- 
ton]. I hope and expect that we will 
continue the close and productive 
working relationship that has existed 
between the subcommittee and this 
Administration. 

As you know, this Administration 
has placed renewed emphasis on human 
rights objectives in the conduct of our 
foreign affairs. In this endeavor, we 
have had the benefit of this subcommit- 
tee's extensive interest and involve- 
ment in human rights issues. It has 
played a vital role, particularly through 
building a solid legislative foundation 
for the pursuit of human rights objec- 
tives in foreign affairs. Perhaps most 
significant was a 1976 amendment to 
the Foreign Assistance Act — an 
amendment that orignated in this sub- 
committee. It states: "A principal goal 
of the foreign policy of the United 
States shall be to promote the observ- 
ance of internationally recognized 
human rights." 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



Human Rights 



Today I would like to describe the 
steps that have been taken in the past 2 
years and 4 months to implement that 
directive. In particular, I would like to 
discuss three areas in which human 
rights considerations have become an 
integral, everyday part of the foreign 
policy process: first, reporting and 
evaluating information on human rights 
conditions; second, incorporating 
human rights into our diplomacy, both 
bilateral and multilateral; and third, 
bringing human rights considerations to 
bear on our foreign assistance pro- 
grams. 

Reporting and Evaluating 
Information 

A necessary first step in imple- 
menting an effective human rights pol- 
icy is the systematic collection and 
evaluation of basic data on human 
rights conditions throughout the world. 
Without balanced, objective, and de- 
tailed assessments of the human rights 
situation in a country, we cannot hope 
to have productive discussions with 
that country about possible improve- 
ments in the situation. 

In order to develop such assess- 
ments, we have sought information 
from many sources. Of course, a pri- 
mary source of information is our em- 
bassies abroad. All U.S. Ambassadors 
have been asked to report on human 
rights conditions in their host countries 
on a regular and detailed basis. 

We also rely on the published re- 
ports of nongovernmental human rights 
organizations, on reports of interna- 
tional organizations, on findings of con- 
gressional committees, on discussions 
with private U.S. citizens, and on other 
information in the public domain. 

Some of this information is inevi- 
tably controversial. Reports of serious 
human rights abuses often elicit official 
denials. Official claims of significant 
progress may be challenged by private 
human rights groups. We are careful to 
check and recheck the accuracy of criti- 
cal information and the reliability of its 
source. 

The information we collect is used 
both for internal decisionmaking and 
for preparing the annual reports re- 
quired by the Congress on human 
rights practices in countries receiving 
U.S. development or security assist- 
ance. I believe that if you compare the 
reports submitted for the 3 years Con- 
gress has required them, you will see a 
consistent improvement in their cover- 
age and quality. This year's reports 
cover over 650 pages and 115 countries. 
They include for the first time an over- 
all assessment of the human rights situ- 



ation worldwide. Also included is an 
appendix reporting on the compliance 
by East European countries with the 
human rights provisions of the Helsinki 
Final Act. 

We recognize, of course, that the 
assessment of human rights conditions 
is not an exact science. There are inevi- 
tably some questions of judgment on 
which reasonable people will differ. 
There are inevitably some elements of 
subjectivity which the most conscien- 
tious process of reporting and evalua- 
tion cannot eliminate. And there are in- 
evitably differences in the quantity and 
quality of data available on human 
rights practices around the world, de- 
pending for example, on the degree of 
contact of a particular country with the 
United States and other Western coun- 
tries or on the extent of foreign press 
coverage. 

Nevertheless, I believe we can 
have confidence in our overall apprais- 
als and in our identification of trends. 
And that is an essential predicate for an 
effective human rights policy. 

Diplomacy 

Let me turn to the diplomacy of 
human rights. The primary ingredient 
in this human rights diplomacy has a 
seeming simplicity: We frankly discuss 
human rights in our consultations with 
foreign diplomats and leaders. This may 
seem an obvious technique. But it is a 
dramatic change from past diplomatic 
practice. 

In the past, our diplomats tended 
to shy away from high-level dialogue on 
sensitive human rights issues, such as 
the fate of political prisoners. Now 
those issues are raised in face-to-face 
conversation. They are brought to the 
center of the diplomatic interchange, 
where they must be addressed rather 
than being conveniently ignored. 

In the case of governments which 
seriously restrict the rights of their 
citizens, we have expressed concern 
over specific abuses. Where countries 
have good records, we have encouraged 
such practices and invited support for 
our efforts. In all cases, we discuss the 
international legal foundation for rec- 
ognizing basic obligations owed by all 
governments to their citizens. We em- 
phasize, in addition, the high priority 
which the Congress and the American 
people attach to human rights concerns. 

We underline these discussions 
with actions, such as meeting with op- 
position political figures or with exiled 
victims of human rights abuses. For 



example, when President Carter visited 
Brazil last year, he met with a Brazilian 
human rights leader, as well as with of- 
ficials of the military government. 

In some circumstances, a public 
statement of concern or praise may be 
appropriate. We generally do not prefer 
to use public criticism, but we will not 
shrink from it where it can be effective. 

This bilateral diplomacy has been 
complemented by our multilateral ef- 
forts. We are participating actively in 
the consultations and conferences in 
which the 35 nations which signed the 
Helsinki Final Act are reviewing what 
has been done — and what has not been 
done. It is clear that the Soviet Union 
and the East European countries, in 
varying degrees, have not lived up to 
their human rights commitments. We 
have not hesitated to say so publicly. 
And we are persisting in our efforts to 
seek fuller compliance. The role of the 
congressional Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, under the 
wise and able leadership of Con- 
gressmen Dante Fascell, has been in- 
dispensable in this work. 

At the United Nations, we have 
pressed for more even-handed treat- 
ment of human rights issues. We re- 
main deeply disturbed by the unfair 
politicization of these issues in that 
body. But we believe that progress is 
being made toward establishing fair 
procedures that can lead to broader and 
more objective consideration of human 
rights issues by the United Nations. 

In the Western Hemisphere, we 
are working to strengthen the inter- 
governmental machinery for protecting 
human rights. The authority and staff 
of the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission have been increased. Last 
year the Commission reported on viola- 
tions in Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay; and the Commission has 
accepted an invitation to visit Argen- 
tina this year. 

Foreign Assistance Programs 

These and other efforts at quiet 
diplomacy are in many ways our most 
effective tools in promoting human 
rights. But we are also prepared to 
support our words with actions — to 
take tangible steps to recognize good 
human rights performance or to man- 
ifest our concern over human rights 
violations. I would like to discuss one 
such area — namely, the way we are 
bringing human rights considerations to 
bear on our foreign assistance pro- 
grams. 

Our foreign assistance programs 
are an essential tool in promoting a 
broad category of internationally rec- 






January 1980 



33 



Human Rights 



ognized human rights — rights to ful- 
fillment of such vital needs as food, 
shelter, health care, and education. In 
the face of severe budget pressures, the 
President proposed significant in- 
creases in development assistance for 
1979 and 1980. At the same time, we 
are attempting to channel a growing 
share of our economic aid to countries 
that respect the human rights of their 
people. The President reaffirmed this 
policy a few months ago when he said: 

In distributing the scarce resources of 
our foreign assistance programs, we will 
demonstrate that our deepest affinities are 
with nations which commit themselves to a 
democratic path to development. 

Congress has played an active role 
in this area by mandating that human 
rights considerations be taken into ac- 
count in decisions to provide aid to 
some countries and deny it to others. It 
has enacted a broad range of statutes 
which restrict the flow of economic and 
military assistance to countries with 
serious human rights problems. Re- 
strictions of varying kinds apply, for 
example, to our economic assistance, 
our military assistance and sales, our 
PL-480 food aid, and our votes on loans 
in the World Bank and other interna- 
tional development banks. 

Congress passed many of these 
provisions before the Carter Adminis- 
tration came into office and others more 
recently. For example, in the last ses- 
sion of Congress, new legislation was 
passed requiring the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation to take into ac- 
count human rights considerations in 
the conduct of its programs abroad. In 
that same session, Congress also 
strengthened the restriction on pro- 
viding security assistance to serious 
human rights violators. 

We are commited to carrying out 
the letter and the spirit of these laws. 
To assist in these efforts, the Inter- 
agency Group on Human Rights and 
Foreign Assistance was established in 
the early months of the Administration 
to provide a broad and open forum for 
discussion within the executive branch 
of human rights issues relating to 
foreign assistance programs. The mem- 
bership includes representatives from 
the Departments of State, Defense, 
Labor, Treasury, Commerce, and Ag- 
riculture, from the National Security 
Council and the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development, and from other 
agencies that have a potential interest 
in the deliberations of the group. 

In applying the relevant statute to 
a particular loan, grant, or program, 
this interagency group generally con- 



siders a wide range of factors, including 
the following: 

• The present human rights situa- 
tion in the recipient country and any 
positive or negative trend; 

• The political, economic, and cul- 
tural background of the country and the 
level of human rights performance that 
can reasonably be expected of the coun- 
try in light of that background; 

• The other fundamental U.S. 
interests with respect to that country; 

• The extent to which a loan will 
directly benefit the needy; and 

• The effectiveness of a decision to 
defer or oppose a loan in comparison or 
in combination with any of the available 
diplomatic tools for indicating our con- 
cern about human rights violations. 

The interagency group is by no 
means the only forum in which issues 
relating to human rights and foreign as- 
sistance are discussed. For example, 
human rights aspects of arms transfers 
are generally considered by the Arms 
Export Control Board, which is respon- 
sible for formulating our security as- 
sistance programs. 

Over the past 2 years, the agencies 
participating in these and other groups 
have gained valuable experience in 
carrying out the new function of sys- 
tematically bringing human rights con- 
siderations to bear on foreign 
assistance decisions. Working groups 
have been established which, in an in- 
creasing number of cases, are able to 
develop consensus recommendations 
that eliminate the need for higher level 
review. 

Perhaps most useful in promoting 
the smooth functioning of this inter- 
agency process has been the emergence 
of a number of general principles which 
have come to guide our decisionmaking. 
We have not tried to formalize these 
principles because we wished to pro- 
ceed cautiously and deliberately in im- 
plementing a new and controversial 
policy and because we wished to re- 
spond flexibly to the widely varying 
circumstances presented by particular 
countries and particular programs. 

U.S. Guidelines 

However, I think it is now appro- 
priate to mention a few of these 
guidelines that have developed over the 
more than 2 years that we have been 
addressing these problems. 

• We attach fundamental impor- 
tance to all three basic categories of in- 
ternationally recognized human 
rights — that is, personal, economic, 



and political rights. We are prepared to 
react to flagrant denials of any of these 
rights, but we have found in practice 
that we are most often called to re- 
spond to flagrant violations of personal 
rights such as widespread systematic 
torture or arbitrary executions. 

• The most effective strategy for 
obtaining human rights improvements 
is one that combines the full range of 
diplomatic approaches with a willing- 
ness to adjust our foreign assistance 
programs as required. No element in 
the overall strategy can be as effective 
alone as in combination with others. In 
addition, the use of these various ele- 
ments must be calibrated and sequen- 
tial, conveying our concerns in a 
steady, even way while avoiding sud- 
den escalations. 

• Bilateral or multilateral economic 
assistance that directly benefits the 
needy is rarely disapproved, even to 
governments with poor human rights 
records. Disapproval could penalize the 
poor because of their government's 
misdeeds. 

• Only compelling considerations of 
national security can justify providing 
security assistance to countries with 
very serious human rights problems. 
Even where these considerations re- 
quire us to go forward with military 
sales to such a country, we still restrict 
sales to the police or others involved in 
human rights abuses. And we take par- 
ticular care to convey our human rights 
concerns through other diplomatic in- 
struments. 

• Decisions to extend or withhold 
assistance are often taken on the basis 
of trends in human rights conditions, as 
well as the overall level of performance. 

It should be apparent from these 
five principles that we do not rigidly 
adopt the same approach to foreign as- 
sistance decisions just because two 
countries have a similar human rights 
situation. Our decisions are influenced 
by other factors — factors such as the 
presence of other important U.S. inter- 
ests, conditions, and traditions unique 
to a particular foreign country and con- 
siderations of effectiveness and tactics. 
What does remain constant in our ap- 
proach to human rights problems 
around the world is our determination 
to bring these concerns to bear on 
foreign assistance programs in a con- 
scientious process that fully reflects the 
will of Congress. 

I have discussed the implementa- 
tion of the human rights policy in three 
areas — reporting, diplomacy, and 
foreign assistance. Let me turn now to 
address briefly what I believe we have 
accomplished with this policy. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



SPECIAL 

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 



Following are President Carter's address to the nation on 
January 4, 1980, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Donald F. 
McHenry's statement in the Security Council on January 6, 
and the text of the draft Security Council resolution cospo)i- 
sored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, the Philippines, and 
Zambia. Whe)i the Council voted on the draft resolution on 
January 7, it was vetoed by the Soviet Union and not adopted (a 
veto by a permane>/t member of the Council prevents adoption 
of a resolution). Members of the Council which voted in favor of 
the draft resolution were Bangladesh, China, France, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Zambia. The Soviet 
Union and the German Democratic Republic voted against the 
resolution. 



PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, 
JAN. 4, 1980» 



I come to you this evening to discuss the 
extremely important and rapidly chang- 
ing circumstances in Southwest Asia. 

I continue to share with you the 
sense of outrage and impatience because 
of the kidnapping of innocent American 
hostages and the holding of them by 
militant terrorists with the support and 
approval of Iranian officials. 

Our purposes continue to be the pro- 
tection of the long-range interests of our 
Nation and the safety of the American 
hostages. 

We are attempting to secure the re- 
lease of the Americans through the In- 
ternational Court of Justice, through the 
United Nations, and through public and 
private diplomatic efforts. We are deter- 
mined to achieve this goal. We hope to do 
so without bloodshed and without further 
danger to the lives of our 50 fellow Amer- 
icans. In these efforts we continue to 
have the strong support of the world 
community. The unity and the common 
sense of the American people under such 
trying circumstances are essential to the 
success of our efforts. 

Recently there has been another 
very serious development which 
threatens the maintenance of the peace in 
Southwest Asia. Massive Soviet military 
forces have invaded the small non-aligned 
sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which 
had hitherto not been an occupied satel- 
lite of the Soviet Union. 

Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet 
troops have crossed the border, and are 
now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, 
attempting to conquer the fiercely inde- 
pendent Muslim people of that country. 

The Soviets claim falsely that they 
were invited into Afghanistan to help 



protect that country from some unnamed 
outside threat. But the President, who 
had been the leader of Afghanistan before 
the Soviet invasion, was assassinated — 
along with several members of his 
family — after the Soviets gained control 
of the capital city of Kabul. 

Only several days later was the new 
puppet leader even brought into Af- 
ghanistan by the Soviets. 

This invasion is an extremely serious 
threat to peace — because of the threat of 
further Soviet expansion into neighbor- 
ing countries in Southwest Asia, and also 
because such an aggressive military pol- 
icy is unsettling to other peoples, 
throughout the world. 

This is a callous violation of interna- 
tional law and the United Nations Char- 
ter. 

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful 
atheistic government to subjugate an 
independent Islamic people. 

We must recognize the strategic im- 
portance of Afghanistan to stability and 
peace. 

A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan 
threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a 
stepping stone to possible control over 
much of the world's oil supplies. 

The United States wants all nations 
in the region to be free and to be inde- 
pendent. If the Soviets are encouraged in 
this invasion by eventual success, and if 
they maintain their dominance over Af- 
ghanistan and then extend their control 
to adjacent countries — the stable, stra- 
tegic and peaceful balance of the entire 
world will be changed. This would 
threaten the security of all nations includ- 
ing, of course, the United States, our al- 
lies and our friends. 

Therefore, the world simply cannot 
stand by and permit the Soviet Union to 
commit this act with impunity. 



Fifty nations have petitioned the 
United Nations Security Council to con- 
demn the Soviet Union and to demand 
the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan. 

We realize that under the United Na- 
tions Charter the Soviet Union and other 
permanent members may veto action of 
the Security Council. 

If the will of the Security Council 
should be thwarted in this manner, then 
immediate action would be appropriate in 
the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions where no Soviet veto exists. 

In the meantime, neither the United 
States nor any other nation which is 
committed to world peace and stability 
can continue to do business as usual with 
the Soviet Union. 

I have already recalled the United 
States Ambassador from Moscow to 
Washington. He is working with me and 
my other senior advisors in an immediate 
and comprehensive evaluation of the 
whole range of our relations with the 
Soviet Union. 

The successful negotiation of the 
SALT II Treaty has been a major goal 
and a major achievement of this Adminis- 
tration — and we Americans, the people of 
the Soviet Union, and indeed the entire 
world will benefit from the successful 
control of strategic nuclear weapons 
through the implementation of this care- 
fully negotiated Treaty. 

However, because of the Soviet ag- 
gression, I have asked the United States 
Senate to defer further consideration of 
the SALT II Treaty so that the Congress 
and I can assess Soviet actions and inten- 
tions and devote our primary attention to 
the legislative and other measures re- 
quired to respond to this crisis. 

As circumstances change in the fu- 
ture we will, of course, keep the ratifica- 
tion of SALT II under active review in 






January 1980 



Special 



consultation with the leaders of the Sen- 
ate. 

The Soviets must understand our 
deep concern. 

We will delay opening of any new 
American or Soviet Consular facilities, 
and most of the cultural and economic ex- 
changes currently under consideration 
will be deferred. Trade with the Soviet 
Union will be severely restricted. 

I have decided to halt or reduce ex- 
ports to the Soviet Union in three areas 
that are particularly important to them. 
These new policies are being and will be 
coordinated with those of our allies. 

I have directed that no sales of high 
technology or other strategic items will 
be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union 
until further notice, while we revise our 
licensing policy. 

Fishing privileges for the Soviet 
Union in United States waters will be se- 
verely curtailed. 

The 17 million tons of grain ordered 
by the Soviet Union in excess of that 
amount which we are committed to sell 
will not be delivered. This grain was not 
intended for human consumption but was 
to be used for building up Soviet live- 
stock herds. 

I am determined to minimize any ad- 
verse impact on the American farmer 
from this action. The undelivered grain 
will be removed from the market through 
storage and price support programs and 
through purchases at market prices. We 
will also increase amounts of grain de- 
voted to the alleviation of hunger in poor 
countries and we will have a massive in- 
crease of the use of grain for gasohol 
production here at home. 

After consultation with other princi- 
pal grain exporting nations, I am confi- 
dent that they will not replace these 
quantities of grain by additional ship- 
ments on their part to the Soviet Union. 

These actions will require some sac- 
rifice on the part of all Americans, but 
there is absolutely no doubt that these 
actions are in the interest of world peace 
and in the interest of the security of our 
own nation and they are also compatible 
with actions being taken by our own 
major trading partners and others who 
share our deep concern about this new 
Soviet threat to world stability. 

Although the United States would 
prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic 
games scheduled in Moscow this summer, 
the Soviet Union must realize that its 
continued aggressive actions will 
endanger both the participation of ath- 
letes and the travel to Moscow by spec- 
tators who would normally wish to attend 
the Olympic games. 



Along with other countries we will 
provide military equipment, food, and 
other assistance to help Pakistan defend 
its independence and its national security 
against the seriously increased threat it 
now faces from the North. The United 
States also stands ready to help other na- 
tions in the region in similar ways. 

Neither our allies nor our potential 
adversaries should have the slightest 
doubt about our willingness, our deter- 
mination, and our capacity to take the 
measures I have outlined tonight. 

I have consulted with leaders of the 
Congress and I am confident they will 
support legislation that may be required 
to carry out these measures. 

History teaches perhaps very few 
clear lessons. But surely one such lesson 
learned by the world at great cost is that 
aggression unopposed becomes a con- 
tagious disease. 

The response of the international 
community to the Soviet attempt to crush 
Afghanistan must match the gravity of 
the Soviet action. 

With the support of the American 
people and working with other nations, 
we will deter aggression, we will protect 
our nation's security, and we will pre- 
serve the peace. 

The United States will meet its re- 
sponsibilities. 



AMBASSADOR McHENRY, 
JAN. 6, 1980 2 



The Security Council meets today, at the 
request of more than 50 members of the 
United Nations from all parts of the 
world and of all political persuasions. We 
meet to consider a matter of fundamental 
importance to world peace and to the 
principles on which the United Nations 
was founded. 

A member state of this world organi- 
zation has been invaded by massive con- 
tingents of troops from another state. Its 
government has been overthrown. Its 
leaders have been killed. Its people have 
been silenced. Its territory has been oc- 
cupied. 

The United States has joined in the 
call for an urgent meeting of the Security 
Council to consider the Soviet Union's 
blatant act of aggression against the ter- 
ritory and people of Afghanistan. We 
have done so because the action of the 
Soviet Union not only breaches the peace 
and violates international law, but also 



threatens the viability of the fundamental 
principles that underlie the U.N. Charter. 

Sequence of Events 

The representative of the Soviet Union 
has offered us a wide and confusing range 
of rationales for the so-called "limited" 
but surely deadly assistance foisted on 
the people of Afghanistan. Let us look at 
the chilling sequence of events connected 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 

• During the first weeks of Decem- 
ber, the Soviet Union secured Bagram 
airfield, north of the Afghan capital of 
Kabul, by sending the equivalent of an 
airborne regiment there. It also landed 
troops and equipment at the Kabul air- 
port and, at the same time, mobilized 
enormous forces in areas bordering Af- 
ghanistan. 

• On December 25 and 26, a massive 
Soviet airlift into Kabul took place. In 
over 200 flights, roughly 10,000 Soviet 
troops were transported into Afghanis- 
tan. 

• On the evening of December 27, a 
special Soviet assault unit surrounded the 
presidential palace in Kabul. Afghan sol- 
diers defending the palace were attacked 
and overcome, and President Amin was 
summarily executed. Simultaneously, 
Soviet troops attacked Afghan forces 
guarding radio Afghanistan and other key 
government installations and took them 
under control. 

• The first announcement of the 
Soviet-engineered coup d'etat, and the 
replacement of President Amin by Bab- 
rak Karmal, who had been in exile in 
Eastern Europe, was made using fre- 
quencies purporting to be Radio Kabul. 
In fact, the transmitters from which 
these announcements were made were lo- 
cated in the Soviet Union. We know this 
because the real Radio Kabul continued 
normal transmissions for at least lVfe 
hours after these announcements were 
first heard. Nothing in these broadcasts 
from Kabul confirmed the content of the 
Soviet broadcast disseminated in Af- 
ghanistan's name. 

• Subsequently, Soviet troops cap- 
tured all key civilian and military instal- 
lations in the Kabul area and established 
a defense perimeter around Kabul. Af- 
ghan military forces have been disarmed. 

• Immediately after the coup, two 
Soviet motorized rifle divisions entered 
Afghanistan by land, one at Kushka and 
the other at Termez. Elements of the 
western division arrived at Herat, where 
fighting between Soviet and Afghan 
forces was reported. Much of the Termez 
division proceeded to the Kabul area. 



Department of State Bulletin 






Special 



• The Soviet Union now has up to 
50,000 troops in Afghanistan. There are 
indications that other Soviet divisions are 
moving into the Soviet-Afghan border. 
Soviet forces have moved out to secure 
other key towns. 

The Soviet Union has claimed that 
the leadership of Afghanistan requested 
Soviet military assistance. Which leader- 
ship? It is beyond doubt that President 
Amin was still in office when the Soviet 
troops attacked the presidential palace 
and when he was executed. Are we to be- 
lieve that President Amin invited Soviet 
troops to come into Afghanistan in order 
to oversee his own downfall and his own 
execution? Or was it the leadership of 
Babrak Karmal, President Amin's 
Soviet-appointed successor, a man who 
was not even in Afghanistan at the time 
of the Soviet intervention but was, 
rather, in the Soviet Union? 



U.N. Principles 

The armed intervention of the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan and the presence of 
an uninvited occupation force in that 
country is a gross and blatant violation of 
the most important principles of interna- 
tional law and of the U.N. Charter. What 
are those principles? 

• That one state must not use force 
against the territorial integrity and polit- 
ical independence of another state; 

• That a state must not intervene by 
force in the internal affairs of another 
state; 

• That all states must respect the 
principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples; 

• That fundamental principles of 
human rights must be respected by all 
governments; and 



Article 51 of U.N. Charter 

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in 
the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 



The Afghan people and Afghan army 
units have resisted this Soviet aggres- 
sion, despite the overwhelming military 
superiority of the invader. Fighting con- 
tinues in several areas of the country. 

The facts of the situation are clear. 
Over a period of months, the Soviet 
Union carefully planned and prepared to 
invade Afghanistan, because it was dis- 
satisfied with the degree of subservience 
of the Amin government and undoubtedly 
with its performance against Moslem in- 
surgents in Afghanistan who long have 
been struggling for their rights. The 
Soviet Union then carried out its military 
operation — quickly and brutally. They of- 
fered no recourse whatsoever to the au- 
thorities then in power in Afghanistan. 
The Soviet Union overthrew the Amin 
government, which it had previously 
supported, and replaced it with a puppet 
regime. 



• That states must settle interna- 
tional disputes by peaceful means. 

The Soviet claim that it was acting in 
furtherance of collective self-defense 
under Article 51 of the Charter is a per- 
version of the Charter — an insult to the 
intelligence of the members of this Coun- 
cil. Article 51 can be invoked only "if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations." From whence came 
the armed attack on Afghanistan? The 
only armed attack on Afghanistan was 
the one launched by the Soviet Union. No 
one can believe the claim that the Soviet 
Union was requested by the Afghan Gov- 
ernment to intervene in Afghanistan in 
the fashion in which it did, unless one also 
believes that President Amin invited the 
Soviet Union in to overthrow him. Arti- 
cle 51 of the Charter requires that meas- 
ures taken by members in exercise of 
their right of self-defense "shall be imme- 
diately reported to the Security Council 



and shall not in any way affect the au- 
thority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the . . . Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems neces- 
sary in order to maintain or restore in- 
ternational peace and security. " That 
neither the Soviet Union, nor the puppet 
regime it has installed in power in Kabul, 
has given the required notice to the Secu- 
rity Council under article 51 is itself evi- 
dence of the hollowness of the Soviet 
Union's refuge behind the Charter. 

Nor can one believe that the Soviet 
Union was requested by the Afghan Gov- 
ernment to intervene in Afghanistan pur- 
suant to the terms of the so-called Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation it entered 
into with that country in 1978. For the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violates 
the Soviet Union's obligation, under the 
terms of the treaty, to respect Afghanis- 
tan's national sovereignty and to refrain 
from interfering in its internal affairs. 

The U.N. Charter does not give the 
Soviet Union or any nation, the right to 
take military action in another country or 
to replace its government because it dis- 
agrees with the policies or performance of 
the existing government. The fact is that 
the Soviet Union has flouted interna- 
tional law and has violated regional and 
international peace and stability. That the 
Soviet Union has done so with cold calcu- 
lation and advance planning, in an area of 
the world which is now experiencing par- 
ticular instability and tension, makes its 
act even more egregious and irresponsi- 
ble. That the Soviet Union is taking mili- 
tary action against a deeply religious and 
fiercely independent people, who are 
struggling for human and religious rights, 
underscores the brutality and illegality of 
its action. 

The Need for U.N. Action 

Accordingly, it remains for this Council to 
take action under the Charter to restore 
international peace and security. 

A terrible miscalculation has been 
made by Soviet authorities. The ramifica- 
tions of the Soviet intervention in Af- 
ghanistan are enormous. For no state will 
be safe against a larger and more power- 
ful neighbor if the international commu- 
nity appears to condone the Soviet Union's 
armed intervention. This must be of 
particular concern to states whose ter- 
ritories lie near the Soviet borders. 

It is, therefore, incumbent upon this 
Council and upon every nation that be- 
lieves in the rule of law and opposes the 
use of force in international affairs to de- 
nounce this dangerous breach of peace 
and security. It is incumbent upon this 



January 1980 



Special 



Council to make the weight of world opin- 
ion felt. 

We note that the Soviet Union has 
stated that it intends to withdraw its 
troops from Afghanistan at some point. 
We urge the Soviet Union to do so imme- 
diately and to allow the people of Af- 
ghanistan to conduct their own affairs, to 
choose their own system of government, 
to choose their own national leaders 
without outside pressure and interfer- 
ence. Only in this way can the grave 
threat to international peace and security 
created by the Soviet Union be di- 
minished and this most serious challenge 
to the basic principles of the United Na- 
tions be removed. 

No state, not even a great power, can 
be allowed to ignore with impunity the 
responsibilities, obligations, and com- 
mitments it assumed when it became a 
member of the United Nations. The 
United States therefore calls on all mem- 
bers of the Council to act vigorously in 
discharge of their Charter obligations. 



DRAFT RESOLUTION, 
JAN. 7, 1980 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the letter dated 3 Jan- 
uary 1980 addressed to the President of the 
Security Council (S/13724 and Add.l and 2), 

Gravely concerned over recent develop- 
ments in Afghanistan and their implications for 
international peace and security, 

Reaffirming the right of all peoples to de- 
termine their own future free from outside in- 
terference, including their right to choose their 
own form of government, 

Mindful of the obligations of Member 
States to refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the ter- 
ritorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations, 

1. Reaffirms anew its conviction that the 
preservation of sovereignty, territorial integ- 
rity and political independence of every State 
is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the 
United Nations, any violation of which on any 
pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and 
purposes; 

2. Deeply deplores the recent armed 
intervention in Afghanistan, which is incon- 
sistent with that principle; 

3. Affirms that the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, political independence and non- 
aligned status of Afghanistan must be fully re- 
spected; 

4. Calls for the immediate and uncondi- 
tional withdrawal of all foreign troops from 
Afghanistan in order to enable its people to de- 
termine their own form of government and 
choose their economic, political and social sys- 
tems free from outside intervention, coercion 
or constraint of any kind whatsoever; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to 
submit a report on progress towards the im- 
plementation of this resolution within two 
weeks; 

6. Decides to remain seized of this ques- 
tion. 



{Documentation concerning tak- 
ing the question of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan to the General Assem- 
bly will he published in the February 
1980 Bulletin.] ■ 



•Broadcast live on television and radio 
from the Oval Office (text from White 
House press release). 

2 USUN press release 1. 



Department of State Bulletin 



World Opinion on the Holding 
of U.S. Hostages in Iran 



Folloiring is a partial list of public actions take)! by gov- 
ernments, international organizations (both governmental and 
nongovernmental), and prominent persons supporting efforts to 
assure the safety and release of the U.S. hostages in Iran. 



Special 



November 4 

West European Embassies (Nov. 
4-5) inform U.S. of developments in 
Tehran and offer to assist in efforts for 
release of hostages 

November 6 

U.N. Security Council. Issues 
statement on behalf of Secretary Gen- 
eral Waldheim expressing extreme con- 
cern about the situation in Iran and of- 
fering his assistance. 

Canada. House of Commons ap- 
proves resolution to protest to the Ira- 
nian Government against an "act of 
criminal aggression." 

November 7 

Turkish Ambassador attempts to 
visit hostages. 

November 8 

Liberia. President Tolbert appeals 
to the Ayatollah Khomeini for release of 
hostages on humanitarian grounds. 

Canadians visit Charge d'Affaires 
L. Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S. dip- 
lomatic official held hostage in Tehran. 

U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher an- 
nounces that the United Kingdom will 
continue to do everything possible to 
assist the United States. 

November 9 

U.N. General Assembly. President 
Salim Ahmed Salim issues a statement 
expressing his concern for the safety 
and security of hostages and announces 
he is sending a personal message to 
Khomeini appealing for their release. 

U.N. Security Council. President 
Palacios de Vizzio reads a statement 
expressing the Council's profound con- 
cern over prolonged detention of hos- 
tages and states that the taking of hos- 
tages is in violation of internationally 
accepted norms. 



European Community Ambas- 
sadors join in demarche to Iran's 
Foreign Ministry, urging access to the 
U.S. Charge and hostages. 

November 10 

Cape Verde. Voz de Povo, a Cape 
Verde newspaper which speaks for the 
government party, comments that "in- 
vasion of the American Embassy in 
Tehran runs counter to all the princi- 
ples of conduct of relations and coexist- 
ence among nations." 

Algerian, French, Swedish, and 
Syrian Ambassadors visit hostages. 

EC-9 Ambassadors call at the Ira- 
nian Foreign Ministry to express their 
governments' concern over violations of 
diplomatic immunity. 

Swiss Ambassador appeals to Ira- 
nian Foreign Ministry to release women 
hostages as a humanitarian gesture. 



November 11-12 

Pakistan. In response to Secretary 
General Waldheim's request, major 
newspapers report that President Zia 
Ul-Haq sent a special message to Kho- 
meini appealing for release of hostages. 

November 12 

EC-9 Ambassadors again visit the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry. 

November 13 

Prince Sihanouk, in a message to 
Khomeini, asks that he grant mercy to 
the hostages "who are in no way re- 
sponsible for the actions of their gov- 
ernment." 

Norway. Undersecretary Hoist 
states that the Norweigen Government 
views the use of hostages as an intoler- 
able mechanism and points out that it is 
equally intolerable that Iranian au- 
thorities condone the violation of dip- 
lomatic immunity. 



November 14 

Brazil. In columns and editorials, 
newspapers criticize Khomeini govern- 
ment, and several applaude U.S. re- 
straint. 

Netherlands. Foreign Minister van 
der Klaauw expresses deep concern and 
states that the principle of inviolability 
of diplomatic missions and personnel 
must be upheld. 

In Paris, the International 
Human Rights Federation, which de- 
nounced the Shah's rule some time ago, 
states that Iran's demand to return a 
"sick man" is unjustified and urges un- 
conditional release of hostages. 

November 15 

West Germany. Economic Minister 
Lambsdorff states that the F.R.G. will 
take no action to undermine the U.S. oil 
embargo. 

Kenya. A statement by President 
Moi, broadcast on the "Voice of 
Kenya," states in part that "whatever 
crimes might have been committed by 
the Shah during his reign," the taking 
of hostages to coerce the U.S. Govern- 
ment to return him for trial "consti- 
tutes a serious breach of diplomatic in- 
tercourse and must be viewed with dis- 
approval by the entire international 
community." 

India. The Times carries a letter 
by a prominent Indian Moslem, Bad- 
ruddin Tyabji, expressing his hope that 
Khomeini will remind the students of the 
distinguished Islamic traditions of 
chivalry, hospitality, and generosity. 

Paraguay. Senate, in a unanimous 
vote, issues a strong statement re- 
nouncing the action of Iranian au- 
thorities. 

New Zealand. Government expres- 
ses its profound concern about the Ira- 
nian situation and associates itself with 
the statement made by Security Coun- 
cil President Palacios on November 9 
urging immediate release of hostages. 

Malaysia. Press refers to U.S. ac- 
tion as "commendably restrained" and 






January 1980 



Special 



most state that the United States can- 
not be expected to bow to pressure by 
meeting the Iranian Government's de- 
mands. 

London Times states that if the 
United States were to yield to Iranian 
Government pressure, such action 
would invite lawless governments or 
unscrupulous armed groups worldwide 
to seize U.S. diplomats as hostages and 
hold them for ransom. 

Resolution is adopted by the Euro- 
pean Parliament condemning deten- 
tion of U.S. diplomatic personnel in 
Tehran and expressing solidarity with 
all those who oppose the seizure of hos- 
tages. 

Bangladesh. Daily newspaper, It- 
tefaq, calls the Iranian occupation of the 
U.S. Embassy and the taking of hos- 
tages a disgrace for the entire nation. 
In the Sangbad, often anti-U.S., a col- 
umnist says that action by Iranian stu- 
dents violates all practiced diplomatic 
norms and cannot be supported. 

November 17 

Paraguay. Press editorial expres- 
ses outrage at Iranian action. 

Norway. Press is uniformly sup- 
portive of President Carter and 
strongly condemns Iranian authorities 
for their breaches of diplomatic immu- 
nity. 

West Germany. Chancellor 
Schmidt announces West Germany's 
"full solidarity with the American na- 
tion and the American leadership" in 
the Iranian crisis. 

November 18 

Swiss Ambassador in Tehran as- 
sists in coordinating evacuation of hos- 
tages scheduled for release. 

November 19 

Papua New Guinea. Government 
states that it regards the seizure of 
hostages under any pretext as indefen- 
sible, and the taking of diplomatic per- 
sonnel as hostages, in violation of in- 
ternational law and the canons of 
civilized behavior, as especially rep- 
rehensible. 

Cyprus. Union of Members of the 
Foreign Service delivers a message to 
the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, express- 
ing to the families of the hostages their 
sympathy and their support. 

Liberia. President Tolbert again 
writes Khomeini appealing for release of 
hostages on religious, moral, human- 
itarian, and international legal grounds. 



Dominican Republic. Both houses 
of Parliament pass resolutions de- 
nouncing the taking of hostages and the 
invasion of the Embassy. 

Turkish Ambassador visits 
Laingen. 

November 20 

Swedish Ambassador visits 
Laingen. 

Finland. Foreign Minister Vayry- 
nen says Finland considers the Vienna 
convention on diplomatic relations a 
central part of international law, and it 
should be respected by every govern- 
ment. 

Netherlands. Parliament passes a 
resolution condemning the hostage 
taking and expressing support for Sec- 
retary General Waldheim's efforts to 
reach a peaceful solution. 

Portugal. Government issues a 
statement calling the Embassy 
takeover a "grave act which collides 
frontally with the basic norms of inter- 
national law and coexistence." 

EC-9 Foreign Ministers Council 
condemns "any attempt to exert pres- 
sure on governments by the taking of 
hostages." 

Guyana. Foreign Ministry con- 
demns the holding of U.S. hostages. 

Australia. Foreign Minister 
Peacock declares that the holding of 
hostages conflicts with Iran's obliga- 
tions under international law and can- 
not be justified in any circumstances. 
He adds he would "strongly deplore" 
any so-called trial of hostages. 

Venezuela. President of the 
Chamber of Deputies, Carlos Canache 
Mata, writes that Khomeini is a 
"medieval fanatic" who has "edited God 
out of the Koran." 

Togo. President Eyadema calls for 
release of hostages. 

EC-9 Foreign Minister's Council 
issues a statement denouncing the 
holding of hostages and the threat to 
put them on trial as a breach of interna- 
tional law, concluding that the Iranian 
Government failed to fulfill its obliga- 
tions under international law to protect 
diplomats and embassy premises. 

West Germany. Chancellor 
Schmidt informs President Carter of 
West Germany's wholehearted support 
in the U.S. -Iranian crisis and pledges 
to assist in securing release of hos- 
tages. 

Secretary General Waldheim, 
through the U.N. press spokesman, ex- 
presses deep concern over the con- 
tinued detention of hostages. He 



stresses that the hostage-taking con- 
travenes diplomatic conventions and a 
U.N. resolution to which Iran was a 
party. 

U.N. General Assembly. President 
Salim Ahmed Salim issues a statement 
expressing his personal gratification 
and appreciation at the release of 13 
hostages and recalls the appeal he ad- 
dressed to Khomeini on November 9. 

November 21 

Australia. Foreign Minister 
Peacock states he deplores the taking of 
hostages. 

Honduras. General Paz sends a 
message to Khomeini appealing for re- 
lease of hostages. 

Sweden. Foreign Minister states 
that the takeover of the Embassy is of 
the utmost gravity because a govern- 
ment is behind the violation of interna- 
tional law. 

Jamaica. Government issues an 
appeal to Iranian authorities to insure 
the release of hostages and cessation of 
the occupation of the Embassy. 

Mexico. Government expresses 
sympathy with the United States and a 
desire to be helpful. It publicly declares 
that the Shah is welcome to return to 
Mexico. 

Tanzania. President Nyerere 
sends a strong personal message to 
Khomeini urging the prompt release of 
hostages. 

Zambia. President Kaunda writes 
Khomeini as a fellow revolutionary. 

Zaire. President Mobutu and 
Foreign Minister Nguza send messages 
to Khomeini and acting Foreign Minis- 
ter Bani-Sadr, respectively. 

Senegal. On orders from President 
Senghor, the Prime Minister makes an 
official protest against the taking of 
hostages to the Iranian Charge. 

Cameroon. President Ahidjo 
promises a government communique on 
the situation and views that as the only 
effective avenue available to Cameroon. 

Botswana. In Parliament, Foreign 
Minister Mogwe makes what the local 
radio terms "a strong statement" on the 
Iranian situation. 

Sierra Leone. Government issues a 
statement which is carried on the local 
media and sent to Iran. 

Mauritius. Minister of External 
Affairs sends a message to Tehran 
urging release of hostages. 

Mozambique. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to U.N. informs the Iranian 
Charge that Iran's action is unaccept- 
able and is criticized by almost all gov- 
ernments. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Special 



Rwanda. Government sends U.S. 
Embassy a diplomatic note expressing 
support. 

Mauritania. Prime Minister de- 
clines public support for U.S. efforts or 
to intervene with Iranian authorities. 
The government also turns down an 
Iranian request for support. 

Tanzania. Student organization of 
the political party at Dar es Salaam 
University passes a resolution and is- 
sues a statement calling the holding of 
hostages inhumane and indefensible and 
appeals for their unconditional and im- 
mediate release. 

Guyana. Foreign Minister tells the 
press he is especially disturbed over 
the events in Iran. The Foreign Minis- 
ter announces that he has written to 
Cuban Premier Castro proposing that 
the nonaligned movement help resolve 
the conflict. 

Panama. Permanent Mission to 
U.N. expresses dismay and concern 
that a large number of Embassy per- 
sonnel are still held captive and remain 
a prey to terror and uncertainty. Under 
the Vienna convention, they call for 
release of hostages. 

France. Government says all must 
obey rules that govern diplomatic im- 
munity and which conform with univer- 
sal law. 

Canada. Former Prime Minister 
Trudeau, in Parliament, calls for 
Canada to do all possible to support the 
United States in its present situation 
and to take the lead in mobilizing inter- 
national support. 

Greece. Government, through its 
Charge d' Affaires in Tehran, partici- 
pates in a joint action by ambassadors 
requesting release of hostages. 

November 22 

Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe notes that Iranian 
action "constitutes a flagrant violation 
of the most elementary rules of interna- 
tional law . . . [and] appeals to the Ira- 
nian authorities to see that the hos- 
tages are released immediately." 

Austria. Foreign Minister Wil- 
libald Pahr calls the taking of hostages 
an outrageous violation of international 
law and the Vienna convention. 

Nepal. Student association issues 
a statement praising Iranian students 
for their role in bringing down the 
Shah, but calls their conditions for re- 
lease of hostages "fanatic" and 
"bizarre." 

Mauritius. National Moslem Coun- 
cil sends a message to Khomeini uring 



release of hostages to mark the occas- 
sion of Muharram. 

South Africa. Moslem Judicial 
Council of Cape Province cables Kho- 
meini seeking release of hostages and 
stating that holding them for the crime 
of another is not in accordance with Is- 
lamic teachings. The Cape Times car- 
ries the cable as well. 

Singapore. Government appeals to 
the Iranian Government to release hos- 
tages, stating that diplomatic immunity 
has been the cardinal principle of inter- 
national relations, and any breach 
would render it impossible for peaceful 
exchanges and contacts between na- 
tions. 

Libya. Radio reports that Libya 
does not support any action against 
diplomatic missions and their staff 
members, and in principle, it is against 
any action directed against missions 
and the holding of staff members as 
hostages. 

November 23 

Turkey. Prime Minister Demirel 
states that his government disapproves 
of events occurring in Iran. 

Poland. Primate Stefan Wyszinski 
appeals publicly to Iran to release hos- 
tages. 

Spain. Council of Ministers urges 
release of hostages and stresses accept- 
ance of international relations. 

Spain. Leading weekly, Cambio 
IG, carries an editorial by publisher 
Juan Tomas de Salas, who calls Iranian 
actions "a current of irrationalism — 
which threatens to lead humanity into 
new and frightening holocaust." 

Italy. President Pertini urges 
Khomeini to release hostages; Liberal 
Party condemns holding hostages; and 
the foreign affairs spokesman of the 
Italian Communist Party, Gian Carlo 
Jajetta, states that Iranian actions 
"completely violate international law," 
put Iran in "a difficult position before 
every other country and international 
organization, and certainly do not help 
the government of Tehran in this dif- 
ficult moment." 

East Germany. Publishes a call for 
the release of hostages. 

Swiss Ambassador visits Laingen. 

EC-9 Ambassadors visit the Ira- 
nian Foreign Minister and stress their 
anxiety about hostages' well-being. 

U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister 
Gromyko advocates fulfillment of inter- 
national convention of respect for dip- 
lomatic immunity. 



Niger. President Kountche sends 
message to Khomeini. 

Twelfth World Congress of the In- 
ternational Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU) is shocked that 
Iran blatantly disregards principle of 
inviolability of embassies in that it con- 
dones holding hostages as a means of 
attaining objectives. 

Colombia. National Confederation 
of Liberal Youth, National Federation 
of Liberal Youth, and Social Action 
Brigades of the Conservative Party 
urge Iranian students to respect the 
hostages' lives and to release them to 
show that the Islamic republic respects 
human rights. 

Zaire. In a message to Khomeini, 
President Mobutu publicly appeals for 
release of hostages. 

November 24 

Suriname. Prime Minister calls for 
release of hostages and condemns Iran's 
violations of international law. 

Nicaragua. Junta members, 
Ortega and Bobelo, strongly condemn 
holding of hostages as an act of ter- 
rorism. Nicaraguan delegation to the 
Organization of American States will 
support OAS consensus resolution on 
hostages. 

Colombia. Youth groups deliver 
telephone message to Iranian students 
asking "respect for the lives and per- 
sonal integrity" of hostages and for 
their liberation. 

Tunisia. Tunis press reports that 
the government expresses disappoint- 
ment over the hostage situation to a 
delegation from the Iranian Revolu- 
tionary Council. Iran is asked to con- 
sider the consequence of escalation and 
to conform to the rules of international 
law. 

Senegal. Government issues com- 
munique on November 22 meeting be- 
tween Prime Minister Abdou Diouf and 
the Iranian Charge in which the former 
"vigorously requested the prompt lib- 
eration of the hostages" and expressed 
his government's "ardent wish to see 
the tension created by the occupation" 
of the Embassy "dissipate rapidly." 

Mauritius. Prime Minister Ram- 
goolam appeals to "the head of the 
Revolutionary Council of Iran" for re- 
lease of hostages. 

Canada. Ivan Head, an interna- 
tional lawyer who is now President of 
Canada's International Development 
Center, states that the hostage actions 



January 1980 



Special 



by Iranians violate the law of treaties 
and the law of diplomatic immunity. 

November 25 

Guinea. President Sekou Toure 
strongly condemns the taking of hos- 
tages and refers to international law, 
the Koran, and the Bible. 

November 26 

Italy. President Pertini outlines 
his previous record of support for 
human rights and urges Khomeini to 
free hostages. 

Turkey. Prime Minister Demirel 
expresses disapproval of the taking of 
hostages. 

Bolivia. Foreign Minister Julio 
Garret instructs U.N. Security Council 
President Palacios to do everything 
possible to help secure release of hos- 
tages. 

Brazil. Foreign Minister Guerreiro 
is cited in the press as defending the 
concept of immunity for diplomats and 
the inviolability of diplomatic property. 

China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issues a statement saying "principles 
guiding international relations and ac- 
cepted diplomatic immunities should be 
universally respected." 

Ghana. Government issues a 
statement calling for the release of hos- 
tages. 

Burundi. Issues of the 
government-controlled newspaper con- 
demns the taking of hostages and cites 
President Bagaza as stating Burundi's 
committment to international conven- 
tions on diplomatic immunity. 

Canada. Roman Catholic Arch- 
bishop of Plourde of Ottawa and Dr. W. 
Gunther Plaut, President of Canadian 
Jewish Congress, respond to U.S. Am- 
bassador Ender's telegram com- 
municating President Carter's state- 
ment asking for special prayers for hos- 
tages. 

Swedish branch of Amnesty Inter- 
national calls for release of hostages. 

Morocco. Maroc Sair calls hostage 
situation a "condemnable act." 

Guinea. President Toure condemns 
the hostage situation as "absolutely 
contrary" to international law, as well 
as to the Koran. 

Canada. Maxwell Cohen, former 
Law Dean at McGill University and 
former Canadian Chairman of the In- 
ternational Joint Commission, calls for 
respect for the principle of protection of 
diplomats. 



OAS. Approves resolution in spe- 
cial session which condems holding of 
hostages in Tehran. 

November 27 

Cameroon. Government-owned 
Tribune carries text of a message from 
President Ahidjo to Khomeini. 

Austria. Foreign Minister Pahr 
states that hostage-taking is "an out- 
rageous violation of international law 
and the Vienna diplomatic convention." 

Chile. Human rights exponent, 
Raul Cardinal Silva, Archbishop of San- 
tiago, says in reference to the Iranian 
situation that "men who say they love 
God seemingly do not want to respect 
their brothers; to respect the innocent 

"Suriname unconditionally con- 
demns the seizure" and supports "in- 
ternational action to undo the occupa- 
tion of the Embassy." 

Iceland. Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister announce they have 
protested to the Iranian Government's 
takeover of the U.S. Embassy. 

A statement is issued by the Com- 
monwealth High Commissioners ap- 
pealing to the Iranian Government to 
procure the release of all hostages and 
expressing the hope that the parties 
will resolve their differences by peace- 
ful means. 

Uruguay. Dr. Edwardo Jimenez de 
Arechaga, former judge and President 
of the International Court of Justice 
1970-79, states: "The conduct of Ira- 
nian authorities . . . constitutes the 
most flagrant violation of the norms of 
international law .... Diplomatic and 
juridical annals will register the actions 
of those authorities or the most com- 
plete list of infractions against univer- 
sally recognized norms of international 
law in matters relating to diplomatic 
immunity and privileges . . . ." 

Senegal. President Senghor de- 
nounces taking of hostages, burning of 
buildings, and murders as means for 
the solution of conflicts ". . . beyond in- 
ternational law." 

Commonwealth Secretary Gen- 
eral Ramphal says holding diplomatic 
personnel hostage violates international 
law and jeopardizes fabric of interna- 
tional relations. 

November 28 

Tehran-based Embassies of Fin- 
land, other Nordic countries, Austra- 
lia, Austria, Canada, Greece, New 



Zealand, Spain, Portugal, and Swit- 
zerland submit appeal to Iranian 
Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr for release 
of Embassy personnel. 

France. President Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing calls the taking of hostages 
"totally unacceptable." 

Non-EC-9 Western Ambassadors 
meet with Iranian Foreign Minister; 
EC-9 Ambassadors hold similar meet- 
ing with Foreign Minister. 

Canada. A unanimous resolution 
adopted by the House of Commons "un- 
equivocally condemns the Government 
of Iran" for breaching the rule of inter- 
national law "by allowing and en- 
couraging the taking of American dip- 
lomatic staff as hostages within that 
country." 

No Date 

Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
the father of Malaysian independence, 
strongly denounces the holding of dip- 
lomatic hostages and calls for their re- 
lease. 

Amnesty International issues two 
statements calling for release of hos- 
tages. 

Belize. Premier Price appeals on 
grounds of international law and hu- 
manity for release of hostages. 

The Dalai Lama appeals to Kho- 
meini to protect hostages. 

Hungary. Television states that 
the taking of diplomats as hostages 
should not be condoned. 

South Korea. Supports the United 
States in its public positions. 

German Democratic Republic. 
Calls for adherence to and respect for 
principle of protection of diplomatic 
missions extended under international 
law and in accordance with the Vienna 
convention, as essential part of the 
function of normal government-to- 
government relations. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin 






INTERNATIONAL LAW 



Accomplishments 

One of the major achievements is 
the dramatic increase in world aware- 
ness of human rights issues. To quote 
from the 1978 annual report of a leading- 
private human rights organization, the 
International League for Human 
Rights. 

Within the past year, human rights 
has for the first time become a subject 
of national policy debate in many coun- 
tries. Human rights concerns have been 
the focus of greater discussion in inter- 
national organizations and of greater 
attention in world media. A most sig- 
nificant factor in this has been Presi- 
dent Carter and the U.S. human rights 
policy. 

This new consciousness helps to 
curb existing abuses and to deter new 
violations. Moreover, there are many 
examples of tangible human rights 
progress. We do not claim credit for 
particular improvements. But we be- 
lieve that we have contributed to an 
atmosphere that makes progress more 
likely to occur. 

In the past year, significant steps 
toward the transfer of power from the 
military to civilian democratic institu- 
tions were taken in the Dominican Re- 
public, Ghana, Nigeria, Peru, Brazil, 
and Thailand. In Bangladesh, Sudan, 
Indonesia, Nepal, and Paraguay, sub- 
stantial numbers of political prisoners 
were released, and other prisoner re- 
leases occurred in Cuba, Guinea, and 
the Republic of Korea. In Bangladesh, 
Brazil, and Thailand more freedom was 
extended to the press, to labor organi- 
zations, and to political parties. Just a 
few days ago, successful elections were 
held in Ecuador which help pave the 
way for civilian rule. 

In Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, human rights conditions remain 
a source of serious concern. But even 
there, we have seen some positive 
signs: prisoner releases in Poland and 
Yugoslavia; greater tolerance for dis- 
sent in Hungary and Poland; and sig- 
nificant increases in emigration from 
the Soviet Union. We are particularly 
gratified that Aleksandr Ginzburg and 
four fellow dissidents have been re- 
leased from prison and are now in the 
United States. 

In my view, then, our policy clearly 
has been effective in improving human 
rights around the world. Moreover, I 
believe our policy is also making an im- 
portant contribution to our security in a 
changing and often turbulent world. In 
this regard, our idealism and self- 
interest coincide. 



Our human rights policy responds 
to the aspirations of more and more 
people in the Third World for a fuller 
participation in their government and 
economy. As Secretary Vance said last 
night in Chicago, these growing de- 
mands for fulfillment of fundamental 
rights are generally in our national 
interest, because they are producing 
new or strengthened democratic in- 
stitutions in many countries around the 
world. By helping Third World nations 
meet popular aspirations in an orderly 
and peaceful way, we can improve our 
relations and strengthen our own secu- 
rity, not on a temporary basis of ac- 
commodation to a repressive regime 
but on an enduring basis of a shared 
commitment to democratic values. 

As I have said, I believe our efforts 
in implementing the human rights pol- 
icy have been effective. But the dis- 
tance covered is dwarfed by the dis- 
tance that still must be traveled. Let 
me say a few concluding words about 
this task that remains. 

Despite the many improvements I 
have mentioned and others like them, 
egregious violations of human rights 
persist around the globe. Through our 
words and our actions, we will perse- 
vere in our efforts to improve these 
situations. As progress is achieved, we 
will set new goals for further attain- 
ment. 

In these efforts, we seek your sup- 
port to carry out the common objective 
of Congress and the President to rekin- 
dle the beacon of human rights in 
American foreign policy. ■ 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Political Asylum 



by Warren Christopher 

Address before the Los Angeles 
County Bar Association on November 
6, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy 
Secretary of State. 

Late last summer, I found myself 
confronted with one drama of political 
asylum. As you will recall, the Soviet 
Dancer Alexandr Godunov had left the 
Bolshoi Ballet while on tour here and 
was granted asylum. The circumstances 
led the State Department to request an 
interview with his wife, the Bolshoi 
ballerina Lyudmila Vlasova, so that we 
could ascertain her wishes. Despite 
Soviet assurances to Department offi- 
cials that such an interview would be 
arranged, Ms. Vlasova suddenly ap- 
peared at Kennedy Airport in New 
York, accompanied by a group of husky 
Soviet escorts who rushed her aboard 
an Aeroflot flight for Moscow. 

This issue reached my desk on a 
Friday afternoon at about the same time 
Ms. Vlasova arrived at the airport. Our 
laws authorize the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to prevent 
an alien's departure from the United 
States when such a departure would be 
contrary to the national interest. Act- 
ing under that statute, I asked the 
Department of Justice to delay Ms. 
Vlasova's departure so that we could 
determine whether her leaving was 
truly voluntary. 

Ms. Vlasova had been taken aboard 
the aircraft before this order could be 
carried out — and thus ensued a 3-day 
standoff at the airport. The "prevention 
of departure" order issued by INS kept 
the plane on the ground, while we dis- 
cussed with the Soviets our insistence 
that Ms. Vlasova be interviewed in a 
noncoercive atmosphere. As the 
weekend wore on, it became clear that 
the issue was being considered at the 
highest levels of the Soviet Govern- 
ment. 

On day three of this incident, the 
Soviets finally acquiesced to a sugges- 
tion we had made on day one, and the 
interview was conducted in a mobile 
lounge at the airport. Our team of ex- 
perts on the scene was led by Ambas- 
sador Don McHenry [then U.S. Deputy 
Representative to the U.N. Security 
Council and now U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations] and included both a 
doctor and Mr. Godunov's attorney. 
They were convinced that Ms. Vla- 
sova's expressed desire to leave was, in 
fact, voluntary, and she was, therefore, 



January 1980 



35 



International Law 



permitted to depart without further 
delay. 

While we were able, in this case, to 
uphold the principle of no forced repa- 
triation, the procedures employed were 
not ideal. As I shall discuss a little 
later, we are now working with the Jus- 
tice Department to improve them. 

Since then, a number of spectacular 
defections and asylum cases has been in 
the news. In September two more Bol- 
shoi dancers sought and received 
asylum here in Los Angeles. A pair of 
Soviet Olympic skating champions 
sought asylum in Switzerland. A Soviet 
journalist appeared at our Embassy in 
Tokyo to ask for asylum, and he, too, is 
now in the United States. An East 
German family fled to West Germany in 
a homemade hot-air balloon. And re- 
cently, reports appeared in the press 
suggesting that a champion Soviet 
canoeist, who had received asylum in 
West Germany, has disappeared under 
mysterious circumstances, perhaps in a 
case of forced repatriation. 

Such dramatic cases are, in many 
ways, a tribute to the West and its free 
institutions. Certainly we in the United 
States can take pride in the fact that 
citizens from other countries are willing 
to risk their lives in order to breathe 
the free political and cultural air of 
America. 

But we should not let pride blind us 
to the complexities that surround the 
subject of asylum. While asylum is an 
essentially humanitarian issue, it can 
have far-reaching international ramifi- 
cations. In controversial cases, when 
charges and countercharges are traded 
back and forth — involving undiplomatic 
words like "persecution," "kidnapping," 
and "espionage" — tensions inevitably 
increase, and the whole range of 
relations between countries can be 
affected. 

For a nation like ours, the decision 
to grant or deny asylum in a particular 
case cannot turn on a cool calculation of 
the international pros and cons. Be- 
cause of our historical role as a country 
of refuge for the oppressed, because of 
our firm national commitment to human 
rights, we must insure that our actions 
in such cases comport not only with the 
law but also with the dictates of con- 
science. 

So let us explore the theory and 
practice of asylum — in the belief that 
the United States can handle these sen- 
sitive matters with intelligence and 
compassion and with more efficiency as 
well. 



Theory of Asylum 

The concept of asylum appears to 
be almost as ancient as the idea of 
human mercy. And the law of asylum, 
like so much of our law, has its roots in 
primitive magic and taboo: Ancient 
tribes and societies had their sacred 
places — temples or the houses of 
chiefs — where bloodshed and revenge 
were prohibited. The Incas had for- 
tified places to which women and chil- 
dren repaired for safety in time of hos- 
tilities. Some of the Greek city-states 
even sought to formalize a basic law of 
asylum. 

In modern times — to leapfrog over 
a great stretch of history — the right of 
asylum is enshrined in both national 
and international law. 



Asylum is granted to persons 
who are already in the United 
States and want to stay. Refu- 
gee status is granted to those 
who are somewhere else, but 
who want to come to the United 
States. 



Before discussing the legal princi- 
ples, I should note that when I speak of 
asylum, I am actually referring to what 
is properly called territorial asylum, 
which involves refuge sought by foreign 
persons within U.S. territory. The re- 
lated concept of diplomatic asylum, in- 
volving refuge in diplomatic missions 
abroad, is widely recognized in some 
parts of the world. But it is strictly 
limited by U.S. law. It is longstanding 
U.S. policy to grant temporary refuge 
in our diplomatic posts abroad only to 
persons in immediate physical danger. 
Of course, Cardinal Mindszenty's 15- 
year stay in our Embassy in Budapest 
demonstrates that the rule is not totally 
inflexible, but that example also dem- 
onstrates the kind of practical problems 
that can arise when diplomatic missions 
become places of refuge. 

We should also differentiate be- 
tween asylum and the related issue of 
refugees. While the legal distinction is 
not clear cut, it is useful to think of the 
difference this way: Asylum is granted 
to persons who are already in the 
United States and want to stay. Refu- 
gee status is granted to those who are 
somewhere else, but who want to come 
to the United States. 



Legal Principles 

The starting point in discussing the 
law of asylum is the U.N. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which 
declares that: "Everyone has the right to 
seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution." Similarly, 
the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 
passed by the U.N. General Assembly 
in 1967, provides that no person seek- 
ing territorial asylum ". . . shall be 
subjected to measures such as rejection 
at the frontier ... or compulsory re- 
turn to any state where he may be 
subjected to persecution." 

While these declarations are aspi- 
rational in nature, the U.N. Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees has 
the force of a treaty and, therefore, the 
force of law. This protocol provides that 
no signing state shall return a seeker of 
asylum who would face a threat to his 
life or freedom ". . . on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group or political 
opinion." 

Our own domestic legislation 
adopts a similar standard. Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, the 
Attorney General is authorized to 
"withhold deportation" of an alien 
seeking asylum who would be subject to 
persecution on account of race, religion, 
or political opinion. 

This statutory standard sounds 
fairly straightforward, but there are 
some significant ambiguities. For 
example, what constitutes "persecu- 
tion" under the act? Is "persecution" 
necessarily political in nature — or is the 
concept of "persecution on account of 
. . . political opinion" broad enough to 
encompass restrictions on the ability of 
a painter or sculptor to express herself 
fully? Or on a dancer's right to the full- 
est artistic expression? Or the highest 
pay? Can extreme economic deprivation 
amount to "persecution"? Hundreds of 
would-be immigrants from Haiti claim 
that it does and are currently pressing 
their claims in a U.S. District Court in 
Florida. 

Many asylum cases involve no com- 
plications and are handled each year by 
our immigration authorities without 
fanfare and with only routine advice 
from the State Department. But in 
politically sensitive cases — where the 
safety of the seeker of asylum may be in 
doubt, where there is the danger of for- 
cible repatriation, or where sensitive 
relations between nations could be 
affected — the State Department may 
be involved from the outset. 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



MIDDLE EAST 



It is in such cases, involving not 
only high diplomatic stakes but the 
problems of coordination among various 
government agencies, that the dangers 
are greatest that missteps and mis- 
takes will occur. Our laws and regula- 
tions governing the granting of asylum 
are, in my judgment, generally fair and 
adequate. It is in trying to execute 
them with compassion and dispatch that 
problems may arise. And it is here that 
we are working to improve our per- 
formance. 

Potential Problems 

One problem arises from the fact 
that a request for asylum may occur- 
almost anywhere, at any time. A re- 
quest may be encountered, in spite of 
our best efforts, by people who simply 
do not know what to do. 

In 1970, for example, a Lithuanian 
seaman leapt from his Soviet ship onto 
the deck of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter 
Vigilant. A sad scenario was played out 
in which the proper authorities were 
not notified; the standard procedures 
for handling asylum requests were not 
begun; and judgments were made on 
the spot to return the seaman to his 
ship, where he was beaten unconscious. 

The story of the seaman, Simas 
Kudirka, has a happy ending. As it 
turned out, he was an American citizen 
by birth and was later granted entry to 
the United States. But the incident on 
board the Vigilant should have been 
handled very differently. 

Another potential problem we are 
likely to encounter in the future, as we 
did with Ms. Vlasova, concerns the 
question of whether a foreign citizen is 
departing the United States voluntarily 
or under duress. 

More specifically, when are we jus- 
tified in delaying someone's departure 
from the United States, in the face of 
the person's express desire to leave, in 
order to determine whether he or she is 
acting under duress? As I suggested 
earlier, there was a reasonable basis for 
our concern about the circumstances 
surrounding Ms. Vlasova's hasty depar- 
ture. Our request for an interview in a 
noncoercive environment was amply 
justified by both U.S. and international 
law. I am convinced, however, that we 
do need to strengthen our regulations 
on this point and to clarify the proce- 
dures to be followed when such inci- 
dents occur. 

Improving Procedures 

To deal with all these and with 
other problems, we are taking several 



steps, in cooperation with the Justice 
Department. 

First, we are updating and 
clarifying the State Department's offi- 
cial guidelines for dealing with asylum 
cases. These guidelines will be issued to 
other government agencies, to local of- 
ficials, and to police agencies across the 
nation so that those who may become 
involved in asylum cases will be aware 
of the specific steps to be taken. 

Second, we are amending the reg- 
ulations governing the departure of 
aliens from the United States to deal 
more explicitly with the problem of 
possible involuntary departure. This 
involves two steps. We will make clear 
in the proposed new regulation that 
where doubt exists whether an alien is 
departing voluntarily, such departure 
would be prejudicial to the interest of 
the United States and may, therefore, 
be temporarily delayed while an inquiry 
is conducted. And we will propose that 
immigration officers be granted the 
power to subpoena persons who in our 
judgment should be interviewed. This 
will make clear their authority to con- 
duct an investigation into the question 
of whether an impending departure is 
voluntary or forced. 

Third, we are studying how best to 
handle the problem of protecting a per- 
son who may be in danger of forced re- 
patriation. As lawyers, you will readily 
understand the complexity of affording 
such protection without violating the 
constitutional rights of the person in- 
volved. 

In a very real and often dramatic 
way, the issue of political asylum is a 
barometer of humanity's yearning for 
freedom. Asylum was traditionally 
granted to political figures who needed 
protection from their own governments 
in the wake of wars or revolutions. 
Today, increasingly, we see not only 
political figures but writers, dancers, 
musicians, and others seeking asylum 
as a means of free expression — artistic 
or even athletic expression. And we see 
ordinary people seeking asylum for rea- 
sons of religion or personal belief. 

For us in the United States, these 
requests for refuge may create tempor- 
ary abrasions and difficulties. But they 
are a tribute to our way of life — and to 
the values we represent in the world. 
They are also a recurring challenge to 
our support for human rights. 

The steps I have outlined today 
represent our continuing effort to do 
not only what the law requires but what 
conscience compels, so that in the fu- 
ture we can respond to that challenge 
with imagination, skill, and the 
generosity that are the hallmarks of our 
people. ■ 



U.S. Takes Case 
Against Iran to the 
International 
Court of Justice 



DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV. 29, 1979 l 

The United States on November 
29, 1979, took its case against Iran to 
the International Court of Justice. In 
an action filed with the Court in The 
Hague, the United States charges that 
the Government of Iran has violated 
fundamental principles of international 
law in not protecting the U.S. Embassy 
in Tehran, in supporting the actions of 
those holding the American hostages, 
and in threatening to subject the hos- 
tages to trial. 

In particular, the United States 
charges Iran has violated the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela- 
tions, the 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, the 1973 Conven- 
tion on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally Pro- 
tected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents, the 1955 U.S. -Iran Treaty of 
Amity, and the Charter of the United 
Nations. 

The United States will seek an ur- 
gent hearing before the Court and has 
requested the Court to issue forthwith 
a preliminary order directing Iran to 
secure the release of the hostages and 
to insure their safety. 

Following are the texts of the U.S. 
Application to the Court, its Request 
for Interim Measures of Protection, and 
a letter from Secretary of State Vance 
to the President of the Court. The pa- 
pers were filed by the Legal Adviser of 
the Department of State, Mr. Roberts 
B. Owen, who will represent the United 
States in the action. 



LETTER TO ICJ 

Dear Sir Humphrey: 

The Government of the United States 
is today filing with the Court an Applica- 
tion and a Request for Interim Measures of 
Protection in a case against the Govern- 
ment of Iran for the seizure, and holding as 
hostages, of members of the United States 
Embassy in Tehran. As you are aware, at 
least fifty United States nationals are 
being subjected to prolonged and inhumane 
detention. They have already been held 






January 1980 



37 



Middle East 



hostage for more than three weeks, and 
threats have been made that they may be 
placed on trial. 

In view of the extraordinary urgency 
of this case, which is unlike any before 
submitted to the Court, I respectfully 
suggest that you, as President of the 
Court, urge the Government of Iran to act 
immediately to appoint its Agent in the 
case. I further urge that the Court in any 
event hold any hearing on the request for 
Interim Measures as soon as it has a 
quorum. My Government earnestly hopes 
that the Court will issue an Order indicat- 
ing appropriate interim measures within 
days. As the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations has informed the Security 
Council, the present crisis constitutes a 
serious threat to international peace and 
security. 

May I further respectfully suggest that 
you, as President of the Court, im- 
mediately request the Government of Iran 
to ensure that no steps are taken to inflame 
opinion against the hostages, to heighten 
the danger to which they are exposed, or to 
place them on trial. 

I have designated the Legal Adviser of 
the United States Department of State, the 
Honorable Roberts B. Owen, as Agent of 
the United States in this case. 

Sincerely 

Cyrus Vance 

Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
President, 

International Court of Justice, 
The Hague. 



APPLICATION TO THE COURT 



Sir, 



I have the honor to refer to the follow- 
ing: 

(1) the Vienna Convention on Diploma- 
tic Relations of 1961, and Article I of the 
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compul- 
sory Settlement of Disputes of that Conven- 
tion; 

(2) the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations of 1963, and Article I of the Op- 
tional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes of that Convention; 

(3) Article XXI(2) of the Treaty of 
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular 
Rights between the United States of 
America and Iran of 1955, and 

(4) Article 13(1) of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973. 

Under the jurisdiction thereby conferred 
upon the Court, I hereby submit, in accord- 
ance with Article 40(1) of the Statute and 
Article 38 of the Rules of Court, this appli- 
cation instituting proceedings in the name of 
the Government of the United States of 
America against the Government of Iran in 
the following case: 



I. Statement of Facts 

At about 10:30 a.m., Tehran time, on 
November 4, 1979, during the course of a 
demonstration of approximately 3,000 per- 
sons, the United States Embassy compound 
in Tehran was overrun by several hundred 
of the demonstrators. The Iranian Govern- 
ment's security personnel on duty at the 
Embassy compound apparently made no ef- 
fort to deter or discourage the dem- 
onstrators from the takeover. Access to 
the compound and Chancery building was 
gained by cutting chains and removing bars 
from a Chancery basement window, and con- 
trol of the first floor of the Chancery was 
rapidly seized. In the process the invaders 
took hostage the Embassy security officer, 
who had come out of the Chancery to 
negotiate with them, and four of the Em- 
bassy's Marine guards. A large group of 
Embassy personnel, including consular and 
non-American staff and visitors, took refuge 
on an upper floor of the Chancery. 

About two hours after the beginning of 
the attack, and after the invaders had at- 
tempted to set fire to the Chancery building 
and to cut through the upstairs steel doors 
with a torch, the demonstrators gained 
entry to the upper floor and seized the re- 
maining personnel. 

During the two hours of attack on the 
Embassy, no Iranian security forces were 
sent to relieve the situation, despite re- 
peated calls for help from the Embassy to 
the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and despite 
the efforts of the United States Charge 
d'Affaires, who made contact with the Prime 
Minister's office and Foreign Ministry offi- 
cials at the time the attack occurred. No at- 
tempt was made by the Government of Iran 
to clear the Embassy premises, to rescue 
the personnel held hostage, or to persuade 
the invaders and demonstrators to termi- 
nate their action. Nor did the Government of 
Iran take any action when, shortly after the 
Embassy seizure, the U.S. consulates in 
Tabriz and Shiraz were also seized. 

Since the time of the takeover, the Em- 
bassy personnel have been held hostage in 
the compound under threatening and in- 
humane conditions. Some hostages have 
been paraded in sight of the crowd outside, 
blindfolded and hands bound, in full hearing 
of menacing, chanting crowds. Inside the 
buildings the hostages have been kept 
bound, often by hand and foot, forced to re- 
main silent, subjected to other forms of 
coercion, and denied communication with 
their families and U.S. officials. Embassy 
records have been ransacked. 

During the entire time and with the 
support and assistance of the Iranian au- 
thorities, demonstrations have been occur- 
ring outside the compound, often quite vo- 
ciferous. A crowd of hundreds of thousands 
of demonstrators converged on the Em- 
bassy on November 22. 

Those holding the hostages have refused 
to release them and have conditioned their 
release on various unacceptable demands. 
They have threatened on several occasions 
that, in certain circumstances, the hostages 
would be put to death. While 13 hostages 
were released on November 18 and 20, at 



least 50 Americans remain in captivity, vir- 
tually all of whom are diplomatic agents of 
the United States or members of the ad- 
ministrative and technical staff of the Em- 
bassy. The group holding the Embassy has 
asserted that the remaining hostages are 
guilty of espionage and will be tried for their 
"crimes" if their demands are not met. 
Non-Iranian outside observers have been 
permitted only limited access to the hos- 
tages. It is not certain that all persons held 
have been seen, and the conditions during 
these few visits did not permit free com- 
munication with the hostages. 

During this continuing ordeal, the Gov- 
ernment of Iran is failing and refusing to 
make any effort to secure the release of the 
hostages and the return of the Embassy and 
consular premises to the United States' con- 
trol. The Government has refused any direct 
substantive contact with United States Gov- 
ernment officials in Tehran or at the United 
Nations. It refused to admit the special 
emissaries sent to Iran by the Government 
of the United States. The United States 
Charge d'Affaires, who was at the Foreign 
Ministry at the time the attack began, has 
been confined to the Foreign Ministry and 
denied free access both to his diplomatic 
colleagues from other Embassies and to 
senior Iranian officials. 

Moreover, the Government of Iran, 
from an early stage of the crisis, has given 
direct support and encouragement to the 
group holding the Embassy. Members of 
that group have been permitted to come and 
go freely from the compound. The Govern- 
ment of Iran has refused or ignored the re- 
peated requests of the Government of the 
United States to free the hostages and to re- 
store the Embassy compound to the posses- 
sion of the United States. The Government 
of Iran has supported the demands of those 
holding the hostages, has endorsed the 
charges of espionage leveled against Em- 
bassy personnel, and has threatened to place 
the personnel on trial for espionage. 

II. The Jurisdiction of the Court 

Under Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the 
Statute of the Court, the jurisdiction of the 
Court encompasses "all matters specially 
provided for . . . in treaties and conventions 
in force." The United States and Iran are, as 
members of the United Nations, parties to 
the Statute, and are also parties to three in- 
ternational conventions, each of which inde- 
pendently establishes the Court's jurisdic- 
tion over the present dispute. 

First, the United States and Iran are 
parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplo- 
matic Relations (done at Vienna, April 18, 
1961) and to its Optional Protocol Concern- 
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. 
As set forth separately in this application, 
the actions of Iran bearing on this dispute 
constitute multiple and profound violations 
of that Convention. Article I of the Protocol 
provides: 

"Disputes arising out of the interpreta- 
tion or application of the Convention shall lie 
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the In- 
ternational Court of Justice and may ac- 
cordingly be brought before the Court by an 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle East 



application made by any party to the dispute 
being a Party to the present Protocol." 

Second, the United States and Iran are 
parties to the Vienna Convention on Con- 
sular Relations (done at Vienna, April 24, 
1963) and to its Optional Protocol Concern- 
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. 
Article I of that Protocol is identical in its 
terms to Article I of the Protocol to the 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
supra.* The present dispute involves 
numerous violations of the Consular Con- 
vention. 

Finally, the United States and Iran are 
parties to the Treaty of Amity, Economic 
Relations, and Consular Rights between the 
United States and Iran, signed in Tehran on 
August 15, 1955 (284 U.N.T.S. 93). As set 
forth below, numerous and serious violations 
of this treaty are also involved in the pres- 
ent dispute. Article XXI, Paragraph 2 of the 
treaty provides: 

"Any dispute between the High Con- 
tracting Parties as to the interpretation or 
application of the present Treaty, not satis- 
factorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be 
submitted to the International Court of Jus- 
tice, unless the High Contracting Parties 
agree to settlement by some other pacific 
means." 

That a dispute exists between the United 
States and Iran is clear. The present dispute 
has not been satisfactorily adjusted by dip- 
lomacy, Iran is continuing in its violations, 
and Iran has refused to discuss pacific 
settlement of the dispute. 

In addition to the foregoing, the United 
States and Iran are parties to the Conven- 
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (done 
at New York, December 14, 1973). Serious 
violations of this Convention are also in- 
volved in the present dispute. Article 13, 
Paragraph 1 of the Convention provides: 

"Any dispute between two or more 
States Parties concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Convention which is 
not settled by negotiations shall, at the re- 
quest of one of them, be submitted to arbi- 
tration. If within six months from the date of 
the request for arbitration the parties are 
unable to agree on the organization of the 
arbitration, any one of them may refer the 
dispute to the International Court of Justice 
by request in conformity with the Statute of 
the Court." 

In light of the urgency of rectifying the 
present violations of the Convention and 
Iran's refusal to meet with United States 
emissaries on the subject, which renders 
impracticable and infeasible any prior resort 
to arbitration, it is submitted that the Court 
is competent to hear the United States' 
claims under this Convention in connection 
with its other claims. 

III. The Claims of the United States 

The Government of the United States, 
in submitting the dispute to the Court, 
claims as follows: 



(a) Pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 
Government of Iran is under an interna- 
tional legal obligation to the United States 
to ensure that the persons of United States 
diplomatic agents be kept inviolate from 
"any form of arrest or detention" and that 
every such diplomatic agent shall be treated 
"with due respect" and protected from "any 
attack on his person, freedom, or dignity." 
The Government of Iran has violated and is 
currently violating the foregoing obliga- 
tions. 

(b) Pursuant to Article 37 of the same 
Convention, the Government of Iran is 
under an international legal obligation to the 
United States to ensure that members of the 
administrative and technical staff of the 
United States Embassy in Tehran, and 
members of the families of United States 
diplomatic agents and of administrative and 
technical staff, enjoy the relevant privileges 
and immunities specified in Article 29 of the 
Convention. The Government of Iran has 
violated and is currently violating the 
foregoing obligations. 

(c) Pursuant to Article 31 of the same 
Convention, the Government of Iran is 
under an international legal obligation to 
the United States to ensure that its diplo- 
matic agents shall be absolutely immune 
"from the criminal jurisdiction" of Iran and 
that, under Articles 31 and 37 of the Con- 
vention, such immunity is accorded to 
members of the administrative and techni- 
cal staff of the United States Embassy as 
well as to the families of diplomatic agents 
and of administrative and technical staff. 
By its threats of prosecution, the Govern- 
ment of Iran has violated and is currently 
violating the foregoing obligations. 

(d) Pursuant to Article 22 of the same 
Convention, the Government of Iran is 
under an international legal obligation to 
the United States to ensure that United 
States diplomatic premises in Iran "shall be 
inviolable." The Government of Iran has 
violated and is currently violating this ob- 
ligation. 

(e) Pursuant to Articles 24, 25, 27, and 
47 of the same Convention, the Govern- 
ment of Iran is under an international legal 
obligation to the United States to ensure 
the inviolability of the archives and docu- 
ments of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran, to accord full facilities for the 
performance of the functions of the Em- 
bassy, to permit and assist Embassy per- 
sonnel to depart from Iran, and to pre- 
clude discrimination between States in the 
application of the Convention. The Gov- 
ernment of Iran has violated and is cur- 
rently violating the foregoing obligations. 

(f) Pursuant to Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 
36, and 40 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, the Government of 
Iran is under an international legal obliga- 
tion to the United States to ensure that the 
United States enjoys full facilities for the 
performance of consular functions; that 
United States consular premises, docu- 
ments, and archives are kept inviolate; that 
the consular personnel of the United States 
shall enjoy freedom of movement and 
travel in Iran; that such personnel shall 



enjoy the right to communicate and contact 
other United States nationals; that the con- 
sular personnel of the United States be 
treated with respect and protected from at- 
tack on their persons, freedom, and dig- 
nity; and that United States consular offi- 
cers be free from arrest or detention. The 
Government of Iran has violated and is cur- 
rently violating the foregoing obligations. 

(g) Pursuant to Article 4 of the Con- 
vention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally pro- 
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents, the Government of Iran is under 
an international legal obligation to the 
United States to cooperate in the preven- 
tion of crimes against the official premises 
and the staff of the United States Embassy 
in Tehran, including an obligation to take 
all practicable measures to prevent prep- 
arations in its territory for the commission 
of such crimes. The Government of Iran has 
violated and is currently violating the 
foregoing obligations. 

(h) Pursuant to Article 7 of the Con- 
vention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally Pro- 
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents, the Government of Iran is under 
an international legal obligation to the 
United States to submit to competent Ira- 
nian authorities for the purpose of prosecu- 
tion all those persons who, since November 
4, 1979, have been engaged in committing 
crimes against the official premises and the 
staff of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran. The Government of Iran has vio- 
lated and is currently violating the forego- 
ing obligation. 

(i) Pursuant to Articles 11(4) and XIX 
of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Rela- 
tions, and Consular Rights between the 
United States and Iran, the Government of 
Iran is under international legal obligation 
to the United States to ensure that nation- 
als of the United States shall receive "the 
most constant protection and security" 
within the territory of Iran; that such na- 
tionals shall, if placed in custody, receive 
reasonable and humane treatment; that the 
United States shall have the full opportu- 
nity to safeguard the interests of such de- 
tained nationals; and that such nationals 
shall, while in custody, have full access to 
United States consular officials and serv- 
ices. The Government of Iran has violated 
and is currently violating the foregoing ob- 
ligations. 

(j) Pursuant to Articles XIII and 
XVIII of the foregoing Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, 
the Government of Iran is under an inter- 
national legal obligation to the United 
States to accord to United States consular 
officers and employees the privileges and 
immunities accorded to officers and em- 
ployees of their rank and status by general 
international usage and, in particular, im- 
munity from local jurisdiction for acts done 
in their official capacities and within the 
scope of their authority; to accord to such 
consular officers and employees the oppor- 
tunity to exercise all functions which are in 
accordance with general international 



January 1980 



39 



Middle East 



usage; and to ensure that consular offices 
are not entered by the police or other local 
authorities except in case of fire or other 
disaster. The Government of Iran has vio- 
lated and is currently violating the forego- 
ing obligations. 

(k) The Government of Iran, or persons 
acting with its support and approval, are 
holding United States citizens as hostages 
and are threatening the lives of these hos- 
tages in order to coerce the United States 
into taking actions which the United States 
has no international legal obligation to 
take. This exercise of coercion is in viola- 
tion of Iran's obligations under the Charter 
of the United Nations, particularly Article 
2, paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article 33. 

(1) The Government of Iran is under an 
international legal obligation to the United 
States to respect and observe, and ensure 
respect for and observance of, the obliga- 
tions of Iran under customary international 
law to ensure the immunities of the diplo- 
mats and staff of the United States Em- 
bassy in Tehran, the inviolability of its 
Embassy, and the protection of its nation- 
als. The Government of Iran has violated 
and is currently violating the foregoing ob- 
ligations. 

IV. Judgment Requested 

Accordingly, the United States re- 
quests the Court to adjudge and declare as 

follows: 

(a) That the Government of Iran, in 
tolerating, encouraging, and failing to pre- 
vent and punish the conduct described in 
the preceding Statement of Facts, violated 
its international legal obligations to the 
United States as provided by 

• Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 
47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 

• Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 40 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
tions, 

• Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
Including Diplomatic Agents, and 

• Articles 11(4), XIII, XVIII, and XIX 
of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations 
and Consular Rights Between the United 
States and Iran, and 

• Articles 2(3), 2(4), and 33 of the 
Charter of the United Nations; 

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing in- 
ternational legal obligations, the Govern- 
ment of Iran is under a particular obliga- 
tion immediately to secure the release of all 
United States nationals currently being de- 
tained within the premises of the United 
States Embassy in Tehran and to assure 
that all such persons and all other United 
States nationals in Tehran are allowed to 
leave Iran safely; 

(c) That the Government of Iran shall 
pay to the United States, in its own right 
and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic 
protection of its nationals, reparation for 
the foregoing violations of Iran's interna- 
tional legal obligations to the United 



States, in a sum to be determined by the 
Court; and 

(d) That the Government of Iran sub- 
mit to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution those persons re- 
sponsible for the crimes committed against 
the premises and staff of the United States 
Embassy and against the premises of its 
Consulates. 

The Government of the United States 
further requests the Court to indicate 
interim measures of protection as set forth 
in a separate request filed concurrently 
with this Application. 

The Government of the United States 
has designated the undersigned as its 
Agent for the purposes of these proceed- 
ings. All communications relating to this 
case should be sent to the Embassy of the 
United States, The Hague, Lange Voor- 
hout 102. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Roberts B. Owen 
The Legal Adviser 

The Registrar, 

International Court of Justice, 
The Hague. 



APPENDED STATEMENT 

I, David D. Newsom, certify and de- 
clare the following: 

1. I am Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs of the United States Department of 
State. I have been vested by the Secretary 
of State with overall responsibility within 
the Department for matters relating to the 
crisis in Iran. 

2. In this capacity, I have closely moni- 
tored events since the attack on the United 
States Embassy in Tehran began. The facts 
stated in the Application of the United 
States to the Court are, to the best of my 
knowledge, true. 

David N. Newsom 



REQUEST FOR INTERIM 
MEASURES OF PROTECTION 

The Registrar 

International Court of Justice 

Sir, 

1. I have the honor to refer to the Ap- 
plication submitted to the Court this day 
instituting proceedings in the name of the 
Government of the United States of 
America against the Government of Iran 
and to submit, in accordance with Article 
41 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 
73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court, an ur- 
gent request that the Court indicate provi- 
sional measures which ought to be taken 
promptly to preserve the rights of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States. 



2. The compelling reasons for this re- 
quest are set out in the Statement of Facts 
of the Application of the United States to 
the Court. The facts set forth therein have 
been verified in the appended statement of 
David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs of the United States De- 
partment of State. The premises of the 
Embassy and Consulate of the United 
States in Tehran have been invaded by 
large numbers of persons acting with the 
support and under the apparent authority 
of the Government of Iran, and remain oc- 
cupied without the authorization of the 
United States. At least fifty United States 
citizens, virtually. all of whom are diploma- 
tic agents or administrative and technical 
staff of the Embassy, are being held hos- 
tage. The conditions of their detention are 
harsh, demeaning, dangerous and in fla- 
grant violation of international law. The 
Iranian authorities have stated that the 
hostages will be kept until the United 
States complies with various demands. The 
Government of Iran has also threatened to 
submit the hostages to criminal trial and 
punishment, despite their entitlement to 
diplomatic and other immunities. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
has convoked the United Nations Security 
Council because of this "grave situation". 
In exercise of his exceptional powers under 
Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, 
he has informed the Security Council that 
"the present crisis poses a serious threat to 
international peace and security". 

3. The Government of the United 
States submits that the interim measures 
of protection requested are urgently 
needed to preserve the rights of the United 
States. The United States in its Applica- 
tion primarily requests the Court to ad- 
judge and declare that Iran shall release 
immediately and permit to depart from 
Iran immediately all hostages and other 
members of the Embassy of the United 
States who are not of Iranian nationality, 
shall restore to the United States its em- 
bassy premises, shall be held in violation of 
multiple international legal obligations, and 
shall pay to the United States reparations 
for numerous grave violations of the inter- 
national legal rights of the United States. 
Interim measures of protection are re- 
quired to preserve the following rights of 
the United States: the rights of its nation- 
als to life, liberty, protection and security; 
the rights of inviolability, immunity and 
protection for its diplomatic and consular 
officials; and the rights of inviolability and 
protection for its diplomatic and consular 
premises. The Court can grant and Iran can 
execute a decision providing effective and 
meaningful redress only if the lives and 
physical and emotional well-being of the 
hostages are preserved. In the volatile cir- 
cumstances existing in Tehran, the hos- 
tages are, to an anguishing degree, in con- 
tinuing jeopardy; their situation could 
sharply deteriorate at any moment. In the 
absence of effective measures of protec- 
tion, a tragedy of an irreparable kind could 
result. It is these possible consequences of 
the Court's not indicating provisional 
measures that so urgently impel the United 
States to request them. 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle East 



4. Moreover, the Government of the 
United States submits that the urgent nejed 
for interim measures of protection is rein- 
forced by the dangers to the fabric of dip- 
lomatic relations and international law 
which are posed by the continued detention 
of United States diplomatic personnel. 
Each day that this condition continues 
causes irreparable damage to principles of 
international law and the fundamentals of 
diplomatic relations. Indeed, recent events 
in other countries demonstrate that con- 
tinuation of this situation in Tehran pre- 
sents a clear and present danger to the 
safety of the diplomatic community at 
large. Moreover, should the Government of 
Iran proceed to implement a possible 
course of action which it has threatened, 
namely, to place diplomats on trial for al- 
leged criminal acts of espionage, the prin- 
ciples of international law and the funda- 
mentals of diplomatic relations will have 
been irreparably damaged. No judgment of 
the Court will be able to undo the taking of 
so lawless and extraordinary a step. 

5. In view of the considerations re- 
ferred to in the foregoing paragraphs and 
in the Application of the United States, I 
respectfully request, on behalf of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America, 
that, pending final judgment in this suit, 
the Court indicate forthwith the following: 

(a) That the Government of Iran im- 
mediately release all hostages of United 
States nationality and facilitate the prompt 
and safe departure from Iran of these per- 
sons and all other United States officials in 
dignified and humane circumstances. 

(b) That the Government of Iran im- 
mediately clear the premises of the United 
States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate 
of all persons whose presence is not au- 
thorized by the United States Charge 
d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises 
to United States control. 

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure 
that all persons attached to the United 
States Embassy and Consulate should be 
accorded, and protected in, full freedom 
within the Embassy and Chancery prem- 
ises, and the freedom of movement within 
Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic 
and consular functions. 

(d) That the Government of Iran not 
place on trial any person attached to the 
Embassy and Consulate of the United 
States and refrain from any action to im- 
plement any such trial. 

(e) That the Government of Iran en- 
sure that no action is taken which might 
prejudice the rights of the United States in 
respect of the carrying out of any decision 
which the Court may render on the merits, 
and in particular neither take nor permit 
action that would threaten the lives, 
safety, or well-being of the hostages. 

6. In view of the gravity of the current 
situation caused by the actions taken and 
threatened by the Government of Iran and 
by persons acting under its authority or 
with its support, the Government of the 
United States urges that this request be 
treated as a matter of extreme urgency. In 
this connection, the attention of the Court 



is invited to the letter from the Secretary 
of State of the United States to the Presi- 
dent of the Court, a copy of which is at- 
tached, which is submitted in conformity 
with Article 74, paragraph 4, of the rules of 
the Court. In view of the extreme urgency 
of the case, the United States further re- 
spectfully requests that the Court set a 
hearing on this request at the earliest pos- 
sible date. 

7. The undersigned is authorized by 
the Government of the United States of 
America to appear before the Court in any 
proceedings or hearings relating to this re- 
quest which the Court may convene in ac- 
cordance with the terms of Article 74, 
paragraph 3 of the Rules of the Court. 

Roberts B. Owen 

Agent for the Government of the 

United States of America 



RESPONSE FROM THE ICJ, 
NOV. 30, 1979 2 

The Registrar of the International 
Court of Justice has sent on November 
30, 1979, the following communication 
to Roberts B. Owen, the Legal Adviser 
of the State Department, who is repre- 
senting the United States in the case 
the United States has brought against 
Iran before the Court: 

I have the honor to refer to the Appli- 
cation of the United States of America, in- 
stituting proceedings against Iran on 29 
November and to simultaneous request 
filed by the United States for indication of 
provisional measures. The President di- 
rects me to express his hope that the two 
governments concerned will take into ac- 
count the fact that the matter is now sub 
judice before the International Court. This 
being so the President, in conformity with 
Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of 
Court, draws the attention of both parties 
to the need to act in such a way as will en- 
able any order the Court may make on the 
request for provisional measures to have 
its appropriate effects. A similar communi- 
cation addressed today to Government of 
Iran. Court will hold public hearings at an 
early date to afford parties the opportunity 
of presenting their observations on request 
for interim measures. Projected date and 
time for such hearings is Monday, 10 De- 
cember, at 3 p.m. 

The provisional measures which 
the United States has requested and to 
which the Registrar referred were as 
follows: 



(a) That the Government of Iran im- 
mediately release all hostages of United 
States nationality and facilitate the prompt 
and safe departure from Iran of these per- 
sons and all other United States officials in 
dignified and humane circumstances. 

(b) That the Government of Iran im- 
mediately clear the premises of the United 
States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate 
of all persons whose presence is not au- 
thorized by the United States Charge 
d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises 
to United States control. 

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure 
that all persons attached to the United 
States Embassy and Consulate should be 
accorded, and protected in, full freedom 
within the Embassy and Chancery prem- 
ises, and the freedom of movement within 
Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic 
and consular functions. 

(d) That the Government of Iran not 
place on trial any person attached to the 
Embassy and Consulate of the United 
States and refrain from any action to im- 
plement any such trial. 

(e) That the Government of Iran en- 
sure that no action is taken which might 
prejudice the rights of the United States in 
respect of the carrying out of any decision 
which the Court may render on the merits, 
and in particular neither take nor permit 
action that would threaten the lives, 
safety, or well-being of the hostages. 

The United States welcomes the 
action of the President of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice and urges that 
the hearing take place at the earliest 
feasible time. ■ 



'Press release 311. 

*Articles II and III of the Protocols to 
the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and 
Consular Relations both provide that the 
parties may agree on alternate 
procedures — arbitration or conciliation — in 
lieu of proceeding directly to this Court. 
No such agreements have been made. In- 
deed, the Iranian authorities have refused 
to discuss the dispute— still less modes of 
settlement of it— with United States emis- 
saries. The terms of the preambles to both 
Protocols demonstrate the intent of the 
protocols to make recourse to the Court 
unconditional and not dependent upon joint 
pursuit by the parties of the options of ar- 
bitration or conciliation. They provide that: 
"expressing their wish to resort in all 
matters concerning them in respect of any 
dispute arising out of the interpretation or 
application of the Convention to the com- 
pulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice, unless some other form of 
settlement has been agreed upon by the 
parties within a reasonable period . . . ." 
(Emphasis supplied.) [Text in Original.] 

2 Press release 313. 






January 1980 



41 



Middle East 



U.S. Embassy 
Marine Security 
Guards 



Marine security guards have a long 
and proud tradition of providing secu- 
rity guard coverage at U.S. Embassies 
and Consulates abroad. 

Shortly after World War II, the 
Department of State recognized a need 
for a guard force of young, alert, well- 
trained, and highly disciplined Ameri- 
can military personnel to man its Em- 
bassies and Consulates. The evolution 
of the present-day Marine Security 
Guard Battalion, based at Quantico, 
Va., began in 1947. In that year, a pro- 
posal was made that the Department of 
War furnish Marine Corps personnel 
for Foreign Service guard duty under 
the provisions of the Foreign Service 
Act of 1946. Two years later, on Jan. 
28, 1949, the first Marines departed 
Washington, D.C., for their assign- 
ments. 

A normal tour for Marine security 
guards is 30 months, broken into two 
15-month tours at different posts. Usu- 
ally, a new Marine security guard will 
be assigned to a hardship post where 
there are restricted recreation and so- 
cial activities. Examples are Moscow 
and Brazzaville (Congo), which are 
12-month tours. Tour length in Iran has 
been 6 months. 

The largest detachment is in Paris, 
with 35 Marines. Other large posts are 
London (19) and Tokyo (20). The small- 
est posts have six Marines, such as the 
one at Bridgetown, Barbados. 

While on post, Marine security 
guards are under direct operational 
control of the Chief of Diplomatic Mis- 
sion. The primary mission of Marine se- 
curity guards is to provide protection of 
classified and administratively con- 
trolled material and other assigned 
U.S. Government property and person- 
nel. 

In the event of large-scale riots and 
demonstrations directed against U.S. 
diplomatic installations, the role of the 
Marine security guards is twofold: (1) 
to delay entry of a hostile group into 
the installation long enough to allow for 
the destruction of classified material 
and (2) to aid in safeguarding the lives 
of American and locally hired person- 
nel. 

Their duties, therefore, are defen- 
sive in nature, entailing both the pro- 
tection of classified information and the 
provision of an "in-house" deterrent to 
counter small-scale acts of violence di- 



rected against U.S. personnel and 
facilities. 

Overall protection of U.S. Embas- 
sies and assigned personnel is the re- 
sponsibility of the host governments. 
This is generally provided by national 
police or other paramilitary organiza- 
tions. The host government is bound by 
the "Vienna convention" to protect the 
lives and property of assigned diplo- 
mats. Contingency plans concerning use 
of Marine security guards in a "delay- 
ing action" presuppose that the host 
government will honor its obligations. 
Marine security guards are not in- 
tended to be a fighting force ready and 
able to engage a hostile population in 
pitched battle. 

There are presently about 1,100 
Marine security guards on duty. They 
man 118 posts in 105 countries around 
the world. There are 15 women serving 
with the Marine security guards, who 
are part of a pilot program. No more 
women will be admitted to the program 
until it has been evaluated. They are 
serving at Kingston, Jamaica; Seoul, 
Korea; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Amman, 
Jordan; Quito, Ecuador; and Karachi, 
Pakistan. ■ 



International Court 
of Justice 

The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations. It was created by 
the U.N. Charter in 1945 as the succes- 
sor to the Permanent Court of Interna- 
tional Justice. The Statute of the ICJ 
forms an integral part of the U.N. 
Charter. The Court's principal func- 
tions are to decide such cases as are 
submitted to it by states and to give 
advisory opinions on legal questions at 
the request of intergovernmental 
bodies authorized pursuant to the Stat- 
ute of the Court and the U.N. Charter. 

The Court is composed of 15 
judges, no two of whom may be nation- 
als of the same state, elected by the 
U.N. General Assembly and the Secu- 
rity Council, voting independently. The 
electors are mandated to bear in mind 
the qualifications of the individual can- 
didates and the need for the Court as a 
whole to represent the main forms of 
civilization and the principal legal sys- 
tems of the world. Members of the 
Court are elected for 9 years, one third 
of the total number of judges being 
elected every 3 years. 



The membership of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice at the present 
time is as follows: President, Sir Hum- 
phrey Waldock (United Kingdom); 
Vice President, Taslim Olawale Elias 
(Nigeria); and Judges Manfred Lachs 
(Poland), Isaac Forster (Senegal), 
Andre Gros (France), Richard R. Bax- 
ter (United States of America), P. D. 
Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics), Jose Sette Camara (Brazil), 
Jose Maria Ruda (Argentina), 
Nagendra Singh (India), Abdullah Ali 
El-Erian (Egypt), Hermann Mosler 
(Federal Republic of Germany), Shig- 
eru Oda (Japan), Salah El Dine Tarazi 
(Syrian Arab Republic), and Robert 
Ago (Italy). ■ 



Situation in Iran 



WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, 
NOV. 14, 1979 ! 

The President has today acted to 
block all official Iranian assets in the 
United States, including deposits in 
U.S. banks and their foreign branches 
and subsidiaries. This order is in re- 
sponse to reports that the Government 
of Iran is about to withdraw its funds. 
The purpose of this order is to insure 
that claims on Iran by the United 
States and its citizens are provided for 
in an orderly manner. 

The order does not affect accounts 
of persons other than the Government 
of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and 
other controlled entities. The precise 
amounts involved cannot be ascertained 
at this time, but there is no reason for 
disturbance in the foreign exchange or 
other markets. 

The President is taking this action 
pursuant to the International Emer- 
gency Economic Powers Act, which 
grants the President authority "to deal 
with any unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United 
States." 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
NOV. 14, 1979 ! 

Pursuant to Section 204(b) of the In- 
ternational Emergency Economic Powers 
Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1703, I hereby report to 
the Congress that I have today exercised 
the authority granted by this Act to block 
certain property or interests in property of 
the Government of Iran, its instrumen- 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle East 



talities and controlled entities and the Cen- 
tral Bank of Iran. 

1. The circumstances necessitating the 
exercise of this authority are the recent 
events in Iran and the recent actions of the 
Government of Iran. 

2. These events and actions put at 
grave risk the personal safety of United 
States citizens and the lawful claims of 
United States citizens and entities against 
the Government of Iran and constitute an 
extraordinary threat to the national secu- 
rity and foreign policy of the United 
States. 

3. Consequently, I have ordered 
blocked all property and interests in prop- 
erty of the Government of Iran, its in- 
strumentalities and controlled entities and 
the Central Bank of Iran which are or be- 
come subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States or which are or come within 
the possession of persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. I have 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to 
employ all powers granted to me by the In- 
ternational Emergency Economic Powers 
Act to carry out the blocking. 

4. Blocking property and property 
interests of the Government of Iran, its in- 
strumentalities and controlled entities and 
the Central Bank of Iran will enable the 
United States to assure that these re- 
sources will be available to satisfy lawful 
claims of citizens and entities of the United 
States against the Government of Iran. 

5. This action is taken with respect to 
Iran for the reasons described in this re- 
port. 

Jimmy Carter 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
NOV. 17, 1979 2 

We welcome this announcement 
that some of the Americans held in the 
Embassy of Tehran will be released. 
We are thankful the ordeal may be over 
for them and that they may be soon re- 
united with their families. 

We strongly urge that the au- 
thorities in Iran now move to secure 
the safe release of all those still being 
held. Their ordeal is not over. The U.S. 
Government will continue to work in 
every channel open to it to achieve that 
end. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 17, 1979 2 

As we approach our traditional day 
of national Thanksgiving, the hearts of 
all Americans are heavy with concern 
for the safety of those held hostage in 
Iran. 

We join with people of all faiths 
throughout the world who adhere to 
fundamental principles of human rights 
and international law. We are united 



with them in seeking an end to acts of 
terrorism against innocent people. 

On Thanksgiving Day and during 
the holiday weekend, I ask all Ameri- 
cans to make a special prayer at 
churches and synagogues and places of 
public meeting. 

Let us seek God's guidance in our 
search for peace and human brother- 
hood and pray for the safe return of 
those whose lives are threatened. May 
we come with gratitude for our abun- 
dant blessings and humility before the 
heavy burden of world responsibility 
that our blessings and power have 
brought. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
NOV. 19, 1979 2 

Three of our hostages in Tehran 
have been released and have left Iran. 
After a brief period of rest and care, 
they will be reunited with their families 
here in the United States. 

The remaining hostages must also 
be released. Their detention is without 
justification. The Government of Iran is 
responsible for achieving their im- 
mediate and safe release, and the 
United States has the right to expect 
that Iran will do so. 

The specter has been raised of 
other American diplomatic hostages 
being placed on trial. Such a step would 
be a further flagrant violation of 
elementary human rights, religious 
precepts, and international law and 
practice. Worldwide outrage at the de- 
tention of the hostages would be 
greatly heightened by any attempt to 
put these diplomatic personnel on trial. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
NOV. 20, 1979 2 

There are reports that the Ameri- 
can citizens being illegally held as hos- 
tages in Tehran with the support of the 
Iranian Government might soon be put 
through some sort of "trial." This would 
be a flagrant violation of international 
law and basic religious principles, and 
the Government of Iran would bear full 
responsibility for any ensuing conse- 
quences. The United States is seeking a 
peaceful solution to this problem 
through the United Nations and every 
other available channel. This is far 
preferable to the other remedies avail- 
able to the United States. Such rem- 
edies are explicitly recognized in the 
Charter of the United Nations. The 
Government of Iran must recognize the 
gravity of the situation it has created. 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
NOV. 28, 1979 3 

This morning I have received the 
credentials of the Ambassadors of sev- 
eral nations. This is a very important 
and a very solemn occasion for me 
whenever I have this opportunity. 
There is a vivid reminder in this cere- 
mony of the importance of diplomatic 
relationships. In looking down this row 
of representatives, who are quite dis- 
tinguished in their own right, the dif- 
ferences among us are apparent. We 
represent countries with different 
backgrounds, different political sys- 
tems, different customs, heritage, 
commitments, goals, opportunities, 
different levels of income, different al- 
liances with widely varying countries. 
The only way to bridge the inher- 
ent gaps between countries and to 
maintain peace and proper relationships 
is through the honoring of the integrity 
of diplomatic immunity. It's extremely 
important that mob violence be con- 
trolled and that international terrorism 
not be permitted to reign. All countries 
are afflicted at times with mob violence 
and terrorism. 

The tragedy of the occurrences in 
Iran is that in a departure from ac- 
cepted custom and tradition down 
through the centuries, in this instance, 
the Government itself has both con- 
doned and encouraged the seizure of an 
American Embassy and our personnel 
through mob violence and through 
terrorism. 

The inviolability of embassies is 
absolutely indispensable in easing ten- 
sions and resolving problems that exist 
among nations and in searching for a 
common ground of peace and communi- 
cation among people. This is vital to 
every country. It's particularly vital to 
those countries which are small and 
which are weak and which do not have 
military power or economic power to 
exert in defending one's own institu- 
tions and one's own rights. 

In this principle, the attitude of our 
own country, our efforts to have our 
hostages released and to restore the in- 
tegrity of our diplomatic institutions, is 
an effort not only for the rights and 
benefits of the United States but for 
the rights and benefits of all nations. 
Some of the countries represented 
here, almost all of them, have strongly 
supported the condemnation of the Ira- 
nian Government's actions in seizing 
our Embassy and holding our hostages 
captive. We need the help of all coun- 
tries. The rule of law is only as strong 
as the efforts of those who are com- 
mitted to defend it. We are very 
grateful for the help of those nations 



January 1980 



43 



Middle East 



which have joined us in this effort. 

The harming of innocent people is 
condemned by every law of mankind 
and by every law of God, no matter 
what religious principles or economic or 
political principles prevail in a country. 
We are determined to work as peace- 
fully as possible to achieve the release 
of our hostages as early as we possibly 
can and, of course, commensurate with 
that, to defend and to protect the un- 
changing principles on which our nation 
and other nations are founded. 

My hope is that all countries repre- 
sented here and those others who have 
representatives in our Capital City will 
join with us in bringing a quick and 
peaceful resolution to the problem 
which afflicts not only the United States 
but all countries. ■ 

•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979. 

2 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Nov. 26, 1979. 

3 Made in the Oval Office when he re- 
ceived diplomatic credentials from the 
newly appointed Ambassadors from 
Nicaragua, Algeria, Australia, Honduras, 
Yugoslavia, and West Germany (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Dec. 3, 1979). 



Chronology of 
Events in Iran, 
November 1979 

Nov. 4 Iranian students seize U.S. 

Embassy in Iran and hold 
100 hostages (65% Ameri- 
\ can) protesting that the de- 
posed Shah of Iran, Moham- 
med Reza Pahlavi, be re- 
turned to Iran to stand trial. 
Promised host government 
help never arrives. 

Nov. 5 Iran announces cancellation of 

20-year-old defense agree- 
ment with U.S. and scraps 
portions of a 1921 treaty 
with Russia. 
U.S. rejects students' de- 
mands to return the Shah to 
Iran and expects Prime 
Minister Mehdi Bazargan's 
government to live up to its 
assurances for protection of 
American diplomatic staff 
and premises. 

Nov. 6 Prime Minister Bazargan's 

provisional revolutionary 
government dissolves, 
yielding power to the Islamic 
authority of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini and his 
secret Revolutionary Coun- 
cil. 



\ 



\ 



Nov. 7 



Nov. 8 



Nov. 9 



Iranian students publicly 
threaten to kill American 
hostages if U.S. attempts 
rescue. 
PLO announces that it is 
sending representatives to 
Iran to seek release of hos- 
tages. 
At President Carter's request, 
former Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark and Mr. Wil- 
liam Miller, U.S. Senate 
committee senior staff offi- 
cial, leave Washington for 
Tehran carrying a message 
from the President to Ira- 
nian authorities seeking the 
release of American hostages 
and to discuss U.S. relations 
with Iran. 
Iranian authorities agree to 

receive emissaries. 
Khomeini rejects talks with 
President Carter's special 
envoys Clark and Miller 
stating that if the U.S. gives 
up the Shah and stops es- 
pionage, negotiations may be 
possible. 
PLO officials announce that a 
two-member delegation, 
headed by a leader of Al 
Fatah (the main guerrilla 
group), arrives in Tehran in 
efforts to protect the lives of 
the hostages. 
Deposed Shah offers to leave 
U.S but is dissuaded by doc- 
tors. 
Secretary Vance declares that 
the U.S. holds Iranian au- 
thorities responsible for 
safety of hostages. 
Iranian students reject negoti- 
ations with PLO. 
Iranian students protest in 
Washington, and American 
students stage counter- 
demonstration. 
President Carter announces 
postponement of Canada 
visit until 1980. 
Iran cuts supplies to some oil 
concerns by 10% for rest of 
1979. 
U.N. Security Council Presi- 
dent urges Iran to free hos- 
tages. 
U.S. announces suspension of 
deliveries of about $30 mil- 
lion in military equipment 
and spare parts to Iran. 
Egyptian President Sadat in- 
vites Shah to Egypt for fur- 
ther medical treatment and 
political asylum and attacks 
Khomeini as a "lunatic who 
misrepresents Islam." 
Pope John Paul II sends a 
message to Khomeini asking 
him to insure the safety of 
the hostages. 



2 



% 



\ 



X 



Nov. 10 President Carter directs 

Attorney General Civiletti to 
deport any Iranian student 
who is in the U.S. illegally. 

Officials of the PLO fail in 
their efforts to free hos- 
tages. 

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr becomes 
Iran's acting Foreign Minis- 
ter and reaffirms demands 
that the U.S. return the 
Shah. 

Khomeini receives Papal Nun- 
cio but rejects Pope's appeal. 
Nov. 12 President Carter orders sus- 
pension of purchases of Ira- 
nian oil to U.S. Shortly 
after, Iran announces that it 
is cutting petroleum ship- 
ments to the U.S. 

Bani-Sadr asks the Security 
Council to hear charges 
against the U.S., accusing 
America of being a "threat to 
peace." 

Mexico announces it is closing 
its embassy in Iran. 
Nov. 13 American and British naval 
vessels start maneuvers in 
the Arabian Sea. Iran, 
charging the U.S. with war 
threats, calls for a meeting 
of the Security Council. 
Nov. 14 Iran's Foreign Minister an- 

nounces that Iran will with- 
draw its funds from Ameri- 
can banks. 

President Carter acts to block 

all official Iranian assets in 

-j the U.S. including deposits 

in U.S. banks, their foreign 

branches, and subsidiaries. 

With Secretary of State 
Vance's support, the Secu- 
~~L rity Council declines to de- 
bate Iran's charges against 
the U.S. until hostages are 
freed. 
Nov. 15 Iranian officials hint that 

women and blacks among the 
hostages are to be freed. 
Students holding them 
strongly reject the possibil- 
ity. 

Iran announces it will no 
longer sell oil to American 
companies. 

Defense Department discloses 
y\ that it may end training in 
the U.S. for Iranian military 
men. 

Khomeini cancels all appoint- 
ments until Dec. 5 because of 
fatigue and illness. 

President Carter accuses Ira- 
nian Government of en- 
couraging embassy takeover 
and warns Tehran that U.S. 
"will not yield to interna- 
tional terrorism or 
blackmail." 
Nov. 16 Iranian students warn that 

hostages will pay if Shah is 
allowed to go anywhere but 
to Iran. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle East 



150 Iranians are ordered by 
U.S. Government to leave 
U.S. voluntarily in 30 days 
or face deportation. 

President Carter discourages 
o public recriminations against 
all Iranians living in U.S. 

Federal Judge orders Presi- 
dent Carter to lift ban on 
demonstrations by Iranians 
and Americans on Federal 
property calling the ban "a 
substantial infringement on 
their First Amendment 
rights." 
Nov. 17 Khomeini orders students to 
release all women and blacks 
among hostages. 
Nov. 18 Khomeini declares U.S. hos- 
tages face being tried as ' 
spies. 

Iranian students announce that 
three hostages will be 
released — a woman and two 
black men. 
Nov. 19 U.S. demands all remaining 
hostages in American Em- 
bassy in Tehran be released 
and says that if any are tried 
on espionage charges, it 
would be "a further flagrant 
violation" of "human rights, 
religious precepts, and in- 
ternational law." 

Iranian officials announce they 
will stop using dollars to pay 
for imports and asks OPEC 
not to accept dollars for their 
oil exports. 
Nov. 20 A second group of 10 hostages 
are released and arrive at a 
U.S. air base near 
Frankfort, West Germany. 

U.S. suggests to Iran that it 
might resort to military 
force if the remaining 49 hos- 
tages are not freed. 

Khomeini repeats threat to try 
the 49 remaining hostages. 

President Carter orders a sec- 
ond naval task force, in- 
cluding the aircraft carrier 
Kitty Hawk, into the Indian 
Ocean to join the carrier 
Midway and four other ships 
in the Arabian Sea. 
Nov. 21 Students warn that all hos- 
tages will die if U.S. attacks 
and the embassy will be 
blown up. 

Security Council offers Iran 
two forums in which to state 
its case in return for the re- 
lease of hostages. 

First stage of the deposed 
Shah's medical treatment 
ends. 
Nov. 22 Thirteen hostages freed from 
U.S. Embassy in Tehran ar- 
rive in Washington; they are 
met by Secretary Vance and 
other senior State Depart- 
ment officials. 

Khomeini urges all Moslems to 
rise up against the West to 
fight "blasphemy." 



} 



U.S. pledges to maintain pres- 
ence in Islamic world. 
President Carter instructs 
U.S. Embassies around the 
world to undertake greater 
security precautions and for 
host governments to do all 
they can to protect embas- 
sies. 
U.S. again warns Iran that it 
will be held "strictly ac- 
countable" for the safety of 
the hostages. 

Nov. 23 Bani-Sadr declares that all 

Iranian foreign debts are re- 
pudiated. 
PLO officials say Yasir Arafat 
never tried to mediate the 
release of hostages because 
"we are allies of the Iranian 
revolution." 
Israel announces in a broad- 
cast that it has a plan for 
rescuing hostages. 

Nov. 24 Khomeini accuses U.S. and Is- 
rael of attempting to seize 
two of the most sacred Mos- 
lem mosques in the holy 
cities of Mecca and Medina. 

Nov. 25 A U.N. Security Council session 
is called by Secretary Gen- 
eral Waldheim because Iran 
fails to respond to an appeal 
to release U.S. hostages. It 
is only the second time in 19 
years that a Secretary Gen- 
eral has requested such a 
meeting. 
U.S. Congressman George 
Hansen (Idaho), on a self- 
appointed peace mission to 
Tehran, visits some of the 
U.S. hostages. 

Nov. 26 State Department orders em- 
bassies in 11 Moslem coun- 
tries to evacuate "voluntar- 
ily" dependents, nonessen- 
tial diplomats, and private 
businessmen to minimize 
risks in the aftermath of 
events in Iran, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, and other 
countries. 
The U.N., in a new appeal for 
immediate release of hos- 
tages, moves to bring U.S. 
diplomats together with a 
responsible figure in the 
Iranian regime. Foreign 
Minister Bani-Sadr, who had 
planned to fly to the U.N. 
headquarters in New York, 
is overruled by Iran's ruling 
Revolutionary Council which 
decides that no leader can 
leave Iran until Ashura, the 
holiest period of the Shiite 
Moslem calender, ends. 
Bani-Sadr plans to come to 
the U.N. on Dec. 1 when 
talks could begin. 
Italian President Pertini urges 
Khomeini to free the hos- 
tages on humanitarian 
grounds. 



Nov. 27 



*5 



Nov. 28 



Nov. 29 



Nov. 30 



~h 



State Department recommends 
that only essential travel by 
U.S. citizens be undertaken 
to United Arab Emirates, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Oman, Libya, Bah- 
rain, the Yemen Arab Re- 
public, and Bangladesh. 

Officials at New York 
Hospital-Cornell Medical 
Center announce that the 
deposed Shah of Iran is able 
to leave the hospital and re- 
turn to Mexico within a 
week. 

Khomeini attacks plans for a 
session of the Security 
Council claiming the outcome 
had been dictated by the 
U.S. 

Security Council receives writ- 
ten promise that Iran's act- 
ing Foreign Minister will ar- 
rive for the Dec. 1 session. 

A statement issued by the 
Commonwealth High Com- 
missioners appeals to the 
Iranian Government to pro- 
cure the release of all hos- 
tages and expresses the hope 
that the parties will resolve 
their differences by peaceful 
means. 

Bani-Sadr is dismissed as 
Iran's acting Foreign Minis- 
ter. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Di- 
rector of Iranian television, 
is named to the post. 

Deposed Shah's health is im- 
proved and a plane is re- 
ported standing by at Ken- 
nedy International Airport 
to return him to exile in 
Mexico. 

President Carter denounces 
the "inhuman and degrading 
conditions" imposed upon 
the hostages and again 
warns Iran that it would 
suffer "grave consequences" 
if hostages are harmed. 

Iranian Government files suit 
in New York against the de- 
posed Shah and his wife 
asking $56.5 billion in dam- 
ages. 

U.S. initiates actions against 
Iran in the International 
Court of Justice. 

Mexico announces it will not 
renew visa for deposed 
Shah. 

U.S. expects Shah to leave 
country despite Mexico's 
refusal to renew his visa. 
The Shah announces he in- 
tends to leave U.S. in hopes 
that his departure would 
"end the tragic situation in 
Iran." 

President Carter cancels six- 
state political tour because 
of Iranian crisis. 

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh 
announces Iran will not at- 



Z 



January 1980 



45 






Middle East 



tend the meeting of the Se- 
curity Council stating that 
"there is no basis for negoti- 
ations over the hostages ex- 
cept the return of the de- 
posed Shah for trial in this 
country." He also announces 
that Laingen and two other 
embassy officials are not 
hostages and "are free to 
leave at any time" although 
he could not guarantee their 
safety to the airport. 
Registrar of the ICJ issues call 
to parties of hostage case 
stating that the "Court will 
hold public hearings at an 
early date to afford parties 
the opportunity of present- 
ing their observations on 
request for interim meas- 
ures. Projected date and 
time for such hearings is 
Monday, 10 December, at 3 
p.m."H 



The Challenge of 
Peacemaking 

by Harold H. Saunders 

Address before the Conference on 
U.S. Vital Interests in the Middle East 
in St. Louis on November 6, 1979. Mr. 
Saunders is Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 

I am delighted to be here in St. 
Louis to speak about the challenge of 
war and peace in the Middle East, and 
we appreciate the interest all of you 
have shown in coming to share this day 
with us. Conferences such as these give 
us in your Department of State a valu- 
able opportunity to exchange percep- 
tions with informed and interested citi- 
zens about what is at stake for all of us 
in this key area of the world — an area 
which Americans in many walks of life 
increasingly recognize can affect their 
lives and interests. 

At the root of our exchange of 
views are some basic questions. 

• Why is the United States so deeply 
involved in the search for peace in the 
Middle East? 

• Does that involvement serve our 
national interests or threaten them? 

• What are those national interests, 
and just how should we pursue them in 
this unstable region where change is 
taking place with unprecedented rapid- 
ity? 



The answers to these questions 
begin to define the elements of a truly 
national policy toward this troubled re- 
gion. For years, Middle East policy was 
the preserve of a few specialists. Today 
it is the concern of all Americans. 

The purpose of this conference has 
been to stimulate thought and to con- 
tribute to a greater understanding of 
the ingredients of our policy. For, 
without a national consensus about 
what the United States is trying to do 
in such a critical area and why, no 
policy — no matter how designed and 
executed from Washington — can 
succeed. 

At the outset let me make three 
central points about the Middle East, 
and then develop them in relation to the 
peacemaking process. 

• More important and yet different 
American interests converge in the 
Middle East today than in any other 
area of the developing world. The 
United States no longer has the choice 
of distancing itself from what happens 
there. 

• Fundamental changes are taking 
place in the Middle East at breathtak- 
ing speed. Some of the richest and fast- 
est modernizing nations in the world 
live side-by-side with some of the 
poorest and most traditional nations, 
and all are coping with the impact of 
rapid change. Instability of some kind 
is inevitable. The issue is not whether 
we can avoid instability but how we 
deal with it. 

• Within this environment of high 
stakes and diverse interests, the only 
sensible policy for us is one which per- 
mits us to pursue all of our interests at 
the same time in conditions of orderly 
change. We must avoid being forced to 
make choices among our various inter- 
ests because none is so unimportant 
that it can be sacrificed. This is in our 
interest. It is in the interest of our 
friends in the Middle East. 

Important U.S. Interests 

Any discussion of American inter- 
ests in the Middle East today must 
begin with some thought about how 
American perceptions of the Middle 
East and our interests there have 
changed in recent years. Only after 
such reflection do we see what is at 
stake. 

For years, the Middle East was 
thought of mainly in schoolbook geog- 
raphy terms as a "strategic cross- 
roads," as a "land bridge" joining Asia, 
Africa, and Europe and forming the 
"life line" of the British Empire. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the area took on new 
geopolitical importance because of the 



oil it provided to our NATO allies and 
Japan and because of the importance of 
Turkey and Iran in containing Soviet 
expansion to the south toward that oil. 
Even during those years, however, the 
Middle East still did not seem to have 
direct overriding importance to the 
United States itself. We could still 
make the choice of standing a step back 
from direct involvement in its problem. 

That situation has changed mark- 
edly in the 1970s. If we can just look 
for a moment at the five areas of pri- 
mary interest which the United States 
has today in the Middle East we will 
see the extent of the change. 

The first relates to the Soviet 
Union. While we have long recognized 
the importance of denying to the Soviet 
Union a predominant influence in the 
Middle East, we have also learned in 
the heat of two crises that we have a 
particular concern to avoid confronta- 
tion with the Soviets there in this nu- 
clear age. The Soviet Union, for rea- 
sons of power, oil, geographic prox- 
imity, and ethnic and cultural ties be- 
tween elements of its population and 
peoples of the Middle East also consid- 
ers that it has interests in the area. 

Our interest is to help the nations 
of the area preserve their independence 
against any foreign domination. But 
unlike Europe, where the lines between 
the Soviets and us are drawn both geo- 
graphically and by precedent, the lines 
are not clearly drawn in the Middle 
East. Either by accident or by escala- 
tion, the two superpowers could end up 
in confrontation. Messages exchanged 
between Moscow and Washington in the 
heat of crisis in both the 1967 and the 
1973 wars made that specter all too 
clear. 

So today we are more acutely 
aware than ever before of the challenge 
of avoiding confrontation, while making 
certain that nations of the area pre- 
serve their independence. 

Our second major interest is the 
security and well-being of Israel. Every 
American President since the estab- 
lishment of Israel in 1948 has declared 
the unwavering American commitment 
to that end. Our two peoples have deep 
cultural and emotional ties which make 
relations between our two countries 
both unique and indestructible. We 
have stood by Israel through its wars 
and given generously to its develop- 
ment and defense. As President Carter 
has put it: "For 30 years we have stood 
at the side of the proud and independ- 
ent nation of Israel. I can say without 
reservation, as President of the United 
States of America, that we will con- 
tinue to do so not just for another 30 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle East 



years, but forever. The United States 
will never support any agreement or 
any action that places Israel's security 
in jeopardy. 

Today this traditional interest in 
Israel has new dimensions. 

During the early days of the 1973 
war, Israeli reverses shook Israel's 
faith in its military prowess and led to a 
further military buildup. But those re- 
verses also raised questions about 
whether, over time, Israel could de- 
pend solely on its military strength to 
survive. 

Now the peace treaty with Egypt 
signed last March finally provides a 
practical complement. Today, for the 
first time, Israel has a realistic hope of 
assuring its future not just by arms 
alone — though these will always be 
necessary — but by developing peaceful 
relationships with its neighbors as an 
accepted member of the Middle East 
community of nations. In helping Israel 
realize this dream of peace with its 
largest neighbor, President Carter has 
given a new dimension to our commit- 
ment to Israel. We now have the his- 
toric challenge and opportunity to help 
determine what is necessary to provide 
Israel with security in peace as well as 
in war. 

Our third interest is in the supply 
of Middle Eastern oil. We have long 
held that this oil must be available "at 
reasonable prices" to our allies who 
were so dependent on it. In this decade 
we see that oil in a different light. That 
dependence has hit closer to home. We 
need only remember the impact of the 
oil embargo of 1973-74, or again more 
recently the gas lines of early summer, 
to note that the United States itself 
now is deeply affected by imported oil, 
much of it from the Middle East. Be- 
cause the greatest reserves are there, 
those nations also have the capacity to 
affect price as well as supply. 

The fourth American interest, 
closely tied to the third, is maintenance 
of close and friendly ties with key mod- 
erate Arab nations. The reasons are 
both political and economic. Politically, 
the moderate leaders of the Middle 
East will set the character of that area 
for the remainder of the century. They 
control the forces which will be the first 
line of defense against any foreign 
domination. Economically, the Middle 
East is among the fastest growing mar- 
kets in the world. We have an obvious 
interest in developing trade which will 
help offset the cost of oil. We also have 
a larger foreign policy interest in the 
growing network of relationships that 
link the people of this area to the people 
of the United States in common pur- 
suits. 



Furthermore, the oil-producing na- 
tions of the Middle East, with their 
large supplies of capital, also have the 
capacity to influence world economic 
stability and to provide help to the de- 
veloping nations with everything from 
expensive development projects to aid 
in meeting high energy costs. 

Our fifth and no means last inter- 
est in the Middle East is a humanitarian 
one. We remain a nation concerned 
about the people of the area. For years 
we have provided assistance to refu- 
gees, whether from the Holocaust in 
Europe or from Arab villages in Pales- 
tine. We are now trying to help end the 
cycle of violence in southern Lebanon 
which has caused so much suffering to 
innocent civilians and caused 200,000 
refugees to flee north from their homes. 
We have contributed to economic de- 
velopment of the poorer nations and 
have provided necessary technology to 
those nations which have oil money. 



Until the Palestinian refugees 
can find dignity and hope in a 
future . . . there can be no 
final peace in the Middle East. 



Today exciting new opportunities 
exist. With the conclusion of the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty as the 
first step toward a comprehensive 
peace settlement, we have realistic 
hope of progress in resolving the Pales- 
tinian problem in all its aspects. We can 
look to the day when the refugees will 
no longer define their future in the 
hopelessness of the camps. This is a 
complex problem but also a vital human 
one. Until the Palestinian refugees can 
find dignity and hope in a future — until 
they can have a voice in the determina- 
tion of that future and feel that peace in 
the Middle East has something in it for 
them — there can be no final peace in the 
Middle East. In facing this tragic 
human problem, we are deeply con- 
scious that, as President Carter has 
said, it sometimes takes more courage 
to wage peace than to wage war. 

Forces of Change 

In considering these diverse and 
important interests — and our sharp- 
ened national perception of them — we 
must consider the forces of change 
which define the environment in which 
those interests are pursued. 



With rapid change comes instabil- 
ity. In the past year, we have wit- 
nessed a revolution in Iran, a coup 
d'etat in Afghanistan and spreading in- 
surrection there, continued internal 
strife in Lebanon, and the escalating 
dispute over the western Sahara in 
North Africa. All reflect unending tur- 
moil which outsiders are powerless to 
control. The issue for the United 
States, therefore, is not whether 
change will occur but how we deal with 
it. 

Our tendency too often has been to 
consider change as threatening. That 
need not be so. After all, our country 
has been and remains one of the fastest 
changing in the world. Our heritage is 
revolutionary. Our society has thrived 
on change. The spirit of innovation has 
produced human and technological 
achievements which cause other de- 
veloping societies to look to us for lead- 
ership. These achievements are the 
hallmarks of our capacity to advance 
the human condition through harness- 
ing change. 

Dangers do exist in the Middle 
East. We cannot ignore them. At the 
same time, I propose that we look at 
the changes occurring there as an op- 
portunity to build, not solely as a 
danger to destroy. As Secretary Vance 
said in Chicago last May, the United 
States must be seen as a power that 
uses its tremendous resources — 
diplomatic, military, economic — to 
promote healthy change and not as the 
power employing its military might to 
repress change. 

Our task is to work with the mod- 
erate governments of the area, to try to 
help them direct change into construc- 
tive channels. It is they who have to 
cope with the consequences of an eco- 
nomic revolution, where in some, fast 
increases in oil revenues have produced 
new power of global dimensions at a 
time that their societies are experienc- 
ing the painful stresses and strains of 
rapid modernization. Nor are any gov- 
ernments there immune from the pres- 
sures of new-found nationalism, of the 
Islamic revival, of the traditional rival- 
ries within the region, which, together 
with the economic revolution, feed 
change and instability. 

For our part, we have great assets 
in helping these nations meet the chal- 
lenge. While some are just beginning to 
enjoy the independence and power 
which their resources provide them, 
they are also finding that interdepend- 
ence is equally a force in the modern 
world. Whether it be in food production 
and imports, acquiring industrial and 
consumer goods, importing skilled and 
unskilled labor, no nation — no matter 






January 1980 



47 



Middle East 



how rich — can prosper on its own. 

With few exceptions, the peoples of 
North Africa, the Middle East, and 
Southwestern Asia want a good work- 
ing relationship with us. They value our 
know-how, our practicality and inven- 
tiveness, our technology, our educa- 
tional system, and share many of our 
values. They know we respect their 
right to solve their own problems and 
to preserve their own freedom. They 
know that we do not ask them to be like 
us but only to work with us in a shared 
desire for an orderly and peaceful 
world. Our acceptance of a pluralistic 
world enables us to contribute rather 
than to dominate. While they recognize 
we have our own interests in the area, 
they also recognize that we will pursue 
them with respect for their integrity. 

Strategy for Peace 

This brings me to the third point I 
mentioned in opening — that the only 
sensible policy for us in the Middle East 
is one designed overall to permit us to 
pursue all our interests simultaneously 
in conditions of orderly change. 

Our problem is that interests as di- 
verse as ours sometimes come into con- 
flict with one another. The most ob- 
vious example is the difficulty over the 
years of pursuing steadfast support for 
Israel while preserving and developing 
the relationships we need in the Arab 
world; nor can we totally thwart Soviet 
designs on the region or pursue hu- 
manitarian aspirations to end the plight 
of refugees and release valuable re- 
sources for economic development so 
long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is al- 
lowed to fester and periodically 
explode. 

We have discovered over the past 6 
years that a strategy centered on find- 
ing an Arab-Israeli peace best meets 
our interests. It allows us to work 
closely with all of the key nations in the 
Middle East in pursuing a common, if 
difficult, objective. We have been 
helped by the common perception in the 
area that we are the one outside nation 
able to help obtain settlement by dip- 
lomatic means rather than the military 
means which have proved so fruitless. 

We do not delude ourselves that 
this is an easy task. It is extremely dif- 
ficult. Nevertheless, this active search 
for peace not only enables us to pursue 
the full range of our national interests 
in the Middle East, it also can claim full 
support of the American people, har- 
monizing as it does the strategic, eco- 
nomic, political, moral, and humane 
interests of this nation. In the Middle 
East we need not be torn between cur- 
rent perceptions of strategic interests 



48 



and our humane and moral interests as 
we were during the decade of Vietnam. 

Egyptian-Israeli Peace 

The progress of the past year in 
moving toward an Arab-Israeli peace 
has been historic. Today after three 
decades of recurrent war without hope, 
the prospect for peace in the Middle 
East is real. For the first time negotia- 
tions are directed toward lasting 
peace — not just temporary armistice. 
They are built on real achievement by 
brave and dedicated leaders who have 
had the courage to put aside fatalistic 
assumptions about the insolubility of 
the conflict between them— President 
Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and 
President Carter. The Treaty of Peace 
between Egypt and Israel signed on the 
White House lawn last March 26 opened 
the door to negotiated peace between 
Israel and all its neighbors. 

The first gigantic step came in Sep- 
tember of last year, when the leaders of 
Egypt and Israel agreed at Camp David 
on two "framework" documents for 
peace in the Middle East. The first set 
forth the principles for a comprehensive 
peace and established the basis for pro- 
ceeding with negotiations on the West 
Bank and Gaza, where Palestinians 
would participate in determining their 
own future. The second document es- 
tablished the basic terms governing an 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. When 
those terms were actually translated 
into a contractual peace agreement last 
March 26, President Sadat and Prime 
Minister Begin signed a joint letter ad- 
dressed to President Carter setting 
forth a time frame for the West Bank- 
Gaza negotiations. 

Americans can take pride in the 
role their country played in this historic 
event. Both leaders have paid tribute to 
the key role of President Carter. I can 
say as a professional that without the 
courage, vision, and persistence of our 
President, this first practical step in 30 
years toward peace in the Middle East 
would not have been taken. 

The Egyptian-Israeli treaty is now 
being scrupulously implemented. It was 
reached through mutual concessions — 
Egypt, by breaking the pattern of con- 
frontation and giving full recognition to 
Israel; Israel by agreeing to withdraw 
completely from the Sinai. The treaty 
opens new avenues for trade and com- 
munications; for economic, scientific, 
and social betterment; and for the en- 
hancement of learning and cultural ex- 
change. Its achievement against heavy 
odds is a demonstration of men and 



women everywhere that human reason, 
common sense, goodwill, hard work, 
and faith can prevail. Its careful im- 
plementation is demonstrating that 
even those who have been adversaries 
for generations can overcome enmity 
and make peace. 

Status of the Peace Process 

As important as the Egypt- Israel 
Peace Treaty is, it is not an end in it- 
self. It is still only the first step on the 
long and difficult road to a comprehen- 
sive peace. Peace has come to Egypt 
and Israel; it has not come to the other 
peoples involved. Until it does, the 
peoples of Egypt and Israel cannot 
realize fully the benefits of their peace, 
and there can be no end to the tension 
and hostility which have plagued the 
Middle East. All the governments at 
Camp David have committed them- 
selves to a comprehensive peace. The 
process outlined in September 1978, by 
President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, 
and President Carter at Camp David 
continues. 

The principal unfinished item on 
the Middle East agenda is the relation- 
ship between Israel and its other 
neighbors, particularly between Israel 
and the Palestinian Arab people. What 
we seek, as full partner in continuing 
negotiations, is a permanent basis for 
assuring the full security of Israel and, 
at the same time, satisfaction of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinians. 

To that end, Egypt, Israel, and the 
United States have entered the next 
phase of negotiations set out in the 
Camp David framework. For the first 
time in 30 years, we have begun a 
negotiation which concentrates on is- 
sues of concern to the Palestinians as 
well as protection of Israel's security. 
We have embarked on negotiating the 
series of practical steps laid out at 
Camp David by which more than 1 mil- 
lion Palestinians living on the West 
Bank and Gaza— and eventually those 
displaced by war now living 
elsewhere — can participate in deter- 
mining their future. 

These negotiations have been 
underway since late May with Ambas- 
sador Robert Strauss heading the 
American negotiating team. It is impor- 
tant to understand their objective. 
They are a first stage in dealing with 
the issues of the West Bank and Gaza. 
What we are attempting to do is build a 
political structure— a self-governing 
authority— on the West Bank and Gaza 
that takes into account the legitimate 
interests of both Israelis and Palestin- 
ians. This step is designed to pave the 
way, over a succeeding 5-year transi- 

Department of State Bulletin 



UNITED NATIONS 



tional period, for working out the final 
status of these territories. This first 
step is to give them full autonomy to 
run their lives through their own self- 
governing body and to participate in 
negotiations on the final status of these 
territories. 

This is complicated. No one before 
has defined "full autonomy" in such cir- 
cumstances. The three parties to the 
present talks are developing a transi- 
tional arrangement, not deciding the 
final status of the territories. Yet that 
self-governing authority must be 
meaningful and credible so that Pales- 
tinians will be willing to vote and par- 
ticipate in picking leaders who will rep- 
resent them in the next round of 
negotiations during the 5-year transi- 
tional period. Obviously, many deep 
differences exist at this early stage. 
Over the past 5 months, the negotiating 
teams and their two working groups 
have been laying the technical basis for 
deciding just what will be the content of 
autonomy. 

Progress has been slow, painstak- 
ing, and not highly visible. But it is 
there in the steady achievements of the 
working groups. The achievements, 
though modest, are building blocks for 
turning autonomy into a reality. As you 
know, we have a May 1980 target date 
for completing these first negotiations. 
It is essential to insure that genuine, if 
slow, progress is being made, that sub- 
stantial progress is there by next year, 
that we are on the way to resolving the 
remaining difficult issues in order to 
insure the credibility of the peace 
process. 

This credibility is essential if we 
are to encourage Palestinians and other 
Arab nations and leaders to join in the 
negotiations. They must see that these 
negotiations are a genuine beginning. It 
is no secret that a sizable body of opin- 
ion in the Arab world remains uncon- 
vinced that our course is the right one. 
Rather than a step toward a com- 
prehensive peace, they see the Egypt- 
Israel treaty as a separate peace de- 
structive of Arab unity. We hope that 
attitudes will become more positive as 
the world sees that these negotiations 
can produce concrete results. 

One of the positive elements in the 
present situation is that parties on all 
sides are taking a fresh look at their 
interests in the present fluid situation. 
Signs exist that the Palestinians and 
other Arabs are watching the negotia- 
tions closely, that they are carefully 
considering their next steps, and that a 
certain sense of realism is emerging in 
parts of their relationship. 



In Israel, too, awareness is grow- 
ing of the need for creativity and 
imagination in dealing with the Pales- 
tinian problem. As for the United 
States, we see evidence all around us 
that more and more Americans under- 
stand the need to resolve the Palestin- 
ian dimension of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 

Success will not come overnight. 
Violence continues to poison the envi- 
ronment. Years of hatred and suspicion 
are not easily overcome. At Camp 
David we all recognized this truth. 
Since the gap between Israeli and Pal- 
estinian and other Arab perceptions of 
each other's motives cannot be bridged 
in one stroke, the Camp David 
framework sets up a process for evolv- 
ing a negotiated solution over time. 
Each success and the trust which comes 
with genuine accommodation form the 
basis for tackling still harder issues in 
later stages and a context for testing 
the results of negotiations. What re- 
mains for us all is to persevere in the 
course we have set. This we intend to 
do — for our own interests in the Middle 
East, as well as for those of the peoples 
living there. ■ 



Security Council 

Meets 

on Iranian Situation 



Following are statements made by 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Na- 
tions Donald F. McHenry to the press 
following a Security Council meeting 
on November 27, 1979, in Security 
Council sessions on December 1 and 4-, 
and the resolution unanimously 
adopted by the Council on December k- 

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, 
NOV. 27, 1979 » 

I can say on a preliminary basis 
that what you have seen the Council do 
this afternoon has been to respond to 
the call of the Secretary General for an 
immediate meeting and to reject the 
idea that a situation can be so urgent as 
to require action under article 99 and 
then wait until one party finds it conven- 
ient to appear. 

What we sought to do was to, in a 
sense, bend over backward to insure 
that there was no excuse for the con- 
sideration of the Council on the issue 
before it, and that issue, stripped of all 



of the rhetoric which may be present, is 
the question of the illegal detention of 
the American diplomatic personnel and 
the occupation of the American diplo- 
matic premises in Iran in violation of 
every principle of international law. 

There has been a great deal of dis- 
cussion within the Council in the con- 
sultations over the last several days 
with regard to the procedure which was 
to be followed. And some of the discus- 
sions went on at interminable length. 

Basically what the Council has 
done has been to publicly and formally 
not only restate the important principle 
involved here, which is the inviolability 
of diplomatic personnel, but to both re- 
state and reiterate that principle and 
the call for release despite the excuses 
which have been offered for the action 
which has been taken. Our effort here 
was to insure that that was done even 
while trying to accommodate and to in- 
sure that there was no excuse, no im- 
pediment to the work of the Council. 

I think it is clear from the reitera- 
tion of the statement by the President 
of the Council, on the behalf of all of its 
members, that the position of the 
Council with regard to the holding of 
hostages is one which is unanimously 
held. In my own experience here in the 
last 3 weeks since this unbelievable 
event occurred, I have not come upon 
any single delegate, whether they are 
in agreement with the United States on 
other issues or in disagreement with 
the United States on other issues, I 
have yet to find one delegate who has 
defended the action which has been 
taken by the authorities in Iran. 

I think that one thing is clear, one 
additional thing is clear, and it is that 
the unanimity which is present in the 
Security Council and in the General As- 
sembly as a whole is one which is also 
present with regard to the American 
public. Despite efforts to try and take 
advantage of differences which may 
exist within our own society, Ameri- 
cans are at one, whether they are 
women or men, white or black; they are 
at one in the insistence that American 
diplomatic personnel held in Iran be 
released and be released safely and 
promptly. I think in view of the gravity 
of the situation, the restraint which has 
been shown by the American public is a 
restraint which is both admirable, and I 
would suggest to you one which must 
not be misunderstood. It would be a 
mistake to interpret the restraint which 
exists as one which in any way ac- 
quiesces with the action which has been 
taken in Iran. 






January 1980 



49 



United Nations 




General view of the Security Council on December 4, 1979, when the 15 members 
(U.S., Norway, Portugal, U.K., Gabon, France, Bolivia, Bangladesh, U.S.S.R., Zam- 
bia, Nigeria, Czechoslovakia, China, Jamaica, and Kuwait) unanimously adopted a 
resolution calling on Iran to immediately release the U.S. personnel being held in 
Tehran. 



Our expectation is that the Council 
will meet on Saturday. We specifically 
insisted that it not only have a day 
given but that the Council would have 
to set a time, and we insisted that the 
Iranians had to submit a letter to the 
President of the Security Council this 
morning, prior to any agreement on 
this afternoon's activities, indicating 
that they would be present and indi- 
cating the individual who would be 
present. 

Our hope is that the efforts of the 
Secretary General over the last 3 weeks 
will be facilitated by the process which 
has been set in train. 

There is one final point which I 
wish to make. I have read some of your 
statements in terms of dissension 
within the Council and I think that in 
some instances individuals, members of 
the Council, are done a disservice by 
the interpretations, snippets here and 
there, because I think as was indicated 
by the unanimous statement which the 
President read, the Council is at one on 
the question of the release of the hos- 
tages and maintains that position de- 
spite the effort to put this in a broader 
context. 



AMBASSADOR McHENRY, 
DEC. 1, 1979 2 

Twenty-seven days ago, 63 Ameri- 
cans, as well as personnel of other 
nationalities, were seized when an 
armed, disciplined group of dem- 
onstrators invaded the U.S. Embassy 
in Tehran. Eighteen of those captured 
have been released. At least 50 Ameri- 
cans remain captive. 



As with diplomats everywhere, the 
individuals who were taken hostage are 
entitled to the protection of the Gov- 
ernment of Iran by the most solemn 
commitment nations can give — the 
sovereign pledge of governments by 
treaty and international obligation. 

Governments retain the right to 
require that foreign diplomatic person- 
nel leave their soil. But every standard 
of international behavior, whether es- 
tablished by practice, by ethics, by 
treaty, or by common humanity, sup- 
ports the principle that the personnel of 
a diplomatic mission and diplomatic 
property are inviolate. Even in the 
darkest moments of relationships be- 
tween countries, the security and 
well-being of diplomatic personnel have 
been respected. 

Iran asks that its grievances be 
heard and acted upon. Yet Iran, and 
the authorities who speak for it, are 
violating the most basic obligation of 
nations. They hold hostage the very 
people who facilitate those communica- 
tions that can resolve differences and 
lead to understanding and agreement 
among nations. 

None of us, whatever our differ- 
ences on other issues, can ignore the 
implications for all of us of this event. 
Nor can the world ignore that these 
diplomatic representatives are being 
held under degrading conditions. They 
are threatened, kept bound, isolated, 
not allowed to speak, denied mail. Even 
their whereabouts are uncertain. All of 
us at this table are also diplomatic rep- 
resentatives of our countries, charged 
with the same duties and protected by 
the same laws and rules of conduct as 
those now held captive in Tehran. It is 
for all of us to speak up to demand their 



release and to insist upon basic condi- 
tions of humanity for their care pending 
that release, including daily visitation 
by impartial observers. 

Many members of the United Na- 
.tions, including some members of this 
Council, have had ambassadors mur- 
dered, diplomatic personnel injured, 
embassy facilities destroyed. On each 
occasion the delicate framework of our 
international community has been 
harmed, but efforts were made to re- 
pair the wounds. The situation in 
Tehran has a feature unlike other as- 
saults on the diplomatic ties that bind 
our world. In Iran, the government it- 
self defends the violence which holds 
diplomats hostage. Such a position is 
intolerable. 

The United States insists that its 
diplomatic personnel be released and its 
diplomatic premises restored. These 
are not negotiable matters. The United 
States will hold the authorities in Iran 
fully responsible for the safety of the 
Americans held captive. 

I speak today for hostages who are 
endangered by the frenzy and uncer- 
tainty of events, by the inhumane con- 
ditions under which they are held, and 
by the threat of the authorities in Iran 
to compound unjust acts through trials. 

Around the world, nations of East 
and West, North and South, in indi- 
vidual and collective statements, have 
expressed their opposition to this viola- 
tion of international law and called for 
the immediate release of the hostages. 
We express our appreciation for this 
overwhelming expression of interna- 
tional concern and support in behalf of 
principles that lie at the heart of 
civilized international behavior. 

In this spirit, the President of the 
Security Council, speaking for the 
members of this body, has twice ur- 
gently appealed for the release of the 
hostages. The President of the General 
Assembly has twice spoken eloquently 
in support of this plea. The Secretary 
General of the United Nations has 
worked unceasingly to resolve this 
crisis. 

There has not been a satisfactory 
response, and the hostages are still not 
free. We gather here to determine what 
more can be done. 

None of us is deaf to the passionate 
voices that speak of injustice, that cry 
out against past wrongs, and that ask 
for understanding. There is not a single 
grievance alleged or spoken in this 
situation that could not be heard in an 
appropriate forum. 

In addition, as we have said from 
the beginning, the United States re- 
mains ready, upon the release of the 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



United Nations 



hostages, to discuss with the Iranian 
authorities the differences which exist 
between us and to seek their resolution. 

But no country can call for justice 
while at the same time denying it to the 
defenseless. No country can breach the 
most fundamental rules of the commu- 
nity of nations and at the same time ex- 
pect that community to be helpful in the 
problems which it perceives for itself. 

In the simplest terms, no country 
can break and ignore the law while 
seeking its benefits. 

What is it that the world can agree 
upon if not the protection and respect 
for those whom we appoint to represent 
our sovereignty and resolve our differ- 
ences? 



The United States insists 
that its diplomatic personnel 
be released and its diplomatic 
premises restored. These are 
not negotiable matters. 



How tragic for Iran, how tragic for 
the world that threats to peace are 
being driven to a new crescendo. The 
most powerful voices in Iran are en- 
couraging violence in neighboring 
countries and condoning bloodshed 
rather than condemning it. In addition, 
totally unfounded charges which can 
only inflame the situation are being 
made against the United States with 
respect to the current crisis. 

The United States, in all the years 
of its history, has had as a fundamental 
principle the freedom of all people to 
worship as they choose. Out of this his- 
tory and long association, we honor and 
respect the leaders and the nations of 
Islam. 

The principle of noninterference in 
the internal affairs of other nations is 
both a tenet of the United Nations and 
of the foreign policy of the United 
States, and that includes, of course, re- 
spect for the territorial integrity, 
political independence, and sovereignty 
of Iran. We respect the right of the 
people of Iran to determine their own 
future through institutions of their own 
choosing. All of us must accept their 
decisions. 

The President of the United 
States, speaking for a unified and de- 
termined nation, has made it clear that 
we are seeking a peaceful resolution to 
this conflict so that the wounds of the 
past can be healed. In this spirit, the 
United States has turned to the Secu- 
rity Council and the Secretary General 



in the search for a peaceful solution. In 
this spirit, the United States has begun 
proceedings in the International Court 
of Justice. 

There is in the United States a 
unity of purpose, a disciplined sensitiv- 
ity to the needs of peace, a determina- 
tion to search out all peaceful means to 
bring this dispute to a just conclusion, 
and also a determination to do what 
must be done to protect our fellow citi- 
zens and the rule of law. That unity of 
purpose is shared by all Americans. But 
make no mistake. Beneath that disci- 
pline is a seething anger which Ameri- 
cans properly feel as they witness on 
daily television new threats and out- 
rages against their fellow citizens. The 
hostages must be freed. 



AMBASSADOR McHENRY, 
DEC. 4, 1979 3 

The 15 members of the Security 
Council in their action today have given 
unanimous expression once more to 
their urgent call on the Government of 
Iran for the immediate and uncondi- 
tional release of the hostages of our 
Embassy being held in Tehran. They 
have called on the Government of Iran 
to provide the hostages protection and 
to allow them to leave the country. 

It is clear from this vote and from 
the debate of the last 4 days, in which 
representatives from all parts of the 
world have participated, that the family 
of nations speaks with one voice in 
calling for the immediate release of the 
hostages. We are deeply appreciative. 

We hope that this call of the Secu- 
rity Council will be heeded and carried 
out by the Government of Iran in a 
matter of hours. Whatever the time re- 
quired, we urge the Secretary General, 
in the exercise of his good offices, to 
provide all humanitarian support possi- 
ble to those being detained against 
their will. We remain deeply concerned 
for their safety, their well-being, and 
their health on this, their 30th day of 
suffering and isolation. 

The United States wishes to place 
on the record that the adoption of this 
resolution by the Security Council 
clearly is not intended to displace 
peaceful efforts in other organs of the 
United Nations. Neither the United 
States nor any other member intends 
that the adoption of this resolution 
should have any prejudicial impact 
whatever on the request of the United 
States for the indication of provisional 
measures of protection by the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice. 



With the hostages released, the 
resolution calls on the Governments of 
Iran and the United States to take ur- 
gent steps to resolve peacefully the re- 
maining issues between them in accord- 
ance with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations. The 
United States is fully prepared to coop- 
erate with this call. 

Many speakers in this debate have 
also referred to the grievances of the 
people of Iran. I myself did so when I 
remarked that: "None of us is deaf to 
the passionate voices that speak of in- 
justice, that cry out against past 
wrongs, and that ask for understanding. 
There is not a single grievance alleged 
or spoken in this situation that could 
not be heard in an appropriate forum." 
The Security Council has now also 
noted those grievances in its acknowl- 
edgment of the Iranian letter of 
November 13, 1979. 

Neither the United States nor the 
other members of the community of na- 
tions has a desire to isolate Iran. We 
are all members of the United Nations. 
Let us then, all of us, be true to the 
purposes and principles of the charter 
which we have pledged ourselves to 
honor. 

SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 457 4 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the letter dated 25 
November 1979 from the Secretary- 
General (S/13646), 

Deeply concerned at the dangerous 
level of tension between Iran and the 
United States of America, which could 
have grave consequences for international 
peace and security, 

Recalling the appeal made by the 
President of the Security Council on 9 
November 1979 (S/13616), which was reit- 
erated on 27 November 1979 (S/13652), 

Taking note of the letter dated 13 
November 1979 from the Foreign Minister 
of Iran (S/13626) relative to the grievances 
of Iran, 

Mindful of the obligation of States to 
settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that in- 
ternational peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered, 

Conscious of the responsibility of 
States to refrain in their international rela- 
tions from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political inde- 
pendence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of 
the United Nations, 

Reaffirming the solemn obligation of 
all States Parties to both the Vienna Con- 
vention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
tions of 1962 to respect the inviolability of 
diplomatic personnel and the premises of 
their missions, 






January 1980 



51 



United Nations 



1. Urgently culls on the Government of 
Iran to release immediately the personnel 
of the Embassy of the United States of 
America being held in Teheran, to provide 
them protection and allow them to leave 
the country; 

2. Further calls on the Governments of 
Iran and of the United States to take steps 
to resolve peacefully the remaining issues 
between them to their mutual satisfaction 
in accordance with the purposes and princi- 
ples of the United Nations; 

3. Urges the Governments of Iran and 
of the United States to exercise the utmost 
restraint in the prevailing situation; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to 
lend his good offices for the immediate im- 
plementation of this resolution and to take 
all appropriate measures to this end; 

5. Decides that the Council will remain 
actively seized of the matter and requests 
the Secretary-General to report urgently to 
it on developments regarding his efforts. ■ 



'USUN press release 129. 
2 USUN press release 134. 
3 USUN press release 138. 
4 Adopted unanimously on Dec. 4, 1979. 



Agenda of Global 
Economic Issues 



by Howard T. Rosen 

Statement in Committee II (Eco- 
nomic and Financial) of the U.N. 
General Assembly on October 12, 1979. 
Mr. Rosen is a U.S. delegate to the 
U.N. General Assembly. 1 

We meet in the 34th General As- 
sembly of the United Nations at a criti- 
cal time in international economic rela- 
tions. The global economy faces serious 
challenges: 

• The traditional fuel supply of our 
planet is shrinking while its population 
is burgeoning. 

• Economic growth is slowing 
while the aspirations of the world's citi- 
zens are soaring. 

• The shocks of high oil prices are 
undermining economic stability. 

• Joblessness is increasing and in- 
flation eroding the real value of income. 

• Exchange markets are moving 
erratically and gold prices are rising ir- 
rationally. 

• Protectionist pressures are 
mounting even as international trade is 
becoming increasingly important to the 
health and prosperity of all nations and 
their people. 



• The interdependence of our des- 
tinies is becoming clearer, yet the call 
for protectionism is growing louder. 

These challenges must be met and 
they must be met urgently. All of our 
futures, and those of our children, will 
depend on the outcome of our en- 
deavors. We will succeed in restoring 
balance to the world economy and pro- 
moting national and international 
growth and prosperity if we demon- 
strate the will to take strong actions 
domestically and globally. We will fail if 
we procrastinate or seek to avoid hard 
decisions by casting all the blame for 
the current malaise elsewhere. New 
initiatives will be required, but older 
programs and institutions, whose effec- 
tiveness has been tested, must continue 
to be utilized and strengthened. 

A cooperative international ap- 
proach is imperative for the orderly and 
mutually beneficial management of the 
world economy. Such an approach re- 
quires that all nations set their domes- 
tic houses in order as well as seek in- 
ternational solutions to issues of global 
significance. 

On the national level the indus- 
trialized countries must curb inflation 
while maintaining employment, stimu- 
late growth, seek to insure that their 
economic actions do not adversely af- 
fect others, and undertake effective 
measures to produce more energy and 
moderate their consumption. 

The developing countries must in- 
crease domestic savings and invest- 
ment, utilize scarce economic resources 
more effectively, and make difficult 
trade-offs between growth rates and 
indebtedness. 

The oil-exporting nations must ac- 
cept, in their pricing and production 
policies, the responsibilities for global 
economic health and stability thrust on 
them by their position as suppliers of 
the world's chief source of energy. 

And the countries with centrally 
planned economies must follow internal 
programs and policies which both re- 
flect the reality of their increasing par- 
ticipation in the global economic system 
and enable them to assume their re- 
sponsibilities vis-a-vis the developing 
countries. 

U.S. Domestic Actions 

Let me briefly note several recent 
actions taken by President Carter to 
strengthen the U.S. economy and con- 
tribute to international economic pros- 
perity and stability. 

Determined to maintain a reason- 
able balance in our external accounts 
and to insure that the dollar is sound 



and stable, my government has im- 
plemented policies to strengthen un- 
derlying economic conditions and to 
counter market disruptions with force- 
ful exchange market operations. In 
1980 we expect a strong current ac- 
count surplus. We are confident that 
budgetary stringency measures and 
policies announced last week to raise 
interest rates, slow monetary growth, 
and increase reserve requirements will 
moderate significantly our inflation 
rate, sharply reduce inflationary expec- 
tations, and strengthen the dollar. 
These efforts will be reinforced by the 
new national accord with labor that 
provides, among other things, for an 
effective voluntary program of wage 
and price restraints. We will overcome 
our energy difficulties; the President is 
committed to hold down oil imports, to 
raise domestic oil prices to market 
levels, and to assist the development of 
domestic alternate energy supplies, in- 
cluding new and renewable sources of 
energy. 

These unilateral actions by the 
United States, and equally appropriate 
ones by other nations — developed and 
developing, producer and consumer — 
are necessary for internal and global 
prosperity. But by themselves they are 
not sufficient. We face many common 
problems — global problems — where 
complementary national actions are es- 
sential, or we all suffer. And most of 
these problems cannot accurately be 
characterized as North-South issues 
that demand action by one group of 
countries for the primary benefit of 
another. Instead they are global con- 
cerns that require action by all and en- 
tail gains to all. 

Energy 

The subject of energy is the most 
obvious. The farmer buying diesel fuel 
in Iowa and the farmer buying kerosene 
near Khartoum must both cope with 
rising world petroleum prices. Govern- 
ments in the richest countries and those 
in the poorest must deal with the im- 
pact of higher energy costs and rising 
energy demand on their national 
economies. 

Those who suffer most as we enter 
the era of energy scarcity are to be 
found in the countries emerging from 
centuries of deprivation. In the de- 
veloping nations, 3 billion people need 
energy at prices they can afford if they 
are to rise from lives of bare subsis- 
tence. The oil-importing developing 
countries will face an oil bill in 1979 of 
more than $35 billion, an increase of $10 
billion over only a year earlier. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



United Nations 



The distinguished Minister of Ex- 
ternal Affairs of India spoke last week 
of the special problem that energy 
poses to many developing economies: 
they are marked by limited substitution 
possibilities for priority uses such as 
transport, by the high capital intensity 
of alternative energy sources, and by 
the difficulty of reducing further a level 
of consumption already at bare and es- 
sential minimums. 

Even the oil-exporting countries 
themselves cannot regard the effects of 
the price and supply policies on the 
world economy with complacency, for 
the effects adversely impact on them. 
Some are poor countries, despite their 
oil production. All have ambitious de- 
velopment plans that can be under- 
mined by global inflation and recession, 
which are related in part to rising oil 
prices. 

Much needs to be done. Secretary 
Vance indicated in the General Assem- 
bly a key question today is whether the 
oil-exporting nations are prepared to 
stabilize prices and, to the extent it is 
in their control, to insure adequate 
supply. All nations must use energy 
more efficiently. They must also inten- 
sify efforts to develop their domestic 
sources of energy. National and inter- 
national efforts should aim at the re- 
search, exploration, and development 
of petroleum and its alternatives as 
part of an overall strategy for increas- 
ing world supply. 

No single subject is in such need of 
study, agreement, and action by this 
body as energy. Yet in an interdepend- 
ent world, there are other vital issues 
which must be addressed if we are to 
have a healthy world economy. 

Food 

Food and nutrition are also eco- 
nomic problems of global dimensions. 
Despite the "green revolution" and 
rising food production worldwide, de- 
mand generated by burgeoning popula- 
tions and improved eating habits is 
rapidly outdistancing supply. There 
are alarming predictions of widespread 
famine in several parts of the world in 
the 1980's. The situation is much more 
critical than most believe. As with 
energy, a major international effort is 
required. 

Our world cannot tolerate that one 
in every five of its citizens is sick or 
weak or hungry because he or she does 
not have enough to eat. We must act 
together to increase food production, 
improve its distribution, and promote 
better nutrition, particularly with re- 
gard to the world's poorest. 



The United States is contributing 
in a major way to dealing effectively 
with the international problem. Our 
bilateral assistance alone in the agricul- 
tural area, including concessionary food 
assistance, will surpass $2 billion this 
year. In various international fora, we 
are pressing for progress on world food 
security, including rapid completion of 
a new food aid convention and for in- 
creased international funding for ag- 
ricultural research. We are also 
stressing the importance of adoption by 
governments of food sector strategies 
which can help increase domestic food 
production and improved nutritional 
levels. 

Trade 

The experiences of the past 30 
years have demonstrated the value to 
all nations of an increasingly open in- 
ternational trading system. The re- 
cently concluded trade negotiations — 
the most recent of several major 
liberalizations since World War II — 
resulted in major tariff cuts, significant 
reductions in nontariff barriers, and an 
intensified framework agreement that 
permits special and differentiated 
treatment for developing countries. 
Though less than many of us would 
have desired, the multilateral trade 
negotiations did produce benefits for 
all. It is in the interests of developing 
countries to sign the various codes at an 
early date and participate actively in 
their implementation to insure that 
their respective interests are advanced. 

Other Issues 

Other global issues require con- 
tinuing attention by the international 
community — managing the growing 
deficits of a number of countries; pro- 
viding better health care worldwide; 
spreading the benefits of science and 
technology around the world; increas- 
ing employment opportunities and im- 
proving living conditions of the poor in 
whichever country they are found; and 
protecting the political, economic, and 
social rights of all human beings. 

Most economic questions of major 
consequence to the world economy are 
under discussion in international fora. 
The exception is energy. This General 
Assembly could make a significant con- 
tribution to global economic health and 
stability by agreeing to a program for 
getting discussion of the world energy 
situation underway. 

We have an extremely full interna- 
tional calendar before us, in Committee 
II and elsewhere. In addition to our 
own work, the negotiations on the 



common fund and commodities under 
the U.N. Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment are in progress; in Belgrade 
the Development Committee recently 
agreed to recommend that the World 
Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund study several important financial 
issues; and the implementation of new 
codes negotiated in the multilateral 
trade negotiations will soon begin in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. In addition, if approved by the 
General Assembly, the Committee of 
the Whole will begin consultations in 
January on the most effective way of 
conducting a new round of global 
negotiations. The special session next 
year will consider the international de- 
velopment strategy and decide on the 
new round of global negotiations. In 
1981, the United Nations will hold the 
important Conference on New and Re- 
newable Energy. 

Our full calendar is a positive sign 
that the international community rec- 
ognizes the urgency of dealing with the 
global issues. 

The following story, told to me by a 
South American diplomat, makes a 
point we should ponder in our work. He 
said a college professor established a 
model farm in a remote rural area of his 
country. The local farmers were as- 
tounded by the excellent crops that re- 
sulted from his new, innovative agricul- 
tural methods. One day the professor 
announced that he was going to train 
his horse, a fine stallion, to survive 
without food or water. Even though 
they were astounded by the plan, in 
view of his previous record, the farmers 
thought it might be possible for the 
professor to succeed. After a week had 
passed, one of the farmers asked the 
professor about the progress of his 
stallion. He replied that the stallion had 
been learning very rapidly and was on 
the verge of a breakthrough until — for 
no apparent reason — it had unexpect- 
edly expired. 

Clearly, if we do not act vigorously 
and with urgency, the international 
community may fail in meeting the 
challenges of the global economic is- 
sues, to the detriment of all nations. 

With the conclusion of our general 
debate, let us then turn to our work 
with a spirit of dedication and a deter- 
mination to make our session produc- 
tive and meaningful. Let us approach 
our task in a manner that will insure 
that our efforts here contribute to con- 
crete progress in dealing with the eco- 
nomic issues of concern to all nations. 
Unfortunately, we have little time to 
accomplish all that is before us. For 
that reason, I will not deal specifically 



January 1980 



53 



United Nations 



in these remarks with all of the key 
items on our agenda; I will put forward 
the U.S. positions as we come to the in- 
dividual subjects. My delegation will 
contribute constructively to our com- 
mon Herculean task of completing our 
work in this committee. ■ 

1 USUN press release 89. 



Arms Control 



by George M. Seignious II 

Statement in Committee I (Politi- 
cal and Security) of the U.N. General 
Assembly on October 18, 1979. Mr. 
Seignious is Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. 1 

I am pleased to have this opportu- 
nity to address the First Committee of 
the United Nations General Assembly. 
This is my first visit to the United Na- 
tions as Director of the United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. I am honored to be here. 

The fact that some $450 billion is 
spent the world over every year for 
arms, the fact that 1,000 missile 
warheads could kill more than 100 mil- 
lion people, the fact that conflict any- 
where could result in destruction 
everywhere — these facts make the 
pursuit of peace a necessity for all 
humanity. 

The fact that this committee now 
deals only with disarmament and secu- 
rity, the fact that more nations than 
ever before are actively participating in 
the consideration of disarmament is- 
sues, the fact that there are some nine 
international arms control conventions 
in effect which have been adhered to by 
most of the nations of the world — these 
facts testify to a simple conclusion: 
arms control and disarmament are the 
province of all nations. 

We have an immense task ahead of 
us. It is difficult enough psychologically 
for any nation or people to share re- 
sponsibility for their security with 
other nations. How much more of a 
revolution in thinking is required for 
nations to see security as a function of 
reducing the very arms that often have 
been the only means that they have had 
to insure their security. Arms control, 
in short, does not come naturally, and 



any progress — although it may fall 
short of our hopes — should be wel- 
comed as a step toward security 
through restraint of arms and as a step 
away from the tradition of security only 
through arms. 

Because so many challenges re- 
main, progress should not mean com- 
placency. We cannot be satisfied with 
the security of the world as it is. The 
weapons we have within our collective 
hands are too numerous and too awe- 
some to entrust our common destiny to 
good fortune and chance. We must ac- 
tively seek a safer world and never fal- 
ter in that search. 

My government has negotiated and 
supported two SALT treaties, because 
we believe that strategic arms lim- 
itations that are equitable can enhance 
the security of all nations. No agree- 
ment constructed on unilateral gain or 
fiat can long endure, even if it were 
possible to achieve in the first place. 
Consensus on SALT between two na- 
tions, or on any other arms control is- 
sues among many nations, is a difficult 
but unyielding prerequisite for success, 
for we are dealing with fundamental is- 
sues of security and survival. 

The process of SALT confirms that 
serious negotiations, seriously con- 
ducted, can move forward provided 
they do not bear impossible burdens. 
No arms control talks will succeed if 
they must right every age-old wrong. 
And no arms control talks can make 
progress if political advantage, rather 
than the enhancement of mutual secu- 
rity, is the principal purpose. My gov- 
ernment is firmly committed to arms 
control agreements based on principles 
of equity and improved security — for 
all. 

Today, I want to discuss five arms 
control subjects that I know are of 
interest to this committee. All of them 
demonstrate that our task ahead is not 
without challenge as it is also not with- 
out hope. 

SALT II Treaty 

I want to begin with the new 
agreement— SALT II — to limit 
strategic offensive nuclear arms. I have 
said over and over to my fellow citizens 
that SALT II is not the millenium, nor 
will it stop competition, nor will it 
guarantee permanent stability. But it is 
still a remarkable accomplishment. 

• The United States and the Soviet 
Union have established, for the first 
time, equal ceilings on strategic nuclear 
forces. 

• We have negotiated equal sub- 
ceilings on strategic systems carrying 



multiple independently targetable 
warheads. 

• We have begun the much-desired 
process of reductions. 

• We have taken major steps to 
control the technological arms race, 
such as limiting the numbers of 
warheads allowed on each missile. 

• We have broken new ground in 
verification procedures. 

• We have renewed our commit- 
ment to the long-term process of 
strategic arms limitation. In crafting a 
framework of equality between two 
different strategic forces, SALT II is 
an essential bridge to deeper reductions 
and further qualitative restraints in 
SALT III. 

I want to reaffirm before you the 
commitment of the United States and 
President Carter — as expressed in the 
SALT II agreement itself — to begin 
negotiations to achieve further lim- 
itations and deeper reductions in nu- 
clear arms promptly upon entry into 
force of SALT II. We take this obliga- 
tion with the utmost seriousness. It is 
an obligation between two nations, and 
it is an obligation of two nations to all 
nations. 

In this regard, let me state in this 
forum what President Carter makes 
clear every day in Washington. The 
Administration is making strenuous 
efforts to insure early ratification and 
entry into force of SALT II. 

Comprehensive Test Ban 

I would like to turn now to the 
subject of the comprehensive nuclear 
test ban, for no arms control measure 
has been consistently assigned a higher 
priority in this chamber over many 
years. Indeed, the very fact that 
negotiations are underway on such a 
treaty can be attributed in part to the 
dedicated efforts by many nations and 
individuals to build strong international 
support for such a ban. 

That support is well founded. A 
comprehensive test ban will place an 
important qualitative constraint on the 
nuclear arms competition, and it will be 
an important contribution to the inter- 
national community's efforts to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons. 

The trilateral negotiations are pro- 
ceeding actively in Geneva. Agreement 
has already been reached on many of 
the features of the treaty, including 
some issues that just a few years ago 
seemed insurmountable obstacles. Ver- 
ification of a comprehensive test ban is 
extremely important. Innovative co- 
operative measures will be 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



United Nations 



required — as both sides have recog- 
nized. Work is now continuing on these 
and other aspects. A number of these 
problems have been less susceptible to 
prompt solutions than we had hoped. 
But my government continues to place 
great importance on the conclusion of 
these negotiations. Success will require 
hard work. But success, I believe, 
would be a statement of hope no nation 
could ignore. 

Chemical Weapons 

As with the negotiations for a com- 
prehensive test ban, progress in the 
talks between the United States and 
the Soviet Union on chemical weapons 
has not been rapid, but it has been sub- 
stantial. Two-and-a-half months ago, 
our two nations provided a detailed re- 
port on these negotiations to the Com- 
mittee on Disarmament. 

A treaty providing for the elimina- 
tion of chemical weapons would be a 
unique and far-reaching accomplish- 
ment. 

• For the first time, an entire class 
of weapons that has been used in a 
major conflict would be banned and 
eliminated. 

• The international community 
would be establishing, and participating 
in, cooperative measures of verification 
of great breadth and complexity. 

• A technology capable of inflicting 
widespread and horrible destruction of 
human life would be safeguarded for 
peaceful uses. 

These are some of the reasons why 
my government attaches high impor- 
tance to the chemical weapons negotia- 
tions. We fully recognize that many 
other countries have a direct interest in 
chemical weapons prohibition. Many 
nations could produce them on short 
notice. And all nations that adhere 
would be affected by the verification 
procedures that are a necessity if such 
an agreement is to promote stability 
and confidence. In this connection, I 
would like to note that my government 
is grateful for the important work on 
verification which is being pursued by a 
number of countries. 

The Committee on Disarmament 
has a vital role to play in the process of 
achieving a chemical weapons conven- 
tion. The United States fully ap- 
preciates the importance of that com- 
mittee's role, and we are giving serious 
thought to how we can contribute to 
making the committee's work in this 
area most effective in advancing the 
objective we all seek. 

The complete prohibition and 
elimination of chemical weapons has 



been an important goal of the interna- 
tional community for many decades, 
ever since, in the first great world war 
of this century, these weapons were 
used on a massive scale. Even though 
that war is receding in time, I can still 
remember, as a boy, the vision of men 
returned home, but gasping for breath 
forever. That is a vision we should 
eradicate entirely from the memory of 
man. 



Radiological Weapons 

We could be haunted by another 
class of weapons never used but with a 
similarly dreadful potential — 
radiological weapons. The number of 
facilities producing radioactive by- 
products has multiplied manyfold in re- 
cent years and the accumulation of ma- 
terials is accelerating. 

I am pleased to note that signifi- 
cant progress was achieved this year to 
deal with such weapons. My nation and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
have presented a joint initiative to the 
Committee on Disarmament to ban all 
radiological weapons. The United 
States hopes that the General Assem- 
bly will encourage the Committee on 
Disarmament to build on this achieve- 
ment and to elaborate an international 
convention. 



Nonproliferation Treaty 

August 1980 will mark the date of 
the second review conference of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. The SALT II 
agreement, with its commitment to 
continuing the process in SALT III, 
reflects the determination of the United 
States and the Soviet Union to fulfill 
their obligation under Article VI of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. My govern- 
ment is deeply conscious of its obliga- 
tions to the nations party to this treaty 
which have forsworn nuclear weapons. 
Their continued restraint, and that of 
other non-nuclear-weapons states, is 
essential to preventing a dangerous 
multiplication of the risk that conflict or 
miscalculation could lead to nuclear 
war. 

In this regard, the United States 
welcomes the recent adherence of the 
nations of Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and 
Bangladesh. 

We can further buttress nonprolif- 
eration and nuclear stability by the es- 
tablishment of nuclear-weapon-free 
zones. The full realization of a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin 
America is drawing closer. We continue 
to hope that the necessary steps to 
bring the treaty of Tlatelolco into force 



for all concerned states within the re- 
gion will be taken in the near future. 

Additionally, the United States 
strongly supports efforts to establish 
nuclear-weapon-free zones in other re- 
gions of the world — in accordance with 
the criteria which we believe can per- 
mit the successful establishment of 
zones that promote the security of the 
participants. 

The development of effective inter- 
national arrangements for assuring that 
nations that forswear nuclear weapons 
will not be threatened by nuclear attack 
is an effort which deserves our serious 
consideration. Such arrangements 
would help create a climate of confi- 
dence and would reduce incentives for 
additional countries to develop nuclear 
weapons. The United States would like 
to reiterate its proposal made last July 
in the Committee on Disarmament that 
there be a General Assembly resolution 
setting forth the various undertakings 
made by the five nuclear powers to give 
assurance to non-nuclear-weapon states 
against the use of nuclear weapons. 

In concluding this brief review of 
the important questions with which this 
committee is concerned, I am also 
happy to refer to the progress which 
has been made on a number of signifi- 
cant and potentially useful studies cur- 
rently underway, such as the pilot test 
of a standard format for reporting mili- 
tary budgets, the study on the relation- 
ship between disarmament and de- 
velopment, and the study of regional 
arms control. The United States, for its 
part, will continue to give these studies 
wholehearted support. They are in- 
vestments in the future. 

My life has been dedicated to the 
security of the United States. Yet, I 
see no greater security for my nation 
than peace among all nations. We share 
a common goal — peace with security. 
For we share, in this nuclear age, a 
common bond for survival and a com- 
mon search for the ability of us all to 
live in a secure world. 

We are all involved in an under- 
taking to shape our destiny. As Presi- 
dent Carter said in Vienna: "If we can- 
not control the power to destroy, we 
can neither guide our own fate nor pre- 
serve our own future. "■ 



'USUN press release 95. 









January 1980 



55 



United Nations 



International Year 
of the Child 

by Jean Young 

Statement to the U.N. General 
Assembly on October /;, 1979. Mrs. 
Young is Chairperson of the ( r .S. Na- 
tional Commission on the Interna- 
tional Year of the Child. 1 

The International Year of the Child 
(IYC) has been a celebration of the in- 
estimable value of the child in all the 
countries of the world. Activities as- 
sociated with the IYC have done much 
to concentrate the attention of the 
world's people not only on the impor- 
tance of children but also on the inter- 
national obligation to meet perhaps the 
most pressing and heart-rending need 
of the day — to improve the lot of suf- 
fering children in so many parts of the 
world and most especially in the de- 
veloping world. It is thus fully appro- 
priate that this meeting focus on the 
follow-up to the International Year of 
the Child and that the follow-up concen- 
trate on methods to improve the situa- 
tion of children of the world, especially 
in developing countries. 

In his report on the work of the or- 
ganization, the Secretary General 
states'. "In the International Year of 
the Child we have been reminded very 
forcefully of the stark deprivations 
suffered by children in many parts of 
the world and we have seen that all too 
often children are also victims of viola- 
tions of human rights. It is absolutely 
intolerable that children should be 
made to suffer in this manner in our day 
and age." 

It is absolutely intolerable that 
children should suffer so in our day and 
age. But they are suffering in varying 
degrees in all parts of the world. 

We in the United States have 
prided ourselves in caring not only 
adequately but very well for our chil- 
dren. We provide free education. We 
have good child labor laws. We have ex- 
tensive safety regulations to protect 
them. Good hospitals and clinics exist in 
all our States. Food is plentiful, and we 
have a high standard of living as com- 
pared with the rest of the world. 

Yet, even as a nation of such im- 
mense resources, we recognize that 
there are, indeed, children suffering. 
There are children in the mountains of 
Appalachia, in rural areas, in the urban 
ghettos, on Indian reservations, in His- 
panic barrios, and in migrant camps 
who lack the basic necessities of life. 
There are other children who do not re- 
ceive an equal opportunity in this great 



nation because of language, race, eco- 
nomic status, or mental or physical 
handicaps. There are still other chil- 
dren who suffer neglect, abuse, or 
indifference. 

Nevertheless, we recognize that in 
comparison with the world statistical 
averages that our children fare very 
well. But we recognize also that if a 
single child suffers anywhere in the 
world, we must be concerned. This is 
why, in addition to appealing to Ameri- 
cans to understand and resolve the 
problems of their own children, we 
have also committed ourselves to 
reaching out to help the most desperate 
of the world's children. The National 
Commission initiated this goal with the 
theme: "The World's Children — A Joy 
to Share, A Responsibility to Care." 

Through more than 350 non- 
governmental organizations and 52 
States and territories, the commission 
shared information on the status of ref- 
ugee children, abandoned children, and 
children in need in developing nations. 
This effort has been followed up with 
fund-raising plans to culminate at 
Thanksgiving. We will give thanks by 
giving to children without. In addition 
to giving funds, we are urging Ameri- 
cans to give programmatic and legisla- 
tive support to meeting the needs of the 
world's children. 

Plight of Children 

It has been estimated that 55 million 
children in the world under the age of 
15 must work. Millions of children in 
our world know virtually no childhood 
at all. They must take on the role of 
adults in many cases even before they 
are old enough to begin school. Poverty 
is the reason for much of this but so 
also is greed, and it is a problem of the 
developed countries as well as the de- 
veloping. Children are employed in 
hazardous jobs, at hard labor. Many 
must beg, and many barely into pu- 
berty are forced to become prostitutes. 
In some places, because child labor is 
cheap, children work at adult jobs while 
adults are unemployed. 

In recent history there have been 
particularly distressing conditions that 
have highlighted rather dramatically 
the deprivation of children. We wit- 
nessed the tragedy of children in south- 
ern Africa. We saw the heart-rending 
plight of "boat people" children. We 
have seen the 9- and 10-year-old chil- 
dren of Northern Ireland and the Mid- 
dle East brandishing weapons. 

Millions of children in our world 
suffer from malnutrition which hampers 
their physical and mental development. 
Many receive little or no education. 



Many are homeless and many are with- 
out parents. 

In some areas where the plight of 
children is so appallingly bad at the 
best of times, it has become immeasur- 
ably worse as children become the inno- 
cent victims of warfare. The world 
community for years has tried to cope 
with the suffering of refugee children. 
Especially in Africa and Asia, extensive 
efforts have been taken to alleviate the 
suffering of refugee children, as well 
as, of course, that of adults. Our own 
government, as well as the interna- 
tional community, has responded mas- 
sively to this need and much has been 
done, although so much more remains 
to be done. This problem will be before 
us for the foreseeable future and de- 
mands our continuous attention. 

Children of Kampuchea 

Even sadder than the tragic plight 
of refugee children — though a greater 
sadness than that seems inconceivable 
— is that of the child victims of war who 
have yet to be reached by the relief ef- 
forts of the international community. 
The most recent case involves the chil- 
dren of Kampuchea, who represent 45% 
of that country's population. 

Professional relief experts have re- 
ported that in that unhappy land, very 
few children under the age of 5 have 
survived the famine and associated dis- 
eases that have resulted from pro- 
longed warfare; the validity of these 
observations is supported by the virtual 
absence of young children among 
Khmer refugees. The few who do sur- 
vive the famine and fighting in Kam- 
puchea will undoubtedly bear perma- 
nent mental and physical scars as a 
result of severe malnutrition. 

Scientific research has proven con- 
clusively that malnutrition in early 
childhood is closely related to later de- 
velopmental disabilities. One recent 
survey of a Khmer refugee group along 
the Thai-Khmer border indicated that 
96% of the surviving children in that 
group were suffering from malnutri- 
tion. A generation of Khmer may al- 
ready have been lost, and thousands of 
older children are likely to perish un- 
less urgent actions are undertaken by 
the international community. 

An international effort to provide 
relief to Kampuchean civilians is 
underway. UNICEF has been desig- 
nated by the Secretary General as the 
lead agency for the U.N. system in this 
effort. Together with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF 
deserves our particular appreciation for 
its initiative and perseverance in at- 
tempting, under the most difficult con- 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



United Nations 



ditions, to alleviate the suffering of 
Kampuchean children and mothers as 
well as others in need. 

It is the fervent hope of my gov- 
ernment that as a fitting contribution to 
the International Year of the Child, all 
member nations will join in support of 
this effort to save the children of Kam- 
puchea and also join in urging all in- 
volved parties, particularly the parties 
in the area, to support and cooperate in 
relief efforts. We trust that this session 
of the General Assembly will receive a 
comprehensive report on the status of 
children in Kampuchea and on the prog- 
ress of efforts to assist them. 

Confronted with the appalling situ- 
ation of so many of the children of the 
world, we must reject despair and at- 
tack the problems with resolution. Gov- 
ernments must do more for the welfare 
and protection of the children in their 
jurisdiction and to the extent that they 
are able to help other governments 
cope with their problems. UNICEF and 
other agencies of the U.N. system must 
continue and expand the work they 
have been doing. My government 
hopes, for instance, that the Interna- 
tional Labor Organization will continue 
to study to seek ways to resolve the 
complex problem of child labor and that 
other U.N. agencies and governments 
will cooperate in this vital effort. 

The International Year of the Child 
has done great service in increasing our 
awareness of the problems of children, 
and there have been many small suc- 
cesses in meeting those needs. All those 
associated with its conception and im- 
plementation deserve our gratitude. 
That this increased awareness also has 
brought increased determination to 
deal with the demands of the situation 
is demonstrated by the Secretary Gen- 
eral's commendable compilation of spe- 
cial messages on the IYC by heads of 
state or government. It is well to re- 
member in the face of intolerable 
tragedy that improvement is possible 
and that the determination to improve 
is great. 

Special credit to the success of the 
IYC must go to UNICEF and the IYC 
Secretariat for their excellent work in 
involving all the countries of the world 
in the year. My special admiration goes 
to Dr. Estefania Aldaba-Lim, the Sec- 
retary General's special representative 
for the IYC, for her skill in stirring the 
imagination and participation of so 
many countries. 

The Government and the people of 
the United States were among those 
who responded enthusiastically to these 
efforts. In his message to the Secretary 
General, President Carter said: 
"Working through UNICEF and other 



United Nations agencies and through 
the leaders of other nations, I think we 
can enhance the opportunity for better 
clothing, housing, food, medical care, 
education and the protection against 
suffering on the part of children of all 
nations. So I am very eager to be a part 
of it. It is a sobering prospect to know 
that perhaps once in a lifetime we have 
an opportunity to focus attention on 
such a neglected group in the world's 
population." 

U.S. National Commission 
Activities 

The President appointed a National 
Commission for the International Year 
of the Child and did me the honor of 
asking me to be its Chairperson. 
Throughout this year, the commission 
has initiated and conducted a dialogue 
for the purpose of increasing public 
awareness of the special needs of chil- 
dren in such areas as health, nutrition, 
education, justice, recreation, and the 
arts. In addition, we dealt with equal 
opportunity, the impact of media on 
children, and the needs of children 
around the world. 

Because of this effort many people 
learned for the first time that many 
among the one-third of our population 
who are children are inadequately pro- 
vided for in these areas. Many were 
shocked to learn that 17 million children 
in the United States do not have an 
adequate standard of living. Many of 
them receive inadequate nutrition, 
medical care, and educational opportu- 
nity. Many, and not necessarily the 
poor, are denied the warmth and secu- 
rity of a loving home. In some of our 
large cities, juvenile crime and juvenile 
exploitation are serious problems. 

The response to the commission's 
activities from the public, from gov- 
ernments at the municipal and State 
levels, from the interagency committee 
at the Federal level, and from non- 
government organizations of many 
kinds was enthusiastic. Activities were 
far too numerous to list in this speech, 
let alone describe. However, a detailed 
description is contained in the commis- 
sion's report to the General Assembly. 
I will say just a few words about how 
the National Commission approached 
its work. 

The commission set itself the fol- 
lowing goals: 

• To stimulate a national dialogue 
on issues facing children, both at home 
and abroad and thus create a broad- 
based support group concerned and 
knowledgeable about children and their 
problems; 



• To form lasting coalitions of con- 
cerned citizens at the local, State, and 
national levels to serve as continuing 
advocates for children's needs, both at 
home and abroad long after 1979; 

• To motivate people from all walks 
of life — private as well as public organi- 
zations, parents as well as children, in- 
dividuals as well as groups, government 
agencies as well as charitable institu- 
tions, organized labor as well as 
corporations — and at all levels from the 
local to the national to evaluate the 
needs of children in their communities 
and take concrete steps toward meeting 
these needs; 

• To provide a celebratory oppor- 
tunity for children, families, and com- 
munities to come together in a joyful 
event; 

• To persuade legislative bodies to 
take legislative actions and governmen- 
tal agencies to review and refine regu- 
lations and policies that affect the 
well-being of children and their 
families; 

• To discover the concerns, feel- 
ings, and aspirations for children from 
all across our country, including those 
of children themselves; and 

• To reach out beyond our own 
country for information exchange and 
cooperation in confronting common 
problems. 

In each of these goals we have re- 
ceived a very positive response from 
the American people. We have begun to 
see progress in all areas. We look for 
this momentum to be sustained through 
existing organizations and governmen- 
tal channels. In light of this we are pre- 
senting to our President not a final 
report but a "challenge report" — a 
challenge to our country to continue the 
work begun on behalf of children here 
and around the world. 

The International Year of the Child 
will soon be behind us and the matter at 
hand is the follow-up to the year. The 
U.S. Government supports a vigorous 
follow-up to the accomplishments of 
this year. We hope that the General 
Assembly will make a strong statement 
on the continuing need to focus on chil- 
dren's welfare as a major element of 
government policies in all countries. 
We believe the IYC has demonstrated 
that its focus on children can serve as 
an organizing principle to mobilize gov- 
ernment actions as well as community 
support and participation for develop- 
ment activities benefiting the country 
as a whole. We hope that UNICEF at 
its next executive board session will 
recommend steps to be taken to con- 
tinue the momentum that has been 
created. We agree with the recommen- 



January 1980 



57 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



dation of UNICEF that we should con- 
tinue to place emphasis on providing 
basic services to the poorest children in 
the low income countries. 

UNICEF has performed admirably 
as the lead agency for the International 
Year of the Child. My government 
looks forward to continued cooperation 
with UNICEF in the lead agency role 
as we move into the follow-up phase. At 
the same time, we urge other U.N. 
agencies to maintain an awareness of 
the needs of children in all of their 
programing. 

Let me reiterate our concern about 
the intolerable situation for many of the 
children of the world and particularly 
about the desperate need to save the 
children of Kampuchea. The govern- 
ments of the world, together with in- 
ternational organizations, have the 
ability to vastly improve this situation. 
My government has supported and will 
support efforts toward this end. We 
urge other governments to continue to 
support and cooperate with these ef- 
forts so that children everywhere can 
have the love and care that they need 
and which the world requires to ad- 
vance the common humanity of us all. ■ 

*USUN pressrelease 93. 



Central America at the Crossroads 



by Viron P. Vaky 

Statement before, the Subcommittee 
on Inter-American Affairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on Sep- 
tember 11, 1979. Mr. Vaky is Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. 1 

I welcome the opportunity to meet 
with you today to discuss the situation 
in Central America. I would like to con- 
sider first the overall Central American 
scene, then the various national con- 
texts and regional aspects, and con- 
clude by reviewing our policy response. 

OVERVIEW 

Much of Central America — 
particularly the northern tier — is 
gripped by a polarizing dynamic of 
pressure for change, terrorism, and po- 
tential radicalization. These wrenching 
instabilities are rooted in basic under- 
lying structural problems and vul- 
nerabilities. The impact of recent 
events in Nicaragua is assuredly a fac- 
tor in the internal politics of all coun- 
tries in Central America. But even 
without Nicaragua the situation would 
be volatile. 

The nations of the region face a 
number of common, interrelated social 
and economic problems, most of which 
produce direct pressures for political 
and systemic change. 

• With the exception of Costa Fvica, 
and to some extent Panama, societies in 
the region are characterized by deep 
class and, in some cases, ethnic divi- 
sions, endemic violence, political atomi- 
zation, and distrust. Inequalities of op- 
portunity mark the social, political, and 
class structures in varying degrees. 
The demands of new middle class 
entrepreneurs and professionals — an 
educated, informed, articulate, and 
generally ambitious group — for a 
greater national role and share of 
political power have frequently not 
been accommodated. The minimal needs 
of workers and peasants, whose ranks 
have been swollen by the population 
explosion, have also remained unmet in 
varying degree. Growing social ten- 
sions and defeated aspirations have, 
therefore, become natural breeding 
grounds for alienation, opposition, and 
violence. 

• With the possible exception of 
Costa Rica and Panama, virtually all of 
these countries are characterized by 
unequal and inequitable economic 
growth, national poverty, and maldis- 



58 



tribution of income. While statistically 
many of these nations show respectable 
growth, the benefits of progress have, 
in most cases, accrued to traditional 
elites; the masses of the people find 
their situation little changed. Malnutri- 
tion and illiteracy rates remain high 
among the poor majority. Unemploy- 
ment and underemployment are high 
and growing. 

• Again with the exception of 
Costa Rica, and to some degree 
Panama — although the system there is 
not yet fully open — political institutions 
have, in the past, tended to be au- 
thoritarian and resistant to change. As 
pressures build up, governments have 
tended to rely on repression of dissent. 
Movements expressing pressures for 
modernization or more basic demands 
for equity have too often been frus- 
trated by electoral manipulation and 
violence, censorship of the media, out- 
lawing of political parties, and suspen- 
sion of constitutional guarantees. 
Where legitimate channels of redress 
are choked off, the political situation 
tends to polarize to the extremes and 
the likelihood of peaceful evolution and 
change is reduced. 



Political Parties and 
Groups in Central 
America 

EL SALVADOR 



Political Parties and Groups 

• National Conciliation Party (Partido 
de Conciliacion National — PCN). The offi- 
cial party; backs progovernment candidates 
but has few other functions. 

• Nationalist Democratic Organization 
(ORDEN). A rural, military-sanctioned 
civilian force with an estimated strength of 
about 30,000. It is ostensibly dedicated to 
civic education and law enforcement but is 
occasionally used in political activity. Owing 
to its record of alleged human rights viola- 
tions, ORDEN has become a major target of 
the government's critics at home and 
abroad. 

• United National Opposition {Union 
Nacional Opositora — UNO). Now shaky op- 
position coalition which includes: 

Christian Democratic Party (Partido 
Democrata Cristiano — PDC). The 
largest opposition party; left-of- 
center. 

National Revolutionary Movement 
(Movimiento Nacional 

Department of State Bulletin 






Western Hemisphere 



• Institutions of all kinds — from 
public order and social services to press 
and political parties — are being under- 
mined by socioeconomic strains, human 
rights violations, and terrorism. These 
dynamics in turn produce obsession 
with survival and a temptation to blame 
external causes for the region's difficul- 
ties. 

• Economic stress in the form of 
world inflation, fluctuating commodity 
prices, and recession have decreased 
real incomes and lessened the ability of 
governments to meet popular needs. 
Petroleum costs have quadrupled, with 
increasingly severe cumulative effects. 

• New political lines and new eco- 
nomic challenges have been drawn in 
the region. Sandinista Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, and Panama will not com- 
municate easily with the passionately 
antileftist governments of the northern 
tier. Yet if communication is imperfect, 
regional tensions will grow, and the 
cooperation necessary to sustain a 
strong regional economy and Central 
American common market will be im- 
peded. Fortunately, indications are 
that these potential costs are recog- 
nized, and tentative but significant ef- 
forts at "bridge-building" are in train 
by all national actors. 



In sum, deep grievances; legitimate 
needs for reform, growth, and moderni- 
zation; and basic demands for equity 
are all coursing through the region. 
These give rise to equally deep pres- 
sures for political and systemic change. 
As in other pai'ts of the world, those 
aspirations and demands are so funda- 
mental that change cannot be avoided. 
Defense of the status quo cannot pre- 
vent it or cap instability for long; it can 
only radicalize the dynamics at work. 

A complicating factor is that 
Castroist/Marxist and extreme insur- 
gent groups have seized upon these 
legitimate aspirations and unstable 
situations to advance their own objec- 
tives. Thereby, they may exacerbate the 
tensions and the violence, but they do 
not cause them. The upsurge of ter- 
rorism and subversion unfortunately 
often confuses perception of the 
realities and strengthens tendencies by 
those benefiting from the status quo to 
misidentify the issues and focus on in- 
surgency rather than on the underlying 
core problems. 

If there is any one central motif 
that characterizes Central America 
today, it is this intense — and essentially 
inevitable — pressure for change which 
has swept into the region. The central 



issue, in turn, is not whether change is 
to occur but whether that change is to 
be violent and radical — or peaceful and 
evolutionary and preserving individual 
rights and democratic values. 



THE NATIONAL CONTEXTS 

The trends, problems, and vul- 
nerabilities described above come to- 
gether in different, even idiosyncratic, 
ways in individual countries. 

Let me first deal with Nicaragua, 
whose revolution cannot help but affect 
its neighbors' political future. Then the 
"south" — Panama and Costa Rica, each 
different but representing progressive 
and moderate forces for change in Cen- 
tral America. Finally, the "northern 
tier" — Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala, now led by conservative es- 
tablishments where the winds of change 
are blowing the hardest. 

Impact of Nicaragua 

For both Latin America and the 
United States, Nicaragua now presents 
a critical challenge and a major oppor- 
tunity. The course of events will influ- 
ence prospects for democracy else- 



Revolucionario — MNR). Small, 
left-of-center party associated with 
Social Democratic circles. 
National Democratic Union (Union 
Democrata National — UDN). 
Communist influenced party often 
considered a legal front. 

• Salvadoran Popular Party (Partido 
Popular Salvadoreno — PPS). Small, right- 
wing party. 

Illegal Groups 

• Popular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque 
Popular Revolucionario — BPR). A coalition 
of teacher, student, and peasant groups 
claiming a membership of 60,000-80,000. 
Largely directed or controlled by the FPL 
(see below); beneficiary of the political 
polarization. 

• The United Popular Action Front 
(Frente de Action Popular Unido — FAPU). 
Smaller mass front group controlled by 
FARN; estimated 8,000-15,000 members. 

• Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation 
Forces (Fuerzas Populares de 
Liberation — FPL). The strongest guerrilla 
group, professing a revolutionary Marxist 
creed; probably numbers about 800. 

• Armed Forces of National Resistance 
(Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia 
National — FARN). Second most important 
terrorist group; about 600 strong. 

• Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejer- 
cito Revolucionario del Pueblo — ERP). 
Smallest terrorist group. 



GUATEMALA 

Political Parties and Groups 

• National Liberation Movement 
(Movimiento de Liberation National — 
MLN). Ultraconservative, linked to rightest 
terrorist groups; now in opposition, controls 
more congressional seats than any other 
party. 

• National Action and Reconstruction 
Party (Partido de Action y Reconstrucion 
National — PARN). Small, conservative 
party of former Chief of State Peralta Azur- 
dia. 

• Institutional Democratic Party (Par- 
tido Institutional Democratico — PID). 
Small, conservative party. 

• Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario — PR). The most powerful 
party in the government. Originally em- 
bracing all elements of the left, it is now 
centrist, liberal, and mildly nationalistic. 

• United Revolutionary Front (Frente 
Unido de la Revoluccion — FUR). Leftwing. 
Founded by Vice President Villagran 
Kramer. Formerly led by Manuel Colom Ar- 
gueta. 

• Christian Democratic Party (Partido 
Democrata Cristiano — PDC). Liberal, re- 
formist. 



Illegal Groups 

• Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido 
Guatemalteco de los Trabajadores — PGT). 
Communist-led, small; has engaged in some 
guerrilla actions. 

• Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Ar- 
madas Rebeldes — FAR). Left terrorist 
group. 

• Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejercito 
Guerillero de los Pobres — EGP). Most po- 
tent insurgent force, formed in 1974; about 
300 members. 

• Guatemalan Workers Militia (Militias 
Obreras Guatemaltecas — MOG). Rightwing 
counterterrorist group. 

• Secret Anti-Communist Army (Ejer- 
cito Secreto Anticomunista — EST). Right- 
wing counterterrorist group. 

HONDURAS 

• Nationalist Party (Partido 
Nationalists de Honduras — PNH). Tradi- 
tional, conservative party; founded in 1911 
but with roots in the old liberal-conservative 
division that characterized Central Ameri- 
can political life in the last century. 

• Liberal Party (Partido Liberal de 
Honduras — PLH). Traditional liberal party, 
founded in 1870; now moderately reformist. 

• Innovation and Unity Party (Partido 
de Inovacion y Unidad — PINU). Small, cen- 
trist; lacks historical base of two major par- 
ties. 



January 1980 



59 



Western Hemipshere 



where and have an important impact on 
U.S. -Latin American relations. 

The new Government of National 
Reconstruction (GNR) took office July 
20 in a country left without functioning 
political, economic, or security institu- 
tions. Almost half of Nicaragua's popu- 
lation was displaced, and the country is 
now struggling with massive problems 
of hunger and unemployment. The loss 
of life and physical destruction were 
staggering. The United Nations has re- 
ported that 45,000 persons were killed, 
160,000 wounded, and 40,000 orphaned, 
while Agency for International De- 
velopment (AID) figures indicate some 
1 million in need of food and 250,000 in 
need of shelter. Economic losses ap- 
proach $2 billion. The Nicaraguan econ- 
omy is completely disrupted. 

Initially formed in exile, the new 
Nicaraguan Government is a coalition 
comprised of former guerrilla and civic 
leaders. It consists of a five-member 
junta as the executive authority, a 19- 
member Cabinet, and a 33-member Na- 
tional Council still in the process of 
formation. The Sandinista National Di- 
rectorate, made up of guerrilla leaders, 
some with close ties to Cuba, wields 
major influence. 

Since the GNR formally took office 
July 20, the following have become 
clear. 



• Nicaragua's humanitarian and re- 
construction needs are immediate and 
too great to be met by Nicaraguans 
alone. 

• Administrative confusion and im- 
provisation remain widespread, but the 
change of government is popularly ac- 
cepted, and there is definite movement 
toward restoration of public order. 

• The GNR has shown generally 
moderate, pluralistic tendencies in its 
initial policies. It is not distinguishably 
Marxist or Cuban in orientation, al- 
though Marxist figures are present in 
key positions. It has restrained repris- 
als, promulgated a decree guaranteeing 
individual rights, and permitted an in- 
dependent press and radio. It has 
promised free elections. In foreign af- 
fairs the GNR has indicated a desire for 
friendly relations with all countries in- 
cluding their northern neighbors. 
Nicaraguan leaders have denied any in- 
tention of "exporting revolution." 

• Nevertheless, the political situa- 
tion remains very fluid, with hetero- 
geneity, confusion, and flux in the power 
dynamics. The country's political and 
economic future thus remain unclear, 
and many outcomes or scenarios are 
still possible within the framework of 
the Sandinista revolution. 



• Christian Democrat Party (Partido 
Cristiano Democratico — PCD). Organized in 
1962 but not yet accorded legal recognition 
by the government. Associated with a 
Christian Democratic trade union confedera- 
tion (CGT) and a Christian Democratic peas- 
ant association (UNC). 

• Communist Party of Honduras (Par- 
tido Communista de Honduras — PCH). 
Soft-line Communist Party; outlawed since 
1963. Funded largely by the Soviets. Neg- 
ligible electoral strength; has pro-Soviet and 
pro-Chinese factions. 

COSTA RICA 

• Unity Party (Partido Unidad—PN). 
Government coalition; constituent groups 
are: 

Democratic Renovation Party (Par- 
tido de Renovacion Democratica). 
President Carazo's party. 

Calderonista Republican Party 
(Partido Republicano Cal- 
deronista). Traditional conserva- 
tive party originally founded by 
Ramon Calderon; now led by 
Foreign Minister. 

Christian Democratic Party (Partido 
Democratica Cristiano). 

Popular Union (Union Popular). 
Small, rightwing group. 

• National Liberation Party (Partido de 
Liberacion Nacional — PLN). Founded by 



60 



Jose Figueres. Reformist, non-Marxist. 

• United People (Pueblo Unido). Coali- 
tion of leftwing groups. Components are: 

Popular Vanguard Party. Orthodox 
Communist. 

Partido de Accion Socialista. Com- 
munist splinter group. 

Partido Obrero. Small radical group 
linked to Sandinista movement. 

Frente Popular. Small, leftist group. 

PANAMA 

Parties are officially suspended. The 
suspension was relaxed prior to the 1978 
elections, but no candidates were permitted 
to run on party tickets. Main parties are: 

• Partido Panamenista. One of two 
major pre-1969 parties (the other being the 
PLN). Led by the charismatic former Presi- 
dent Arnulfo Arias. 

• Partido Liberal Nacional. Stems 
from the Colombian Liberal Party. Led by 
David Samudio. 

• Partido Revolucionario Democratico. 
Left-of-center Torrijista party. Organized in 
1978. 

Other opposition parties are: 

• Partido Democrata Cristiano 

• Movimiento Independiente Demo- 
cratico 

• Partido del Pueblo de Panama. The 
Communist Party. ■ 



The central issue in the Nicaraguan 
situation, therefore — whether in terms 
of its internal system, its relations to 
Cuba, its attitude toward its 
neighbors — is the extent to which a 
moderate, pluralistic, and equitable 
democratic order can emerge in a coun- 
try with few democratic traditions and 
whose new and inexperienced leaders 
could resort to authoritarianism to cope 
with the enormous tasks facing them. 

The course of the Nicaraguan rev- 
olution will thus depend in part on how 
the United States perceived it and re- 
lates to it. Indeed, Nicaragua's future 
internal policies and relationships with 
the outside world will, in fact, be de- 
termined by those Nicaraguans who 
best define and meet the country's 
needs during the reconstruction period. 
The individual leaders who do so will 
necessarily have outside contacts. But 
who they will be and the terms on 
which they relate to each other and to 
outsiders will not be predetermined by 
the past guerrilla war against Somoza. 
It will depend on the reconstruction of 
Nicaragua from that war. 

The "South" 

Costa Rica has long had an excel- 
lent functioning democracy, and 
Panama has been moving toward a 
more open political system. Economic 
and social problems exist but the proc- 
ess of change and accommodation func- 
tions sufficiently well to keep the inter- 
nal situation fairly stable. 

Both countries have established 
close and cooperative relationships with 
the Nicaraguan Government. Having 
supported the Sandinista cause, they 
are not disposed to see the Nicaraguan 
revolution turn out "radical." The lead- 
ers of these countries will continue to 
use their influence to urge moderation. 
Both countries have, relative to their 
resources and capacities, extended sig- 
nificant amounts of technical and mate- 
rial assistance to Nicaragua. 

Panama. U.S. interests in 
Panama, though more extensive than 
the presence of the Panama Canal, re- 
volve primarily around the canal. The 
Panama Canal treaties of 1977 enter 
into force on October 1. With that date 
approaching very fast, we are trying to 
insure the continued smooth and or- 
derly functioning of the canal under the 
new treaty relationships with Panama. 
For this reason, I hope that the Senate 
and the House will proceed promptly to 
enact the implementing legislation 
necessary to exercise our respon- 
sibilities under the treaty. 



Department of State Bulletin 






Western Hemisphere 



Panama has been relatively stable 
since the 1968 coup that deposed Presi- 
dent Arnulfo Arias. We have expressed 
concern about human rights conditions 
in the past. Constitutional reforms and 
other measures taken since 1977 have 
provided for movement toward a more 
open and democratic political system 
and for more engagement of the people 
in reform measures and in developmen- 
tal projects. Although opposition par- 
ties are pushing for more and faster 
political reforms, we do not see at this 
time a real threat to the civilian gov- 
ernment of President Royo. 

Panama's current economic situa- 
tion is difficult. Problems stem largely 
from the same factors that are affecting 
the United States — inflation and energy 
imports. Economic pressures and issues 
have caused disaffection with the gov- 
ernment and will continue to do so until 
the situation eases through new in- 
vestment, improved official economic 
management, and a possible increase in 
confidence when the treaties enter into 
force. 

Some 10 opposition parties have 
formed a National Opposition Front for 
the purpose of seeking prompt reforms, 
particularly the holding of early elec- 
tions for a new government. The two 
major participants in the front — the 
Panamanistas, headed by Arnulfo 
Arias, and the Liberals — have no 
foreign links and are themselves often 
at odds over tactics. The smaller Chris- 
tian Democratic Party is linked to the 
Christian Democratic movement in 
Latin America and Western Europe. 

Costa Rica. Costa Rica continues 
to enjoy a stable democratic political 
system. Strong democratic traditions 
have served to give the country an out- 
standing human rights record. Freedom 
to participate in the political process is 
provided for in the constitution and re- 
spected in practice. Elections are free, 
open, and highly competitive. 

Normally one of the best managed 
economies in the region, Costa Rica is 
experiencing internal stresses stimu- 
lated by oil price increases, internal 
labor difficulties, and the spillover of 
turmoil from neighboring Nicaragua. 
The security situation is stable. 

Our bilateral relations with Costa 
Rica are close and cordial. Problems are 
dealt with in a friendly, straight- 
forward, and pragmatic manner. 

The "Northern Tier" 

The Governments of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras tend to see 
the world through a different lens than 
that used in the "south." They are ap- 



prehensive over the Nicaraguan revolu- 
tion and what its impact will be. Anx- 
iety over their future pervades these 
governments, which expect to have to 
contend with a new rash of insurgency. 

Although circumstances vary 
among them, all three societies are rel- 
atively closed. Political systems and 
processes are relatively restricted. 
Economic development is at varying 
levels, but a small elite is the main 
beneficiary in each country, and oppor- 
tunities for upward mobility remain 
limited. The incidents of violence, re- 
pression, and human rights violations 
are high in Guatemala and El Salvador. 

With limited channels of redress or 
free political flow, dissent tends to back 
up into pressure and instability. Politi- 
cal and social tensions, instabilities, and 
polarization are considerably higher 
here than in the rest of the region, al- 
though domestic circumstances vary. El 
Salvador is the most volatile, given 
conflict between activated and 
polarized political and social groups, 
while Honduras is the most tranquil 
with optimistic prospects for social and 
political modernization. 

El Salvador. El Salvador — the 
smallest and most densely populated 
country in Central America — presents 
a classic setting for social and political 
unrest. Its population density — at 565 
persons per square mile — is the high- 
est of any country in the Western 
Hemisphere. Population growth of 
3.2% and agricultural land pressures 
have pushed the unemployment- 
underemployment rate above 30%. 
New jobs in industry absorb less than 
one-sixth of labor force entrants, and 
agriculture provides jobs for only one- 
half of new job seekers. Many Salva- 
dorans, faced with poverty and lack of 
opportunity, have chosen to emigrate. 

The export-oriented economy is 
characterized by a highly skewed dis- 
tribution of income, wealth, and land. 
In agriculture, for example, 2% of the 
population owns almost 60% of the 
land. A small oligarchy controls much of 
industry and agriculture and has great 
influence on the quasimilitary govern- 
ment. The class structure is one of the 
most rigid in Latin America. Human 
rights violations have been serious, as 
noted in the Department's report on the 
human rights situation submitted to the 
Congress last January. 

Under a constitutional system in 
place since 1962, military candidates 
have been regularly elected to the 
presidency under the banner of the offi- 
cial Partido de Conciliation National. 



The political system has not accommo- 
dated dissent and demands for change 
well. 

Political, economic, and social 
rigidities under successive regimes 
have not allowed a sufficient outlet for 
rising frustration and dissatisfaction. 
This atmosphere has spawned a 
dramatic increase in leftist terrorism, 
and terrorist movements have 
flourished, their actions accelerating a 
drift toward revolutionary violence. 

The country has thus been caught 
in a chronic national crisis; antigovern- 
ment activity is rampant, often beget- 
ting violence, and trust is lacking on all 
sides. In these circumstances polariza- 
tion is far advanced, and the prospects 
for avoiding insurrectional violence are 
rapidly dimming. 

Fortunately, however, there are 
signs that President Romero, the mod- 
erate opposition, and the private sector 
are crucially aware of this spiraling 
polarization and some evidence of a de- 
sire to find some reconciliation. In 
mid- August President Romero an- 
nounced a series of significant electoral 
measures, which if they can be effec- 
tively implemented, hopefully would go 
far to end the spiraling violence, frus- 
tration, and polarization. Halting 
human rights abuses against the integ- 
rity of the person will also be crucial to 
allowing an atmosphere to develop 
which will permit these reforms a 
realistic chance of success. 

President Romero's commitment to 
free municipal and legislative elections 
in March 1980 and to measures to re- 
form and open up the electoral system 
is particularly encouraging. He also in- 
vited all political exiles to return, has 
asked the Organization of American 
States (OAS) for observers and ad- 
visors to assist in electoral reform, and 
has invited the International Red Cross 
to visit the prisons to judge conditions 
there. 

Guatemala. Guatemala is the most 
populous and the most economically 
significant country in Central America. 
The nation's population is divided into 
two distinct ethnic groups, each with 
its own languages and culture. The In- 
dians, embracing 20 distinct indigenous 
tongues, make up 40% of the total 
population and remain both physically 
and culturally separate from the larger 
Spanish-speaking group. The urban 
population growth rate of 4.4% is 
among the region's fastest. Even so, 
rural areas still account for over 60% of 
the population. 

The economy is largely agrarian, 
with agriculture employing 55% of the 
labor force and contributing a little 



January 1980 



61 



Western Hemisphere 



more than one-fourth of GDP. Along- 
side the agricultural base is a developed 
manufacturing sector — the largest in 
the region. Although manufactured ex- 
ports account for less than one-third of 
foreign sales, it is the most dynamic 
sector in terms of employment and 
growth. 

Benefits of Guatemala's generally 
solid economic performance have been 
unevenly distributed. For three-fourths 
of the population, annual per capita in- 
come is still less than one-half of the na- 
tional average. Neither the rural poor 
nor labor have proportionately bene- 
fitted from growth in the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors. Widespread 
poverty and a major need for land re- 
form are probably among the major fac- 
tors contributing to instability and 
political violence. 

Politically, Guatemalan society is 
polarized and has been for many years. 
Violence is widespread and virtually in- 
stitutionalized. Subversive groups of 
the extreme left are capable of terrorist 
operations; the extreme right is simi- 
larly organized with their own terrorist 
organizations. Reciprocal acts of ter- 
rorism have cycled through Guatemalan 
society for many years. The list of as- 
sassinated political reformists is long, 
as is the list of government officials 
who have been assassinated by leftwing 
terrorists. 

While presidential succession takes 
place with regularity every 4 years, the 
political process is relatively closed. 
The political opposition is divided. New 
parties of the right and center left have 
been intimidated by the assassination of 
their most prominent leaders. The labor 
movement is relatively weak. Human 
rights violations have been described in 
the Department's report to the 
Congress. 

While enjoying something of a re- 
surgence since being decimated in the 
early 1970's, leftist guerrilla groups are 
relatively weak. They are isolated from 
the large but unassimilated Indian 
population in rural areas and out- 
gunned in the cities. Moreover, they 
lack broad-based front groups like El 
Salvador's Popular Revolutionary Bloc 
to organize and direct popular dissent. 

Guatemala thus suffers similar 
socioeconomic imbalances and political 
polarization as its neighbors, but the 
conflicts have not yet reached the same 
degree of intensity as in El Salvador. 

Honduras. Honduras is the poorest 
of the Central American countries, but 
at the same time it suffers from far less 
internal polarization and enjoys greater 
domestic calm than other countries in 
the region. Class differences are far 



less marked and rigid, and wealth is 
considerably more evenly distributed 
than in its northern tier neighbors. Al- 
though Honduras has a high population 
growth, it remains comparatively un- 
derpopulated with fewer people and 
five times the land area of neighboring 
El Salvador. Land is relatively abun- 
dant and fairly evenly distributed. 

The current military government 
has experienced a general continuity 
since December 1972 when a Superior 
Defense Council took power from the 
elected Nationalist Party president. 
Admittedly de facto, the government is 
committed to a return to constitutional 
rule beginning with elections for a con- 
stituent assembly in April 1980. 

The government, while ruling as a 
de facto regime, is generally not re- 
pressive. Human rights performance 
and civil liberties are reasonably good. 
The government, and the military in- 
stitutions are much more sensitive to 
popular aspirations and pressures than 
in the other countries, and the govern- 
ment is committed to development pro- 
grams aimed at bettering the lot of the 
ordinary citizen, especially in the rural 
areas. 

Honduras has no current guerrilla 
problem, and it faces the least serious 
threat to stability from internally gen- 
erated insurgent action, at least in the 
short term. Several factors have helped 
insulate Honduras from an insurgent 
threat — relatively benign military rule, 
a favorable land-labor ratio, and an 
economic distribution pattern that has 
avoided the sharp economic polarization 
and deep gaps between rich and poor 
that exist, for example, in El Salvador. 



EXTERNAL FACTORS 

Cuba 

The most important single factor 
governing possible Cuban involvement 
in subversive activities in the northern 
tier will be its perception of opportuni- 
ties. 

Profiting from its experience in the 
1960's, Cuba has generally followed a 
policy of cultivating and maintaining 
contact with leftist rebel movements; in 
some cases providing subsistence-level 
support, safehaven as needed, and 
various types of training; urging 
disparate opposition forces to unite; 
counseling recipients of their aid to ex- 
pand grassroots support; and waiting 
for the development of objective condi- 
tions propitious for additional support. 



Given events in Nicaragua, Cuba is 
certain to increase its attention to Cen- 
tral America. Cuba, however, may now 
seek a period of assessment and diges- 
tion of the results of Nicaragua. Thus, 
we should not be surprised if the Castro 
regime carefully weighs pros and cons 
of each situation as it arises and, rather 
than trying to force events to happen, 
should decide to react to events as they 
occur. In assessing opportunities Cas- 
tro is very likely to consider such fac- 
tors as the internal dynamism in each 
country, the U.S. reaction, the impact 
on members of the nonaligned move- 
ment, the degree of support or toler- 
ance from other Latin American coun- 
tries, the complexities of logistical 
problems, the extent of Cuban influence 
with the insurgent groups, and, ulti- 
mately, the chances of success. 

The major question in the minds of 
interested neighbors is what kind of ul- 
timate relationship with Cuba Nic- 
aragua will develop. While Havana cer- 
tainly has the gratitude of the San- 
dinista leadership for the assistance it 
provided, and considerable ties with 
key figures in the revolution, it is not 
automatic that — whatever Havana's 
intentions — the interests of the San- 
dinistas as the Government of 
Nicaragua will become indentical with 
those of Cuba. There is, indeed, every 
reason to suppose that Nicaraguans 
would prefer independent development. 

Certainly there are significant 
forces at work to produce something 
better than a worst-case model in 
Nicaragua. Practical considerations 
may work to constrain radical impulses 
within the Sandinista movement: a 
period of relative calm needed to re- 
habilitate the country; the diplomatic 
shelter that a broad-based policy af- 
fords in contrast to a provocatively 
Communist tilt; the potential for 
growing power and authority of moder- 
ate elements in the government and the 
society; and the support and coopera- 
tion of non-Communist countries and 
international financial institutions in 
and outside of Latin America. 

Other Latin American Countries 

Moderate governments of Latin 
America, especially the Andean group, 
have shown a keen interest in Central 
America. Venezuela, particularly, has 
chosen to play an active role of assist- 
ance and contact with these govern- 
ments, and an official Venezuelan mis- 
sion recently visited the northern tier 
countries. Mexico, too, has a major 
interest in developments in this geo- 
graphically close region. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



Western Hemisphere 



These governments have indicated 
their goal of fostering peaceful change 
in the region generally and supporting 
pluralism in Nicaraguan domestic and 
foreign policies. It can be expected that 
these nations will play an increasingly 
significant and constructive role. 



U.S. POLICY RESPONSES 

Central America's geographic 
proximity creates special U.S. interests 
in Central American peace, prosperity, 
and cooperation, enhanced by the sym- 
bolism from deep past involvement. 
Our interests embrace: 

• The existence of reasonably sta- 
ble and friendly governments free from 
domination by outside powers; 

• Security against use of the region 
by forces hostile to us; 

• Human rights, including the de- 
velopment of viable democratic institu- 
tions; and 

• Economic and social development 
through domestic reform and increased 
regional cooperation and integration. 

Given the volatile circumstances 
and vulnerabilities described, the in- 
evitability of change, and the dangers 
of polarization and radicalization, we 
would hope to see those vulnerabilities 



reduced by peaceful change consistent 
with individual liberties and democratic 
values and more open, pluralistic, and 
equitable societies. 

To help assure peaceful and 
evolutionary change, we want to work 
with the nations of Central America 
and with other hemisphere countries to 
achieve: 

• An evolution toward more open, 
pluralistic political systems, maintain- 
ing contact with all elements in Central 
America, including labor and youth or- 
ganizations, the media, private sector 
groups, and public officials; 

• Social and economic development 
through bilateral and multilateral as- 
sistance programs; 

• Positive relationships with the 
region's governments on a basis of 
nonintervention, equality, and respect 
for human rights; and 

• Regional cooperation in dealing 
with common economic problems. 

Let me now summarize our major 
policy lines toward Nicaragua and the 
countries of the northern tier. 



Nicaragua 

We seek to develop positive re- 
lationships with the Government of Na- 
tional Reconstruction on the basis of 
nonintervention, equality, and mutual 
respect. I am confident that our new 
relationships will reflect efforts to fos- 
ter respect for human rights and 
democracy. 

We support a humane and pluralis- 
tic evolution, based on Nicaragua's own 
needs, without outside intervention 
from anyone. We plan to maintain con- 
tact with all elements in Nicaragua, in- 
cluding the church, the media, and the 
private sector, as well as public offi- 
cials. 

We will encourage Nicaragua and 
its neighbors to build bridges, to 
dampen tensions, to remove the possi- 
bility of involvement in each other's 
domestic political affairs, and to pro- 
mote regional cooperation and security. 

We are already helping alleviate 
human suffering and hope to assist con- 
cretely in the massive reconstruction 
task facing that nation, thus insuring 
the best possible climate for the estab- 
lishment of a normal democratic order 
with respect for human rights. 

We plan to cooperate with other 
nations and public and private institu- 
tions in assisting Nicaragua's economic 
recovery and progress. 



Economic 

Cooperation, 

Integration 

Despite very real progress in the early 
years, the integration movement is in con- 
siderable disarray. Currently new large- 
scale opportunities for import substitution 
are limited. Political problems abound, Op- 
timism over future progress for economic in- 
tegration is rare. The obstacles to major 
progress include: 

• The current situation in Nicaragua 
and its major political and economic impact, 
which ranges from interrupted transporta- 
tion between Costa Rica and the rest of 
Central America to problems due to insta- 
bility and border closings; 

• The deteriorating security situation in 
El Salvador and Guatemala; 

• The longstanding dispute between El 
Salvador and Honduras that has yet to be 
resolved; 

• The failure to obtain any agreement to 
date on restructuring a substitute for the 
Common Market treaty which expires in 
1981; and 

• The Honduras position that it has not 
received equivalent benefits from the Com- 
mon Market and the unwillingness to date of 
the other countries to agree to structural 



changes to insure that Central America's 
only less developed country receives rela- 
tively favorable treatment. 

Nevertheless there is still enough inter- 
est in the Common Market either because of 
its perceived benefits or because of belief in 
a regional commitment to keep its institu- 
tions and arrangements functioning even 
when ad hoc arrangements are required. 

The strength of the historical, social, 
and psychological basis for continued re- 
gional cooperation in the area does not rest 
solely on the progress of economic integra- 
tion. The realization that Central America 
was one country before 1823; similar legal 
codes; similar climate; production of coffee, 
sugar, and cotton; good transportation and 
communications; intermarriage among 
families; easy movement of people within 
the region; similar cultures; same language; 
and country sizes (small) all lead to a sense 
of community within the region which per- 
mitted the Central American Common Mar- 
ket experiment and holds together a cooper- 
ative structure today. 

After over a decade of relatively rapid 
economic growth, per capita incomes for the 
countries of the region have risen substan- 
tially. There is a considerable variance in 
per capita incomes, however, ranging from 
the low in Honduras of $400 to the middle 
income levels of $1,100+ in Panama and 
Costa Rica. 



While still agriculturally based, the 
economies of the Central American coun- 
tries have become more diversified and a re- 
cent study by the Regional Office for Cen- 
tral America and Panama and the Sec- 
retariat for Central American Integration 
attributes the creation of over 150,000 jobs 
in the modern sector to the effects of the 
economic integration movement. Even in the 
face of great difficulty, intraregional trade 
has grown to about $1 billion annually. 

Nontraditional exports are increasing 
due at least in part to the period of protec- 
tion provided under the Common Market ar- 
rangements. Whether the Common Market 
can be rejuvenated depends largely on 
whether it can become a means for coopera- 
tion in producing exports from the Common 
Market to other parts of the world, particu- 
larly Europe and Japan in addition to the 
United States. Since the easy opportunities 
for import substitution have been seized, 
growth within the market is expected to be 
only that induced by the growth of the con- 
stituent countries. Reform of industrializa- 
tion and export incentives in the region may 
be easier to bring about on a group basis 
than by the individual countries acting 
alone. 

Regional Institutions 

Some regional institutions are techni- 
cally strong although financial support from 
the countries in the area is often disap- 



January 1980 



63 



Western Hemisphere 



El Salvador 

We are encouraging the govern- 
ment and other democratic elements in 
the very delicate political transition 
process now underway in El Salvador. 
This is of critical importance to the fu- 
ture of El Salvador. Putting an end to 
human rights violations of the integrity 
of the person is crucial to the overall 
atmosphere in the country. 

We believe the establishment of a 
real and credible electoral process, 
leading to free municipal/legislative 
elections in March 1980, is crucial to El 
Salvador's peaceful evolution and to ar- 
resting the critical polarization and 
frustration that can lead almost cer- 
tainly to violent confrontation between 
right and left. 

President Romero's August 1979 
proposals offer a constructive and 
hopeful beginning. They represent sig- 
nificant promises that now must be 
given life by both government and op- 
position in restoring trust and agreeing 
to program specifics. The concrete 
steps already taken are encouraging, 
but the overall assessment of the situa- 
tion is uncertain. 

We will support real and serious 
reform with appropriate cooperation 
and assistance. 



Honduras 

We have been impressed by the 
Honduran Government's demonstration 
of social awareness and its commitment 
to return that country to constitutional 
rule next year. 

It is also clear that geography 
gives Honduras a central role in the 
prevention of regional conflict, incur- 
sions, and potential infiltrations both 
ways between revolutionary Nicaragua 
and its conservative northern 
neighbors. 

Honduras is thus central to the 
"bridge-building" process we hope will 
emerge in Central America. We will en- 
courage Honduras to play such a role 
and will encourage both El Salvador 
and Honduras to reach an early settle- 
ment on their border dispute. 

We will provide cooperation and 
assistance to the government to help it 
achieve its goals. 

Guatemala 

We see no crisis in the months im- 
mediately ahead, but we recognize the 
country faces severe and fundamental 
longer term socioeconomic and political 
questions. 

We would encourage the Govern- 
ment of Guatemala to work toward a 



more open electoral process, to take 
effective action to halt spiraling politi- 
cal violence, and to play a constructive 
role in regional cooperation. 

Conclusion 

This brings me full circle to my 
opening comments. Central America is 
a region in which deep demands for 
change exist, in which serious in- 
equities and structural problems create 
political pressures, in which legitimate 
grievances result in basic demands for 
equity and redress. In the northern tier 
these instabilities have run up against 
relatively closed or rigid processes that 
permit their accommodation or venting 
with great difficulty. The consequent 
tensions result in polarization that un- 
less relieved will invite radicalization 
and the capture and perversion of 
legitimate causes by extreme elements. 

There is in all this a difficult and 
agonizing dilemma — the legitimacy of 
grievances and inequities and the in- 
evitability and drive for systemic 
change and reform, on the one hand, 
and the effort by Castroist/Marxist 
elements, on the other, to exploit these 
currents for their own use in order to 
disguise and legitimize their ulterior 
objectives. Clearly, helping resolve the 



pointing. The Common Market Secretariat 
(SIECA) has suffered from insufficient 
backing for its proposals by the Ministers of 
Economy. The impact of the new Secretary 
General remains to be seen. The Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration 
(CABEI) is now an established lending in- 
stitution which has had real success in 
financing regional infrastructure projects, 
particularly highways and telecommunica- 
tions. 

There are several institutions, such as 
the Center for Tropical Agricultural Re- 
search (CATIE), the Nutrition Institute for 
Central America and Panama (INCAP), and 
the Central America Institute of Research 
and Industrial Technology (ICAITI), which 
have substantial technical staffs which can 
address common development problems in 
the area, such as agricultural research, nu- 
trition, energy, technology, and the 
environment. 



International Inputs 

The World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development (AID), and other inter- 
national and bilateral assistance programs 
are active in Central America. There is a 
clear willingness on the part of the World 
Bank to finance additional bilateral projects 
as they materialize. This is demonstrated by 
its current plan to establish, along with the 



U.N. Development Program, a project de- 
sign team in Central America. The Inter- 
American Development Bank is currently 
lending even larger amounts than the World 
Bank. AID programs are relatively much 
smaller but still have a major impact as 
trailblazers. 

All three institutions have provided 
substantial support to projects designed to 
have a direct impact on the rural poor, al- 
though the banks continue to finance major 
infrastructure projects as well. 

Commerce and Trade 

Well over half of current exports from 
Central America are to the United States 
(excluding trade with other countries in the 
region). However, the Central American 
countries have not taken maximum advan- 
tage of general system of preferences (GSP) 
under current U.S. legislation. Commercial 
opportunities have not, therefore, been 
exploited to the extent they can be. 

Realistically, however, any major in- 
crease in exports to the U.S. in such areas 
as textiles or shoes or even fruits and vege- 
tables, can run into major political opposi- 
tion in the United States. As a result there 
are very real limitations on export expan- 
sion to the United States in any area where 
these exports are in direct competition with 
U.S. products. 



Similarly, the European Common Mar- 
ket presents limited opportunities in many 
products, with the additional problem that 
many primary products benefit from prefer- 
ence arrangements with former colonies in 
Africa and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, 
possibilities for major export expansion do 
exist in many areas and products, especially 
nontraditional exports and processed ag- 
ricultural products. Beef and beef products 
are examples. Japan could become a major 
market as it already is for cotton. Assembly 
operations in fields such as electronics for 
reexport offer other possibilities. 

An important conclusion about the Cen- 
tral American countries is that given the 
relative importance of the external sector in 
these economies and their relative openness, 
U.S. trade policy may be an important ele- 
ment in determining the parameters of fur- 
ther growth in the region. ■ 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 






Western Hemisphere 



former in a peaceful, democratic, mod- 
erate way is the best defense against 
the latter. Communism's greatest ally 
is a rigid, indiscriminate defense of the 
status quo and intolerance of change 
and dissent. As I noted, defense of the 
status quo will not avoid change; it will 
only radicalize it. Instability cannot be 
capped, nor repression maintained, in- 
definitely without sowing the seeds of a 
violent and radical denouement. Failure 
on our part to identify with the legiti- 
mate aspirations of the people in these 
countries — and with those democratic 
elements who seek peaceful construc- 
tive change — respect for human rights, 
and basic equity will put us on the 
wrong side of history. 

Our task, therefore, is how to work 
with our friends to guide and influence 
change, how to use our influence to 
promote justice, freedom, and equity to 
mutual benefit — and thereby avoid in- 
surgency and communism. Nowhere 
will this task be more crucial than in 
Nicaragua. As Dr. Hans Morgenthau 
once wrote: "The real issue facing 
American foreign policy ... is not how 
to preserve stability in the face of rev- 
olution, but how to create stability out 
of revolution." ■ 

1 The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Inter-American 

Institute 

for Cooperation on 

Agriculture 

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, 
NOV. 14, 1979 x 

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice 
and consent to ratification, the Convention 
on the Inter-American Institute for Cooper- 
ation on Agriculture (the Convention) which 
was signed at Washington on March 6, 1979. 
For the information of the Senate, I also 
transmit the report of the Department of 
State with respect to the Convention. 

The Convention is a revision of the 1944 
Convention on the Inter-American Institute 
of Agricultural Sciences. It clarifies the 1944 
Convention and strengthens and broadens 
the mandate of the Inter- American Institute 
of Agricultural Sciences (the Institute). 

Membership in the Institute under the 
Convention is open to states which are 
members of the OAS [Organization of 
American States] and the existing Institute, 
or other American states whose admission is 
accepted by the Inter- American Board of 
Agriculture. 

Under the Convention, the Institute 
will consist of three principal organs — the 
Inter-American Board of Agriculture, the 
Executive Committee, and the General Di- 
rectorate. The Inter- American Board of Ag- 
riculture will be the highest organ of the In- 
stitute and will consist of one representative 
from each Member State. The new Conven- 
tion stipulates that such representatives 
should preferably be persons connected with 
agriculture or rural development. This 
Board will be responsible for setting policy 
and budgetary priorities of the Institute. 

To reflect the changed responsibilities 
of the Institute, its name has been changed 
to the Inter-American Institute for Cooper- 
ation on Agriculture. 

The Convention will enter into force 
when two-thirds of the states parties to the 
1944 Convention have deposited instruments 
of ratification. Correspondingly, the 1944 
Convention will cease to be in force for those 
states for which the new Convention is in 
force. 

I recommend that the Senate give early 
and favorable consideration to the Conven- 
tion and advice and consent to ratification. 

Jimmy Carter ■ 

1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979. 



Chile 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 30, 1979 ! 

The Government of the United 
States has been reviewing our relations 
with the Government of Chile, in light 
of Chile's actions with respect to the 
assassination of Orlando Letelier, a 
former Ambassador of Chile to the 
United States, and Ronni Moffitt. 

Mr. Letelier and Mrs. Moffitt were 
killed in Washington in September 1976 
by a bomb attached to their car. On 
August 1, 1978, a Federal grand jury 
handed down a number of indictments 
in the case. Three officers of the Chil- 
ean intelligence service (Messrs. Con- 
treras, Espinoza, and Fernandez) were 
indicted for having planned and di- 
rected the killings. Michael Townley, a 
member of the Chilean intelligence 
service, pleaded guilty and was sen- 
tenced for his role in the crime, and two 
of his Cuban accomplices were sub- 
sequently tried and convicted in the 
U.S. District Court in Washington. The 
United States sought the extradition 
from Chile of the three Chilean offi- 
cials, but on October 1 that request was 
denied by the Chilean Supreme Court. 
The court also chose not to call for a 
Chilean investigation of the murder 
charges. 

The Government of Chile bears a 
twofold responsibility in this matter. 
First, the three men indicted for having 
planned and directed the killings were 
officials of that government and in- 
cluded the former head of Chile's intel- 
ligence service. The overwhelming 
body of evidence amassed by the De- 
partment of Justice makes it likely that 
the charges against these officials 
would be upheld if a fair trial could be 
held. Second, for over 20 months the 
Government of Chile has made no seri- 
ous effort to investigate or prosecute 
these crimes on its own. 

The Government of Chile has thus, 
in effect, condoned this act of interna- 
tional terrorism. It now seems likely 
that the men who planned and directed 
this crime, committed on the streets of 
our nation's capital, will go unpunished. 
We believe it is essential that we make 
clear, both to the Government of Chile 
and to others throughout the world, 
that such acts of terrorism cannot be 
tolerated. 

Accordingly, the President has 
concluded that the following measures 
should be taken. 

• We shall reduce the size of our 
mission in Chile. 



January 1980 



65 



TREATIES 



• By January 1, 1980, we will ter- 
minate the foreign military sales (FMS) 
"pipeline" to Chile and will thereby 
terminate all deliveries of military 
equipment to the Government of Chile 
by the U.S. Government. 

• The military group now stationed 
in our Embassy in Santiago will be 
phased down as the FMS pipeline is re- 
duced; at the end of this year, we will 
assess whether the military group 
should be completely eliminated. 

• Pursuant to the Export-Import 
Bank Act and to authority delegated by 
the President, Secretary Vance has de- 
termined that suspension of Exim 
financing in Chile would "clearly and 
importantly advance U.S. policy" in 
combating international terrorism. 
Exim is, therefore, immediately sus- 
pending all such financing. 

• The Overseas Private Invest- 
ment Corp. will not approve any fur- 
ther guaranties or undertake any new 
activities in Chile. 

Chile's deplorable conduct in this 
affair, and in particular its refusal to 
conduct a full and fair investigation of 
this crime, demand the actions we are 
taking today, which constitute a strong 
reaffirmation of our determination to 
resist international terrorism. ■ 

1 Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Convention on the Inter-American Institute 
for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at 
Washington Mar. 6, 1979. ' 
Ratifications deposited: Barbados, Oct. 24, 
1979; Canada, July 11, 1979. 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at 
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force 
June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. 
Ratification deposited: Jordan, Nov. 15, 
1979. 

Aviation 

Convention for the unification of certain 

rules relating to international transportation 

by air and additional protocol. Concluded at 

Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929. Entered into force 

Feb. 13, 1933; for the U.S. Oct. 29, 1934. 49 

Stat. 3000. 

Accessions deposited: Chile, Mar. 2, 1979; 2 

Uruguay, July 4, 1979. 

Notification of succession: Bangladesh, Feb. 

13, 1979. 

Additional protocol No. 3 to amend the con- 
vention for the unification of certain rules 
relating to international carriage by air 
signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 
3000) as amended by the protocols done at 
The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955 and at 
Guatemala City on Mar. 8, 1971. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 25, 1975. 1 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Aug. 16, 
1979. 2 

Montreal protocol No. 4 to amend the con- 
vention for the unification of certain rules 
relating to international carriage by air 
signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 
3000) as amended by the protocol done at 
The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 25, 1975. » 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Aug. 16, 
1979. 2 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered 
into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Kuwait, Nov. 27, 1979. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the de- 
velopment, production and stockpiling of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin 
weapons and on their destruction. Done at 
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. 
TIAS 8062. 

Ratification deposited: Argentina, Nov. 27, 
1979. 



Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Cooper- 
ation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels 
Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: Mauritania, Oct. 2, 
1979. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental mod- 
ification techniques, with annex. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978. 3 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 28, 1979. 

Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund formulated at Bretton 
Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened 
for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. 
Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 
1501. 

Signature and acceptance : St. Lucia, Nov. 
15, 1979. 

Human Rights 

American convention on human rights. 
Done at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered 
into force July 18, 1978. 3 
Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, Sept. 
25, 1979. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention abolishing the requirement of 
legalization for foreign public documents 
with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 
1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965. 3 
Senate advice and consent to accession: 
Nov. 28, 1979. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490), 
on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consul- 
tative Organization. Adopted at London 
Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 
1978. TIAS 8606. 
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, Oct. 8, 

1979: 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 
8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Adopted at Lon- 
don Nov. 14, 1975. J 

Acceptance deposited: Liberia, Nov. 19, 
1979. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 
8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Adopted at Lon- 
don Nov. 17, 1977. 1 

Acceptances deposited: Canada, Finland, 
Nov. 19, 1979. 



Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conven- 
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



Treaties 



protection of victims of international armed 
conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. 
Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered 
into force Dec. 7, 1978. 3 
Ratifications deposited : Sweden, Aug. 31, 
1979; 4 Tunisia. Aug. 9, 1979. 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conven- 
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of noninternational 
armed conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at 
Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978. 3 

Ratification deposited: Sweden, Aug. 31, 
1979: Tunisia. Aug. 9, 1979. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1977, with 
annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. En- 
tered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 30, 1979. 

Trade 

Protocol extending the arrangement re- 
garding international trade in textiles of 
Dec. 20, 1973 (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva 
Dec. 14, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
1978. TIAS 8939. 

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Oct. 29, 
1979. 

Whaling 

Amendments to the schedule to the interna- 
tional convention for the regulation of 
whaling, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at the 
31st meeting of the International Whaling 
Commission, London July 9-13, 1979. 
Entered into force: Oct. 24, 1979 except for 
the provision concerning the catch limit of 
143 fin whales for the Spain-Portugal- 
British Isles stock of the North Atlantic, 
which shall enter into force Jan. 22, 1980. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending 
the wheat trade convention (part of the in- 
ternational wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 
7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. 
Entered into force June 23, 1979, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, 
with respect to other provisions. 
Accessions deposited: Belgium, Nov. 29, 
1979; Ireland, Dec. 3, 1979. 
Ratification deposited: Cuba, Dec. 3, 1979. 

Protocol modifying and further extending 
the food aid convention (part of the interna- 
tional wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered 
into force June 23, 1979, with respect to cer- 
tain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Accessions deposited: Belgium, Nov. 29, 
1979; Ireland, Dec. 3, 1979. 

Bilateral 

Argentina 

Agreement concerning hide exports and 
other trade matters. Signed at Washington 
Aug. 10, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 19, 
1979. 



Colombia 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 
3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515), relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber 
textiles and textile products. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Bogota Aug. 30 and 
Sept. 7, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 7, 
1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 
3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515), relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber 
textiles and textile products. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Bogota Sept. 6 and 7, 
1979. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1979. 

Egypt 

Agreement concerning U.S. Government 
and other claims, with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Cairo May 19, 1979. 
Entered into force: Nov. 5, 1979. 

Finland 

Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 
11, 1976. 1 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 29, 1979. 

France 

Arrangement for the exchange of technical 
information and cooperation in the regula- 
tion of nuclear safety. Signed at Paris Oct. 
25, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 25, 1979. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Treaty concerning extradition, with pro- 
tocol. Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978. l 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 29, 1979. 

Greece 

Agreement concerning the grant of defense 
articles and services under the military as- 
sistance program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Athens Aug. 30, 1979. Entered into 
force Aug. 30, 1979. 

Hungary 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income, with exchange of 
notes. Signed at Washington Feb. 12, 1979. 
Entered into force Sept. 18, 1979. 
Proclaimed by the President: Nov. 28, 1979. 

Agreement amending the agreement of July 
7, 1972, as amended and extended (TIAS 
8640), on scientific cooperation. Signed at 
Washington and Budapest Oct. 24, 1979. 
Entered into force Oct. 24, 1979. 

Program of cooperation and exchanges in 
culture, education, science and technology 
for 1980 and 1981, with annex. Signed at 
Washington Oct. 25, 1979. Enters into force 
Jan. 1, 1980. 

India 

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 
30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232), 
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man- 
made fiber textiles and textile products. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton Nov. 6, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 6, 
1979. 



Israel 

Memorandum of understanding for technical 
cooperation in mineral technology. Signed at 
Washington and Jerusalem Aug. 14 and 
Sept. 19, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 19, 
1979. 

Agreement relating to cash assistance to Is- 
rael during fiscal year 1980 to support the 
economic and political stability of Israel. 
Signed at Washington Nov. 15, 1979. En- 
tered into force Nov. 15, 1979. 

Japan 

Treaty on extradition, with exchange of 
notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978. ' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 30, 1979. 

Kiribati 

Treaty of friendship, with agreed minute. 
Signed at Tarawa Sept. 20, 1979. Enters 
into force on the date of the exchange of in- 
struments of ratification. 

Malaysia 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 
17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 
9180), relating to trade in cotton, wool and 
man-made fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington and New York Oct. 4 and 12, 
1979. Entered into force Oct. 12, 1979. 

Mexico 

Treaty on extradition, with appendix. 
Signed at Mexico City May 4, 1978. » 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 30, 1979. 



Morocco 

Agreement regarding interpretation of Arti- 
cles 21(2) and 25(1) of the convention of Aug. 
1, 1977 for the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with re- 
spect to taxes on income. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Washington and Rabat 
Oct. 25, 1979. Enters into force upon entry 
into force of the convention of Aug. 1, 1977. 

Norway 

Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 
1977. > 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 30, 1979. 

Panama 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. 
Signed at Panama Jan. 11, 1979. 1 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 30, 1979. 

Agreement relating to the library and 
museum in the Civil Affairs Building. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Panama Sept. 
24, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1979. 
Interim agreement relating to continued use 
of lands and installations for purposes of air 
traffic control and related services, with re- 
lated note. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force 
Oct. 1, 1979. 



January 1980 



67 



CHRONOLOGY 



Agreement relating to the Port 
Meteorological Office. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered 
into force Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement relating to Article II of the 
agreement in implementation of Article III 
of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning es- 
tablishment of a Coordinating Committee. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Panama 
Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement relating to Article III of the 
Panama Canal Treaty concerning the estab- 
lishment of a Consultative Committee. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 
1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement relating to Article III of the 
agreement in implementation of Article IV 
of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning es- 
tablishment of a Joint Committee. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 
1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement relating to the agreements in 
implementation of Articles III and IV of the 
Panama Canal Treaty with respect to tax on 
movable property. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into 
force Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement relating to Article IV of the 
Panama Canal Treaty concerning establish- 
ment of a Combined Board. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. En- 
tered into force Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement relating to Article VI of the 
Panama Canal Treaty concerning establish- 
ment of a Joint Commission on the Envi- 
ronment. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force 
Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement relating to electric power. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 
1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979. 

Agreement relating to tropic testing in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of the agree- 
ment on certain activities of the U.S. in 
Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force 
Oct. 1, 1979. 

Sweden 

Arrangement for the exchange of technical 
information and cooperation in nuclear 
safety matters, with patent addendum. 
Signed at Washington Oct. 30, 1979. En- 
tered into force Oct. 30, 1979. 

Tunisia 

Agreement concerning cultural cooperation. 
Signed at Tunis Sept. 28, 1979. Entered into 
force Sept. 28, 1979. 

Turkey 

Treaty on extradition and mutual assistance 
in criminal matters. Signed at Ankara June 
7, 1979. ' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 28, 1979. 



68 



Treaty on the enforcement of penal judg- 
ments. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979. ' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 30, 1979. ■ 



1 Not in force. 

2 With reservation. 

3 Not in force for the U.S. 

4 With declaration and reservation. 



November 1979 



Events pertaining to Iran can be found on 
page. 44. 

Nov. 1 Secretary Vance departs for Seoul 

to attend President Park Chung 
Hee's funeral. 
U.S. announces normalization of 
diplomatic relations with 
Equatorial Guinea. 

Nov. 2 A military junta headed by Boliv- 

ian Col. Alberto Natusch 
Busch overthrows the govern- 
ment of President Walter 
Guevara Arze. 
U.S. suspends assistance to 
Bolivia in reaction to military 
takeover. 

Nov. 4 Bolivia's new military government 

declares martial law. 

Nov. 5 U.N. General Assembly holds 

Pledging Conference for Emer- 
gency Humanitarian Relief to 
the people of Kampuchea; $210 
million in aid is pledged by rep- 
resentatives of 51 nations. 

Nov. 6 U.S. pledges $69 million to help 

check starvation among Kam- 
pucheans. 
UNESCO meeting on Communi- 
cation Development Activities 
held Nov. 6-9 at State Depart- 
ment. 
UNHCR sends $60 million to aid 
Kampuchean refugees in Thai- 
land. 

Nov. 7 Mrs. Carter leaves on fact-finding 

tour of Kampuchean refugee 
camps in Thailand to focus in- 
ternational attention on the 
problem, Nov. 7-10. 
Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch 

visits U.S., Nov. 7-15. 
Col. Natusch of Bolivia suspends 
martial law and press 
censorship, but remains silent on 
military-civilian junta. 

Nov. 8 Shelling incident occurs during 

Mrs. Carter's visit to the 
Thai-Kampuchean border re- 
sulting in significant number of 
deaths and injuries to innocent 
civilians. 



Kenya's parliamentary elections 
are held with both President 
Moi and Vice President Kabiki 
returned to office. As in pre- 
vious elections, a large number 
of Cabinet Ministers and over 
half the Parliament were de- 
feated in their bids for reelec- 
tion. 

Nov. 12 Turkish Prime Minister Demirel 

announces formation of a gov- 
ernment consisting of 28 Minis- 
ters in the new Cabinet. 
U.S. and Chinese officials hold 
first round of talks in Beijing 
aimed at conclusion of a bilat- 
eral consular convention. The 
talks provide an opportunity for 
a general review of the posi- 
tions of the two parties. 

Nov. 13 Israeli Ambassador to Portugal is 

wounded and his bodyguard 
killed in an attack on the Israeli 
Embassy in Lisbon. 

Nov. 14 Palestinian mayors in Israeli- 

occupied territory resign in pro- 
test against the imprisonment 
and threatened deportation of 
Nablus Mayor Bossam al- 
Shakuaa. U.N. Security Council 
issues unanimous statement ex- 
pressing its concern. 

Nov. 16 Bolivian Congress, for the first 

time, selects a woman, Lydia 
Gueiler, as interim President. 
People's National Party of Ghana 
wins 8 of 10 parliamentary seats 
contested in last round of 
byelections. 

Nov. 18 Thailand opens its borders to 

560,000 Kampucheans camped 
along its frontier. 

Nov. 19 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 

arrives in Spain for a 3-day offi- 
cial visit. While there, he ex- 
presses Soviet opposition to 
Spain's joining NATO. 
Semiannual U.S. -Economic Com- 
munity high-level consultations 
held Nov. 19-20 at State De- 
partment. 

Nov. 20 Armed fundamentalist Moslems, 

believed to be from Iran, seize 
Grand Mosque in Mecca. 

Nov. 21 U.S. Embassy in Pakistan is 

stormed and partially burned. 
A U.S. Marine guard is killed 
and 100 persons are trapped for 
5 hours in the security vault 
before being led to safety by 
Pakistani Armed Forces. 
Former Canadian Prime Minister 
Trudeau resigns as leader of the 
Liberal Party. 

Nov. 25 Minority government of Turkish 

Prime Minister Demirel wins a 
vote of confidence in Parliament 
with the support of the Fun- 
damentalist Nationalist Salva- 
tion Party, "the National Move- 
ment Party, and several Inde- 
pendents. The vote in the 450- 
seat assembly was 229 to 208, 
with 13 members abstaining. 
Israel gives up Alma oilfields in 
the Gulf of Suez to Egypt. 

Department of State Bulletin 









PRESS RELEASES 



Nov. 26 Newly appointed ambassadors to 

the U.S. presented their cre- 
dentials to President Carter — 
Rafael Solis Cerda (Nicaragua), 
Redha Malek (Algeria), 
Nicholas F. Parkinson (Austra- 
lia), Ricardo Midence Soto 
(Honduras), Budimir Loncar 
(Yugoslavia), and Dr. Peter 
Hermes (Federal Republic of 
Germany). 

Nov. 27 Soviet leadership promotes 

Nicolai A. Tikhonov to full 
membership in the Communist 
Party ruling Politburo. 

Nov. 28 South Africa's Ambassador to El 

Salvador Archibald G. Dunn, is 
kidnapped by a group calling it- 
self the Popular Liberation 
Force. 

Nov. 30 State Department announces 

sanctions against Chile affecting 
diplomatic, military, and finan- 
cial relations in response to 
Chilean failure to carry out a 
diligent and prompt investiga- 
tion of murder charges against 
three former secret police offi- 
cers accused of the assassination 
of Orlando Letelier, a Chilean 
exile, and Ronnie Moffitt, an 
American citizen, in Washing- 
ton 1976. 
Several thousand people demon- 
strate near the U.S. Embassy 
in Kuwait. Kuwaiti security 
personnel, using tear gas, dis- 
perse crowd. 
Several explosive devices go off 
simultaneously on the grounds 
of the U.S. Embassy in 
Bangkok. ■ 



Department of State 



November 19-30 

Press releases may be obtained from 
the Office of Press Relations, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. 

*300 



*301 
*302 



Date 

11/19 



11/19 
11/19 



*303 11/20 



*304 11/21 



*305 


11/21 


*306 


11/23 


*307 


11/27 


*308 


11/27 


*309 


11/28 


*310 


11/28 


311 


11/29 


312 


11/30 


313 


11/30 



Subject 

Harry Roberts Malone 
sworn in as Ambassador 
to Rwanda (biographic 
data). 

U.S., Malaysia amend tex- 
tile agreement, Oct. 4 and 
12. 

U.S. Organization for the 
International Radio Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR), study group 1, 
Dec. 13. 

Robert B. Oakley sworn in 
as Ambassador to the 
Republic of Zaire (bio- 
graphic data). 

U.S. Organization for the 
International Telegraph 
and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee (CCITT), 
study group A, Dec. 19. 

Asian-American Foreign 
Policy Conference, Dec. 
1. 

Joint statement following 
U.S. -Andean Pact meet- 
ing. 

Anne Forrester Holloway 
sworn in as Ambassador 
to the Republic of Mali 
(biographic data). 

U.S., Pakistan amend tex- 
tile agreement, Nov. 13 
and 16. 

U.S., India amend textile 
agreement, Oct. 26 and 
Nov. 6. 

U.S., Singapore amend tex- 
tile agreement Sept. 12 
and Oct. 16. 

U.S. initiates action against 
Iran in International 
Court.of Justice. 

International and U.S. ef- 
forts to aid Kampuchean 
famine. 

President of ICJ issues call 
to parties in hostage 
case. ■ 



Not printed in the Bulletin. 



U.S.U.N. 



Press releases may be obtained from 
the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to 
the United Nations, 799 United Nations 
Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. 



No. Date Subject 

*71 8/24 Young: Palestinian ques- 
tion, Security Council. 
72 8/29 Young: Lebanon, Security 
Council. 



*73 



*74 



80 



81 



*85 



8/31 



9/4 



75 


9/4 


76 


9/11 


77 


9/12 


78 


9/12 


79 


9/18 



9/18 



9/21 



82 


9/21 


83 


9/24 


84 


9/27 



10/1 



*86 


10/8 


*87 


10/11 


*88 


10/11 


89 


10/12 


*90 


10/16 


*91 


10/16 


*92 


10/16 


93 


10/17 


*94 


10/18 


95 


10/18 


*96 


10/18 


*97 


10/19 


*98 


10/19 



99 10/22 



Announcement of U.S. con- 
tribution of $102.9 million 
as 1979 partial payment 
toward the U.N. regular 
assessed budget. 

Cardwell: apartheid and 
women, preparatory 
committee for the World 
Conference of the Decade 
for Women. 

Ambassador to lead trade 
mission to Africa. 

McHenry: death of Angolan 
President Neto. 

Hormats: world economy, 
Committee of the Whole, 
Sept. 12. 

Petree: admission of Saint 
Lucia, Security Council. 

McHenry: admission of 
Saint Lucia, General As- 
sembly. 

U.S. representatives and 
alternate representatives 
to the 34th U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly (bio- 
graphic data). 

Petree: Kampuchean cre- 
dentials, General Assem- 
bly. 

Reis: Venda, Security 
Council. 

Vance: opening session of 
the General Assembly. 

Busnell: Nicaraguan relief 
and reconstruction as- 
sistance, ECLA Commit- 
tee of the Whole. 

Saddler: financial reports 
and accounts, Commit- 
tee V. 

Graham: foreign economic 
interests, Committee IV. 

Graham: foreign economic 
interests, Committee IV. 

Dunfey: foreign economic 
interests, Committee IV. 

Rosen: energy, Committee 
II. 

Rosenthal: atomic radia- 
tion, Special Political 
Committee. 

Brecher: assistance to 
Nicaragua, Committee II. 

Saddler: program budget, 
Committee V. 

Young: IYC, General Assem- 
bly. 

Coopersmith: racial discrimi- 
nation, Committee III. 

Seignious: arms control, 

Committee I. 
Jill Schuker named Coun- 
selor for Public Affairs 
(biographic data). 

Rosenthal: UNRWA, Spe- 
cial Political Committee. 

McHenry: Special Commit- 
tee Against Apartheid's 
Day of Solidarity With 
South African Political 
Prisoners. 
McHenry: economic 
dialogue, General Assem- 
bly. 









January 1980 



69 



PUBLICATIONS 



100 10/24 



*101 


10/24 


*102 


10/25 


*103 


10/26 


*104 


10/31 


*105 


10/31 


*106 


11/1 


*107 


11/1 


*108 


11/2 


*109 


11/5 


*110 


11/2 


*1 1 1 


11/5 


112 


11/5 


*113 


11/6 


*114 


11/6 


115 


11/8 


*116 


11/9 


*117 


11/12 


*118 


11/13 


*119 


11/13 



McHenry: address before 
the Appeal of Conscience 
Foundation awards din- 
ner. New York, Oct. 23. 

Vanden Heuvel: human 
rights, Committee III. 

Morgenthau: food, Commit- 
tee II. 

Vanden Heuvel: Czecho- 
slovak dissidents. Com- 
mittee III. 

Dunfey: TTPI, Committee 
IV. 

Coopersmith: torture, 
Committee III. 

Dunfey: U.S. Virgin Is- 
lands and American 
Samoa, Committee IV. 

Petree: outer space, Special 
Political Committee. 

Rosen: environment, Com- 
mittee II. 

Dunfey: U.N. visiting mis- 
sion to Guam, Committee 
of 24. 

Petree: Angolan complaint, 
Security Council. 

Winn: IAEA report, Gen- 
eral Assembly, Nov. 2. 

Vance: pledging conference 
for Kampuchean refu- 
gees, General Assembly. 

Coopersmith: religious in- 
tolerance, Committee III. 

Fisher: arms control, Com- 
mittee I. 

Dunfey: apartheid, General 
Assembly. 

Rosen: operational ac- 
tivities for development, 
Committee II. 

Rosen: U.N.-OAU coopera- 
tion, plenary, Nov. 9. 

Vanden Heuvel: situation in 
Kampuchea, plenary. 

Rosenthal: information, 
Special Political Commit- 
tee. ■ 



GPO Sales 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



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or stock number from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 201,02. A 25% 
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same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must ac- 
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which include domestic postage, are subject 
to change. 

Primary School Reconstruction. Agree- 
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$1.60. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9015.) 
Whaling — International Observer 
Scheme. Agreement with Australia. TIAS 
9034. 8pp. 800. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9034.) 
Assistance to Small Farmers. Agreement 
with Bolivia. TIAS 9043. 35 pp. $1.50. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9043.) 
Crop Protection. Agreement with the 
Philippines. TIAS 9060. 31 pp. $1.40. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:9060.) 

Great Lakes Load Lines. Memorandum of 
understanding with Canada. TIAS 9088. 3 
pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9.10:9088.) 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement 
with Syria. TIAS 9096. 15pp. $1.10. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:9096.) 

Economic Assistance — Program Assist- 
ance Grant. Agreement with Israel. TIAS 
9098. 14 pp. 900. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9098.) 
Agricultural Commodities — Transfer 
Under Title II. Agreement with Rwanda. 
TIAS 9102. 2 pp. 600. (Cat. No. 
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Agricultural Commodities — Transfer 
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TIAS 9104. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
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Agricultural Commodities — Transfer 
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S9.10:9107.) 

Agricultural Commodities — Transfer 
Under Title II. Agreement with Mozam- 
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S9. 10:9108.) 

Agricultural Commodities — Transfer 
Under Title II. Agreement with Somalia. 
TIAS 9109. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9109.) 

Technical Assistance to Develop Civil 
Aviation Infrastructure. Memorandum of 
agreement with Venezuela. TIAS 9110. 19 
pp. $1.10 (Cat. No. S9.10:9110.) 
Aviation — Technical Assistance. Memo- 
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9111. 10 pp. 800. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9111.) 



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and Traffic. Agreement with Mexico. 
TIAS 9113. 13 pp. 900. (Cat. No. 
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Narcotic Drugs — Additional Cooperative 
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1977, as amended. TIAS 9114. 5 pp. 700. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:9114.) 

Narcotic Drugs — Additional Cooperative 
Arrangements to Curb Illegal Production 
and Traffic. Agreement with Mexico, 
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1977, as amended and extended. TIAS 
9115. 6 pp. 700. (Cat. No. S9. 10:9115.) 
Peace Corps. Agreement with Oman, 
amending the agreement of November 15 
and 28, 1972. TIAS 9116. 5 pp. 700. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:9116.) 

Integrated Rural Development. Agree- 
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900. (Cat. No. S9.10:9117.) 
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Niger, TIAS 9118. 51 pp. $1.80. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9118.) 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Tuvalu. 
TIAS 9119. 3 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:9119.) 

Technical Cooperation in Earth Sciences. 
Memorandum of understanding with 
Morocco. TIAS 9121. 5 pp. 700. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:9121.) 

Population Planning. Agreement with 
Thailand. TIAS 9123. 14 pp. 900. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:9123.) 

Population Planning. Agreement with the 
Philippines. TIAS 9124. 57 pp. $1.90. (Cat. 
No. S9. 10:9124.) 

Population Planning. Agreement with the 
Philippines, amending the agreement of 
August 31, 1977. TIAS 9125. 7 pp. 800. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:9125.) 
Meteorological Cooperation. Agreement 
with Iran. TIAS 9127. 9 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:9127.) 

Defense — Evaluation of Sonar System of 
High Speed Surface Vessel. Agreement 
with Canada. TIAS 9129. 18 pp. $1.00. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9129.) 
Establishment of Agricultural Research 
and Development Fund. Agreement with 
Israel. TIAS 9131. 7 pp. 800 (Cat. No. 
S9.10:9131.) 

Agricultural Research. Agreement with 
Tanzania. TIAS 9132. 10 pp. 800. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:9132.) 

Educational Programs. Agreement with 
Panama, amending the agreement of 
November 19, 1975. TIAS 9133. 22 pp. 
$1.10 (Cat. No. S9.10:9133.) 
Rural Health Services. Agreement with 
Egypt, amending the agreement of Sep- 
tember 30, 1976. TIAS 9134. 3 pp. 700. 
(Cat. No. S9. 10:9134.) 
Water Use and Management Project. 
Agreement with Egypt, amending the 
agreement of June 30, 1976. TIAS 9135. 4 
pp. 700 (Cat. No. S9. 10:9135. )■ 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



Rps™, 






INDEX 

JANUARY 1980 
VOL. 80, NO. 2034 

Afghanistan. Soviet Invasion of Af- 
ghanistan (Carter, McHenry, draft 
resolution) A 

Agriculture. Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture (message to 
the Senate) 65 

Arms Control. Arms Control (Seignious) 54 

Canada. Report on the Transport of Air 
Pollutants 4 

Chile. Chile (Department statement) . . .65 

China. Agreements With Taiwan (Christo- 
pher) 10 

Pacific Basin (Newsom) 7 

U.S. -China Trade Agreement (Christo- 
pher) 9 

Congress 

Accounting for MI As (Holbrooke) 12 

Agreements With Taiwan (Christopher) .10 

Central America at the Crossroads 
(Vaky) 58 

CSCE Semiannual Report and 1980 Madrid 
Meeting (Department statement) 24 

Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights 
(Christopher, Derian, Owen) 26 

Implementing the Human Rights Policy 
(Christopher) 32 

Inter-American Institute for Cooperation 
on Agriculture (message to the Senate) 65 

Situation in Iran (Carter, message to the 
Congress, White House announcement, 
statements) 42 

U.S. -China Trade Agreement (Christo- 
pher) 9 

Department and Foreign Service 

President Carter's News Conference of 
November 28 1 

Security Council Meets on Iranian Situa- 
tion (McHenry, text of resolution) 49 

Situation in Iran (Carter, message to the 
Congress, White House announcement, 
statements) 42 

U.S. Embassy Marine Security Guards. .42 

Economics 

Agenda of Global Economic Issues (Ro- 
sen) 52 

Central America at the Crossroads 
(Vaky) 58 

Chronology of Events in Iran, November 
1979 44 

Egypt. The Challenge of Peacemaking 
(Saunders) 46 

Energy 

Agenda of Global Economic Issues (Ro- 
sen) 52 

President Carter's News Conference of 
November 28 1 

Environment. Report on the Transport of 
Air Pollutants 4 

Europe 

CSCE Semiannual Report and 1980 Madrid 
Meeting (Department statement) 24 

Continuity and Commitment (Nimetz) . . .20 

Helsinki Agreement on Human Rights 
(Carter) 25 

Food. Agenda of Global Economic Issues 
(Rosen) 52 

Foreign Aid. World Efforts To Aid Kam- 
pucheans 8 

Human Rights 

CSCE Semiannual Report and 1980 Madrid 
Meeting (Department statement) 24 

Continuity and Commitment (Nimetz) . . .20 

Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights 
(Christopher, Derian, Owen) 26 

Helsinki Agreement on Human Rights 
(Carter) 25 



Implementing the Human Rights Policy 
(Christopher) 32 

International Year of the Child (Young). 56 

Political Asylum (Christopher) 35 

President Carter Receives Human Rights 
Award (Carter) 32 

International Law 

Chronology of Events in Iran, November 
1979 44 

International Court of Justice 42 

Political Asylum (Christopher) 35 

U.S. Takes Case Against Iran to the Inter- 
national Court of Justice (Department 
announcement, Secretary's letter, appli- 
cation to the Court, request for interim 
measures of protection, response from 
ICJ) 37 

Iran 

Chronology of Events in Iran, November 
1979 44 

President Carter's News Conference of 
November 28 1 

Security Council Meets on Iranian Situa- 
tion (McHenry, text of resolution) 49 

Situation in Iran (Carter, message to the 
Congress, White House announcement, 
statements) 42 

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Carter, 
McHenry, draft resolution) A 

U.S. Embassy Marine Security Guards.. 42 

U.S. Takes Case Against Iran to the Inter- 
national Court of Justice (Department 
announcement, Secretary's letter, appli- 
cation to the Court, request for interim 
measures of protection, response from 
ICJ) 37 

World Opinion on the Holding of U.S. Hos- 
tages in Iran E 

Ireland. Visit of Irish Prime Minister 
Lynch (press statement) 25 

Israel. The Challenge of Peacemaking 
(Saunders) 46 

Japan. Pacific Basin (Newsom) 7 

Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Central America at the Crossroads 
(Vaky) 58 

Inter-American Institute for Cooperation 
on Agriculture (message to the Senate) 65 

Laos. Accounting for MIAs (Holbrooke) 12 

Middle East 

The Challenge of Peacemaking (Saun- 
ders) 46 

Chronology of Events in Iran, November 
1979 44 

Monetary Affairs 

Flexible Exchange Rates After 6 Years' 
Experience 14 

Situation in Iran (Carter, message to the 
Congress, White House announcement, 
statements) 42 

Presidental Documents 

Helsinki Agreement on Human Rights 
(Carter) 25 

Inter-American Institute for Cooperation 
on Agriculture (message to the Senate) 65 

Mrs. Carter Visits Thailand (Carter, Car- 
ter, Hesburgh) 5 

President Carter Receives Human Rights 
Award (Carter) 32 

President Carter's News Conference of 
November 28 1 

Situation in Iran (Carter, message to the 
Congress, White House announcement, 
statements) 42 

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Carter, 
McHenry, draft resolution A 

Publications. GPO sales 70 

Refugees 

International Year of the Child (Young) .56 

Mrs. Carter Visits Thailand (Carter, Car- 
ter, Hesburgh) 5 

World Efforts To Aid Kampucheans 8 



Security Assistance. Chile (Department 

statement) 65 

Terrorism 

Chile (Department statement) 65 

Chronology of Events in Iran, November 

1979 44 

President Carter's News Conference of 

November 28 1 

Security Council Meets on Iranian Situa- 
tion (McHenry, text of resolution) ... .49 
Situation in Iran (Carter, message to the 
Congress, White House announcement, 

statements) 42 

U.S. Takes Case Against Iran to the Inter- 
national Court of Justice (Department 
announcement, Secretary's letter, appli- 
cation to the Court, request for interim 
measures of protection, response from 

ICJ) 37 

Thailand. Mrs. Carter Visits Thailand 

(Carter, Carter, Hesburgh) 5 

Trade 

Agenda of Global Economic Issues (Ro- 
sen) 52 

U.S. -China Trade Agreement (Christo- 
pher) 9 

Treaties 

Current Actions 66 

Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights 

(Christopher, Derian, Owen) 26 

U.S. -China Trade Agreement (Christo- 
pher) 9 

U.S.S.R. 

Identifying U.S. Security Interests in 

U.S. -Soviet Relations (Shulman) 17 

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Carter, 

McHenry, draft resolution) A 

United Nations 

Agenda of Global Economic Issues (Ro- 
sen) 52 

Arms Control (Seignious) 54 

Chronology of Events in Iran, November 

1979 44 

International Court of Justice 42 

International Year of the Child (Young) .56 
Security Council Meets on Iranian Situa- 
tion (McHenry, text of resolution) ... .49 
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Carter, 

McHenry, draft resolution) A 

U.S. Takes Case Against Iran to the Inter- 
national Court of Justice (Department 
announcement, Secretary's letter, appli- 
cation to the Court, request for interim 
measures of protection, response from 

ICJ) 37 

World Efforts To Aid Kampucheans 8 

Vietnam 

Accounting for MIAs (Holbrooke) 12 

Pacific Basin (Newsom) 7 



Name Index 

Carter, President 1, 5, 25, 32, 42, 65 

Carter, Rosalynn 5 

Christopher, Warren 9, 10, 26, 32, 35, 37 

Cooper, Richard N 14 

Derian, Patricia M 26 

Hesburgh, Theodore M 5 

Holbrooke, Richard 12 

McHenry, Donald F 49 

Newsom, David D 7 

Nimetz, Matthew 20 

Owen, Roberts B 26 

Rosen, Howard T 52 

Saunders, Harold H 46 

Seignious, George M II 54 

Shulman, Marshall D 17 

Vaky, Viron P 58 

Vance, Secretary 37 

Young, Jean 56 









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The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2035 







MAR 3 1900 



fit un-e^^-C^^PAin^ 



February 1980 





•ff 



Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 80 / Number 2035 / February 1980 



Cover: 

Great Seal of the United States. 



The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 



CYRUS R. VANCE 

Secretary of State 

HODDING CARTER III 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL 
Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA ADAMS 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31, 1981. 



NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
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Single copy— $1.40 (domestic) $1.80 (foreign) 






CONTENTS 



SPECIAL (See Center Section) 

President Carter's State of the Union Address 

President Carter's State of the Union Message to the Congress 



The Secretary 

1 Security of the Western Alliance 

4 Interview on the "Today" Show 

Interview 

6 Deputy Secretary Christopher 

Interviewed on "Face the Na- 
tion" 



Africa 



10 



11 



12 



Negotiations on Southern 

Rhodesia (Richard M. Moose) 
Sanctions Against Southern 

Rhodesia (Memorandum for 

the Secretary of State) 
Southern Rhodesia Settlement 

(Department and White House 

Statements) 
Group Formed for Development 



Arms Control 

12 Delay Requested for SALT II 

Treaty (White House State- 
ment, Letter to Senator Byrd) 

Environment 

13 Wildlife Protection and the 

Habitat (William A. Hayne) 

Europe 



15 
24 
25 

25 
26 

29 



NATO Ministers Meet in Brus- 
sels (Secretaries Brown and 
Vance, Communique) 

Visit of British Prime Minister 
Thatcher (White House State- 
ment) 

U.S. -U.K. Atomic Energy 
Agreement (Message to the 
Congress, Memorandums for 
the Secretaries of Defense and 
Energy) 

16th Report on Cyprus (Message 
to the Congress) 

National Security and U.S.- 
Soviet Relations (Matthew 
Nimetz) 

Publications 



Foreign Aid 

29 Approaching Common Issues 
With Developing Countries 
(Thomas Ehrlich) 

General 

32 Perspective on the Nonaligned 
Movement After the Havana 
Conference (Charles William 
Maynes) 

Human Rights 

37 Missing and Disappeared Per- 
sons (Patricia M. Derian) 

Middle East 

40 World Court Rules on American 
Hostages in Iran (Benjamin 
R. Civiletti, Roberts B. Owen, 
Sir Humphrey Waldock, Text 
of Court Order) 

53 U.S. Seeks Sanctions Against 

Iran (President Carter) 

54 NATO Issues Declaration on 

Iran 
54 Iranian Diplomatic Personnel in 

U.S. (Department Statements) 
54 FMS Credits for Israel (White 

House Statement) 

54 Publications 

55 American Hostages in Iran 

(President Carter, Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale, White House 
and Department Statements) 

56 Iran Chronology, December 1979 



Military Affairs 

58 U.S. Defense Policy (President 
Carter) 

South Asia 

. 61 Review of U.S. Policy in the 
1980s (Howard B. Schaffer) 
65 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 

(Department Statement) 
65 Background on Afghanistan 

United Nations 

67 U.S. Asks Security Council to 

Impose Sanctions Against Iran 
(Secretary Vance, Donald F. 
McHenry, Texts of Resolu- 
tions, Voting Records) 

72 General Assembly Acts on 

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
(Donald F. McHenry, Texts of 
Resolutions, Voting Records) 

Treaties 

74 Current Actions 

Chronology 

77 December 1979 

Press Releases 

77 Department of State 

Publications 

78 GPO Sales 

Index 



00 BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS 

MOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE 




Profile 

People 

Population: 15.5 million (1979 est.). 
Density: 50 per sq. mi. 
Religion: Sunni Moslem. 
Literacy: 10%. 
Life Expectancy: 40 years. 

Geography 

Area: 260,000 sq. mi. (673,397 sq. km.), 

compares with the size of Texas. 
Capital: Kabul (pop. 603,969). 

Economy 

Agriculture: Products — wheat, cotton, fruit 
and nuts, karakul pelts, wool, mutton. 

Industry: Products — textiles, soap, furni- 
ture, shoes, carpets, fertilizer, cement. 

Natural Resources: Natural gas, oil, coal, 
copper, talc, barites, sulphur, lead, 
zinc, iron, salt, precious and semipre- 
cious stones. 



Trade: Exports— $340 million (1978): natural 
gas, fruit and nuts, karakul pelts, raw 
cotton, carpets, wool. Partners — 
U.S.S.R. (45%), U.S., U.K., India, 
Pakistan, Iran. Imports — $450 million 
(1978): capital goods, petroleum prod- 
ucts, textiles, foodstuffs. Partners — 
U.S.S.R. (45%), U.S., Japan, India, 
U.K., F.R.G. 

Economic Aid Received: Foreign aid was in 
the range of $200 million per year just 
before the April 1978 coup. This was 
two to three times the level of earlier in 
the decade. The leading donor has been 
the Soviet Union. Substantial aid has 
also been received traditionally from 
the U.S., the F.R.G., and multilateral 
agencies. During the Daoud period, 
large commitments were also received 
from Middle East oil states and China. 
More recently, much of the foreign aid 
has been suspended except for that re- 
ceived from the U.S.S.R. 

(For more details on Afghanistan's ge- 
ography, people, history, government, and 
economy, see p. 65.) 






THE SECRETARY 



Security of the Western Alliance 



Address before the Berlin Press 
Association in Berlin on December 10, 
1979 (delivered by George S. Vest, 
A ssista » t Secretary for Ex ropea » 
Affairs). 1 

I want to begin by expressing Secre- 
tary Vance's keen regret that the pres- 
sure of events makes it impossible for 
him to be here tonight. The continuing 
situation in Iran has required that he 
make some urgent changes in his travel 
plans — a fact which he regrets and 
which he and I hope you will under- 
stand. He has asked, therefore, that I 
convey to you his greetings and that I 
stress to you this point: that every 
word I speak tonight should be ac- 
cepted as his — and attributed to him. 

An invitation to address the Berlin 
Press Association is itself an honor. 
Some lines of Goethe go this way: "He 
only earns his freedom and existence 
who daily conquers them anew." 

Each day, the press corps of this 
city expresses anew the truth of those 
lines — by upholding the principles of a 
free and open press. You help us under- 
stand the profound changes taking 
place about us, and you help defend the 
right of citizens to participate in deci- 
sions which affect their lives and well- 
being. 

This gathering affords an opportu- 
nity also to express, once again, the 
admiration that millions of Americans 
feel for Berlin and its people — and the 
abiding commitment of our nation to 
this city. President Carter, who re- 
members with great warmth his visit to 
Berlin last year, has asked that his per- 
sonal greetings be conveyed to you, 
along with his assurance that the 
United States is steadfast in this 
commitment. 

For 35 years, Berlin has been a 
symbol for free people everywhere. In 
the postwar period of tension and con- 
frontation, Berlin became a stirring 
example of human determination to be 
free — to live under democratic institu- 
tions. It is this unyielding determina- 
tion which helped create the balance 
upon which Berlin's current stability is 
based. The clear demonstration that 
Berlin would not yield, that Berliners 
w ished to remain part of the Western 
world, made possible the Quadripartite 
Agreement. 

And in the years since the Quad- 
ripartite Agreement, Berlin has been 
an impressive symbol of the tangible 
fruits detente can yield. 



For the United States, the freedom 
of Berlin — and protection of the bene- 
fits made possible by the Quadripartite 
Agreement — are central foreign policy 
objectives. We will use every means at 
our disposal to guarantee the safety and 
the freedom of this city. 

Moreover, we are committed to 
further easing tensions in Berlin 
through the opportunities provided by 
the Quadripartite Agreement. Full 
realization of these opportunities will 
benefit both East and West. Strict ob- 
servance and full implementation of all 
aspects of the Quadripartite Agreement 
will make such progress possible. 

It is essential to maintain the deli- 
cate balance of interests which has de- 
veloped in and around the city. There 
should be no temptation to use Berlin 
as a point of pressure in reaction to de- 
velopments in other areas of East-West 
relations. 

There should be no questioning the 
important ties between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Western 
sectors of Berlin, to which the United 
States attaches particular importance. 

Perhaps most importantly, there 
should be no questioning of Four Power 
rights and responsibilities for Berlin as 
a whole. These remain the basis for the 
stable situation which has developed in 
this city. The United States is deter- 
mined to maintain Four Power rights 
and responsibilities for Berlin as a 
whole. We expect the agreement, and 
the practices and procedures which 
have arisen from it, to be strictly 
honored. 

There is yet another reason to wel- 
come this forum, for it affords us the 
opportunity to discuss an issue of vital 
concern to the people of Berlin and to 
us all — the security of our Western 
alliance. 

Berliners know, better than most, 
that true security — what John F. Ken- 
nedy called "the survival and success of 
liberty" — cannot be bought with arms 
alone. The security of the West de- 
pends ultimately upon the vitality and 
the appeal of free political systems, 
upon the health of our economies, upon 
the ability of the Western democracies 
to cooperate with one another. Our goal 
is not only to defend ourselves, it is to 
build and maintain a way of life worth 
defending. 



Nonetheless — as Berliners also 
know — it would be folly to neglect the 
military aspects of security. Indeed, 
one of the stern lessons of the past 
three decades is that we make detente 
possible through strength, not weak- 
ness. In a perfect world this would not 
be true; in the real world it is inescapa- 
ble. 

So let us focus tonight on the issue 
of military security — in both its defense 
and arms control aspects. 

The subject is especially timely 
now, for the NATO allies are reaching, 
at this moment, a number of 
decisions — decisions which will shape 
the security of Europe in the 1980s and 
deeply influence relations between East 
and West. Such decisions, as you know, 
will be the chief concern of the NATO 
ministers when they meet in Brussels 
later this week. 

One of these decisions involves a 
fundamental question which confronts 
NATO members and, indeed, all of the 
West. How should the alliance respond 
to the Soviet Union's unprecedented 
buildup of long-range theater nuclear 
forces targeted against Western 
Europe? 

Deterrence and Arms Control 

We will be answering that question in 
Brussels this week in a way which em- 
phasizes two essential points. 

• First, we stand ready to adjust 
force levels through concrete arms con- 
trol negotiations. Our hope is that such 
negotiations will limit force levels on 
both sides. The Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact nations should under- 
stand that we have a genuine commit- 
ment to seek mutual arms limitations in 
strategic, theater nuclear, and conven- 
tional arms. 

• NATO is determined, 
however — and this is the second essen- 
tial point — to maintain secure deter- 
rent forces across the entire nuclear 
and conventional spectrum. This the 
Soviets must also understand. 

This dual policy — a policy of main- 
taining deterrence and of pursuing 
arms control — will be at the heart of 
NATO's strategy in the 1980s, for it is 
self-evident to us that adequate de- 
fenses and arms control must go 
hand-in-hand. Arms control agreements 
hold out the hope of affording greater 
security than arms competition with its 
high costs and built-in dangers. But 






The Secretary 



only a strong defense, including pru- 
dent measures to modernize our forces, 
can remove any doubts about our 
resolve — doubts which themselves 
would make genuine arms limitations 
less likely. 

Let me explain how this dual policy 
will manifest itself in our decisions in 
the coming decade — decisions concern- 
ing strategic, theater nuclear, and con- 
ventional forces. 

The Balance of Strategic Forces 

Strategic nuclear parity between the 
United States and the Soviet Union is, 
and will remain, a central fact of inter- 
national security. Efforts by either side 
to resist this central fact, or to evade it, 
will inevitably threaten the world's sta- 
bility and security — for neither side 
will allow the other to attain superior- 
ity. 

Over the past decade, the Soviet 
Union has steadily increased its 
strategic capabilities. Without new in- 
vestments on our part in our strategic 
forces, this Soviet momentum could 
jeopardize a stable balance at the 
strategic level. So we are making those 
investments in each leg of our strategic 
triad. 

• We are developing advanced 
cruise missiles for our B-52 bombers. 

• We are now deploying the new 
Trident I missile in some existing sub- 
marines, and by 1981 we will be de- 
ploying the new Trident submarine. 

• And we are moving forward with 
the MX missile program to assure the 
survivability of our land-based strategic 
missiles. 

These improvements represent the 
most vigorous American strategic 
weapons program in more than a 
decade. 

Our purpose in these efforts is not 
only to maintain essential equivalence 
in strategic forces, it is also to maintain 
flexibility in our strategic nuclear op- 
tions. For, while we accept the idea 
that mutual vulnerability is a deterrent 
to war, we do not accept the notion that 
our options should be limited to mutual 
assured destruction. We must have in 
our strategic quiver more than the 
single arrow of Armageddon. 

It is both our policy and our prac- 
tice, therefore, to maintain a variety of 
strategic forces, capable of absorbing 
the heaviest blows possible and still re- 
taining the power to retaliate against 
the entire spectrum of military and 
economic targets. We refuse to lock 
ourselves into either of two doctrines: 



the doctrine of reliance on massive re- 
taliation alone or a doctrine which em- 
phasizes so-called limited nuclear ex- 
changes directed by each side against 
the other's strategic forces. 

There must be a deliberate uncer- 
tainty about precisely what our re- 
sponse to attack might be — for that 
very uncertainty strengthens deter- 
rence. Our doctrine of flexible re- 
sponse, and our wide range of strategic 
forces, preserve that uncertainty. 

We will maintain a secure strategic 
balance and a credible deterrent, at 
whatever level of effort is required. 
But we know that there can be no ulti- 
mate security in relentless escalations 
of strategic power. Both we and the 
Soviet Union have a compelling national 
interest in stabilizing the strategic 
competition and achieving balanced re- 
ductions through negotiation. 

The SALT process demonstrably 
serves these ends. And SALT provides 
a striking illustration of the dual ap- 
proach I have described — the mutual 
reinforcement of arms control and force 
modernization. For it is clear that au- 
thentic arms control progress would not 
be possible without our determination 
to maintain the balance in any 
environment — whether with arms con- 
trol or without it. But it is clear, as 
well, that in a nuclear age, true secu- 
rity will elude us unless we are equally 
determined in our diplomacy — in the 
search for dependable and balanced 
controls on nuclear arms. 

The SALT II Treaty is now before 
the U.S. Senate. It is my hope and be- 
lief that it will be ratified in the near 
future. Once that step is taken, the 
agreed goal of SALT III will be to 
achieve substantial reductions in nu- 
clear arsenals. 

Throughout this process we have 
benefited from consultations with our 
European allies. We have worked to as- 
sure that European security interests 
and options are fully protected. In the 
next phase, SALT III, those consulta- 
tions will be even more intense; the role 
of the allies in shaping our approach 
will be even more direct, as the talks 
take up issues of long-range theater, as 
well as strategic, forces. 

But the same central principles will 
guide us: a commitment to have what- 
ever arms we need to maintain the bal- 
ance while we press for progressively 
more stringent mutual limits through 
negotiations. 



Theater Nuclear Forces 

Maintaining stability and deterrence is 
important not only in the field of inter- 
continental strategic weapons but at 
the theater nuclear level as well. 

Indeed, the emergence of parity in 
these strategic systems focuses atten- 
tion on NATO's long-range theater nu- 
clear forces as a stone in the arch of 
deterrence. 

For many years, NATO's European 
allies have had the assurance that the 
threat posed to Western Europe by 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces is ulti- 
mately deterred by the intercontinental 
nuclear striking power of the United 
States. 

That assurance is undiminished. 
Our strategic nuclear forces would be 
used if necessary for Europe's defense. 
The vital interests of the United States 
are so engaged in Europe, our commit- 
ments so deep, and our ties so strong 
that it could not be otherwise. 

But NATO's chief aim is to prevent 
aggression. We must, therefore, be 
sure that no problem arises with regard 
to Soviet perceptions, for it is on those 
perceptions that deterrence rests. 

It is crucial that the Soviets not be 
tempted to believe — however 
wrongly — that strategic parity between 
the superpowers means that Europe's 
defense could be separated from that of 
the United States or that the Soviet 
Union itself could remain immune from 
a military conflict in Europe. Thus de- 
terrence requires that NATO have a 
full range of capabilities to respond to 
any level of military challenge. It re- 
quires that there be no gap in this con- 
tinuum of forces; that every stone in 
the arch of deterrence be sound. 

Such a gap could emerge if we 
should fail to modernize NATO's long- 
range theater nuclear forces. For the 
Soviet Union, having achieved strategic 
parity, appears now to be driving to- 
ward nuclear preponderance in the 
European theater. 

We can see the evidence in the 
Soviet Union's vigorous program to 
modernize and expand its long-range 
theater nuclear forces. 

The most dramatic development in 
this regard — and the matter of greatest 
concern to us — is the rapid, ongoing 
Soviet deployment of the SS-20 mobile 
missile. 

Let us make no mistake: The SS-20 
is not an upgrading of an old system. It 
is an entirely new system — the first 
mobile, land-based, long-range missile 
system in the European theater. Each 
SS-20 launcher can reload and refire. 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Secretary 



Each missile can deliver not one but 
three nuclear warheads. The SS-20 can 
reach everywhere in Europe from bases 
deep within Soviet territory. 

Add to the SS-20 system the 
growing numbers of Backfire bombers 
deployed in the European theater and 
the conclusion is inescapable: This 
Soviet buildup goes beyond what is 
necessary to upgrade their armaments 
or to meet developments in NATO's 
forces. 

Yet Soviet spokesmen tell us that 
any moves by NATO to redress this 
situation could undermine detente and 
launch a new period of East-West ten- 
sions in Europe. They have insisted 
that we accept, in the name of detente, 
a trend toward manifest inequality. 

The West cannot be passive in this 
situation. From a political standpoint, 
to do so would constitute a curious ap- 
proach to detente. It would say to the 
world that Western security decisions 
are the business of both East and West 
but that those of the East are for Mos- 
cow to make alone. For the West to ac- 
quiesce in such a notion could tempt 
Moscow to risk other kinds of pressure 
on other issues. I need not remind this 
audience how gravely this would 
undermine the only sensible basis for 
cooperation between East and West — 
the principle of mutual security. 

So it is essential for the United 
States and the NATO allies to maintain 
deterrence across the whole military 
spectrum. 

This week in Brussels, therefore, 
the NATO Defense and Foreign Minis- 
ters will decide upon a set of proposals 
providing for theater nuclear moderni- 
zation and arms control. 

In this connection, let me say that 
the staunchness of the German Gov- 
ernment and Chancellor Schmidt and 
the resolution passed here in Berlin last 
week by the Social Democratic Party 
Congress are far-sighted contributions 
which will add to the unity and deter- 
mination of the alliance as we meet in 
Brussels. 

The pending modernization propos- 
als call for deployment by NATO in 
Western Europe of long-range theater 
nuclear weapons — a mix of land-based 
cruise and ballistic missiles. 

By replacing aging long-range 
theater nuclear systems with highly 
survivable and more capable systems, 
the deployments will reduce the chance 
that the Soviet Union might perceive, 
however incorrectly, a gap in NATO's 
spectrum of deterrence. And by im- 
proving NATO's deterrent posture, 
they will raise the most significant 
threshold— that between peace and 
war. 



This deployment will permit NATO 
to reduce its overall nuclear stockpile in 
Europe as part of the rationalization of 
its theater nuclear forces. And it will 
signal to the Soviet Union that its 
buildup promises no real military or 
political advantages — because NATO 
will respond to the challenge. 

At the same time, we firmly be- 
lieve that our security can be enhanced 
through genuine arms control; through 
concrete agreements to regulate force 
levels. Such agreements hold the 
promise of preventing unrestrained 
competition and providing greater sta- 
bility in the theater nuclear field. 

But arms limitation cannot be uni- 
lateral; it must be achieved through a 
process that is truly mutual. 

Because we are committed to 
seeking genuine arms control, our mod- 
ernization decisions will be coupled 
with an important arms limitation 
offer — an offer aimed at limiting long- 
range theater nuclear forces on both 
sides. NATO's proposal will call for 
verifiable limits that are significant and 
based upon the principle of equality. 

This arms control initiative will 
test the sincerity of the Soviets on lim- 
iting these systems. Since the first 
NATO systems will not be fielded until 
1983, there will be ample time to pur- 
sue serious arms control negotiations. 

There are those, I know, who 
argue that NATO should delay its de- 
ployment decision until such talks can 
be held. We must not delay, for two 
important reasons. 

First, we cannot know in advance 
that such talks will succeed. It would 
make little sense for the allies to fall 
farther and farther behind in the mere 
hope that the talks might succeed. And 
given the present momentum of Soviet 
efforts, any delay in NATO moderniza- 
tion increases an already troubling 
disparity. 

Second, the West must demon- 
strate its seriousness about moderniza- 
tion or the Soviets will have no visible 
incentive to negotiate reductions in 
forces. 

So our position is clear: The United 
States and the NATO allies' will strive 
to reduce forces through negotiations. 
But we will do all that is necessary to 
maintain a credible deterrent across the 
entire spectrum of nuclear and conven- 
tional forces. 

We cannot, however, accept unilat- 
eral restraint by NATO as a prereq- 
uisite to negotiations, and we will not. 
The restraint must come from both 
sides. 



The Balance of Conventional Forces 

The policy I have described — a policy of 
maintaining deterrence by force im- 
provements where necessary and by 
arms control where possible — is also 
our strategy in the field of conventional 
forces. 

Because improvements in Soviet 
conventional forces continue and be- 
cause conventional forces are central to 
the alliance's deterrent, it is essential 
that the allies hold to their comprehen- 
sive modernization program. NATO's 
Long-Term Defense Program will as- 
sure us a modern, better integrated, 
and more effective conventional force 
for the 1980s. The NATO goal of 3% 
real annual increases in member de- 
fense spending will provide the re- 
sources essential to finance these im- 
provements in conventional forces, 
which consume the largest share of de- 
fense budgets. 

But here again, we are determined 
both to maintain deterrence and to ne- 
glect no opportunity for progress in 
arms limitation. 

One significant opportunity for 
progress lies in the mutual and bal- 
anced force reduction (MBFR) talks in 
Vienna. Here our hope is to give practi- 
cal meaning to the concept of balance in 
the conventional field — just as the 
SALT process has sought to do in the 
strategic field. 

The goal of the MBFR talks— a 
goal now accepted by both sides — is to 
negotiate common collective ceilings at 
lower levels for NATO and Warsaw 
Pact forces in central Europe. But 
progress toward that goal has been 
hobbled by Eastern unwillingness to 
resolve the data issue. There is still a 
very large discrepancy between the 
figures provided by East and West re- 
garding the level of Eastern forces in 
the area. 

Let me reaffirm today that the 
Western side is eager to make progress 
toward agreement — progress which can 
come only if such basic issues as the 
data problem and verification methods 
can be resolved. 

The announcement by Chairman 
Brezhnev of a Soviet withdrawal of up 
to 20,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, and some 
other equipment is a positive step. 
However, the basic issues of the MBFR 
negotiations must still be resolved. 

Progress toward greater stability 
and mutual confidence in Europe can 
also come through the effort to imple- 
ment the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), signed in 1975 by 35 nations at 
Helsinki. 












February 1980 






The Secretary 



The Final Act is an historic docu- 
ment, for it transcends normal state- 
to-state relations to deal with concrete 
problems that have divided East and 
West. Compliance with its obligations 
would enrich the lives of people and 
east' the tensions between East and 
West. 

The Final Act offers a potential 
framework for reducing' military ten- 
sions in Europe and building greater 
confidence with respect to military 
activities. 

There have been a number of 
suggestions that this objective could be 
advanced through a meeting of the 
CSCE states to deal with security is- 
sues. The Government of France has 
put forward a useful proposal in this 
regard. 

Clearly such a meeting would only 
make sense, however, as part of a bal- 
anced and healthy CSCE process. Thus 
it is important, first, to conclude suc- 
cessfully the review in Madrid. As we 
approach that meeting, the United 
States will keep in mind, above all, the 
importance of implementing all the pro- 
visions of the Final Act, not just the se- 
curity provisions. We are particularly 
concerned about the provisions dealing 
with humanitarian issues that directly 
affect the daily lives of our citizens and 
those elsewhere in Europe. 

We will work to insure that the dis- 
cussions in Madrid take place in a con- 
structive atmosphere, free of polemics. 
But we will not avoid providing an hon- 
est assessment of problems simply to 
project a positive image. 

Conclusion 

The realities of military security I have 
discussed, and the opportunities for 
progress in arms limitation, argue for a 
special attitude on the part of the allies 
as we face the 1980s — an attitude I 
would describe as sober optimism. 

We must be sobered by the pros- 
pect that deep and fundamental differ- 
ences will persist between East and 
West — differences rooted in geog- 
raphy, in history, and in the assump- 
tions underlying our political systems. 
Neither our differences nor our 
weapons systems will be dismantled 
overnight. So we would do well to keep 
ourselves free of illusions based solely 
on hope. 

But we should never abandon hope. 
For in spite of our historic differences, 
East and West have come a long way in 
their relations. The range of contacts 
among the countries of Eastern and 
Western Europe has broadened; their 



relations have taken on an increasing- 
air of normality. 

Clearly, the future of East-West 
relations will be marked by deep differ- 
ences. But we should at the same time 
seek to broaden the areas of coopera- 
tion between us. 

Neither prospect should unsettle us 
in the West, for we bring to the future 
an impressive record of achievements 
and an equally impressive array of 
strengths. 

• For 31 years, the deterrent 
shield of the NATO alliance has worked 
successfully. 

• The economies of the Western al- 
liance are more than three times as 
productive as those of the Warsaw 
Pact. 

• Our societies are free and open, 
hospitable to innovation and creativity, 
unafraid of change. 

• Though we cannot dominate 
events in our world, our power is im- 
mense to influence those events and to 
shape them in ways that improve the 
prospects for humanity. 

If we preserve these strengths and 
build upon them, if in the future we find 
within ourselves the same qualities of 
statesmanship we have always found, 
we need not fear the 1980s or the dec- 
ades beyond. We will be strong — 
strong enough to protect ourselves and 
strong enough, if our adversaries are 
also willing, to cooperate in pursuit of 
peace. 

Indeed, just as we will do whatever 
necessary to maintain stability and de- 
terrence in Europe, so are we deeply 
committed to a relaxation of tensions 
between East and West. We stand 
ready to propose and consider new 
ideas, to follow unconventional paths, 
to respond to every sign of good faith 
from the other side, for we want to 
build a future in which the peace of 
Europe— East and West— is never 
again disturbed. ■ 



1 Press release 321. 



Interview on the 
"Today" Show 



Secretary Vance was interviewed 
in Washington, D.C., on the "Today" 
Show on January 11, 1980, by Richard 
Valeria)! i, NBC News diplomatic cor- 
respondent and Tom Brokaw, host of 
the "Today" Show.' 1 



Q. What other measures is the Admin- 
istration planning to take in reaction to 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? 

A. We are not planning, at this 
point, to take any other measures. The 
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union crossed a new threshold and it re- 
quired a very strong and a very resolute 
response. That response was given by 
President Carter in the speech which he 
made. 

We have two purposes in the actions 
which we have taken. First, to make it 
very clear to the Soviet Union that they 
will continue to pay a heavy price as long 
as their troops remain in Afghanistan. 
And secondly, to make sure that they 
understand that aggression will be faced 
up to whenever it occurs. It's too early to 
say at this point what the long-range ef- 
fect is going to be on the U.S.-Soviet re- 
lationship. That depends upon Moscow 
and actions which will be taken in 
Moscow. 

I do want to make a point, which I 
think is a very important point to make. 
And that is that the invasion of Afghanis- 
tan underscores the importance of pursu- 
ing the policies which we have been em- 
barked upon. What are those policies? 
Let me outline them for you very briefly. 

• Continuing to strengthen America 
— we have been in the process of doing 
that during the past 3 years through a 
wide variety of steps in the strategic 
fields and the field of theater nuclear 
weapons and in the field of conventional 
weapons as well. That will continue. 

• Secondly, we will continue to play 
an active diplomatic role throughout the 
world, taking the kind of actions such as 
we have taken in the past to help pre- 
serve the peace in the Middle East and in 
southern Africa. 

• We will also continue to play an ac- 
tive role in the Third World, dealing with 
Third World problems on Third World 
basis, and not trying to impose solutions 
from the outside, from external forces. 

• In addition to that, we will con- 
tinue to pursue an active policy in terms 
of democratization and the support and 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Secretary 



protection of human rights throughout 
the world, and will continue to pursue our 
policy of seeking mutual and balanced 
arms control progress wherever neces- 
sary. 

Q. Getting back to Afghanistan, 
would the United States consider help- 
ing the Afghan insurgents? 

A. The question of what happens in- 
ternally is a question I'd prefer not to get 
into. 

Q. As you know, the Administra- 
tion has drawn considerable criticism 
over some of the measures it's taken: 
the withholding of the sale of grain and 
advanced technology to the Soviet Un- 
ion. And the question is, why should 
the American farmer, why should the 
American businessman pay the price 
that you're talking about? 

A. I think it's very important, as I 
indicated earlier, that we take firm, clear, 
and resolute action. And this required 
steps across the board. We took not only 
action in the field of cutting back on the 
grain shipments in a very substantial way 
but also steps in denying to the Soviet 
Union high technology. And another 
major area was cutting back on the fish 
allocations so that it would be no longer 
any fish allocations to the Soviet Union in 
the future. 

These kinds of strong steps were 
necessary. And all of us are going to have 
to share in the sacrifices that are neces- 
sary to make this demonstrated stand to 
reflect the view which we hold about the 
importance of the principles which are 
involved here. 

Q. How long will these measures 
remain in effect? And I ask that in light 
of what happened with the Soviet inva- 
sion of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslo- 
vakia in 1968. Six months, a year 
later, we were back doing business as 
usual. 

A. They will remain in effect as long 
as is necessary. And I believe it will be a 
protracted period. That may not be the 
case. That would be fortunate if that 
were the case. But I do not believe that is 
the case. We must assume it will be for a 
protracted period. 

You're absolutely right. When you 
look back at what took place at the time 
of the Hungarian invasion, that was 
soon forgotten in a period of weeks. 
The same thing was true in the case of 
Czechoslovakia. The Soviets must un- 
derstand that this will not be a passing 
thing, that aggression will not be re- 
warded. 



Q. What about the economic re- 
prisals that we've taken thus far? 
Aren't they largely symbolic? There's a 
wide body of opinion that they really 
will have no effect on the Russian qual- 
ity of life or certainly on the presence 
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, that 
they were done primarily to make us 
feel better and to send up some kind of 
a signal; but it's really no more than a 
signal. 

A. No, I would respectfully disagree 
very strongly with you. The steps taken 
insofar as grain are concerned are going 
to have, in our judgment, a major impact 
on the livestock program in the Soviet 
Union. The denial of grain to them is 
going to require a sharp cutback in live- 
stock production. This is a very impor- 
tant program to the Soviets, and it's had 
the strong backing of Mr. Brezhnev. The 
denial of high technology is something 
which is also of great importance and has 
been for many years. Therefore, I think 
that that will have a substantial impact. 
The cutting back in the fish allocations is 
of lesser importance but, again, an im- 
portant step. 

Q. What about the Olympic 
games? Vice President Mondale is now 
suggesting that they be moved to 
Canada. Is that the official Administra- 
tion policy? 

A. The official policy was stated by 
the President at the time that he made 
his speech. At that time he said that we 
prefer the games would go forward, but 
that we would have to watch and see 
what happens, and he would make his de- 
cision in the future, after seeing how the 
situation develops in terms of what the 
Soviets would now do. 

Q. — take the Olympic Games out 
of Moscow is something that would 
probably really hurt the Russians. Is 
there much sympathy for that among 
our allies, other Western countries, 
Third World countries? 

A. It's mixed. 

Q. Is that something you're going 
to push? 

A. We are going to watch and see 
what happens. It remains a possibility 
which may be exercised. 

Q. Let me ask you about Iran now. 
Do you expect the Soviet Union to veto 
the Security Council resolution against 
sanctions? 

A. I don't know. It remains a real 
possibility. As you know, we'll probably 
vote on the sanctions issue either tonight 



at the United Nations or tomorrow morn- 
ing. I believe that the vote will be a posi- 
tive vote, but the Soviet Union may veto. 

Q. What will you do if there's a 
veto? 

A. We will go ahead and take action 
as if the sanctions had indeed been put 
into effect. 

Q. Would you consider a naval 
blockade to back it up? 

A. I do not rule it out. 

Q. What if the Soviets begin to 
move out of Afghanistan and toward 
the warm-water ports of the Persian 
Gulf, as a lot of people are speculating 
that they may. Does that mean that we 
have to begin to move troops to that 
area? 

A. I do not want to speculate on 
events which are not facing us at this 
time. We'll deal with them when we have 
to cross that bridge. ■ 

'Press release 10 of Jan. 15, 1980. 






February 1980 



INTERVIEW 



Deputy Secretary Christopher 
Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 



Deputy Secretory of State Warren 
Christopher teas interviewed on CBS's 
"Face the Nation" on January 6, 1980, 
by George Herman, CBS News (mod- 
erator); Marriii Kalb, CBS News; and 
Henry Trewhitt, Baltimore Sun. 

Q. I think the question that almost 
every American is asking himself or 
herself today, reading the headlines 
about Soviet denunciations of President 
Carter and American sanctions, if you 
like, against the Soviet Union, is are we 
now embarking on a second cold war? 

A. I don't think it is very helpful to 
use terms like that. We are in a period of 
making a strong response to what we re- 
gard as an extraordinary event. You have 
to consider the degree of the aggression 
of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan. 
They go in with 50,000 troops, they are 
involved in wiping out the head of the 
country, they install a puppet regime, 
they are bearing down on the Moslem 
minority. This is the kind of an event that 
calls for the strong response that Presi- 
dent Carter has made. 

We will have to see in the future how 
U.S.-Soviet relations work out. I don't 
think it is time to pronounce the death of 
detente, but I think we need to deal with 
an important and serious reality for 
America. 

Q. In your first answer, you said 
we will have to wait and see in the fu- 
ture what our relations with the Soviet 
Union are going to be. That sort of 
brings to mind the idea that you feel it 
is a temporary situation — this crisis 
over Afghanistan. If we have this em- 
bargo on grain and all these other 
things afoot, what will it take on the 
Soviet Union's part to end it? What is 
the minimum Soviet action which will 
stop this threat of a second cold war? 

A. Let me respond to that by telling 
you what our goals are. We are deter- 
mined to show the Soviet Union that 
their aggression into Afghanistan is not 
without considerable cost to them. We are 
also determined to make it clear to them 
that any subsequent event of the same 
kind will be subject to very severe penal- 
ties. 

Now, if we can make those points, 
then the Soviet response will, I think, de- 
termine what our relationship will be 
with them in the future. 

Q. Isn't there some danger, how- 
ever, that if you simply withdraw these 



sanctions after the Soviet Union has 
consolidated its position in Afghanis- 
tan, that you will be seen in something 
of the ambivalent position you have in 
the past as with the combat brigade in 
Cuba, that sort of thing? 

A. We don't intend to set any time 
for withdrawing the sanctions. I think 
one of the lessons coming out of the 
Czechoslovakia crisis is that the response 
needs to be determined and of consider- 
able duration. When I was in Europe last 
week, I was struck by the number of offi- 
cials there who had gone through the 
Czech crisis and who regretted the fact 
that their response was of such short du- 
ration. I think we need to be determined 
and persistent here. 

Q. Could you — pointing out this 
West European possible allied response 
— could you point out for us what you 
expect, what you have worked out with 
the European allies? 

A. We are in the early stages of that. 
But there are a number of things we do 
expect. First, we expect our allies will 
not move in to supply the grain that we 
are denying to the Soviet Union. 

Q. That is Canada, Australia, 
Argentina. 

A. That is Canada, Australia, and 
any of the other European countries 
which may have some grain stocks which 
could be substituted for ours. 

Second, I think we expect them to 
terminate their aid programs for Af- 
ghanistan. It is one thing to aid a 
nonaligned country; it is quite another 
thing to aid a puppet regime of the Soviet 
Union. 

We expect them to take some action 
with respect to their diplomatic repre- 
sentation. We also expect them to take 
actions which are somewhat parallel to 
ours in the economic field. Every country 
will have to do what it can do best. For 
example, I would expect some of the 
countries there to deny export credits 
that they have been giving in the past. 

Now we are in the early stages of 
working through this kind of a response. 
The United States took a long step when 
President Carter announced his program 
on last Friday; the NATO group will be 
meeting this week to consider what ac- 
tions they will take in response. In my 
meetings with our NATO allies, I am sure 
that they are as concerned about this ac- 
tion of the Soviet Union as we are, and I 



expect their response to be determined 
and firm. 

Q. What about the French? There 
have been reports that the French 
really don't see it quite the same way 
that the United States does. 

A. I will have to see it as that devel- 
ops. In the comparable situation in Iran, 
France has been very supportive of the 
United States, and I didn't see any dif- 
ference in talking with my French col- 
league as to his analysis of the gravity of 
the Soviet step. Everyone recognizes 
that it is a new departure in Soviet policy. 

Q. The American position regard- 
ing the Olympic games is unclear to 
me. Now I see the Saudis have with- 
drawn from the games next summer. 
What is the United States really rec- 
ommending in that regard? Are you 
considering withdrawing support of the 
games, recommending voluntary non- 
participation by Americans? What is 
the American position? 

A. First let me comment on the 
Saudi reaction which I think is very in- 
teresting here. We have a leading Moslem 
country feeling so strongly about the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that they 
are pulling out of the Olympic games. 

Our position is the one stated by 
President Carter on Friday night. We 
would much prefer to be able to go to the 
Olympic games, but the aggressive be- 
havior of the Soviet Union puts at some 
risk both the athletes and the fact that 
individuals will be going to the Soviet 
Union. So we have not reached a decision 
on that subject. It is under review and 
will continue to be. 

Q. On the question of SALT, which 
is of interest to a lot of people, the Ad- 
ministration tried so hard to complete 
the process of negotiating SALT. You 
went to the Congress, held up in the 
Senate Afghanistan, and suddenly you 
are pulling back and shelving it for the 
time being. At the same time, it is made 
very clear that we are going to abide by 
the terms of the treaty as it was negoti- 
ated and it seems why the ratification 
process, in a sense? But why stick with 
the terms? 

A. Under international law, a coun- 
try is obligated to stick to the terms of a 
treaty that has been negotiated and 
which is in the process of ratification. We 
intend to do that for our part. But we 
also intend to keep our eye on the Soviet 
Union, and if we find some deviation 
from the terms of SALT II on their part, 
then, of course, we will be in quite a dif- 
ferent position ourselves. 



Department of State Bulletin 






Interview 



Q. Listening to your answers ear- 
lier to what our intentions were on this 
Soviet-Afghanistan incursion or inva- 
sion, you said we wanted to show that 
such an action was not without cost to 
them, that it would incur very severe 
penalties. 

It sounds — now correct me if I am 
not getting the diplomatic language 
exactly right — it sounds as though what 
this means is you do not expect our ac- 
tions to roll back the Soviet action, you 
just are trying to say that any future 
actions of this kind will be expensive. 

A. No. We hope both. 

Q. Realistically? 

A. We hope both. We hope that they 
will roll back their actions in Afghanistan, 
and we hope to make the point that any 
consequent actions of that same kind will 
incur very heavy penalties. 

Q. You also said — I just am trying 
to clear up a few loose ends on this very 
opening point, I asked about the cold 
war. You said it is too early to call it 
that, yet you quoted various diplomats 
who regretted our response to the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was 
so brief, and it sounds to me a little bit 
as though you are hinting that our 
reaction at this time, or displeasure, 
should be longer. 

A. I would not think our reaction 
will be a brief one this time. I don't ex- 
pect to go back to business as usual with 
the Soviet Union for some time to come. 
We have taken severe actions in this 
country. It will result in a loss to the 
Soviet Union of 17 million tons of grain 
this year, 360,000 tons offish, a good deal 
of high technology. Those are strong ac- 
tions. We intend to carry them out for 
long enough so that the Soviet Union in- 
curs some cost for this really quite un- 
precedented action that they have taken 
in moving into Afghanistan. 

Q. I wonder if I could get into this 
area. Did you have intelligence before 
the Russians moved in that they would 
do such a thing? 

A. We knew that there was a buildup 
across the border of Soviet troops. And 
we have been warning, backgrounding, 
talking about this prospect for some time. 
But until they flew in the 250 planes in a 
30-hour period, of course, we didn't know 
that they were going to do that. Indeed, 
there had been some signs that they were 
going to shore up the Amin regime, but 
when they flew in the 250 planes, when 
they went across the border with two 
divisions, then, of course, we had an en- 
tirely new situation on our hands. 



Q. What I am trying to get at 
really — that suggests surprise by the 
dimension of the Soviet action, the 
boldness of it. What about our intelli- 
gence? There has been a problem with 
that in the past, expressed by the Presi- 
dent himself concerning Iran, and I am 
wondering if the same problem is not 
manifest here. In talking to your col- 
leagues, I find that they were taken 
quite by surprise by the boldness of this 
Soviet action. Isn't that in itself worse? 

A. I think we ought to recognize 
that this is the first time since World War 
II that the Soviet Union has used its 
troops outside the Warsaw bloc. Now the 
very audacity of that move is one that 
caused us to be taken aback. We didn't 
think the Soviet Union would take such a 
great risk, and, having taken it, I think 
we are determined to respond in a way 
that is commensurate with the risk. 

Q. That leads directly to the ques- 
tion of why they were willing to take 
that risk. Do you think they felt that 
the United States had become, in order 
to borrow a phrase from the past, "a 
pitiful, helpless giant" and simply 
would not react in a substantive way? 

A. It is very hard to speculate about 
Soviet intentions. I do not think we are a 
weak or pitiful giant in any respect. As a 
matter of fact, I think our country's mili- 
tary posture is a good deal stronger than 
it was when we came into office 3 years 
ago with the strengthening of NATO, 
with the cruise missile, and the other de- 
fense steps that we have taken. 

There are a number of reasons why 
the Soviet Union might have done what 
they did. They might be in Afghanistan 
for a specific reason, or there might be 
reasons that extend beyond. 

Q. Which is it? 

A. I don't think anybody knows at 
the present time, but I think the United 
States has to be ready for either one of 
the alternatives. 

Q- — put it the other day in terms 
of the steppingstone. He said the Af- 
ghan action was a steppingstone toward 
some broader strategic aim. 

A. I think we believe it could be a 
steppingstone to some broader aim, per- 
haps to their historic interest in a warm 
water port, perhaps to their interest in 
oil. 

Q. Do you see this as an effort by 
perhaps a new group within the Krem- 
lin, a new hard faction? There are some 
of your intelligence people who talk 



about the rise once again of Mikhail 
Suslov to greater prominence in the 
Politburo. Is this possible to explain 
what the Russians have done? 

A. I wouldn't want to get into fac- 
tions. This was an action taken by the 
Soviet Government. They have the re- 
sponsibility for it. I wouldn't want to get 
into a good-guys, bad-guys situation 
within the Soviet Government. They are 
responsible as a government. 

Q. That leads in turn again to the 
question about their objectives in 
Pakistan, which is a neighbor that 
clearly feels threatened. How far is the 
United States prepared to go in setting 
aside its concern over the development 
of nuclear weapons in Pakistan in 
order to help the Pakistanis rearm? 

A. We retain our concern over the 
development of nuclear weapons there. 
Our nuclear nonproliferation policy is one 
of our important policies. On the other 
hand, it is only one of the tenets of our 
foreign policy. This is an exceptional situ- 
ation and we will be prepared to help the 
[Pakistanis] in this exceptional situation if 
they do desire. 

Q. Do they so desire? Are you in 
communication with them on this? 

A. We are in communication with 
them and I think the next week or two 
will give us an opportunity to indicate 
how we and to what extent we will be 
helpful to the [Pakistanis]. 

Q. Would you have to balance aid 
to Pakistan with some kind of aid to 
India, or some help, something to keep 
from tilting as the previous Administra- 
tion once said? 

A. We are determined to maintain 
relations with India, but India ought to 
see the action of the Soviet Union as a 
threat to India as well as the other coun- 
tries in the region. After all, India — 

Q. Do you see signs that they do? 

A. I see signs that some elements of 
the government do. They are in the pro- 
cess of an election campaign. I think we 
will have a fuller response for them after 
the campaign. 

Q. I would like to ask you about 
China and Defense Secretary Brown's 
visit there. There has been speculation 
that the United States, while not in any 
sense choosing at this point to establish 
a military relationship with the 
People's Republic of China, is not be- 
yond considering with Peking the pos- 
sibility of stationing radar facilities in 






r ebruarv 1980 



Interview 



China to replace, for example, some of 
those lost in Iran. Is there that kind of 
halfway-house military relationship 
possible with the Chinese? 

A. Let me say in general terms that 
we don't intend to let the misconduct of 
the Soviet Union keep us from developing 
a normal relationship with the People's 
Republic of China. 

On the other hand, we have said, and 
we continue to maintain, that we do not 
intend to furnish arms or weapons to the 
People's Republic of China. Now Secre- 
tary Brown is there. He will be having 
conversations with respect to many sub- 
jects, including the new Afghan invasion 
by the Soviet Union, and I think that out 
of that will come an important indication 
to us as to how we can cooperate in that 
area. But as I say, we will not be in a 
military relationship of supplying arms or 
weapons to the People's Republic. 

Q. But short of the supply of 
American weapons to China, will the 
United States try to explore with the 
Chinese the possibility of using Chinese 
territory for the basing of radar-type 
facilities? 

A. On that subject I really wouldn't 
have any comment except to say that we 
will be discussing with them, for exam- 
ple, their possible aid to other countries 
in the region which might be threatened 
by the Soviet behavior. 

Q. In Pakistan, for example? 

A. If Pakistan desired, we would be 
talking to a number of countries around 
the world about aiding Pakistan. So I 
would put Pakistan in that group. 

Q. Let me direct your attention to 
Afghanistan's other boundary. The im- 
pact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanis- 
tan has been sort of peculiar in Iran. 
On the one hand you have the Moslems 
from Afghanistan invading the Soviet 
Embassy in Tehran; on the other hand 
you have the militants who hold the 50 
Americans demanding three more 
Americans. Do you have any kind of 
evaluation as to what the adventure in 
Afghanistan is going to do to the hold- 
ing of American hostages in Tehran? 

A. If the people in Iran are thinking 
clearly about the matter, I would think 
that it would cause them to want to end 
their controversy with the United States 
and the obscene holding of our hostages 
and direct their attention to the greater 
threat which comes from Soviet domina- 
tion of Afghanistan. 

Q. But what have you seen or 
sensed? 



A. I have some reason to think that 
a number of the leaders of that country 
sense the importance of ending the prob- 
lem with the United States. How high 
that goes in that government is, of 
course, a puzzle. 

Q, But there is no guarantee at all 
that reasonable thought has dominated 
the people who hold the hostages in the 
Embassy. Do you see any evidence 
whatever that the transition in the gov- 
ernment, if that is what is happening, 
appreciation of strategic reality or 
whatever, is having an influence on the 
willingness of the people who are in 
that Embassy to release the hostages? 

A. We haven't seen it yet but I have 
to believe that the people of that country 
are concerned about their own welfare, 
concerned about their own future, and 
that the combination of actions that the 
United States is taking— the seeking of 
sanctions, the condemnation of the world 
community, and now the threat from 
Afghanistan — that combination of events 
may bring the people of Iran, including 
the terrorists who hold our hostages, 
bring them to their senses. 

Q. Is it your sense that if the 
Ayatollah Khomeini should give a di- 
rect order through whatever gradual 
process for the people in the Embassy 
to release those hostages, that they 
would do it? 

A. It is my judgment that the 
Ayatollah could give such an order and 
have it carried out. 

Q. You seemed to be suggesting a 
moment ago when you said there might 
be some members of the government 
who would like to end all of this and 
get on with better relationships with 
the United States, that these were 
lower ranking members. What about 
Khomeini who seems to have the 
power? Is there anything from all of 
your diplomatic activities and ventures 
over the last 9 or 10 weeks to suggest 
that he has changed his basic approach 
to this crisis? 

A. No, I don't have any indication of 
a change in his mind. I hope one will be 
forthcoming. 

Q. What help, what support can 
the American people realistically hope 
for from the United Nations in bringing 
pressure to bear on the Soviet Union 
over Afghanistan? 

A. Well I think the fact that 50 coun- 
tries have gone to the United Nations 
from all over the world seeking a resolu- 
tion in the Security Council of condemna- 
tion against the Soviet Union is an impor- 



tant fact in itself. This is outcrying of in- 
ternational opinion against this invasion 
that has its own importance. Beyond 
that, I think you can look forward per- 
haps to a debate in other organs of the 
United Nations which once again could 
focus world opinion, add to the costs that 
the Soviet Union is paying for their ac- 
tions. 

Q. During this and other Adminis- 
trations, I think specifically of some 
of the statements by Ambassador 
Moynihan as he was then, there was a 
strong feeling in this country that the 
independent nations, the Third World, 
tended more to support the Soviet 
Union than the United States. Does this 
sudden end of, at least temporary end, 
of detente begin to push the balance in 
the United Nations a little more in our 
favor? 

A. Well there have been a number of 
interesting indications along those lines. 
You know it is important to remember 
that on Iran, the vote in the Security 
Council was 15 to nothing. The vote at 
the International Court of Justice in 
favor of the United States was 15 to noth- 
ing. The Third World countries on these 
two issues — both Iran and Afghanistan 
— are lining up behind the United States 
policy, and I think that is a very impor- 
tant change. 

Q. What about the question of 
America being able to use not bases but 
military facilities in the Persian Gulf 
region? We have read stories about the 
possibility of Oman providing facilities, 
Kenya, Somalia. Could you tell us 
something about that? 

A. Let me back up just a minute on 
that and say President Carter's speech on 
Friday night was primarily directed to 
bilateral steps that might be taken be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Now in addition to that, the 
United States is in the process of impor- 
tant steps to improve its military posture 
in the Middle East. A carrier task force, 
to be operating in the Indian Ocean, 
building up our facilities at Diego Garcia, 
and in that connection we will be seeking 
additional facilities in those three coun- 
tries to service the fleet and to give us a 
greater capacity, additional facilities, both 
ports and airfields. 

Q. Could I pursue that, because 
perhaps even more sensitive than the 
three countries Mr. Kalb mentioned 
would be the possibilities of facilities in 
Egypt and Israel, both of which would 
be receptive to that kind of arrang- 
ment. What is the U.S. attitude on 
that? 



Department of 









AFRICA 



A. They are under consideration as 
well, along with the others. 

Q. There is a movement in this 
country now to end that old traditional 
thing — bipartisan foreign policy. Will 
the beginning of Republican and other 
Democratic attacks on this Administra- 
tion have any impact on our ability to 
conduct our foreign policy and to make 
it stick? 

A. I think the people of the United 
States are unified. Some of the politicians 
may not be at the moment. I thought it 
was rather strange and ironic last night 
that those who call out most loudly for a 
stronger U.S. position against the Soviet 
Union were criticizing the single 
strongest step we took — the grain em- 
bargo. 

I might say in this connection that 
the Administration will be announcing 
tomorrow a major new gasohol program, 
one that will use the equivalent of 5 mil- 
lion tons of corn during the next year. 
This will lead, during 1980, to the produc- 
tion of over 500 million gallons of gasohol. 
Indeed, by the end of 1980 over 10% of a 
particular kind of gasoline will have al- 
cohol added to it. 

[Later in the week, the Administra- 
tion announced a gasohol program which 
will seek to create, during 1981, the ca- 
pacity to use 5 million tons of biomass 
products, most of which will be corn, in 
the production of more than 500 million 
gallons of ethanol. This would replace 
about 10% of the anticipated U.S. demand 
for unleaded gasoline.] 

This is the kind of thing that we can 
do to compensate for the grain and corn 
that is not being sold to the Soviet Union. 
I think it is an important development. I 
think our farmers would rather be grow- 
ing grain to solve our energy problems 
than they would for the Soviet Union's 
herds. 

Q. So you don't think that the end 
of bipartisanship hurts your ability to 
conduct foreign policy? 

A. I don't think there is an end to 
bipartisanship among the people. There 
may be among some of the political lead- 
ers. ■ 



Negotiations on Southern Rhodesia 



by Richard M. Moose 

Statements before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on 
November 27, 1979, and the Subcom- 
mittees on Africa and International 
Organization Affairs of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on 
December 5. 1 



NOV. 27, 1979 

I appreciate the opportunity to meet 
with you today. I want to discuss the 
President's determination on sanctions 
and the relationship of that decision to 
the negotiations on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
now underway at Lancaster House in 
London. 

As you are aware, the President 
informed the Congress on November 14 
of his determination that it is in the na- 
tional interest to continue sanctions 
against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at this 
time. In the justification which accom- 
panied his determination, he noted that 
the negotiations presently being con- 
ducted by the United Kingdom have not 
yet concluded. 

If the United States lifts sanctions 
now, it could jeopardize the chance for 
a successful conclusion to those negotia- 
tions. A termination of sanctions at this 
stage could lead all the parties to 
harden their positions on the remaining 
issues. 

The President made it clear that 
we are prepared to lift sanctions when a 
British Governor assumes authority in 
Salisbury and a process leading to im- 
partial elections has begun. With this 
objective in mind, he instructed the 
Secretary of State to report to him im- 
mediately upon the conclusion of the 
conference and to recommend action by 
the United States with respect to the 
termination of sanctions. 

The London conference started 
with a sober appreciation that this 
could be the last chance to achieve a 
peaceful settlement for Rhodesia. Im- 
portant obstacles subsequently have 
been overcome. It is remarkable that so 
much has been accomplished in bridging 
the differences between the parties to 
the conflict. 

Agreement has been reached on 
two of the fundamental goals we have 
pursued for so long — a democratic con- 



stitution providing for majority rule 
and protection of minority rights and an 
impartial transition government which 
would manage elections open to all 
parties. 

The constitution to which the par- 
ties have now agreed corrects the in- 
adequacies of the previous constitution. 
While the white minority will not be 
able to exert disproportionate influ- 
ence, the rights of every individual — 
white as well as black — would be pro- 
tected. This would include property 
rights. And the minority would be 
guaranteed a special 20% representa- 
tion in Parliament for the first 7 years 
of independence. 

The parties have also agreed to 
transition arrangements. They provide 
for a British Governor who will assume 
all legislative and executive authority 
and manage the election. The Governor 
would be assisted by senior British civil 
servants and police, who would thor- 
oughly supervise the day-to-day opera- 
tions of government, the elections 
process, and the maintenance of law 
and order by the existing civil police. 
Commonwealth observers would be in- 
vited to observe every aspect of the 
elections. All parties would be repre- 
sented on an Election Council, which 
would be concerned with the fair con- 
duct of elections. Political prisoners 
would be released, bans against politi- 
cal parties lifted, and all parties allowed 
to campaign freely. 

These are enormous achievements. 
It has been possible because of the 
statesmanship shown by the parties and 
the skill with which [British Foreign 
Secretary] Lord Carrington has con- 
ducted the negotiations. And it has 
been possible, as well, because we — the 
United States as well as the United 
Kingdom — did not choose sides in a 
tragic conflict. By maintaining our own 
impartiality among the parties, we have 
been able effectively to assist Britain in 
pressing for agreement to arrange- 
ments which are both workable and 
fair. 

The conference is now addressing 
the cease-fire issues, which form the 
third and last phase of the negotiations. 
The British tabled their elaborated 
cease-fire proposals on November 22. 
We believe the prospects are good that 
the British will be able to obtain 
agreement on a cease-fire very soon. 
For us to change our policy at this deli- 
cate moment would be unnecessary and 
unwise. 



Africa 



The British should have a chance to 
resolve the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian 
problem. It is not in our national inter- 
est to move before they do. Our most 
effective role is to reinforce the British 
effort to bring the talks to a successful 
conclusion. We have been doing pre- 
cisely that, and we shall continue to do 
so. 

While the negotiations continue, 
the British are maintaining most of 
their sanctions. They have stated these 
sanctions will remain in force until the 
British Governor arrives in Salisbury. 
No other country has terminated sanc- 
tions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 
Under these circumstances, there is no 
reason why the United States should 
stand alone in the international commu- 
nity. 

As we look to the future, we should 
bear in mind that a peaceful settlement 
will benefit not only the people of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia but neighboring 
countries as well. Because of the hos- 
tilities, Zambia and Mozambique have 
suffered, and important lines of trans- 
portation and communication have been 
disrupted. The surrounding countries 
have also had to cope with a steady in- 
flux of refugees which has strained 
their economies and their societies. The 
process leading to an independent and 
internationally recognized government 
in Zimbabwe will allow the recovery 
process to begin throughout the region. 

The Lancaster House conference is 
in its concluding moments. The goal we 
share is within sight. We urge the Con- 
gress not to take precipitous action by 
lifting sanctions now. 



DEC. 5, 1979 



Since the announcement of the Presi- 
dent's determination, there have been 
important developments at the Lancas- 
ter House conference. On November 
15, the Patriotic Front delegation 
agreed to the transition arrangements, 
which were the focus of the second 
stage of the conference. These ar- 
rangements provide for a British Gov- 
ernor who will assume all legislative 
and executive authority and manage 
the elections. In the same sense that 
the earlier agreement on constitutional 
proposals provided for majority rule, 
the transition proposals provide an im- 
partial framework for the holding of 
elections. These are extremely impor- 
tant and significant accomplishments. 
They are entirely consistent with our 
previous objectives when we sought to 
obtain a negotiated settlement to the 
Rhodesian problem. 



Subsequently and during the past 
2*/2 weeks, the conference has ad- 
dressed the cease-fire issues. This con- 
stitutes the last phase of the negotia- 
tions. The Salisbury delegation has 
agreed to the cease-fire proposals 
which were tabled by the British on 
November 16 and were amplified on 
November 22. Lord Carrington pro- 
vided a more detailed description of 
these proposals to the Patriotic Front 
on November 28 and asked for a posi- 
tive response to them so that technical 
discussions could be conducted to work 
out the final details for the implementa- 
tion of a cease-fire. 

As of the time of the preparation of 
this statement, the Patriotic Front has 
not replied favorably to Lord Car- 
rington's request. The Patriotic Front 
has advanced counterproposals on 
cease-fire arrangements, and discus- 
sions are continuing. 

Under these circumstances, the 
Administration continues to believe 
that this is not the moment to lift sanc- 
tions. The negotiations have not been 
concluded; the British are retaining 
most of their sanctions at this point; 
and the British Governor has not ar- 
rived in Salisbury and assumed author- 
ity. No other country has ended sanc- 
tions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. If 
we were to lift sanctions now, we would 
stand alone and isolated in the interna- 
tional community. 

On December 3, the Secretary of 
State informed the Senate Foreign Re- 
lations Committee that when the 
British Governor arrives in Salisbury to 
implement an agreed Lancaster House 
settlement and the electoral process 
begins, the President will take prompt 
action to lift sanctions. The Secretary 
said that this will be done no later than 
1 month after the Governor's arrival. 

The Secretary also took the posi- 
tion that if an agreed settlement is not 
reached at the conference, we will con- 
sult with the respective committees of 
the Senate and the House regarding the 
course of action which best serves the 
national interest. 

I would emphasize, however, that 
in view of the agreements which have 
been reached at Lancaster House, the 
prospects for a successful conclusion to 
the negotiations remain very good. We 
believe that the talks can be concluded 
quickly and the terms of the agree- 
ments can soon thereafter be im- 
plemented. If this is achieved, the Ad- 
ministration will move to terminate 
sanctions for there would be no reason 
to maintain sanctions under these 
conditions. 



Our principal objective in the im- 
mediate days ahead should be to lend 
full support to the British effort to 
bring the conference to a successful 
conclusion promptly. This has been our 
overriding purpose ever since the con- 
ference began, and I believe that we 
have been helpful to the negotiating 
process. We must never lose sight that 
the United Kingdom has primary re- 
sponsibility for Rhodesia and that they 
should have the opportunity to resolve 
this problem. After 15 years of failed 
negotiations, I do not believe this is too 
much to ask. 

The parties are now close to an 
agreement. When the record of the last 
3 months is reviewed, it is remarkable 
that so much has been accomplished. 
We must give great credit for this re- 
sult to the skill that Prime Minister 
Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Car- 
rington have shown during the negotia- 
tions. Until we know the final outcome 
at Lancaster House, however, we 
should not risk jeopardizing that proc- 
ess by lifting sanctions now. ■ 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committees 
and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Sanctions Against 
Southern Rhodesia 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE, 
NOV. 14, 1979 1 

Subject: Maintenance of Sanctions Against 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Under Section 408(b) 
of the Department of State Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981. 

Pursuant to Section 408(b) of the De- 
partment of State Authorization Act, Fis- 
cal Years 1980 and 1981 (93 Stat. 405), I 
hereby determine that it is in the national 
interest of the United States to continue 
sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at 
this time. 

You are requested, on my behalf, to 
report this determination promptly to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the Chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

You are further requested to report to 
me immediately upon the conclusion of the 
present Constitutional Conference on 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia being held in London, 
describing the conclusions of that confer- 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



Africa 



ence and your recommendations for action 
by the United States with respect to the 
termination of sanctions. 

This determination shall be published 
in the Federal Register. 

Jimmy Carter 

Justification for Presidential Determina- 
tion Under Section 408(b) of the Depart- 
ment of State Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1980 and 1981 Concerning Sanc- 
tions Against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 

Problem 

Section 408(b) of the Department of 
State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 
and 1981, requires that sanctions against 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia be terminated by 
November 15, 1979, unless the President 
determines that it would not be in the na- 
tional interest of the United States and so 
reports to the Congress. 

Justification 

Encouraging progress has been made 
in recent months toward a peaceful resolu- 
tion of the conflict in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; 
however, the negotiations presently being 
conducted by the United Kingdom with the 
parties have not yet been concluded, and 
differences still remain. A termination of 
sanctions at this stage could lead all the 
parties to harden their positions and would 
jeopardize the chances for a successful set- 
tlement for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 

The British Government has not yet 
concluded negotiations that would end the 
rebellion in Rhodesia. They have stated 
that this will occur when the British Gov- 
ernor arrives in Salisbury and assumes au- 
thority. At the present time, the great bulk 
of British sanctions remain in force and 
none of our major allies has taken action to 
terminate sanctions. 

The negotiations are now at a critical 
stage. We hope they will be rapidly and 
successfully concluded. While the talks 
continue, it would be premature for the 
United States to alter its position on sanc- 
tions. We would, however, be prepared to 
lift sanctions when a British Governor as- 
sumes authority in Salisbury and a process 
leading to impartial elections has begun. 
Our policy will continue to be that no party 
should have a veto over fair settlement 
proposals. 

This issue will be kept under continu- 
ous review and the President will promptly 
notify the Congress when conditions war- 
rant the lifting of sanctions. ■ 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979. 



Southern Rhodesia Settlement 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 6, 1979 ' 

Tfye U.S. Government welcomes the 
news of an agreement on cease-fire ar- 
rangements for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 
The historic accomplishments of the 
Lancaster House negotiations reflect 
great credit on all of the participants 
who have displayed a seriousness of 
purpose and a willingness to com- 
promise in the interest of ending the 
bloodshed. 

Although a few issues remain to be 
dealt with in detail, the United States 
is confident that a settlement is near 
and urges all the parties to conclude the 
historic task in which they are engaged. 
In doing so, the British Government 
and the parties have the full support of 
the American Government. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 12, 1979 2 

The United States welcomes and urges 
prompt acceptance of the now complete 
British proposals for a settlement in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Those parts of the 
proposals already agreed to by the par- 
ties provide for a democratic constitu- 
tion with protection of individual rights 
and elections for an independent gov- 
ernment in which all parties can par- 
ticipate freely. 

The final proposals for implementa- 
tion of the cease-fire certainly would 
appear to assure that voters could 
choose their government in peace, free 
from intimidation by any faction. 

We strongly urge the Patriotic 
Front to accept the cease-fire im- 
plementation proposals and join in the 
settlement. It would be tragic if this 
remarkable chance for peace were lost 
in last-minute efforts to gain military 
advantage. 

As the President has said, our pol- 
icy will continue to be that no party 
should have a veto over fair settlement 
proposals. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 15, 1979 3 

With the arrival of the British Gover- 
nor in Salisbury on December 12, the 
United Kingdom has assumed legal and 
constitutional authority in Rhodesia, 
and a process leading to impartial elec- 
tions and independence has begun. The 



British Government has taken this ac- 
tion on the basis of proposals developed 
by the parties at the Lancaster House 
conference. 

On the Governor's arrival, ordi- 
nances have come into effect which 
establish the powers of the Election 
Commissioner and make provision for 
the Election Council. All parties which 
agree to campaign peacefully will be 
able to do so freely. All parties which 
wish to participate in the elections have 
been invited to register. The British 
Government is taking the legislative ac- 
tion necessary to bring into force those 
parts of the independence constitution 
required for elections to be held. 

It has been heartening that the two 
delegations led by Bishop Muzorewa 
and Messrs. Nkomo and Mugabe have 
accepted the basic principles of all the 
proposals elaborated by the British 
delegation in the Lancaster House 
negotiations. The remaining issues re- 
late to some aspects of the implementa- 
tion of the cease-fire. On December 11, 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Car- 
rington presented detailed dease-fire 
proposals which we believe provide the 
assurances necessary for the Patriotic 
Front to have confidence in the condi- 
tions under which the elections will 
take place. 

Having studied all the British pro- 
posals presented at Lancaster House 
for the constitution, the transitional ar- 
rangements, and the cease-fire, it is our 
judgment that they are fair and make 
possible an impartial election leading to 
a just settlement of the Rhodesian 
conflict. 

In these circumstances, it seems 
clear that the aims and objectives of the 
U.N. sanctions as set forth in the rel- 
evant resolutions of the Security Coun- 
cil, have, in fact, been achieved. 

President Carter, in explaining his 
November 14 decision to maintain sanc- 
tions against Rhodesia, stated that he 
would be prepared to lift sanctions 
when a British Governor assumes au- 
thority in Salisbury and a process 
leading to impartial elections has 
begun. These conditions have now been 
met, and the President has ordered, 
effective midnight the 16th of De- 
cember, that U.S. sanctions against 
Rhodesia be lifted. 









February 1980 



11 



ARMS CONTROL 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 17, 1979 4 

Today, final agreement was reached at 
Lancaster House on a Rhodesian set- 
tlement. The world can celebrate a 
triumph of reason and an extraordinary 
diplomatic success. A long, destructive, 
and tragic conflict is ending. 

This settlement is a tribute to the 
parties concerned, who rose above bit- 
terness and suspicion to agree upon a 
formula for peace. It is a tribute to the 
United Kingdom, whose leaders took 
the issue directly in hand and applied a 
remarkable combination of wisdom, 
courage, persistence, and skill. The 
concerned African states played a vital 
role. 

Active American involvement in 
the search for a Rhodesian settlement 
began in the last Administration. In 
cooperation with the British we inten- 
sified that effort and, since last sum- 
mer, have given our full support to the 
British negotiations. 

The settlement which has been at- 
tained can lead to an enduring peace in 
Zimbabwe and promote tranquillity in 
the region. It is founded upon majority 
rule with protection of minority rights 
and reflects the interest of all of the 
parties. 

As the process leading to an inde- 
pendent Zimbabwe unfolds, it will be 
incumbent upon the international com- 
munity, and especially the surrounding 
states, to support and respect the elec- 
toral process and its outcome. 

For its part, the United States 
looks forward to the day when an inde- 
pendent Zimbabwe can be welcomed to 
the family of nations. ■ 



tiative, in order to work toward coordi- 
nation of resources for joint projects 
within the framework of a concerted ac- 
tion for development in Africa. They 
are prepared to consider widening the 
circle of donor countries to other mem- 
bers of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 

The six countries, aware of the fact 
that Africa has a great need for sub- 
stantial assistance from the interna- 
tional community, are resolved to take 
this necessity into account. They have 
more particularly in mind projects of a 
regional character related, for example, 
to the opening-up of land-locked re- 
gions, the development of agricultural 
resources, or the effects of problems 
such as drought or tropical diseases, 
since these action areas require efforts 
which are still only partially covered by 
the national or international programs. 

They deem it indispensable that 
this new action should be elaborated in 
close collaboration with the Africans 
concerned on the continental, regional, 
or national levels in such a way that 
projects which are selected for joint ac- 
tion conform to priorities set by the Af- 
ricans themselves. This means that the 
concerted action should harmonize with 
the existing international and national 
programs. 

The projects shall be identified and 
carried out according to appropriate 
procedures which will be worked out 
during periodic meetings of representa- 
tives of donor countries. A permanent 
liaison will be insured by means of a 
group of officials in Paris beginning 
January 1, 1980. ■ 

Unnumbered press release of Dec. 28, 1979. 



The President has asked that the 
delay continue while he and the Con- 
gress assess Soviet actions and inten- 
tions and devote their attention to 
legislative and other measures required 
to respond to the crisis created by the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 



LETTER TO SENATOR BYRD, 
JAN. 3, 1980 2 

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghani- 
stan, I request that you delay consideration 
of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor. 

The purpose of this request is not to 
withdraw the Treaty from consideration, 
but to defer the debate so that the Congress 
and I as President can assess Soviet actions 
and intentions, and devote our primary at- 
tention to the legislative and other measures 
required to respond to this crisis. 

As you know, I continue to share your 
view that the SALT II Treaty is in the na- 
tional security interest of the United States 
and the entire world, and that it should be 
taken up by the Senate as soon as these 
more urgent issues have been addressed. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter ■ 



1 Read to news correspondents by 
White House press secretary Jody Powell 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents of Jan. 7, 1980). 

2 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Jan. 7. 



1 Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Hodding Carter III. 

2 Read to news correspondents by act- 
ing Department spokesman Tom Reston. 

3 Made available to news corre- 
spondents by acting Department spokesman 
Tom Reston. 

4 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 24, 1979. 



Group Formed 
for Development 



For the purpose of strengthening their 
economic assistance effort in sub- 
Saharan Africa, representatives of Bel- 
gium, Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, the United King- 
dom, and the United States have met in 
Paris, on the French Government's ini- 



Delay Requested 
for SALT II Treaty 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JAN. 3, 1980 « 

After consultation with the Senate 
leadership, the President has asked 
Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to 
delay consideration of the SALT II 
Treaty on the Senate floor. 

While the President continues to 
believe that ratification of SALT II is 
in the national security interest of the 
United States, he has concluded that 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 
defiance of the U.N. Charter, has made 
consideration of the SALT II Treaty 
inappropriate at this time. 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 






ENVIRONMENT 



Wildlife 
Protection 

by William A. Hayne 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Resource Protection of the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public 
Works on November 7, 1979. Mr. 
Hayne is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Oceans and International En- 
vironmental and Scientific Affairs. 1 

These hearings are timely. They co- 
incide with an upsurge of activities 
involving international conservation is- 
sues and efforts by the Department of 
State to increase international wildlife 
protection, drawing on the considerable 
expertise of U.S. Government agencies, 
especially the Department of Interior. 
We are also helped by other Federal 
agencies such as the Council on En- 
vironmental Quality and the Smithso- 
nian, the private sector, and interna- 
tional organizations to define specific 
needs and develop domestic and inter- 
national activities to implement them. 
The Department of State is firmly 
committed to development of environ- 
mentally sound strategies and pro- 
grams. 

Until recently many nations, par- 
ticularly the less developed ones, re- 
garded environmental protection as a 
luxury of the rich. Now we see growing 
recognition that unless the natural re- 
source base is protected, future eco- 
nomic development is impossible. This 
translates into increased willingness to 
protect soil resources and tropical 
forests. While there is yet in our view 
some distance to go in recognizing the 
value of wildlife — apart from the ob- 
vious tourist attractions — the forests at 
least help preserve needed habitat. But 
on the whole, increasing populations 
engage in a never-ending quest for 
food, land, and raw materials. These 
pressures on the Earth's grasslands, 
oceans, forests, and croplands are un- 
relenting. 

The only visible means of support 
for these new millions are the Earth's 
wildlands and a more intensive use of 
those areas already dominated by man's 
activities. Unknown numbers of species 
are slated for extinction unless coun- 
tries working together can devise new 
strategies for protecting wildlife and 
their habitat until population growth 
can be contained. Wildlife is our canary 
in the coal mine. Its decline signals our 
own. 



Framework for Protection 

Today's hearings focus on channels 
available to the United States for the 
protection of international wildlife. The 
most important is the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
negotiated in 1973 and ratified by the 
U.S. Senate in 1975. The convention es- 
tablished an international system for 
controlling trade in endangered and 
threatened species and created a co- 
operative network of scientific and 
management authorities in signatory 
countries to administer the trade con- 
trols and advise the 54 member gov- 
ernments on the status of species cov- 
ered by the convention. 

Other international conventions 
and agreements collectively provide an 
institutional and programmatic 
framework within which nations are 
now making significant progress toward 
improved protection of wildlife species. 

Before I move on to habitat degra- 
dation, the most important factor in 
wildlife decline internationally, I would 
like to note a couple difficult issues that 
reoccur in wildlife protection negotia- 
tions. Your committee may wish to re- 
view these issues and consider legis- 
lating clearer guidelines. At any rate, 
airing them as problems will serve 
notice that we don't like the situation 
any better than do some of our con- 
stituent groups. 

One of the first difficult issues is 
that of Federal-State relationships. 
During the negotiation of a Convention 
on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals in Bonn, and 
again recently in our preparations for 
negotiating with the Canadians a treaty 
on migratory caribou, the concern of 
State groups that the Federal govern- 
ment would use international agree- 
ments to encroach upon traditional 
State rights to manage wildlife has 
caused confusion. Lack of a clear un- 
derstanding of the State and Federal 
roles brought widespread opposition 
from State fish and wildlife groups to 
the migratory species convention; it 
may happen as well to the caribou 
treaty. This ambiguity should be 
resolved. 

Another issue is that of habitat 
protection in international agreements. 
We, as well as most other nations, re- 
sist any outside suggestions — especially 
those of a compulsory nature — affecting 
the use to which we will put our land. 
We are not always certain what eco- 
nomic activities are compatible with 
maintaining wildlife populations. Fur- 
thermore, we and other nations are 
faced with possible difficult choices. 



To illustrate this problem, I invite 
the committee's attention to the pro- 
posed treaty with Canada on migratory 
caribou. Complete habitat protection is 
in possible conflict with petroleum 
exploration. Access highways on both 
sides of the border expose herds to 
sports hunters. What is the relative 
importance of these uses to the tradi- 
tional needs of local people who use 
caribou for essential food needs? 

Other issues that arose in connec- 
tion with the negotiation in Bonn of a 
treaty to protect migratory species in- 
volved possible conflicts with U.S. Law 
of the Sea positions. We were also 
restricted by possible overlapping jur- 
isdictions with existing treaties ap- 
plicable to marine mammals and par- 
ticularly by possible application to all 
marine species, including commercial 
fish species. 

As the commitee may be aware, the 
United States and a number of other 
major countries were unable to sign 
this convention at Bonn. 

Habitat Degradation 

There is growing recognition that 
the major issue is the loss of critical 
habitat in many regions. Accordingly, 
our wildlife conservation efforts now 
center on the advancement of habitat 
protection strategies. This is most dif- 
ficult to do effectively; the United 
States has supported and assisted a 
number of recent international efforts 
that support this goal including the 
world conservation strategy (in prep- 
aration by the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and National 
Resources), UNESCO's Man and the 
Biosphere Program, and the Global 
Plan of Action to Combat Desertifica- 
tion. 

Chief among our efforts, however, 
has been development of a series of 
recommendations for the President on 
U.S. goals, strategies, and programs to 
help protect and conserve world 
forests. 

Forests. One of our highest 
priorities is tropical deforestation. 
Forest cover in most of the world's 
tropical countries is disappearing at an 
accelerating rate to meet an increasing 
demand for cropland, rangeland, 
firewood, and commercial wood and 
wood products. One of the most alarm- 
ing aspects is that mankind stands to 
lose critical habitat for hundreds of 
thousands of plants and animal species. 
This committee has heard from other 
witnesses about the importance of 
maintaining genetic diversity and about 
the potential benefits of many indi- 



February 1980 



13 



Environment 



vidual tropical species threatened with 
extinction which have, to date, never 
even been examined for their social and 
economic values. 

In June 1978, the Department of 
State and the Agency for International 
Development (AID) cosponsored a 
"U.S. Strategy Conference on Tropical 
Deforestation" to obtain a better as- 
sessment of the nature of the problem, 
to clarify U.S. interests in addressing 
it, and to obtain views on an appropri- 
ate U.S. response. One result was the 
establishment by the State Department 
of an interagency task force on tropical 
forests to provide a government-wide 
focal point for policy and program plan- 
ning and coordination. The conference 
also recommended that a comprehen- 
sive "U.S. policy strategy and pro- 
gram" on tropical forests be developed 
to shape and guide future U.S. efforts 
in this area; we anticipate transmitting 
recommendations on this to the Presi- 
dent next month. 

I believe that we must mobilize an 
expanded U.S. effort on tropical forest 
management which will catalyze and 
support a much larger effort by the in- 
ternational community as a whole. In 
pursuit of this, the United States raised 
the deforestation issue at the U.N. 
General Assembly earlier this week and 
over the past year in other major U.N. 
forums. Last May, the Governing 
Council of the U.N. Environment Pro- 
gram overwhelmingly approved a 
U.S. -sponsored resolution calling for 
an international meeting of experts to 
develop proposals for a coordinated ac- 
tion program, and a division of labor, to 
insure better management of tropical 
forests. That meeting is now scheduled 
for February 1980 in Gabon. 

Given the fact that the U.S. pos- 
sesses less than 1% of the world's tropi- 
cal forests, it is clear that international 
cooperation is the key to any success 
we wish to achieve in this area. 

Acid Rain. Moving closer to 
habitat in our own forests and lakes, we 
see a problem, particularly in the 
Northeast, of acid rain. This is a widely 
recognized problem as was illustrated 
earlier this month when 800 people 
gathered in Toronto for a "action semi- 
nar on acid precipitation" under the 
sponsorship of the National Clean Air 
Coalition and a number of environmen- 
tal groups. We anticiapte that Presi- 
dent Carter and Canadian Prime Minis- 
ter Clark will discuss this topic when 
they next meet. Next week Douglas M. 
Costle, Administrator of the Environ- 
mental Protection Agency, will sign for 
the United States, in Geneva, a Con- 
vention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution. 



Acid rain has been linked to sharp 
declines in the number of fish in many 
lakes and streams. Some freshwater 
lakes in Canada, the United States, and 
Scandanavia are totally unable to sup- 
port fish life. We are less certain of our 
facts with respect to the effect on vege- 
tation, but there is evidence to show 
that tree growth is slowed and agricul- 
tural crops are affected adversely. 

Negotiations have been begun with 
Canada with a view to conclude a treaty 
concerning the transboundary acid rain 
problem. 

Meanwhile, we and the Canadians 
are engaged in a number of joint pro- 
grams to attack this problem pending 
the negotiation of a treaty. By their 
signature to the Economic Commission 
for Europe treaty in Geneva, both 
Canada and the United States will ac- 
cept the broad and rather general obli- 
gations specified in that convention 
concerning transboundary air pollu- 
tions. Efforts are now underway to im- 
plement the extensive programs to 
combat acid rain set out in President 
Carter's environmental message of Au- 
gust 2. These measures have a direct 
bearing on our transboundary acid rain 
problem and on wildlife habitat in the 
United States and Canada. 

Tropical deforestation and acid rain 
are two very different types of habitat 
disruption for the many species of 
wildlife that call the forests, both tropi- 
cal and temperate, home. On both 
fronts the Department of State is look- 
ing for solutions before the situation 
deteriorates further. 

Trade in Elephant Products 

Earlier in the year Chairman John 
Murphy of the House Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee introduced 
H.R. 4685, a bill to provide for the con- 
trol of the importing into, and the ex- 
porting from, the United States of 
elephants and elephant products. The 
bill authorizes the Secretary of the 
Interior to permit importation of 
elephant products only from nations ac- 
tively managing and conserving 
elephant populations. 

The Administration, while in sym- 
pathy with the intent of the bill, op- 
posed H.R. 4685, largely because it was 
not certain that an elephant product 
import ban would actually help save 
elephants. 

In response to Chairman Murphy's 
request that the State Department 
canvas its sources for African elephant 
range state views on the legislation and 
on the elephant conservation situation 
in general, we found division among 
countries on the question of whether 



H.R. 4685 would help conserve African 
elephants. 

We found consensus on a couple 
other points. First, while range states 
appreciate our good intentions in seek- 
ing ways to assist them in controlling 
illegal trade in elephant products and 
generally regard the convention on 
trade in endangered species as useful, 
they do not have the financial where- 
withal to build the wildlife management 
infrastructure sufficient to bring them 
into compliance with either the conven- 
tion or what H.R. 4685 would do if 
enacted. 

Secondly, approximately two- 
thirds of responding states were in- 
terested in various types of technical 
assistance, ranging from wildlife train- 
ing programs and equipment supply to 
help with creating and managing na- 
tional parks and wildlife reserves. One 
range state spokesman commented that 
developed countries do not seem to un- 
derstand fully the expensive demands 
on developing countries' limited re- 
sources entailed by compliance with the 
convention. He urged priority attention 
by developed countries to increasing 
funds available to elephant range states 
for enforcement of their conservation 
and antipoaching laws and for training 
of the necessary wardens and other 
staff. 

We cannot set standards for is- 
suance of permits to countries if there 
is no visible means to achieve those 
standards. If we are going to continue 
to press poor countries to join the con- 
vention on trade in endangered species, 
we must find a way to marshal existing 
monies and personnel into projects that 
offer multiple benefits. A pooling of 
agency resources through an inter- 
agency coordinating mechanism might 
aid the Department of State and other 
Federal agencies in this difficult task. 

Many of the African elephant range 
states are AID or Peace Corps coun- 
tries. AID is developing a number of 
natural resource protection projects 
which will also aid the elephant and 
provide environmental training for host 
country personnel. The Peace Corps 
has environmental projects in over 30 
countries. Approximately 200 volun- 
teers are involved in forestry, soil con- 
servation, and watershed protection. 
Approximately 20 Peace Corps volun- 
teers are involved in wildlife 
management and another 200 in 
fisheries management. Perhaps 200 
more are involved in various water 
supply and agricultural projects which 
are beneficial to wildlife habitat. 

The African elephant is not the 
only African species threatened with 
extinction. As populations grow and 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



EUROPE 



development increases, many more will 
disappear. The most feasible course 
would seem for the Federal Govern- 
ment, conservationists, and the Con- 
gress to turn away from single species 
approaches and work toward training 
wildlife and natural resource managers 
in regional centers such as the College 
of African Wildlife Management in 
Mweka, Tanzania, and the Wildlife 
School at Garoua, Cameroon. We must 
redouble efforts within the interna- 
tional organizations such as the U.N. 
Food and Agriculture Organization, the 
U.N. Development Program, the U.N. 
Environment Program, and the U.N. 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization which are engaged in 
wildlife management and ecosystem 
protection efforts. 

Future Needs 

As mentioned above, the greatest 
present need is the protection of 
wildlife habitat. As this frequently puts 
wildlife needs in competition with 
people for agricultural land or resource 
development, solutions are not easy. 

Depending upon the priority we in 
the United States are prepared to give 
to the protection of international 
wildlife, we should be able to extend 
additional help. It might be possible to 
coordinate better international ac- 
tivities of U.S. Government agencies 
with a view to protecting wildlife. 

Greater use might possibly be 
made of Federal personnel assigned to 
temporary duty in countries which re- 
quest training assistance. Sometimes 
agencies can spare someone for a 1 or 2 
month assignment, when an entire year 
wouldn't be possible. Short training 
courses would double or triple the 
wildlife management expertise in many 
countries and help countries achieve 
the standards we might wish for them, 
in the process saving their resident 
wildlife from extirpation. 

The Department of State does not 
have suggestions at this time for 
statutory changes that might facilitate 
our work. If we develop any sugges- 
tions, we will be glad to submit them 
for the record. ■ 



^he complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



NATO Ministers Meet 



Secretary Venice departed Wash-, 
ington, D.C, December 9, 1979, to meet 
with officials in London (December 10), 
Paris (December 10-11), Rome (De- 
cember 11), and Bonn (December 
11-12). He then headed the U.S. dele- 
gation at a special meeting of Foreign 
and Defense Ministers of NATO mem- 
bers (December 11-12) and at the reg- 
ular semiannual session of the North 
Atlantic Council (December 13-14) in 
Brussels before returning to Washing- 
ton on December 14. 

Following are the Secretary's 
statement in the special meeting, the 
communique, a statement issued by 
Secretary Vance, and the text of a joint 
news conference by Secretary Vance 
and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
on December 12 and Secretary Vance's 
statement in the North Atlantic Coun- 
cil on December IS and the com- 
munique and Secretary Vance's news 
conference of December 14-. 



SECRETARY VANCE, 
SPECIAL MEETING, 
DEC. 12, 1979 

The Foreign and Defense Ministers of 
NATO have just concluded a successful 
meeting of extraordinary importance. We 
have decided to proceed with a plan to 
deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles 
and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles 
in Europe. At the same time, we have 
decided to pursue vigorously with the 
Soviets a meaningful and equitable arms 
control agreement on long-range theater 
nuclear forces. 

The far-reaching decisions we have 
made here attest to the determination 
and common purpose of NATO's member 
states. The 2 years of intensive consulta- 
tions which led up to these decisions give 
evidence of the mutual trust that prevails 
in the alliance. 

Before Secretary Brown discusses 
the details of the steps taken here to 
strengthen NATO's defense posture, I 
would like to sketch for you the political 
context of these decisions. 

The Atlantic alliance is committed to 
a reduction of tensions between East and 
West. But our pursuit of detente, includ- 
ing balanced arms control agreements, 
must rest on a firm foundation of military 
security. Relaxation of tensions is possi- 
ble only when each side has confidence in 
its own strength. Serious negotiations 



can only proceed when neither side 
doubts the will and capacities of the 
other. Steps to consolidate and 
strengthen NATO's collective defense 
thus are central not only to a secure de- 
terrence of military threats; they also 
provide a basis for broader efforts to find 
a relaxation of tensions. 

In a political as well as military 
sense, defense modernization and the 
pursuit of detente are twin paths along 
the road of security. In recent years, the 
Soviet Union has improved significantly 
its nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet 
deployment of modern MIRVed SS-20s, 
and the Backfire bomber, threatens to 
provide the Soviets with nuclear prepon- 
derance in the European theater. In re- 
sponse, the alliance has developed paral- 
lel programs of modernization and arms 
control. 

In deciding to deploy new long-range 
nuclear forces in Europe and to support 
the United States in its pursuit of a seri- 
ous arms control agreement involving 
theater nuclear forces, the alliance is giv- 
ing new meaning and force to its policy of 
deterrence, defense, and detente. Our 
deployment decision gives evidence of the 
continued vitality and cohesiveness of the 
alliance. This decision has strengthened 
our spirit as well as our forces, and it has 
conveyed the clear message that we de- 
fine detente as a search for mutual and 
balanced, rather than unilateral, advan- 
tage. 

In this context, we are prepared to 
enter into serious negotiations on long- 
range theater nuclear forces, within the 
framework of SALT III. Any agreement 
reached must — like SALT II — be bal- 
anced and adequately verifiable. We will 
not entertain any notion of a freeze which 
would confirm a Soviet preponderance in 
long-range nuclear forces in this theater. 
But we are prepared to negotiate an equi- 
table agreement on U.S. and Soviet de- 
ployments of these systems at reduced 
levels. This would mean a reduction of 
the Soviet threat and a reduction in 
NATO's deployment program. 

The modernization decision that we 
have made here also makes it possible for 
us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads 
from Europe. In addition to this reduc- 
tion, for each of these weapons we deploy, 
we will withdraw one existing weapon 
from Europe. Thus, far from increasing 
NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, our 






February 1980 



15 



Europe 



decisions will result in a significant reduc- 
tion in the size of NATO's overall nuclear 
stockpile in Europe. 

Our willingness to enter into negoti- 
ations on theater nuclear forces in the 
SALT framework is but one of a com- 
prehensive set of arms control initiatives 
which the alliance is now developing. 
Mutual and balanced force reductions and 
the Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe are other negotiations 
which the alliance members are pursuing 
with equal vigor. 

The political effects of the decisions 
taken here today are considerable. Faced 
with a real challenge to the security of 
Western Europe, the alliance has reacted 
decisively, prudently, and in a way that 
invites the pursuit of arms control initia- 
tives. I believe that our governments can 
be proud of this memorable achievement, 
and that the free peoples of the alliance 
will show overwhelming support for the 
decisions made here today. 



COMMUNIQUE, 
SPECIAL MEETING, 
DEC. 12, 1979 1 

1. At a Special Meeting of Foreign and 
Defense Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 
1979: 

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Sum- 
mit where governments expressed the political 
resolve to meet the challenges to their security 
posed by the continuing momentum of the 
Warsaw Pact military build-up. 

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years 
developed a large and growing capability in 
nuclear systems that directly threaten Western 
Europe and have a strategic significance for 
the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been 
especially aggravated over the last few years 
by Soviet decisions to implement programs 
modernizing and expanding their long-range 
nuclear capability substantially. In particular, 
they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which 
offers significant improvements over previous 
systems in providing greater accuracy, more 
mobility, and greater range, as well as having 
multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, 
which has a much better performance than 
other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a 
theater role. During this period, while the 
Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superior- 
ity in LRTNF [long-range theater nuclear for- 
ces] both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
Western capabilities have remained static. In- 
deed these forces are increasing in age and 
vulnerability and do not include land-based, 
long-range theater nuclear missile systems. 

4. At the same time, the Soviets have 
also undertaken a modernization and expan- 
sion of their shorter-range TNF [theater nu- 
clear forces] and greatly improved the overall 
quality of their conventional forces. These de- 
velopments took place against the background 



of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabili- 
ties and achievement of parity in inter- 
continental capability with the United States. 

5. These trends have prompted serious 
concern within the Alliance, because, if they 
were to continue, Soviet superiority in theater 
nuclear systems could undermine the stability 
achieved in inter-continental systems and cast 
doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deter- 
rent strategy by highlighting the gap in the 
spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response 
to aggression. 

6. Ministers noted that these recent de- 
velopments require concrete actions on the 
part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flex- 
ible response is to remain credible. After in- 
tensive considerations, including the merits of 
alternative approaches, and after taking note 
of the positions of certain members, Ministers 
concluded that the overall interest of the Al- 
liance would best be served by pursuing two 
parallel and complementary approaches of 
TNF modernization and arms control. 

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to 
modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment 
in Europe of US ground-launched systems 
comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which 
would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 
464 GLCM [ground-launched cruise missiles], 
all with single warheads. All the nations cur- 
rently participating in the integrated defense 
structure will participate in the program: the 
missiles will be stationed in selected countries, 
and certain support costs will be met through 
NATO's existing common funding ar- 
rangements. The program will not increase 
NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this 
connection, Ministers agreed that as an inte- 
gral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nu- 
clear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe 
as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided 
that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be ac- 
commodated within that reduced level, which 
necessarily implies a numerical shift of empha- 
sis away from warheads for delivery systems 
of other types and shorter ranges. In addition 
they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear 
Planning Group [NPG] is undertaking an ex- 
amination of the precise nature, scope, and 
basis of the adjustments resulting from the 
LRTNF deployment and their possible impli- 
cations for the balance of roles and systems in 
NATO's nuclear armor as a whole. This exami- 
nation will form the basis of a substantive re- 
port to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980. 

8. Ministers attach great importance to 
the role of arms control in contributing to a 
more stable military relationship between East 
and West and in advancing the process of de- 
tente. This is reflected in a broad set of initia- 
tives being examined within the Alliance to 
further the course of arms control and detente 
in the 1980's. They regard arms control as an 
integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure 
the undiminished security of its member 
states and to make the strategic situation be- 
tween East and West more stable, more pre- 
dictable, and more manageable at lower levels 
of armaments on both sides. In this regard 
they welcome the contribution which the 
SALT II treaty makes towards achieving these 
objectives. 



9. Ministers consider that, building on 
this accomplishment and taking account of the 
expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of 
concern to NATO, arms control efforts to 
achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance 
at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both 
sides should therefore now include certain US 
and Soviet long-range theater nuclear sys- 
tems. This would reflect previous Western 
suggestions to include such Soviet and US sys- 
tems in arms control negotiations and more re- 
cent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev 
of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support 
the decision taken by the United States follow- 
ing consultations within the Alliance to negoti- 
ate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose 
to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as 
possible along the following lines which have 
been elaborated in intensive consultations 
within the Alliance: 

A. Any future limitations on US sys- 
tems principally designed for theater missions 
should be accompanied by appropriate limita- 
tions on Soviet theater systems. 

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long- 
range theater nuclear systems should be nego- 
tiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework 
in a step-by-step approach. 

C. The immediate objective of these 
negotiations should be the establishment of 
agreed limitations on US and Soviet land- 
based long-range theater nuclear missile 
systems. 

D. Any agreed limitations on these sys- 
tems must be consistent with the principle of 
equality between the sides. Therefore, the lim- 
itations should take the form of de jure equal- 
ity both in ceilings and in rights. 

E. Any agreed limitations must be 
adequately verifiable. 

10. Given the special importance of these 
negotiations for the overall security of the Al- 
liance, a special consultative body at a high 
level will be constituted within the Alliance to 
support the US negotiating effort. This body 
will follow the negotiations on a continuous 
basis and report to the Foreign and Defense 
Ministers who will examine developments 

in these negotiations at their semi-annual 
meetings. 

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue 
these two parallel and complementary ap- 
proaches in order to avert an arms race in 
Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, 
yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy 
of deterrence and defense and thus maintain 
the security of its member states. A moderni- 
zation decision, including a commitment to de- 
ployments, is necessary to meet NATO's de- 
terrence and defense needs, to provide a cred- 
ible response to unilateral Soviet TNF de- 
ployments, and to provide the foundation for 
the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF. 
Success of arms control in constraining the 
Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, 
modify the scale of NATO's TNF moderniza- 
tion requirements, and promote stability and 
detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's 
basic policy of deterrence, defense and detente 
as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's 
TNF requirements will be examined in the 
light of concrete results reached through 
negotiations. 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



Europe 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 12, 1979 2 

The Foreign and Defense Ministers of 
NATO have just concluded a successful 
meeting of extraordinary importance. 

We have decided to proceed with a 
plan to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic 
missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise 
missiles in Europe. At the same time, 
we have decided to pursue vigorously 
with the Soviets a meaningful and 
equitable arms control agreement on 
long-range theater nuclear forces. 

The far-reaching decisions we have 
made here attest to the determination 
and common purpose of NATO's 
member states. The 2 years of intensive 
consultations which led up to these de- 
cisions give evidence of the mutual 
trust that prevails in the alliance. 

Before Secretary Brown discusses 
the details of the steps taken here to 
strengthen NATO's defense posture, I 
would like to sketch for you the political 
context of these decisions. 

The Atlantic alliance is committed 
to a reduction of tensions between East 
and West. But our pursuit of detente, 
including balanced arms control agree- 
ments, must rest on a firm foundation 
of military security. 

Relaxation of tensions is possible 
only when each side has confidence in 
its own strength. Serious negotiations 
can only proceed when neither side 
doubts the will and capacities of the 
other. Steps to consolidate and 
strengthen NATO's collective defense 
thus are central not only to a secure de- 
terrence of military threats; they also 
provide a basis for broader efforts to 
find a relaxation of tensions. In a politi- 
cal as well as military sense, defense 
modernization and the pursuit of de- 
tente are twin paths along the road of 
security. 

In recent years, the Soviet Union 
has improved significantly its nuclear 
forces in Europe. The Soviet deploy- 
ment of modern MIRVed SS-20s, and 
the Backfire bomber, threatens to pro- 
vide the Soviets with nuclear prepon- 
derance in the European theater. In re- 
sponse, the alliance has developed 
parallel programs of modernization and 
arms control. 

In deciding to deploy new long- 
range nuclear forces in Europe and to 
support the United States in its pursuit 
of a serious arms control agreement in- 
volving theater nuclear forces, the al- 
liance is giving new meaning and force 
to its policy of deterrence, defense, and 
detente. Our deployment decision gives 
evidence of the continued vitality and 
cohesiveness of the alliance. 



This decision has strengthened our 
spirit as well as our forces, and it has 
conveyed the clear message that we 
define detente as a search for mutual 
and balanced, rather than unilateral, 
advantage. 

In this context, we are prepared to 
enter into serious negotiations on long- 
range theater nuclear forces, within the 
framework of SALT III. Any agree- 
ment reached must — like SALT II — be 
balanced and adequately verifiable. 

We will not entertain any notion of 
a freeze which would confirm a Soviet 
preponderance in long-range nuclear 
forces in this theater. But we are pre- 
pared to negotiate an equitable agree- 
ment on U.S. and Soviet deployments 
of these systems at reduced levels. This 
would mean a reduction of the Soviet 
threat and a reduction in NATO's de- 
ployment program. 

The modernization decision that we 
have made here also makes it possible 
for us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear 
warheads from Europe. In addition to 
this reduction, for each of these 
weapons we deploy, we will withdraw 
one existing weapon from Europe. 
Thus, far from increasing NATO's re- 
liance on nuclear weapons, our deci- 
sions will result in a significant reduc- 
tion in the size of NATO's overall 
nuclear stockpile in Europe. 

Our willingness to enter into 
negotiations on theater nuclear forces 
in the SALT framework is but one of a 
comprehensive set of arms control ini- 
tiatives which the alliance is now de- 
veloping. Mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions (MBFR) in Europe and the 
Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (CSCE) are other 
negotiations which the alliance mem- 
bers are pursuing with equal vigor. 

The political effects of the decisions 
taken here today are considerable. 
Faced with a real challenge to the secu- 
rity of Western Europe, the alliance 
has reacted decisively, prudently, and 
in a way that invites the pursuit of 
arms control initiatives. I believe that 
our governments can be proud of this 
memorable achievement and that the 
free peoples of the alliance will show- 
overwhelming support for the decisions 
made here today. 



SECRETARIES VANCE AND 
BROWN, NEWS CONFERENCE, 
DEC. 12, 1979 

Secretary Vance: I think you've all got 
a copy — and if you haven't got it, you'll 
get it shortly — of a short press state- 
ment which I have issued. I'd like to 



say a few words of introduction and 
then Harold and I would be glad to an- 
swer any of your questions. 

As you know from your meeting 
with the Secretary General, the 
Foreign and Defense Ministers have 
just concluded a successful meeting of 
extraordinary importance. We decided 
at that meeting that we would go for- 
ward with the program to modernize 
our long-range nuclear theater forces. 
And at the same time we decided to 
pursue vigorously our program for 
arms control agreement in the long- 
range nuclear theater forces area with 
the Soviet Union. As you know, the 
subject has been under study for ap- 
proximately 2 years now, and the rec- 
ommendations of the two study groups 
made their presentations to the group 
today and the final decision was taken. 
The decision, I think it is important to 
note, was a unanimous decision on the 
part of the alliance to go forward with 
the program. 

Q. Did you bring up the subject of 
the Iran crisis at any point in the pro- 
ceedings? What did you ask of the al- 
liance and what response did you get? 

Secretary Brown: It didn't come 
up today in the joint meeting between 
Defense and Foreign Ministers. I did 
raise it this morning with the Defense 
Ministers, and it was along the same 
line that Secretary Vance has been 
speaking to, and I'll let him answer it. 

Secretary Vance: It will be coming 
up again tomorrow morning in the 
meeting which we are going to be hav- 
ing, and I will be reporting to the 
Council on the situation in Iran. It will 
be taken up in restricted session, and 
we will have a discussion of the Iran 
issue, and in my judgment we will 
probably issue a statement of the 15 na- 
tions, as 15 nations — not as NATO but 
as 15 nations. 

Q. Could you comment on the re- 
strictions made by the Dutch and the 
Belgian Governments on the installa- 
tion and the difficulties for the deci- 
sion to go on with the production of 
the new arms? 

Secretary Brown: First, I would 
say that the decision was a very suc- 
cessful one in deciding to respond to 
Soviet modernization and increased de- 
ployments of its theater nuclear forces; 
that the agreement provides a solid 
basis for the United States to proceed 
with production of the missiles. The 
agreement did call for that, and you will 
recall that President Carter has in- 
sisted that if the United States is to 



February 1980 



17 



Europe 



produce the missiles, there must be a 
previous decision on the part of NATO 
to deploy them. The Belgian Govern- 
ment, along with the United Kingdom, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
Italy, has decided to deploy the mis- 
siles. It has also decided that it will 
examine the question of implementing 
that decision in about 6 months on the 
basis, among other things, of the suc- 
cess reached during that time in arms 
control of theater nuclear forces. 

The Dutch position is that they will 
make a decision on whether to accept 
deployments within 2 years. But it 
should be noted that of the total 
number being contemplated for de- 
ployment, only about 15% or 209c are to 
be deployed in those two countries. 

Q. We have three countries that 
have agreed to station these systems. 
The Germans have said that they will 
not be the only country that would 
take them on the continent. If Italy 
were, during the next 2 years, to de- 
cide for one reason or another to pull 
out, couldn't this decision quickly 
unravel? 

Secretary Brown: The Germans 
consider their conditions to have been 
met. As I noted, Belgium, as well as 
Italy, has made a decision to deploy. 

Q. Are you optimistic over a posi- 
tive response by Russia on the offer of 
negotiating on the long-range theater 
nuclear weapons? And can you figure 
out how long it will take to start 
off — months or years? 

Secretary Vance: I am optimistic 
that negotiations will get underway be- 
tween ourselves and the Soviet Union 
on the question of arms control, in the 
field of long-range nuclear theater 
forces. As to when the discussions can 
get underway, I am merely speculating. 

Let me say that the first step will 
be to assemble the consultative group 
which is to be established pursuant to 
the plan which has been developed. 
That is a consultative group including 
ourselves and our allies. We will be 
working to put together the final 
touches on what we will be sending 
forward to the Soviet Union, and fol- 
lowing that there will be discussions 
with the Soviet Union. I do not rule out 
some preliminary discussions, but they 
would be only of a preliminary nature 
sometime in the next month or two. At 
what pace those negotiations will pro- 
ceed is a different question, because it 
is the decision that these negotiations 
can best be carried out in SALT III. 
And we, therefore, have the factor of 



when we can get to SALT III in order 
to get the starting date for actual 

negotiations. 

Q. Given the Belgian and Dutch 
reservations, are you confident that 
Congress will provide them $5 billion 
to finance this program, and 
moreover, what kind of signal of this 
lack of unity within the alliance do 
you think NATO is sending the Soviet 
Union? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say first 
that I think that it is wrong to charac- 
terize this as a lack of unity. The deci- 
sion taken across the board was that 
the program was accepted and that we 
would go forward with the program. 

Secretary Brown: Indeed, this was 
a unanimous decision to proceed with 
the program, and these countries will 
all participate in the infrastructure 
funding, which is a part of the opera- 
tions funding of these systems. The 
Congress, as you know, has been very 
interested and very concerned about 
the imbalance of theater nuclear forces 
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, 
and as a consequence of this decision, I 
would expect that Congress will, in- 
deed, support the program. They have 
been supporting the research and de- 
velopment; they have been saying, tell 
us when you have a place to put most of 
these, and we now have that. 

Secretary Vance: Let me just add 
from somebody who sees it from a 
slightly different perspective, because I 
deal with different committees than 
Harold does in the Congress. I find the 
same interest and importance attached 
to the modernization of our theater nu- 
clear forces, and I would expect that we 
would find support in the Congress. 

Q. What was your reaction to the 
Danish proposal? 

Secretary Vance: Insofar as the 
Danish proposal was concerned — which 
called for a deferral for 6 months or a 
postponement of making any 
decision — I have felt all along that we 
could not and should not postpone this 
decision. The time had come, after 2 
years of study, when all the work was 
done; we've got to get on with the proc- 
ess of modernizing our forces. We've 
also got to get on with the companion 
program of discussions in the arms con- 
trol area so that the sooner the better, 
and, therefore, I was against any 
postponement. 



Secretary Brown: Moreover, that 
proposal found no support from any 
other country, partly because I think it 
was realized that during that 6 months, 
the Soviet deployment of SS-20s, 
which continues at the same or perhaps 
even an accelerated rate as part of their 
theater nuclear force increase and mod- 
ernization, would have deployed about 
200 additional nuclear warheads against 
the countries of Western Europe. 

Q. [Inaudible] by the Defense 
Minister includes a specific reference 
of assumption that SALT II will have 
been ratified by the end of this 2-year 
period. Before this meeting, there had 
been, over some period, indications 
that the ratification of SALT would 
have an important influence on Euro- 
pean positions. Do you feel that if 
SALT had been ratified by now, all 
the alliance members would have 
been able to stay on the same line? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know the 
answer to that. But let me say — 
because I don't know enough about the 
internal politics of a number of the 
various countries — that I think all of 
you are familiar with the reasons that 
the hearings on SALT have fallen be- 
hind schedule in the Congress. It not 
only came about as a result of the need 
to get through vital energy legislation 
that is before the Congress right now, 
but of course, we have been seized with 
the Iranian crisis which has not only 
taken most of the waking hours of those 
of us in the executive branch but also 
has consumed a great amount of the at- 
tention and time of the congressional 
leadership and the Members of the 
Congress. As a result of these factors, 
Senator Byrd decided that he would 
delay, until about the fourth week in 
January, the bringing forward of the 
SALT debate to the floor. I believe that 
it will come forward at that time, and it 
is still my strong belief that we will, in 
those hearings, come out with a 
successful conclusion. 

Q. Don't you have any fears that 
the Soviet Union might consider the 
restrictions which have been put for- 
ward by Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Denmark as a sign of weakness, 
as a breach in NATO solidarity and 
that they will seek political profit 
from it? 

Secretary Vance: No, I don't think 
so. I think that there are obviously 
very difficult problems, political prob- 
lems, in various countries. However, 
the decision was taken in Belgium, as 
Harold Brown has previously indicated 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



Europe 



to you, to make a positive decision with 
respect to the problem and to the issue 
of deployment with the caveat that they 
wanted to take a look at the situation in 
6 months to see whether there had been 
enough progress in the arms control 
field to change their mind. Otherwise, 
the decision is made; they are going 
forward. 

Q. Could you just tell us whether 
the United States is going to ask any 
other country, besides the five, on de- 
ploying the missiles in the coming 2 
years? 

Secretary Brown: The program 
was made up by a military-civilian 
group, a so-called high-level group, and 
these were the candidate countries. I 
don't rule out further studies, but the 
program we are proceeding with is the 
program that the high-level group came 
up with. 

Secretary Vance: Let me add one 

thing to that. We decided how many 
additional warheads were required in 
the modernization program. Having 
made that determination, the next step 
was to determine how it might be best 
to allocate the deployment, and the 
most sensible course of action de- 
veloped by the group which was study- 
ing it was the five countries which we 
have referred to. And, that's how we 
arrived at the group that is included 
now as the deployment sites for the 
new missiles. 

Q. If I understood well, it will 
take at least 2 or 3 years before these 
modern weapons are going to be in- 
stalled here. What about if the Soviet 
Union, in the meantime, produces or 
creates a more modern weapon? What 
will happen? 

Secretary Vance: This is the very 
problem that Harold was talking about 
because as the months go by, more and 
more weapons are being deployed, and 
this is obviously a matter of great con- 
cern to us. This is the reason that we 
have both the modernization program 
and the arms control program. So that 
it is necessary not only that we take the 
steps to move forward to produce and 
deploy these new weapons but also to 
proceed vigorously with the arms con- 
trol aspect of this bilateral program. 

Q. Given your answer on possible 
timing of any negotiations, what do 
you think the Belgians will have in 6 
months time to change their minds? 



Secretary Vance: Quite honestly, I 
would say that there probably will be 
not a great deal. I think negotiations 
will have been started by that time, but 
as anybody knows who has been in- 
volved in negotiations in the strategic 
nuclear field, these are very compli- 
cated matters. They proceed extremely 
slowly. We also took 6 : /2 years to 
negotiate the SALT II agreement, and 
I would expect that this is going to be 
even a more complex negotiation than 
the ones which we've had so far in 
SALT II. 

Secretary Brown: Again, I'm not 
sure that we've gotten across to the 
public the very substantial existing im- 
balance in theater forces. The Soviets 
have far more warheads, far more mis- 
siles, of intermediate range than the 
NATO alliance, and they are adding 
SS-20 warheads at the rate of about 
one a day. 

Q. To what extent does the Dutch 
and Belgian decision represent a mes- 
sage that they are sending to the 
American Congress on SALT? To 
what extent did you find the agree- 
ment that you reached here in effect 
depends upon ratification of the 
SALT Treaty? 

Secretary Vance: I think that as I 
said earlier, they continue to attach 
great importance to ratification of 
SALT. But, at the same time, they at- 
tach great importance to dealing with 
the theater nuclear problem. So, I think 
that it sends forward two messages to 
the Congress: number one, they stand 
just as strongly as they did before in 
urging and hoping that we can get on to 
ratification of SALT, and at the same 
time they want to get us moving in the 
theater nuclear field not only on the de- 
velopment, production, and deployment 
side but also on the arms control side. 

Q. Secretary General Luns said 
that the infrastructure financing 
would be done by NATO as a whole, 
which would seem to imply that all 
the systems are single systems and 
that the level of financing is rather 
lower than what Secretary Brown 
mentioned in The Hague what the 
United States might hope for. Or are 
you satisfied with what — 

Secretary Brown: The United 
States is going to pay for the develop- 
ment and production of the missiles. 
That is likely to run into several billions 
of dollars. The operation and mainte- 
nance costs including the guard force, 
security force, etc., construction of 
some base equipment, will be arranged 



through infrastructure and that cost 
will be shared. The United States un- 
questionably will carry the great bulk 
of the cost. 

Q. Can you move ahead with 
negotiations on theater nuclear 
weapons if you don't get a ratification 
of SALT II? 

Secretary Vance: I think the an- 
swer is yes we can. But it will be much 
more difficult to do. Therefore, I think 
it's incumbent on us to get SALT II 
ratified and get moving on both aspects 
of the problem, negotiating SALT III 
insofar as central systems are con- 
cerned and also insofar as theater sys- 
tems are concerned. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 
DEC. 13, 1979 

Before leaving Washington for this ses- 
sion of the North Atlantic Council, I 
reviewed our forthcoming meeting with 
President Carter. He has a deep inter- 
est in our work here this week and 
asked me to extend to all of you his 
greetings. I would also like' to extend a 
special welcome to the Ministers joining 
the Council for the first time. 

In the history of the alliance, this 
meeting will be remembered as a mo- 
ment of special significance. Issues cen- 
tral to NATO are always important. 
But on this occasion, the issues before 
us are so important. Our decisions are 
of such deep meaning for the continued 
security of the alliance and for the 
strengthening of peace in Europe that 
our deliberations merit well the word 
"historic." 

We meet at the opening of a new 
decade. None of us believes that the 
times ahead will be easy. But turbulent 
times can call forth the best that is in 
us. Such challenges can rally our 
societies to greater achievements. Our 
peoples have shown such strength 
throughout the history of our alliance. 
They will do so again. 

We of this alliance, which has been 
so successful in the past, should look 
with confidence to the future. Our sys- 
tems are strong and flexible. Our 
economies are resilient and innovative. 
Our peoples are steadfast. With con- 
tinuing hard work and cooperation, we 
will maintain the healthy and strong 
societies on which our security ulti- 
mately depends. 

It was the quest for security that 
brought us together in this alliance. 
Today, no less than 30 years ago, we 



February 1980 



19 



Europe 



have the strength and the will to be 
able to decide for ourselves, through 
sober assessment, the requirements of 
our defense. This unique group of free 
nations, valuing our sovereign inde- 
pendence and collective values, will 
never permit others to dictate the 
terms of our security. 

With the understanding and 
support of our peoples, we are now 
taking action to preserve the peace. We 
are acting to strengthen our strategic 
forces in the United States — to mod- 
ernize our theater nuclear forces in 
Europe and to improve our conven- 
tional posture. 

I am convinced that the alliance is 
on the right track. Our Long-Term 
Defense Program, our commitment to 
3% real increases in annual defense 
spending, and our decisions to modern- 
ize theater nuclear forces promise to 
take us into the 1980s with a sense of 
real security. It has been clear to all 
that we will maintain the fortitude and 
determination necessary to carry these 
decisions forward. 

The strength of our alliance re- 
mains the essential underpinning of our 
efforts to strengthen the framework for 
more productive relations with the 
East. It is clear to all that we will pur- 
sue security for Europe through 
negotiations as well as through military 
preparedness. Here also we need to 
move forward on a broad front. 

• In SALT and theater nuclear 
force negotiations, we look forward to a 
more intensive alliance consultative 
mechanism. We must insure that the 
promise this mechanism holds for closer 
coordination within the alliance is 
matched by our determination to make 
progress in the negotiations 
themselves. 

• In MBFR, our persistent and pa- 
tient negotiations will continue to 
explore vigorously all promising av- 
enues for achievement of an agreement. 

• In CSCE, we will couple creative 
new proposals for building military 
confidence with a determination to pre- 
serve the integrity of the Final Act; to 
maintain progress across the board on 
CSCE issues, including those that most 
directly affect people's lives. 

• In East-West relations, we un- 
derstand that security in the broadest 
sense is not achieved by weapons alone. 
The members of the alliance will con- 
tinue to show willingness to increase 
official, individual, and commercial ex- 
changes. These exchanges can grow as 
a mutual commitment to better rela- 



tions between East and West grows. As 
better understanding between East 
and West is pursued, all our people 
benefit from the lessening of tensions. 

This alliance draws strength from 
our determination to achieve both 
mutual security and a lessening of ten- 
sions. This very important meeting 
provides an opportunity to match the 
challenges that we face with the deci- 
sions of wisdom — decisions that will 
reinforce our preparedness, strengthen 
the confidence of our peoples in our 
readiness, and enhance the prospects 
for greater security through the agreed 
control of arms. 

Whenever we assemble, and espe- 
cially at such moments of great decision 
as today, I believe that each of us is 
touched by the past, by recollections of 
the wisdom of the founders of this al- 
liance. They knew that people who live 
in freedom are people at their 
strongest. They knew that collective 
decisions, made in freedom, are the 
strongest decisions. And they knew 
that free nations, acting together, draw 
strength from each other as they work 
for peace. 



COMMUNIQUE, 

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 

DEC. 14, 1979 

1. The North Atlantic Council met in 
Ministerial session in Brussels on 13th and 
14th December 1979. 

Ministers accepted with pleasure the 
invitation of the Turkish Government to 
hold the next Ministerial session of the 
North Atlantic Council in Ankara in the 
spring of 1980. 

2. Ministers renewed their faith in the 
North Atlantic Treaty which guarantees the 
freedom, security and well-being of their 
peoples and the preservation of peace and 
international stability. Because their gov- 
ernments are based on the consent of their 
peoples, on democratic institutions and on 
the principle of equality and the rule of law, 
the members of the Alliance have the 
strength, enhanced by the will to assist each 
other, to face the challenges which lie ahead. 
Looking forward to the 1980's, Ministers 
expressed their confidence that, by main- 
taining the strength and cohesion of their 
Alliance and pursuing the complementary 
goals of arms control, disarmament and the 
improvement of relations between East and 
West in general, their governments would 
continue to make a major contribution to 
peace and stability in Europe and the world. 

3. Reviewing developments in East- 
West relations since they last met, Ministers 
noted that the conclusions of the study un- 
dertaken in 1978 remain valid. They recalled 
their commitment to detente and stressed 



the defensive nature of the Alliance. Events 
since their previous meeting showed the 
continuing influence of forces not conducive 
to the consolidation of international stability 
and security. They expressed concern over 
the direct or indirect actions of the Soviet 
Union and some of its Allies in a number of 
troubled areas concurrently with a very con- 
siderable build-up, both qualitative and 
quantitative, in Warsaw Pact military 
strength, and particularly with growing 
Soviet theatre nuclear and conventional 
capabilities. Ministers noted that these de- 
velopments were a cause for legitimate dis- 
quiet and were not compatible either with 
assurances by the Warsaw Pact countries 
that they do not seek military superiority or 
with their publicly-declared intention to 
promote detente, particularly in the military 
sphere. Ministers reiterated their view that 
detente must be worldwide and indivisible in 
character. 

4. Ministers confirmed that their gov- 
ernments were resolved to take steps to re- 
duce the growing imbalance of forces by im- 
proving their military capabilities and thus 
maintain an adequate level of deterrence 
and defence across the full spectrum. They 
recalled the determination of their govern- 
ments to achieve, as a key element in con- 
ventional force modernization, more effec- 
tive use of available resources through 
co-operative equipment programmes and 
increased standardization and interopera- 
bility of weapons systems. They noted with 
satisfaction the initial progress that has 
been achieved in these respects, they re- 
peated that through the transatlantic 
dialogue they would continue to work to- 
wards more balanced relations among the 
European and North American members of 
the Alliance in the field of armaments de- 
velopment and production in order to en- 
hance the availability and quality of new 
defence equipment. They noted the contri- 
bution which is being made by the Confer- 
ence of National Armaments Directors in 
this respect, and the need to bear in mind 
the interests of the less industrialized mem- 
bers of the Alliance. 

5. Ministers believed that efforts to 
achieve agreement in fields of arms control, 
disarmament and confidence building should 
go hand in hand with defence efforts of the 
Allies. They noted that recent proposals put 
forward by the Eastern countries echoed in 
part the Western proposals and they saw in 
them a hopeful indication of the evolution of 
these countries towards a more positive at- 
titude in the search for common ground. 
Ministers considered ways of advancing ap- 
propriate discussions and negotiations. 

6. Ministers recalled that the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) signed 
by the United States and the Soviet Union 
on 18th June reflected their desire for 
genuine arms control measures which should 
contribute to the stability of East- West re- 
lations. Ministers observed that the Treaty 
makes it possible to maintain a strong US 
strategic nuclear deterrent, which remains 
vital to the defence of the Alliance. Thus 
this Treaty, which will have the effect of 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



Europe 



curbing the build-up of strategic nuclear 
weapons in the world, improves the pros- 
pects for detente without jeopardizing the 
security interests of the members of the Al- 
liance. Ministers expressed the hope that 
the Treaty would soon come into force. They 
looked forward to the early continuation of 
the SALT process, on the basis of further 
close consultations within the Alliance, 
leading to additional United States and 
Soviet reductions and qualitative limitations 
in the nuclear field. They also expressed the 
belief that ratification of the Treaty would 
contribute to other possibilities of progress 
in the field of arms control. 

7. Ministers believed that the process 
initiated by the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe made a most valu- 
able contribution to the strengthening of de- 
tente, and offered further opportunities to 
develop existing and new areas of dialogue 
in the search for agreement. They expressed 
the hope that the CSCE follow-up meeting 
to be held at Madrid in 1980 will be a major 
step forward in that process. Tangible prog- 
ress in the meantime in implementing the 
principles and provisions of the Final Act 
and adequate preparation are of great im- 
portance for the success of the Madrid 
meeting and could provide a basis for par- 
ticipation at the political level. Although 
there have been certain welcome measures 
of relief, in particular the granting of am- 
nesty, and some improvement in other 
fields, Ministers noted with concern that in 
certain countries the situation remained 
unsatisfactory or had even deteriorated as 
regards respect for human rights and fun- 
damental freedoms, including cases where 
citizens continue to be subject to harassment 
and imprisonment for no reason other than 
their efforts to bring about the full im- 
plementation of the Final Act. Ministers also 
noted that process in the field of human con- 
tacts was uneven and expressed their con- 
cern that the level of implementation of the 
provisions dealing with a freer flow of in- 
formation and working conditions for jour- 
nalists had remained low and, in some cases, 
had deteriorated. They noted with satisfac- 
tion, however, that the Final Act increas- 
ingly has become the standard by which the 
actions of signatory states are judged. 

8. Ministers expressed their intention to 
devote increasing efforts to preparations for 
the Madrid meeting during the period 
ahead, emphasizing the importance of con- 
sultations among Allies as well as with the 
other participating states and of maintaining 
balance among all sections of the Final Act. 
They confirmed that they intended to ap- 
proach and conduct the Madrid meeting in a 
constructive frame of mind and in a manner 
which would permit a thorough, frank and 
measured review of the implementation of 
all provisions of the Final Act. In this spirit, 
they will be ready to put forward new pro- 
posals and to discuss proposals from other 
participants calculated to bring concrete and 
balanced progress in all fields covered by 
the Final Act and thereby contribute to the 
vitality of the CSCE process. Ministers rec- 



ognized the importance for the Alliance of 
developing the confidence building measures 
and the other provisions of the Final Act 
relating to certain aspects of security and 
disarmament, and hoped for concrete results 
in this regard at the Madrid meeting. 

They reviewed with interest the pro- 
posals made in these fields by different 
CSCE participants, whether Western, neu- 
tral and non-aligned or Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries, including those made by the latter in 
May and December 1979. They considered 
that the proposal for a Conference on Dis- 
armament in Europe put forward by France 
is a useful concept providing a basis upon 
which to continue developing their approach 
in this field to bring about such a confer- 
ence. 

They agreed to work towards the adop- 
tion during the Madrid meeting, as part of a 
balanced outcome, of a mandate for further 
negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on 
military significant and verifiable confidence 
building measures, applicable to the entire 
continent of Europe. These, if agreed, would 
help create conditions conducive to limita- 
tion and reduction of arms in the same geo- 
graphical area. This process should take ac- 
count of both the varied aspects of the 
existing security situation and of the current 
negotiations on other aspects of arms control 
and disarmament concerning the European 
continent. 

9. The Ministers of countries par- 
ticipating in the negotiations on Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions reemphasized 
their determination to work for a successful 
outcome which would enhance stability, 
peace and security in Europe. They noted, 
however, their concern that despite repre- 
sentations made at the highest level by 
Western leaders to the Eastern partici- 
pants, the East has made no effort to re- 
solve the data question. These Ministers 
noted that agreement on the starting size of 
forces to be reduced is not only an essential 
prerequisite to any reductions, but can also 
serve to build confidence that a reduction 
agreement is being observed and that 
mutual security is being enhanced. 

In order to advance the negotiations 
toward an early result, these Ministers ap- 
proved a proposal for an interim Phase I 
agreement consistent with the objectives of 
their governments in the negotiations, in 
particular the establishment of parity in the 
form of a common collective ceiling on 
ground force manpower and agreement on a 
combined common collective ceiling on air 
and ground force manpower of each side in 
the area of reductions. Their new initiative 
aims at simplifying existing proposals for a 
Phase I agreement by focussing on US and 
Soviet manpower withdrawals and lim- 
itations, based on agreed US-Soviet data, 
and on associated measures applied on a 
multilateral basis. This interim Phase I 
agreement would open the way for a 
subsequent Phase II agreement, based on 
agreed overall data, providing for a common 
collective ceiling on ground force manpower 



for each side at approximately 700,000 and 
for agreement on a combined common collec- 
tive ceiling on air and ground force man- 
power for each side at approximately 
900,000. 

These Ministers called attention to the 
package of associated measures which forms 
an integral part of their proposal for an 
interim Phase I agreement. This package of 
measures is designed to promote military 
stability and confidence, to ensure adequate 
verification of an MBFR agreement and to 
help safeguard undiminished security for 
flank countries. 

These Ministers urged Eastern partici- 
pants to give prompt and serious considera- 
tion to their initiative, which takes account 
of negotiating proposals of both sides and 
which is in accordance with the agreed aim 
of the negotiations to contribute to the crea- 
tion of a more stable relationship and to the 
strengthening of peace and security in 
Europe. They view this new Western initia- 
tive as an integral part of the arms control 
initiatives agreed upon during this Ministe- 
rial meeting. 

10. Turning to the question of negotia- 
tions on disarmament and arms limitation in 
other fora, Ministers reaffirmed the impor- 
tance which they attached to the adoption of 
effective, balanced and verifiable measures. 
They welcomed as positive elements the dis- 
cussions during the first session of the 
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and 
the deliberations of the Disarmament Com- 
mission in New York. They attached impor- 
tance to the frequent and active consultative 
on these questions within the permanent 
machinery of the Alliance. 

11. Ministers discussed developments 
with regard to Berlin and Germany as a 
whole. They noted that since their last 
meeting the climate in and around Berlin 
had continued to remain relatively calm. 
Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that an 
undisturbed situation in Berlin and on the 
access routes is an essential element of de- 
tente, security and cooperation in Europe, 
and noted the continuing relevance of the 
London declaration of 9 May 1977 and the 
Tokyo declaration of 29 June 1979. Ministers 
noted with satisfaction the improved climate 
in the relations between the two German 
states after a period of reserve and wel- 
comed the conclusion of new agreements and 
the continuation of negotiations. Ministers 
consider this as a positive element in the 
process of detente in Europe, having at the 
same time beneficial effects for Berlin. 

12. Ministers noted the report on the 
situation in the Mediterranean prepared on 
their instructions and underlined again the 
necessity of maintaining the balance of 
forces in the whole area. They requested the 
Council in permanent session to continue to 
consult on the question and submit a further 
report at their next meeting. 

13. Ministers welcomed the continuation 
of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey 
in search of a peaceful solution to the differ- 
ences between the two countries and they 
expressed the hope that in this manner posi- 
tive results could be attained in the near 
future. 



February 1980 



21 



Europe 



14. Ministers considered a report by the 
Secretary General on the particular prob- 
lems faced by economically less advanced 
member countries which constitutes a sound 
basis for action. While noting with satisfac- 
tion the special efforts that had been made 
over recent months, they stressed the need 
to give further momentum to the efforts to 
provide, in the spirit of Article 2 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, assistance to those 
countries, so as to reach concrete and timely 
results. They reaffirmed their continuing 
political support for this process which will, 
indeed, constitute an essential element for 
the fulfillment of the contributions by those 
countries to collective defence. 

15. With respect to the Middle East, the 
Ministers affirmed the importance of 
elaborating and implementing a just, lasting 
and comprehensive settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict on the basis of Resolutions 
242 and 338 and with the participation of all 
the parties concerned, including representa- 
tives of the Palestinian people. Ministers 
noted with satisfaction the progress 
achieved by Egypt and Israel in the im- 
plementation of Resolution 242 insofar as 
their mutual relations are concerned. They 
reaffirmed that a lasting peace requires the 
solution of the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects and the achievement of the legiti- 
mate rights of the Palestinian people in the 
context of a negotiated settlement that en- 
sures the security of all states in the region 
including Israel. 

16. Ministers warmly welcomed the 
agreement reached in the constitutional 
conference on Rhodesia. They expressed the 
hope that the cease-fire proposals agreed at 
that conference would quickly become fully 
effective, and that peace would return to 
Rhodesia and the neighboring countries. 
Ministers looked forward to the day when 
the independent Republic of Zimbabwe 
would take its place as a full member of the 
international community. 

17. Ministers, recalling that the Com- 
mittee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
(CCMS) had been set up in 1969, took note 
of the Committee's achievements during its 
first ten years. They commended its innova- 
tive and flexible approach to many problems 
of the human environment in fields such as 
energy conservation, alternative energy 
sources and pollution. Ministers noted the 
studies launched in 1979, including those of 
the restoration and conservation of monu- 
ments, and on man's impact on the strato- 
sphere, as well as projected studies on the 
management of technology. 

18. The Ministers who participated in 
the special meeting of Foreign and Defence 
Ministers on 12th December, 1979 noted 
with satisfaction that the decisions taken 
today by the North Atlantic Council in their 
opinion complemented those adopted at that 
meeting. Taken together, along with con- 
tinuing activities flowing from decisions 
reached at the London and Washington 
meetings, they constitute a comprehensive 
programme of action. This programme com- 
prises measures to reduce the military im- 
balance through concrete improvement and 
modernization of long-range theatre nuclear 
and conventional forces, and the following 



wide range of initiatives particularly in the 
fields of confidence building and arms con- 
trol designed to improve mutual security 
and co-operation in Europe: 

• An offer to negotiate for substantial 
reductions in the Tevel of long-range theatre 
nuclear forces as well as intercontinental 
strategic forces within the framework of 
SALT III; 

• Unilateral withdrawal of one thousand 
US nuclear warheads from Europe as part of 
the 12th December decision; 

• A proposal for an interim Phase I 
agreement for mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions, designed to give fresh impetus to 
the MBFR negotiations; 

• A proposal for a package of associated 
measures in MBFR designed to ensure com- 
pliance with the agreement and to make 
military activities more transparent, 
thereby improving mutual confidence; 

• In furtherance of the CSCE process, 
readiness to examine proposals concerning 
confidence building measures and a confer- 
ence on disarmament in Europe. 

These Ministers are determined that the 
1980's should see a fundamental change for 
the better in the situation between East and 
West and will make every effort to bring 
this about. The programme of action which 
they envisage offers the best opportunity for 
creating more constructive relations be- 
tween East and West for which their citi- 
zens have hoped for so long. 

These Ministers considered that this 
programme represents a major new oppor- 
tunity for the countries of the Warsaw Pact 
to translate into action the interest they 
have signalled in improving the situation in 
Europe. They call on the Warsaw Pact Gov- 
ernments to respond to this offer by making 
a determined effort, in all available 
negotiating fora, to achieve substantial re- 
sults which will enhance security and mutual 
trust. 



SECRETARY'S NEWS 
CONFERENCE, 
DEC. 14, 1979 

Let me say at the outset that I believe 
that this has been one of the most pro- 
ductive ministerial meetings of NATO 
in many years. The achievements were 
solid, and a sense of common purpose 
was impressively high. After this 
meeting and the NATO summit meet- 
ings in 1977 and in 1978, I think we can 
say that we have set the alliance on a 
sound course for the next decade. 

Let me review for you briefly, be- 
fore we get into the questions, what has 
taken place. 

On Wednesday [December 12], as 
you all know, the Ministers reached 
agreement on an important program to 
modernize the theater nuclear forces 
and to start negotiations on limiting 



theater nuclear forces in the SALT III 
framework. Yesterday, the alliance is- 
sued a declaration on the situation in 
Iran, and we had a very useful discus- 
sion of this subject, and I was heart- 
ened by the support shown us by all of 
those around the table. 

Today the alliance has issued a 
communique which I think you have 
probably now seen which presents, in 
my judgment, a challenge to the War- 
saw Pact to translate into action the 
interest that they have signaled in im- 
proving the situation in Europe. 

The Ministers have agreed on a 
comprehensive program of action in the 
field of arms control which is designed 
to improve security and cooperation in 
Europe, and I'll sketch very briefly for 
you the principal items of this com- 
prehensive program. 

The first is an offer for substantial 
reductions in the level of long-range 
theater nuclear forces as well as inter- 
continental strategic forces to be dis- 
cussed within the framework of SALT 
III. 

Next, a withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. 
nuclear warheads from Europe as part 
of the theater nuclear decisions which 
were taken on Wednesday. 

Third, a proposal for an interim 
phase-one agreement for mutual and 
balanced force reductions designed to 
give fresh impetus to the MBFR 
negotiations. 

Next, a proposal for a package of 
associated measures in MBFR designed 
to insure compliance with the agree- 
ment and to make military activities 
more transparent and, as a result, pro- 
ducing and improving mutual confi- 
dence. 

And finally, in furtherance of the 
CSCE process, readiness to examine 
proposals concerning confidence meas- 
ures and a conference on disarmament 
in Europe. 

The United States will be shortly 
transmitting to the Soviet Union the 
communique of the December 12 meet- 
ing which contains the decision taken 
by the United States following consul- 
tations within the alliance to negotiate 
arms limitations on long-range theater 
nuclear forces, and to propose to the 
Soviet Union to begin negotiations as 
soon as possible along the lines con- 
tained in the December 12 communique. 

We also promptly moved within the 
alliance to implement the December 12 
decision by constituting a special 
high-level consultative body to support 
the U.S. negotiating effort on theater 
nuclear weapons in SALT III. I think it 
is a comprehensive and a very impor- 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



Europe 



tant program which was unanimously 
supported today. 

Q. The American proposal for de- 
ploying missiles in Western Europe 
was put forward on the theory that it 
would stimulate arms negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. And yet the 
reaction of the Soviet Union and their 
allies has been a negative one. Do you 
take that reaction as being just an in- 
stant reaction, or does it suggest 
something about their unwillingness 
to see the proposal the way you do 
and to negotiate? 

A. I take it as an initial reaction. It 
is my judgment that when they see and 
study the proposal that has been put 
forward that they will treat it as a seri- 
ous proposal, and I believe that it does 
form the basis for negotiations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States 
acting in consultation with its allies. 

Q. What effect do you think 
events in Iran will have on the au- 
tonomy negotiations for the West 
Bank and Gaza, because the U.S. 
chief negotiator is a pessimist re- 
garding the May 25 target date? 

A. I do not think that the situation 
in Iran will affect the negotiations on 
the West Bank and Gaza. As to whether 
or not the May target date can be met, 
I think it's too early yet to see. We've 
always said that that was going to be a 
very difficult set of negotiations. There 
are very tough issues to be resolved in 
those negotiations. Some progress has 
been made. There's a long way to go on 
that road. People are going to do their 
best to meet that target date. I can't 
say for sure whether it can be met or 
not. 

Q. Did you say that the negotia- 
tions about the reduction of the 
long-range theater nuclear forces will 
take place in the framework of SALT 
III? Does that mean that nothing can 
be started until SALT II is ratified by 
the U.S. Senate? 

A. What it means is that we will 
start consultations with our allies in 
January in the consultative group which 
I referred to earlier, and there will be 
constant consultations with them on a 
regular and periodic basis. I would say 
that they would occur at least at a 
quarterly basis and my guess is more 
frequently. 

In addition to that, I intend to 
communicate to the Soviet Union in a 
few days — probably next Monday — the 
proposal which resulted from our delib- 
erations here. I think it is possible to 
have preliminary discussions, but in- 



sofar as actual negotiations are con- 
cerned they would await the start of 
the SALT III negotiations. 

Q. Does the United States now 
contemplate, either in SALT or in 
these theater nuclear force negotia- 
tions, adding our forward base sys- 
tems to the mix in exchange perhaps 
for the Backfire? 

A. Insofar as the Backfire is con- 
cerned, as I indicated yesterday, 
Backfire is one of the issues which must 
be taken care of in the SALT III 
negotiations, and it is a key and impor- 
tant issue. On the question of forward 
base systems, they were excluded from 
the prior negotiations. We will have to 
wait and see what the Soviet position is 
in the SALT III negotiations. 

Q. Some U.S. officials in recent 
weeks have characterized the NATO 
arms control package as the most 
comprehensive arms control proposal 
ever made concerning Europe. Would 
you agree with that characterization? 

A. That what we arrived at today 
is the most comprehensive? Yes, I 
think it is because it's a comprehensive 
proposal that cuts across the entire 
spectrum. And when you see that, also 
coupled with the fact that insofar as 
central systems are concerned — we will 
be discussing central systems as 
well — it is indeed the most comprehen- 
sive that's ever been put forward. 

Q. Could you repeat the concrete 
proposals you are going with to Mos- 
cow which were very vague in the 
communique? Could you be more con- 
crete on that? 

A. I think it's quite concrete. I've 
just been through an outline; what all 
they covered just a moment ago. 

Q. If we now add yet another 
echelon in the disarmament field of a 
conference — the 35 nation 
conference — how are you going to 
keep the kind of lines of what each is 
doing clear? What's the point of add- 
ing yet another conference to this 
process? 

A. The negotiations with respect to 
theater nuclear forces do add a com- 
plexity to the discussions in SALT III. 
There's no question about that. And it 
will be a much more complex set of 
negotiations than were the negotiations 
in SALT II, because they include not 
only central systems but theater sys- 
tems as well. Insofar as the question of 
a conference on disarmament is con- 
cerned, that I think is a constructive 



idea which has been put forward by 
France, and it's a useful concept which 
may provide a basis for putting 
forward — on which to continue de- 
veloping their approach in this field to 
bring about a conference where one 
could discuss confidence-building 
measures. 

Q. Would you please outline for 
us what you think the accom- 
plishments have been this week in 
terms of your efforts to get the hos- 
tages in Iran free and what future 
steps are contemplated? 

A. I have had a series of very use- 
ful meetings with a number of the heads 
of government of several of the Euro- 
pean nations. In this I have been able 
to explore with them the current state 
of the discussions and activities which 
are going on in the diplomatic field and 
various actions which are underway and 
various actions which are contem- 
plated. This has been very useful to us 
in helping to chart our own course of 
action, and I have been very pleased by 
the solidarity that I have found in the 
discussions with the various heads of 
government. 

In addition to that I have had a 
chance here to meet with the Foreign 
Ministers of the 14 nations and to dis- 
cuss with them also, in a very full but 
less detailed sense, the same matters 
which I discussed with the heads of 
state. I think I have outlined to them 
not only what the situation is but what 
the immediate prospects are for the 
days immediately ahead of us, and, 
again, I feel encouraged by the very 
obvious and clear solidarity that was 
shown by all of our allies. 

Q. You are speaking of solidarity. 
What I want to know is really 
whether you have asked, and whether 
you got some support by the Euro- 
pean governments, in joining the 
United States of America, if eventu- 
ally you will decide to apply sanctions 
against Iran. 

A. I have discussed with our col- 
leagues the possibility of having to go 
to the Security Council for chapter 7 
sanctions if action is not forthcoming in 
the release of the hostages. And I have 
discussed that at quite some length 
with not only the Foreign Ministers but 
with the heads of government, and I 
have been much encouraged by the re- 
sponse I've gotten. ■ 



1 Press release 326 of Dec. 19, 1979. 

2 Issued at the conclusion of the joint 
meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense 
Ministers. 



February 1980 



23 



Europe 



Visit of British 
Prime Minister 
Thatcher 



Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
of the United Kingdom made an official 
visit to the United States December 
16-18, 1979. While in Washington, 
D.C. (Dec. 16-17), she met with Presi- 
dent Carter and other government offi- 
cials. Following is the text of the White 
House statement issued on December 
18. ' 

The President met December 17 with 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of 
the United Kingdom. Prime Minister 
Thatcher is making an official visit to 
the United States, her first to this 
country as Prime Minister. 

The President and the Prime 
Minister reviewed the exceptionally 
close relations between their two coun- 
tries and discussed a number of key 
world issues which are of particular 
concern to both. These included the 
Iran crisis, the Rhodesia settlement. 
Middle East, Northern Ireland, theater 
nuclear force modernization and arms 
control, strategic cooperation, SALT, 
the comprehensive test ban talks, in- 
ternational economic issues and energy, 
common approaches to the Caribbean 
and aid to developing countries, trans- 
Atlantic defense trade, and bilateral 
economic and commercial issues. 

The President expressed his ap- 
preciation and that of the entire Ameri- 
can people for the United Kingdom's 
assistance and support in connection 
with the international effort to secure 
release of American hostages held by 
Iran in defiance of universally accepted 
standards of decency and law. The 
President and the Prime Minister 
agreed that the principle of civilized 
behavior and the rule of law, vital to 
the whole world community, is at stake 
in the present crisis. The Prime Minis- 
ter made it clear that Britain shared 
the anguish of America and would do its 
utmost to convince the Iranian au- 
thorities to release all the hostages 
unharmed. 

The President congratulated the 
Prime Minister on her government's 
vigorous role in the Lancaster House 
negotiations and the potential these 
have for contributing to peace and sta- 
bility in southern Africa. The Prime 
Minister expressed warm appreciation 
for the full support of the United States 
for an all-party solution to outstanding 



issues and its readiness to promote fur- 
ther progress in Rhodesia toward a 
fully democratic, independent state, 
within the framework of the arrange- 
ments agreed upon by the parties di- 
rectly concerned. 

The Prime Minister explained the 
British Government's recent political 
initiative in proposing a conference of 
the principal political parties in North- 
ern Ireland with the aim of finding an 
acceptable way of giving the people of 
Northern Ireland more responsibility 
for their own affairs. Both leaders con- 
demned support for organizations and 
individuals engaged directly or indi- 
rectly in campaigns of violence and 
agreed that such campaigns only delay 
the day when peace and reconciliation 
can come to Northern Ireland. The 
President reaffirmed U.S. policy con- 
cerning the tragic problem of Northern 
Ireland as set forth in this statement of 
August 1977. 

In security matters directly af- 
fecting their two countries, the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister: (1) 
applauded the decision taken last week 
by NATO governments to proceed with 
effective modernization and deployment 
of theater nuclear forces and with arms 
control proposals designed to reduce, 
on a basis of equality, nuclear weapons 
of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (2) 
agreed that the earliest possible ratifi- 
cation of the SALT II treaty would sig- 
nificantly contribute to a safer and 
more stable international security 
environment. 

The President and Prime Minister 
agreed on the importance of maintain- 
ing a credible British strategic deter- 
rent force and U.S. -U.K. strategic 
cooperation. The leaders agreed that 



Prime Minister Thatcher and 
President Carter. 




their governments should continue 
their discussions of the most appropri- 
ate means of achieving these objectives 
for the future. In this connection the 
President and Prime Minister discussed 
the importance of increased efforts to 
strengthen NATO's defenses, both nu- 
clear and conventional. The President 
reviewed the new U.S. 5-year defense 
plan, noting that in order to carry out 
that plan the United States will be in- 
creasing defense spending, in real 
terms, steadily over the next 5 years. 

The President and Prime Minister 
reaffirmed their strong support for the 
NATO Long-Term Defense Program 
and for the NATO aim of 3% real 
growth in annual defense spending. The 
Prime Minister noted plans for further 
significant increases in the U.K. de- 
fense budget to improve the effective- 
ness of United Kingdom conventional 
forces, including provision of modern- 
ized equipment and reserves. The 
Prime Minister agreed that it was es- 
sential for America's European allies to 
share equitably in any collective de- 
fense buildup to meet the needs of the 
common defense. 

During her visit to the United 
States, the Prime Minister is also 
meeting with Secretary of Defense 
Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Jones, and other senior 
defense officials; Members of Congress; 
Chairman Volcker of the Federal Re- 
serve Board; U.N. Secretary General 
Waldheim, and the President of the 
U.N. General Assembly. 

Prime Minister Thatcher invited 
the President to visit the United King- 
dom at a mutually agreeable date, and 
the President accepted the invitation 
with pleasure. ■ 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 24, 1979, 
which also contains President Carter's and 
Prime Minister Thatcher's exchange of re- 
marks at the arrival ceremony and following 
a meeting on Dec. 17 and their toasts at the 
state dinner that evening. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 






Europe 



U.S.-U.K. Atomic 
Energy Agreement 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
NOV. 28, 1979 l 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, 
pursuant to Section 123d of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2153), the text of an amendment to the 
Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Govern- 
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Brit- 
ain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on 
the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual De- 
fense Purposes of July 3, 1958, as amended, 
and my written approval, authorization and 
determination concerning the agreement. 
The joint classified and unclassified 
memoranda submitted to me by the Sec- 
retaries of Energy and Defense which pro- 
vide a summary analysis of the amendment 
are also enclosed. 

The amendment extends for five years 
(until December 31, 1984) those provisions 
which permit the transfer of nonnuclear 
parts, source, by-product special nuclear 
material and other material for nuclear 
weapons and special nuclear material for 
fueling military propulsion reactors. 

In my judgement, the proposed amend- 
ment meets all statutory requirements. The 
United Kingdom intends to continue to 
maintain viable nuclear forces. In light of 
our previous close cooperation and the fact 
that the United Kingdom has committed its 
nuclear forces to NATO, I have concluded 
that it is in our security interest to continue 
to assist them in maintaining a credible nu- 
clear force. 

I have approved the amendment and au- 
thorized its execution and urge the Congress 
give it favorable consideration. 

Jimmy Carter 



MEMORANDUMS FOR THE 
SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 
AND ENERGY, NOV. 28, 1979 1 

Subject: Proposed Amendment to the 
US-UK Agreement for Cooperation on the 
Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense 
Purposes 

I have reviewed your joint letter to me 
of November 2, 1979, recommending ap- 
proval of a proposed Amendment to the 
Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Govern- 
ment of the United Kingdom for Coopera- 
tion on the Uses of Atomic Energy for 
Mutual Defense Purposes. I note from your 
joint recommendation that the United King- 
dom is participating with the United States 



pursuant to an international agreement by 
substantial and material contributions to the 
mutual defense and security. The proposed 
Amendment will permit cooperation which 
will further improve our mutual defense 
posture and be in support of NATO. 
I hereby: 

• Approve the program outlined in the 
proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agree- 
ment; 

• Determine that cooperation under the 
proposed Amendment will promote and will 
not constitute an unreasonable risk to the 
common defense and security; and 

• Authorize the execution of the pro- 
posed Amendment for the Government of 
the United States in a manner specified by 
the Secretary of State. 

Jimmy Carter ■ 



1 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979. 



16th Report 
on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
NOV. 28, 1979 » 

In accordance with the provisions of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress made during the past 60 
days towards the conclusion of a negotiated 
solution of the Cyprus problem. 

In my last Cyprus report to the Con- 
gress, dated September 25, I noted that the 
recess in the intercommunal talks continues 
despite persistent and intensive efforts by 
UN Secretary General Waldheim and his 
staff to bring the two parties back to the 
conference table. I regret to report that in 
the intervening 60 days these efforts have 
still not borne fruit. 

The United States shares the view that 
only sustained intercommunal talks can lead 
to a just and lasting settlement of the Cy- 
prus problem. We believe that the continu- 
ing good-offices efforts of the Secretary 
General are the most promising way to 
achieve a serious negotiation. I am pleased 
that our November 1978 proposals provided 
impetus for the current UN initiative. We 
have strongly supported that initiative since 
it began, and we shall continue to do so. In 
part due to our support, the Secretary Gen- 
eral and his staff are making progress to- 
ward finding a formula on the basis of which 
the talks might resume. 

The current session of the UN General 
Assembly is creating opportunities to 
explore avenues of progress on the Cyprus 
question. Secretary Vance had meetings 
with President Kyprianou in New York on 
September 26 and October 4. Other U.S. of- 
ficials are in contact with principals in the 
Cyprus dispute, and with interested third 
parties, to prepare for the General Assem- 
bly debate on Cyprus. We hope that after 



the General Assembly completes its discus- 
sion of Cyprus, both sides will find it possi- 
ble to resume the intercommunal negotia- 
tions. It is essential that they not allow the 
quest for short-term advantage to erode 
their mutual objective of finding a settle- 
ment which meets the basic needs of all 
people on the island. 

The long and tortuous history of the 
Cyprus problem demonstrates that peaceful 
progress has never been easy. The obsta- 
cles, while formidable, are not insurmount- 
able. We continue to believe that progress is 
achievable, and we are vigorously seeking 
it. Toward that end, we remain in close 
touch with all parties to the Cyprus dispute, 
the United Nations, our European allies, 
and other states which have a legitimate 
role to play and which desire to contribute 
to the achievement of our common goal. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy Carter ■ 



1 Identical letters addressed to Thomas 
P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Frank Church, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979). 



CORRECTION 

In the November 1979 issue of 
the Bulletin, page 35, the Secre- 
tary's statement on "U.S. Commit- 
ment to Western Europe," in the 
first paragraph, the last sentence 
should read: "The substantial forces 
we have deployed to Europe are one 
concrete evidence of that commit- 
ment." Through a typographical 
error, the word "one" was printed as 
"not." 



I 



February 1980 



25 



Europe 



National Security 

and U.S.-Soviet Relations 



by Matthew Nimetz 

Address at Duke University in 
Durham, North Carolina, on 
November 19, 1979. Mr. Nimetz is 
Counselor for the Department of State. 

Forty years ago, Winston Churchill — in 
a now famous piece of rhetoric — 
described the Soviet Union as "a riddle 
wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma." He spoke, of course, before 
the creation of a wartime alliance be- 
tween the Soviet Union and Great Brit- 
ain and the United States, before the 
detonation of the first nuclear device, 
before the onset of the cold war and the 
division of much of the world between 
East and West, before the Cuban mis- 
sile crisis, before the era of detente, 
and before the SALT process. 

Our relations with the Soviet 
Union have undergone much change in 
the intervening years, punctuated with 
major developments and occasional 
crises, but the aura of mystery and un- 
predictability still remains. Both sides 
have yet to arrive at a common under- 
standing of each other, much less a 
common approach to participating in 
the wider international environment. 

That this should be so is not a re- 
flection upon the wisdom or skills of the 
officials who have managed our bilat- 
eral relations in the past decades. 
There has been no lack of desire to 
carve out a peaceful and productive re- 
lationship with the Soviet Union, but 
we remain, however, two nations with 
fundamentally different points of view. 
Our moral values, social beliefs, and 
economic systems are very different. 
Our approach to international problem 
areas is often widely divergent. Our 
perceptions of the strategic military 
balance are probably quite dissimilar. 
Our approach to the Third World, to 
development issues, to the creation of a 
harmonious approach to North-South 
questions is not the same and often in- 
tensely competitive. Our methods of 
formulating foreign policy — including 
the assimilation of domestic 
viewpoints — are notably different. And 
our relationship often is influenced by 
developments in the international envi- 
ronment which neither country can 
control. 

In large part the differences be- 
tween our two countries are inescapa- 
ble, and we must recognize that our 



bilateral relationship must reflect the 
fact that we are dealing with a nation 
and a set of leaders whose background 
and principles and sense of national 
interests are very different from our 
own. The frustration and disappoint- 
ment that sometimes accompany the 
periodic setbacks in our dealings with 
the Soviet Union are understandable; 
but we should not despair that overall 
progress cannot be made. We should 
continue to seek out those areas of ac- 
commodation that are possible while 
accepting the fact that the Soviet lead- 
ership will measure progress in our re- 
lations by a yardstick of their own 
construction. 

It has historically been true that 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
have had only very few areas of con- 
tact. Our genesis as a nation was 
primarily in Western Europe, and our 
ties to that continent have traditionally 
been close and fruitful. Russia, on the 
other hand, on the periphery of 
Europe, retained a powerful tie to na- 
tive Slavic and Central Asian traditions 
and culture that were untouched by the 
Renaissance and only superficially af- 
fected by 17th and 18th century 
humanism. The physical breadth and 
wealth of our two nations insured a de- 
gree of insularity to our two societies. 
We are both continental nations; the 
United States being surrounded by two 
oceans, and Russia being separated 
from major Western European centers 
by vast distances with uncertain 
communication. 

Consequently, trade between our 
two countries has historically been very 
slight. Prior to 1917, our interests in 
terms of global developments centered 
on different portions of the world. Cul- 
tural developments and industrializa- 
tion took place in each country largely 
independent of developments in the 
other. Perhaps most importantly, we 
developed a system of government that 
drew upon principles of individual lib- 
erty, representative government, and 
the subservience of the state to its 
citizens — all markedly different from 
the historical and cultural determinants 
that shaped the character of czarist rule 
and the Government of the Soviet 
Union. 



National Security 

Thus, the historical background alone 
should caution us against being too san- 
guine about the degree to which the 
interests and attitudes of our two na- 
tions can be closely reconciled. We shall 
continue to remain fundamentally op- 
posed on a variety of important issues. 
What has changed in the last four dec- 
ades is not the degree to which the 
world views of the United States and 
the Soviet Union have converged but 
the number of areas in which our direct 
interests have intersected and occa- 
sionally clashed. 

Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in the field of national security. 
We have entered a world since 1945 in 
which the growing arsenals of both 
countries and the revolutionary change 
brought about by the development of 
nuclear weapons has made it impossible 
for us to ignore the potential challenges 
of Soviet military power. Dealing with 
this new factor in the U.S.-Soviet equa- 
tion is perhaps the central foreign pol- 
icy problem we face today. How we re- 
spond to the fact that the Soviet Union 
has at last emerged as a global military 
force, with all the political and diplo- 
matic consequences that stem from that 
development, will influence the course 
of our international policies for some 
time to come and profoundly affect the 
character, the stability, and even the 
continuation of the entire international 
order. 

Until recently, the military forces 
of the Soviet Union were largely 
oriented toward territorial defense and 
control of the Eastern European mem- 
bers of the Warsaw Pact. The U.S.S.R. 
has always maintained a large standing 
army, but these combat forces were 
trained and equipped primarily to fight 
in defense of the homeland or on the 
periphery of the Soviet Union. Simi- 
larly, until the present decade, the 
Soviet Navy lacked a significant 
ocean-going capability, concentrating 
instead upon the deployment of smaller 
craft designed for coastal purposes. The 
Soviet Air Force, although impressive 
in many areas, was largely made up of 
tactical interceptors, and the U.S.S.R. 
has never emphasized the development 
of a significant intercontinental bomber 
force. 

Beginning in the 1960s, the lead- 
ership of the Soviet Union began a 
major, sustained campaign to improve 
Soviet military capabilities across the 
board. Real increases were made in the 
Soviet defense budget on the order of 
3% every year. Significant resources 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 






Europe 



were funneled into an extensive pro- 
gram of military research and develop- 
ment. New weapons were acquired and 
eventually assigned to combat units. 

As a result, major changes have 
taken place in the power and sophistica- 
tion of the Soviet military establish- 
ment. New generations of ICBMs [in- 
tercontinental ballistic missiles], 
equipped with multiple warheads, have 
gradually been introduced into the 
Soviet rocket forces. The Soviet Air 
Force has greatly expanded its ability 
to strike deep within an adversary's 
territory and carry out naval strike and 
interdiction roles. The Soviet Navy has 
now become a truly "blue water" force, 
capable of operating in all oceans of the 
planet and confronting us for the first 
time with a significant danger of inter- 
ference with vital western sea lines of 
communication. 

Why the Soviet leadership has cho- 
sen to emphasize military strength at a 
time when the Soviet economy is having 
great difficulty in meeting even the 
most basic domestic needs is unknown 
to us. Given the bitter differences in 
views among Marxist states and 
parties — among the Soviet bloc, China, 
Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Euro- 
Communists — it is hard to believe that 
the leaders of the Kremlin still pursue 
the dream of Lenin and Trotsky to 
subjugate the world under the unified 
rule of a Russian-based Communist dic- 
tatorship. To rational men those goals 
must long have perished as the 
ideological appeal of the Soviet Union 
has steadily diminished throughout the 
world. Whatever the motive, it seems 
obvious to us that the extent and de- 
gree of this Soviet military buildup is 
far in excess of what is reasonably re- 
quired to protect the basic security 
interests of the Soviet people. 

We should bear in mind that our 
definition of national security is not 
necessarily shared by Soviet defense 
planners. The Soviets obviously are 
concerned not only about the United 
States and our allies but about an un- 
friendly China on their border. Recent 
history plays a major role as well. Our 
country has not, after all, been 
subjected to an actual military invasion 
in this century. The U.S.S.R. has— 
twice — and with devastating results. 
The national calamity of World War II, 
with some 20 million casualties in the 
Soviet Union, is an experience that is 
deeply etched in the minds and psyches 
of every member of the Soviet Polit- 
buro. It has been pointed out that such 



a trauma contributes to a policy that 
errs generously on the side of 
overpreparedness. 

But we, as careful trustees of our 
nation's destiny, must base our plan- 
ning on what we see and assume that 
current Soviet military planning 
springs from pragmatic and calculated 
geopolitical considerations. As dedi- 
cated as our nation may be to the 
peaceful resolution of international dis- 
putes, it is an indisputable fact that 
military power counts in the modern 
world. It counts not only in the direct 
application of force to the settlement of 
conflicts, or in the threat of its use, but 
also in the effects that the knowledge of 
superiority of military power inevitably 
has upon the actions that nations may 
choose to take or to forego when faced 
with a stronger and better armed ad- 
versary. There is no doubt that military 
strength is a powerful aspect of diplo- 
matic relations, even if it is never ac- 
tually used and never actually 
threatened. 

U.S. Policy 

Our policy in the United States has 
been to meet the challenge of the Soviet 
military buildup in two ways. 

First, we are determined that our 
overall military capabilities remain es- 
sentially equivalent to those of the 
Soviet Union and that they are suffic- 
ient to deter any aggression against the 
United States, our allies, or our mili- 
tary forces overseas. 

Second, when we can reach agree- 
ment with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of 
enlightened self-interest, we are com- 
mitted to pursuing those arms control 
initiatives which will reduce the likeli- 
hood of armed conflict, enhance our 
own national security, and contribute to 
international stability. 

These twin goals are interrelated 
and mutually reinforcing. Together, 
they will help us in managing the 
U.S. -Soviet military balance in the 
years to come. 

To insure parity between the de- 
fense forces of the two sides is not to 
insist upon a strict numerical equilib- 
rium based upon the accountant's 
ledger or the unyielding comparison of 
any given set of static indicators. Sim- 
ply counting up the number of tanks, 
ships, and other weapons deployed on 
each side would reveal a military bal- 
ance that is inherently misleading in 
terms of what it indicates about the rel- 
ative effectiveness of the two military 
forces. We do not need a defense struc- 



ture that is a mirror image of the Soviet 
Union's. Perfect symmetry will not in 
itself guarantee the fulfillment of our 
true defense needs. Our geography is 
different; our relations with our 
neighbors are different; our economies 
are different; and our allies are differ- 
ent. 

What we do need is a defense effort 
that is adequate to guarantee our na- 
tional security, the security of our al- 
lies, and our worldwide interests. We 
are spending enough now to meet that 
goal, but the trends in Soviet military 
expenditures mean that we shall have 
to do more in the years to come. The 
Soviet military is currently outspending 
us, although it is worth remembering 
that the U.S.S.R. defense effort must 
draw upon a civilian economy that is 
much less efficient than our own. They 
also began their current buildup from a 
position of clear inferiority, so that we 
have had a marginal advantage for 
many years that has made it relatively 
less important that our defense ex- 
penditures match those of the Soviets. 

Indeed, for most of the years in the 
past decade, our own military spending 
has actually declined when measured in 
constant dollars or as a percentage of 
gross national product. In 1960, for 
example, national defense expenditures 
amounted to $115 billion (in 1978 dol- 
lars) and constituted slightly more than 
9% of our gross national product. Those 
figures rose during the latter half of the 
decade due to our involvement in 
Southeast Asia, but they then began to 
decline. By 1977, we were actually 
spending $12 billion less on defense in 
real terms than we were in 1960, and 
the percentage of our GNP allotted to 
the military had fallen to 5.3%. 

Meanwhile, the Soviet military 
buildup continued unabated. (You 
should know that the Soviets devote 
about 13% of their GNP to defense.) As 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has 
noted, the U.S.S.R.'s commitment to 
rising defense budgets has been unaf- 
fected by the decisions we have made 
with regard to defense spending: "As 
our defense budgets have risen, the 
Soviets have increased their defense 
budget. As our defense budgets have 
gone down, their defense budgets have 
increased again." 

Given these facts, we have ar- 
rested the downward spiral in U.S. 
military spending. Last year, the Ad- 
ministration was successful in obtaining 
a real increase in the defense budget of 
3%, and the President has made clear 
his commitment to an increase in the 
next budget of at least 3%. We have 



February 1980 



27 



Europe 



certainly not been standing still during 
the past 10 years, but it is equally clear 
that further efforts are required if we 
are to be successful in maintaining the 
military balance for the future. 

We have, as I say, made some im- 
pressive strides in modernizing and ex- 
panding our capacity to respond to mili- 
tary conflicts throughout the world. In 
the field of strategic nuclear weapons, 
the President has decided to improve 
the survivability of our land-based in- 
tercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
force through the development and de- 
ployment of the new, mobile MX missile 
system. We have just put the first of 
the new Trident submarines to sea, and 
we are currently in the process of de- 
ploying the improved Trident I 
submarine-launched ballistic missile. In 
1981, we shall begin fitting many of our 
B-52 strategic bombers with long- 
range, air-launched cruise missiles that 
will serve to extend the useful life of 
the B-52 force well into the 1980s. 

We have also sought to upgrade 
our capabilities in the field of conven- 
tional weapons. Together with our 
NATO allies, we have agreed upon a 
long-term defense program for Western 
Europe that will vastly improve the al- 
liance's ability to respond to any mili- 
tary threat or incursion from the War- 
saw Pact. We have accelerated our 
programs for the acquisition of sophis- 
ticated antitank weapons and other 
precision-guided munitions. We have 
generally upgraded the overall effec- 
tiveness of our conventional forces, and 
we are exploring new ways of organiz- 
ing military units — such as the pro- 
posed rapid deployment force — that will 
enable us to meet military situations in 
a flexible and effective manner. A 
major watershed in the deployment of 
theater nuclear weapons will occur next 
month when the NATO governments 
meet to decide upon the emplacement of 
a new generation of medium-range nu- 
clear weapons in Western Europe. 

SALT 

Military competition can be managed, 
however, in ways other than mutual 
buildup of forces. For this reason we 
pursue arms control initiatives, perhaps 
the most important of which is SALT. 
SALT — the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks — is certainly not a panacea that 
will solve all our problems, and it is also 
not a substitute for the increased effort 
we are making in terms of defense out- 
lays. For one thing, SALT deals only 
with a limited category of weapons — 
those that are nuclear capable and that 
are deliverable from the territory of the 



United States to the Soviet Union, or 
vice versa. The talks have not dealt 
with conventional weapons or with 
shorter range, theater nuclear devices. 
These systems continue to be uncon- 
strained by the arms control process. 

Secondly, the SALT II agreement 
that is currently before the Senate of 
the United States does not go as far as 
we would like in limiting and restrain- 
ing the strategic nuclear delivery ve- 
hicles that are included in the agree- 
ment. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union will be able to modernize 
their strategic arsenals to some degree 
even with the SALT II agreement in 
force. We do plan, however, to make 
further progress in obtaining greater 
controls on strategic weapons in the 
context of the SALT III negotiations. 

SALT II is an important step for 
the United States, however, because 
we will slow the momentum of Soviet 
strategic deployments in several crucial 
areas. The agreement will last until 
1985, and we could well be facing a 
more dangerous strategic environment 
in that year without the controls that 
SALT II will provide. 

• We know, for example, that the 
Soviet Union currently has four and 
possibly five new types of ICBMs 
either on the drawing boards or in the 
early stages of development. Without 
SALT II, the U.S.S.R. could deploy all 
five news types. With SALT II, they 
will be limited to one totally new mis- 
sile system. 

• Without SALT II, the Soviet 
Union could deploy as many as 3,000 
strategic missile launchers and heavy 
bombers by 1985. With SALT II, they 
will be limited to no more than 2,250. 

• Without SALT II, the Soviet 
Union could have in place by 1985 as 
many as 1,200 ICBMs equipped with 
multiple warheads. With SALT II, they 
will be limited to a maximum of 820. 

• Without SALT II, the Soviet 
Union could deploy 30 or 35 individual 
warheads on each of their largest land- 
based missiles. With SALT II, they will 
be limited to no more than 10. 

• Without SALT II, it is question- 
able whether the Soviet Union would 
choose voluntarily to make real reduc- 
tions in its nuclear arsenal. With SALT 
II, the U.S.S.R. will be forced to dis- 
mantle some 250 strategic nuclear de- 
livery vehicles that are now targeted on 
the United States. 

The SALT II agreement, there- 
fore, will enhance our ability to meet 
the challenge of rising Soviet defense 
expenditures. It will do so without con- 
straining any significant military pro- 



grams that we plan to inaugurate dur- 
ing the term of the agreement. It will 
be a useful complement to our regular 
defense programs, and it will aid us in 
predicting the future course of Soviet 
defense decisionmaking. 

Other U.S. Strengths 

We should also remember that national 
security is made up of a number of im- 
portant factors, of which military 
strength is only one. By most other in- 
dicators, the United States is clearly 
the most powerful nation in the world. 
In terms of our economic strength, the 
vitality of our basic science and tech- 
nology, the appeal of our democratic 
lifestyle to other nations, and the politi- 
cal and social vitality of our society, the 
Soviet Union does not rank as even a 
distant second. Our allies and 
friends — Canada, Western Europe, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand — 
add overwhelmingly to Western influ- 
ence and strength, particularly when 
compared to the demoralized and often 
reluctant supporters of the Soviet 
Union. 

Let me mention the sphere of 
ideas — the competition for the minds of 
people — as another arena of competi- 
tion where I believe we have a decisive 
advantage, albeit one we have not used 
as adeptly as we might. The Soviets, 
trained in the Marxist-Leninist tradi- 
tion, place heavy emphasis on prop- 
aganda and on ideology, while we tend 
to feel less comfortable with heavy- 
handed verbal posturing. 

But we should make no mistake 
about the importance of articulating our 
values strongly, continuously, and per- 
suasively. Western ideals of indi- 
vidualism, personal dignity, and repre- 
sentative government strike responsive 
cords everywhere. The results can 
clearly be seen in the movement of 
people. The Soviet Union and other 
Marxist states expend great effort, in- 
cluding the crude use of walls and 
barbed wire, to keep their people from 
leaving. Our problem, as we review our 
immigration and refugee policy, is to 
decide how many of the millions who 
want to participate in our society we 
can reasonably accept. 

It is only in the area of military 
strength that the U.S.S.R. has ap- 
proached equivalence with us. We 
should not undervalue the enormous 
potential and capacity of the United 
States in nondefense matters. But we 
must also be realistic about preserving 
our ability to defend our interests, 
should that become necessary. For this 
reason, we see a new realism pervading 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 






FOREIGN AID 



the American polity — a realism about 
the world that is neither defeatist nor 
cocky. The next decade will require 
strengthened defense programs, tough 
negotiations, and a firmness and con- 
stancy of principle. I have no doubt that 
we will meet that challenge. I have no 
doubt that the fundamental advantages, 
now and for the future, lie with the 
West, not the East. ■ 



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Approaching Common Issues 
With Developing Countries 



by Thomas Ehrlich 

Address before the Council of 
Presidents of the National Association 
of State Universities and Land-Grant 
Colleges in Washington, D.C, on 
November 27, 1979. Mr. Ehrlich is Di- 
rector of the International Development 
Cooperation Agency. 

It is a pleasure to be here today. I am 
honored to speak before the represen- 
tatives of institutions that have played 
a vital role in the development of this 
country and many other nations as well. 
My hope today is to underscore my 
commitment to a partnership in inter- 
national economic development be- 
tween the Federal Government and 
State universities and land-grant col- 
leges and to suggest some of the ways 
in which that partnership can be 
strengthened, using the energy field as 
an example. 

Your institutions have been a 
major force in increasing American and 
global agricultural production since the 
last part of the 19th century. They de- 
serve much of the credit for our coun- 
try's ability not only to feed its own 
citizens but also to serve as the granary 
of the world. Your universities have 
made powerful contributions, not only 
in educating students but also in spon- 
soring innovative research and, 
through unique extension services, in 
applying its benefits to communities 
throughout the world. 

Our system of State universities 
and land-grant colleges is a particularly 
important asset to the developing na- 
tions of the world, where more than 
75% of the world's people — over 3 bil- 
lion human beings — live. Far too many 
people in these countries exist in condi- 
tions of abject poverty — more than 1 
billion are continually hungry and mal- 
nourished, more than 700 million per- 
sons in developing countries are illiter- 
ate, and 2Vfe billion do not have 
adequate health care. 

We should all be proud of the 30- 
year history of cooperation between 
your universities and the Agency for 
International Development (AID) and 
its predecessors. Research, extension 
services, and training facilities planned 
and implemented by your universities — 
in collaboration with your colleagues 
abroad — have helped develop vital 
technology and services for poor 
families in the Third World. Many of 



the leaders in every walk of life in the 
Third World were educated in univer- 
sities represented here today. The U.S. 
Government relies heavily on you for 
the expertise and training to manage 
many of our assistance efforts. 

In 1975 Congress reaffirmed the 
vital role of U.S. universities in al- 
leviating world hunger by passing title 
XII of the Foreign Assistance Act. The 
title mandates AID to utilize the skills 
and experience of American univer- 
sities. It goes on to provide means for 
strengthening the capacities of agricul- 
tural universities to assist developing 
countries in increasing their food 
production. 

As a former university dean, I un- 
derstand the importance of government 
support in planning, building, and 
maintaining specialized capabilities. 
Concerns are increasingly expressed in 
some quarters, however, that foreign 
aid funds may merely subsidize Ameri- 
can universities and not go significantly 
to meet the pressing development 
needs of poor countries. These concerns 
arise when there is a perception that 
development assistance funds are not 
being used directly to address the basic 
human needs of people in developing 
countries. 

Our efforts should be and will be 
carefully scrutinized, especially in 
times of fiscal restraint. The ultimate 
success of those efforts rests on our 
ability to deal with the challenges rep- 
resented in these questions. Your uni- 
versities, the U.S. Government, the 
American people, and, especially, poor 
people throughout the world have an 
enormous stake in insuring that our co- 
operative arrangements are im- 
plemented in the most effective manner 
possible and that they are carefully and 
fully explained to the American people 
and their representatives in Congress. 

Purposes of Foreign Aid 

U.S. interests are at stake in a wide 
range of problems that foreign eco- 
nomic assistance addresses. Our own 
prosperity and security, to a large ex- 
tent, will depend on how effectively we 
assist developing countries in advanc- 
ing their economic growth and meeting 
the basic needs of their citizens. 

Our foreign aid serves both the de- 
velopment aspirations of the Third 
World and U.S. interests in three fun- 
damental ways. 



February 1980 



29 



Foreign Aid 



First, our historical values and be- 
liefs provide a humanitarian basis for 
our efforts to help alleviate world pov- 
erty. As a free people with one of the 
highest standards of living in the world, 
we must respond to the staggering pic- 
ture of world hunger, poverty, illiter- 
acy, unemployment, and disease and 
the misery that these words represent 
in human terms. 

Second, we have vital global inter- 
ests that require collaboration with de- 
veloping countries. These include the 
need to control world population 
growth and the need to manage better 
the world's deteriorating natural re- 
source base. The promotion of interna- 
tional human rights and democratic 
values vitally depends on our coopera- 
tion with Third World countries. De- 
veloping countries cannot adequately 
respond to these challenges without our 
assistance. 

Third, foreign aid serves our eco- 
nomic and political interests. Third 
World development means more trade 
and more jobs for Americans. 

• The developing countries are a 
major — and the fastest growing — 
market for U.S. goods. They already 
buy over one-third of our exports — the 
same share as for Europe and the 
Communist countries combined. One 
out of every three acres of American 
farmland produces food for export, 
much of it to the Third World, and 1.2 
million American manufacturing jobs 
now depend on exports to the develop- 
ing countries. 

• The United States is increasingly 
dependent on Third World countries for 
essential raw materials vital to our 
economy and security. We import from 
developing nations 85% of the bauxite 
required for aluminum products. We 
obtain 93% of our tin from developing 
countries. The importance of oil im- 
ports from the Third World has been 
repeatedly, almost bitterly, brought 
home to us. I will focus on energy a bit 
later in my remarks. 

• Our country earned more than 
$16 billion from our direct investments 
in the developing world in 1978. Last 
year U.S. firms invested nearly $6 bil- 
lion in the developing world. 

• Our economy also benefits 
substantially from aid dollars spent 
here to buy commodities and services. 
For every dollar we have paid into the 
multilateral development banks, U.S. 
GNP increased roughly $3 as a direct 
result of bank lending activities. 

A developing country's commit- 
ment to its equitable growth is the most 



important factor in determining its own 
economic development. Basic policies 
concerning trade, investment, com- 
modities, and technology transfer have 
an enormous impact on the develop- 
ment process. But external aid also 
plays a vital role, and this will continue 
for the foreseeable future. 

Earlier this month I visited 
Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia 
and saw how important the programs of 
AID, the multilateral banks, and the in- 
ternational organizations are to the de- 
velopment goals of these countries. The 
problems are enormous. I found the 
pressures of overpopulation in Dacca 
frightening, for example. Every aid 
program, of course, can be 
strengthened. But they are making a 
major contribution. 

World peace and security interests 
are served by foreign aid because de- 
veloping countries are key participants 
in the quest for peaceful resolution of 
disputes, regional stability, arms re- 
straint, nonproliferation, and other 
basic foreign policy objectives. Good 
relations with developing nations are 
essential in a wide range of areas that 
affect our security. 

Human economic and social prog- 
ress, promoted by effective develop- 
ment, mitigates against conflict result- 
ing from poverty, inequitable distribu- 
tion of resources, and denigration of 
basic human rights. The words of Pope 
John XXIII come to mind: "In a world 
of constant want there is no 
peace. . . ." 

The United States has committed 
substantial amounts of foreign aid over 
the past years — acting bilaterally and 
through multilateral development 
banks and international institutions. 
But since 1975, our contributions to de- 
velopment assistance as a share of U.S. 
gross national product have been only 
about Va of 1%. This year the figure is 
less than that — .22%, which ranks the 
United States 13th out of 17 major 
donor countries. All foreign economic 
aid amounts to only about 1% of our na- 
tional budget: $7.3 billion for FY 1979. 
Given the importance of U.S. interests 
at stake, a major priority of all our ef- 
forts must be to seek support through- 
out this country for stronger develop- 
ment assistance efforts in the future. 



Role of IDCA 

An important step in that direction 
came earlier this fall when the new In- 
ternational Development Cooperation 
Agency (IDCA) was established. The 
IDCA, which came into being on Oc- 



tober 1, 1979, plays the central role in 
U.S. development assistance efforts. It 
is primarily responsible for formulating 
U.S. international development policies 
for the President and for serving as his 
principal spokesman on those matters. 

As the principal adviser to the 
President on international develop- 
ment, IDCA must insure that our var- 
ied bilateral and multilateral develop- 
ment efforts are coordinated, efficient, 
and effective. The agency just prepared 
the first comprehensive foreign assist- 
ance budget and will present it next 
year to the Congress and the American 
people. 

The component parts of IDCA in- 
clude AID, the Overseas Private In- 
vestment Corporation, and — if ap- 
proved by Congress — a new Institute 
for Scientific and Technological Coop- 
eration. IDCA's concern and responsi- 
bility is economic development, and 
from this perspective it shares with the 
State Department responsibility for 
U.S. involvement in the U.N. system; 
with the Treasury Department, respon- 
sibility for U.S. participation in the 
multilateral development banks; and 
with the Department of Agriculture, 
the direction of the U.S. Food for Peace 
Program. 

Finally, the new agency has been 
mandated by the President and Con- 
gress to insure that our economic rela- 
tions with developing nations are taken 
into account in the full range of U.S. in- 
ternational policies, including trade, 
commodity arrangements, and financial 
matters. 

In short, IDCA has a broad range 
of responsibilities that extend beyond 
U.S. bilateral assistance. The agency 
should lead the way in analyzing and 
understanding the full complexity of 
U.S. economic relations with develop- 
ing nations and provide advice on the 
development aspects of these relation- 
ships. In that role, we need your 
help — we need the partnership of your 
institutions in many areas, just as it 
exists in agriculture. Let me use 
energy as an example. 

Challenge of Energy Development 

Among development problems, none is 
more challenging than energy. Many 
universities — and many of you, their 
leaders — have already become involved 
in the complex issues that the dynamics 
of energy have thrust on us. Energy 
concerns are plainly global. Domestic 
solutions alone cannot adequately deal 
with our own energy problems. The 
enormity of the task of the transition to 
a postpetroleum era requires our best 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



Foreign Aid 



minds and efforts in cooperation with 
their counterparts in the Third World. 
As events of the past weeks have 
made increasingly clear, the totality of 
our relations with the developing coun- 
tries is interwoven with energy 
economics. 

• More than one half of world oil 
production is in developing countries. 

• Nine out of every 10 barrels en- 
tering the international market come 
from developing countries. 

• Developing countries currently 
use about one-sixth of the world's oil, a 
figure likely to approach one-fourth 
within a decade. 

The oil-importing developing coun- 
tries have been hit very hard by petro- 
leum price rises. Expensive imported 
fuel is exacerbating balance-of-trade 
problems. Many countries are post- 
poning needed investment projects, 
holding down the growth of essential 
social services, and going more heavily 
into debt. Stagflation and the dangers 
of protectionism in industrialized coun- 
tries, as well as the overall slower 
growth in the countries belonging to 
the Organization for Economic Cooper- 
ation and Development, have seriously 
affected most developing countries. 

Developing countries' demand for 
commercial energy is likely to double 
by 1990. Many of these economies are 
entering energy-intensive phases of 
growth, much as we did during the last 
century. 

What is too often not understood, 
or overlooked, is that most of the 
people in developing countries rely on 
so-called traditional fuels for their di- 
rect energy needs. In the rural areas of 
the Third World, between 80% and 90% 
of nonanimate energy is provided by 
wood, charcoal, and crop and animal 
wastes, as well as simple forms of solar, 
water, and wind energy. Growing 
populations are straining these 
supplies. Firewood shortages are espe- 
cially serious. The ever-demanding 
search for firewood diverts villagers 
from agricultural tasks and denudes the 
landscape causing widespread soil ero- 
sion. The shortages of wood leaves 
people without fuel to cook and boil 
water for health needs. Here are a few 
examples of how serious is the firewood 
crisis. 

• At current rates of depletion, the 
world's tropical forests, which are 
mostly in developing countries, will 
disappear in only 60 years. 

• At least 12 countries, with a 
combined population of about 150 mil- 
lion people, are currently using fuel- 
wood in excess of sustainable yields. 



• The pace at which the firewood 
crisis is expanding, and the economic 
and environmental damage it portends, 
present a clear and present danger to 
future generations throughout the 
planet. 

Policymakers and planners in the 
Third World are now paying much more 
attention to energy problems than in 
the past, just as we are. Virtually all 
developing countries have begun to 
take concrete steps to manage their 
energy sectors more efficiently. These 
steps include more rational energy 
prices, expanding investment in domes- 
tic energy resources, organizing energy 
ministries, and funding research on lo- 
cally suitable energy techniques. 

It is also becoming increasingly 
clear, however, that foreign assistance 
is needed to expedite this process. 
Rapid development of their energy sec- 
tors is limited by lack of: 

• Basic knowledge of their own 
resources; 

• Appropriate technology; 

• Financial resources; and 

• Adequately trained personnel. 

Moreover, most developing coun- 
tries are just beginning systematic 
energy planning. Much of what must be 
done will be new, experimental, and in- 
novative. As a new and growing area of 
major concern, IDCA is making energy 
a priority area of focus. Today, I want 
to share with you some of the actions 
that are underway. 

Energy Assistance Programs 

At both the Bonn and Tokyo summits, 
the United States and other Western 
countries agreed to increase aid for 
energy conservation and supply. Presi- 
dent Carter has emphasized the U.S. 
commitment to increased energy assist- 
ance. I reiterate that pledge to you. 
The United States will continue to 
support vigorously bilateral and mul- 
tilateral programs for balanced energy 
development. 

• With strong U.S. backing, the 
World Bank recently approved a major 
new lending program for petroleum, 
natural gas, and coal projects. We an- 
ticipate that lending will rise to an an- 
nual level of $1.5 billion by 1983. 

• We are further urging the World 
Bank to take a more active role in coor- 
dinating the energy assistance pro- 
grams of bilateral and multilateral 
agencies, especially in the areas of re- 
newable energy. 

• We will continue to encourage all 
multilateral development banks to con- 



sider expanding their energy programs. 
This process has begun at the Asian and 
Inter-American Development Banks, 
and we are encouraged that the World 
Bank is now preparing a policy state- 
ment on renewable energy. 

• The U.S. strongly supports the 
planned 1981 U.N. Conference on New 
and Renewable Energy. Preparations 
are underway for active U.S. participa- 
tion at all levels, including helping less 
developed countries with their own 
conference preparations. 

• The United States is currently 
funding, on a bilateral basis, a 
substantial range of assistance projects 
in the energy field. 

• The Department of Energy and 
AID have undertaken energy sector as- 
sessments in Egypt, Peru, Indonesia, 
Portugal, and Argentina. These efforts 
undertaken in collaboration with those 
governments, establish an essential 
data base for planning. 

• A Peace Corps energy program 
has been established to strengthen 
energy-related volunteer training, 
identify rural energy needs, and de- 
velop village-level energy projects. I 
anticipate that such volunteer efforts 
will become an increasingly .important 
part of our energy assistance. 

• AID's funding for pilot energy 
projects in rural areas has more than 
doubled in the past 2 years. 

• We are taking steps to insure 
that energy concerns and needs are in- 
tegrated as a matter of standard proce- 
dure into all rural development assist- 
ance projects that the United States 
supports. 

The lack of properly trained techni- 
cal manpower is a serious constraint to 
accelerated and diversified energy pro- 
duction in the Third World. AID is al- 
ready funding several training pro- 
grams related to energy. Two are at 
your member institutions — a course in 
energy sector management at the 
Stoneybrook Campus of the State Uni- 
versity of New York and a course on al- 
ternate energy technology at the Uni- 
versity of Florida. I am convinced that 
much more can, and should be, done. 

Recognizing that the U.S. higher 
education system is the most significant 
asset we have for transferring technical 
skills, I am pleased to announce to you 
that we are preparing a new program to 
provide support for long-term training 
in science and engineering fields related 
to energy. The program will offer fel- 
lowships for training ranging from in- 
ternships to doctoral-level studies, with 
heavy emphasis on existing master's 
degree programs. I hope that by Sep- 
tember 1981, the first students will 



February 1980 



31 



GENERAL 



have enrolled, many of them at your in- 
stitutions. This could eventually be- 
come one of the largest single economic 
development training programs ever 
undertaken by the U.S. Government 
for people from developing nations. 

Against this background, I under- 
score the important role that you and 
your institutions can play in the energy 
area and in other development sectors 
as well. Training programs relevant to 
the Third World need to be expanded. 
There will be a need to absorb more 
students. There is a need for new cur- 
ricula, especially in emerging fields 
such as energy sector management and 
renewable energy technologies. Simi- 
larly research on new energy technol- 
ogies will have to take into account de- 
veloping country circumstances. 

A strong partnership between de- 
velopment agencies and universities is 
essential given the task before us. De- 
velopment is a taxing and often dis- 
couraging process. It will be even more 
difficult in the future. Our commitment 
to Third World development will re- 
quire even more sacrifice and dedica- 
tion. But no effort is more worthwhile 
in terms of the world's future and the 
future well-being of our children. 

Just 2 years ago, Senator Hubert 
Humphrey, who first proposed the In- 
ternational Development Cooperation 
Agency, spoke at the Famine Preven- 
tion Symposium. It was his final public 
speech. His words apply today as they 
did 2 years ago. 

So, as I said, it is appropriate for these 
institutions which are in title XII — that 
have such a responsibility — begin to play a 
vital and integral role in the agricultural de- 
velopment of countries around this planet. 
But, may I say to my friends of the diplo- 
matic corps that are here today, it won't 
work if we just have to come knocking at 
your door. We have to join hands. You may 
have to knock at our door or we at yours, 
but more importantly we have to understand 
we can help each other. . . . ■ 



The Nonaligned Movement 
After the Havana Conference 



by Charles William Maynes 

Keynote address before the Na- 
tional Conference on the Third World 
at the University of Nebraska in 
Omaha on October 25, 1979. Mr. 
Maynes is Assistant Secretary for In- 
ternational Organization Affairs. 

Once in a while an act can symbolize an 
age: This summer Garry Davis asked to 
come home. 

Who is Garry Davis? A highly pa- 
triotic bombardier in World War II, 
Davis renounced the United States for 
a citizenship of the world to dramatize 
his view that nationhood was incom- 
patible with peace. Over the years he 
drew tens of thousands of Europeans to 
world government rallies and upset 
immigration officials by appearing at 
their borders with a 42-page "World 
Citizens Passport." Now he wants to 
come home. 

But Garry Davis' return poses a 
problem for those of us interested in 
American foreign policy, particularly 
those of us interested in U.S. policy 
toward the Third World. Many of us 
undoubtedly thought Garry Davis' 
quest for world government foolish. 
Yet in an extreme way, he represented 
an underlying and coherent current in 
the postwar American approach to the 
world. In the wake of the devastation of 
World War II — with the evidence of 
the monumental inhumanity which the 
traditional game of international poli- 
tics can bring — we thought we knew 
what we wanted. We also thought we 
knew what the rest of the world 
wanted. Even if few believed in world 
government, many believed we were in 
the process of creating a tightening web 
of international institutions and laws 
which would make the world a better 
place to live. The process of change in 
the Third World seemed almost reas- 
suring. With these new nations, the 
world could begin afresh. 

At first things seemed to work out. 
Self-determination, a word American 
Presidents minted for international 
coinage, swept the world. New states 
took their place on the international 
stage, most verbally supporting our 
values, most visibly copying our in- 
stitutions. They joined the United Na- 



tions. They asked for our help. We 
seemed to have new friends and new 
interests. 

Then it seemed to go sour. In coun- 
try after country, democratic struc- 
tures crumbled under military or mob 
assault. Or the very men and women 
who controlled the new democratic in- 
stitutions appeared intent on subvert- 
ing them. When even India, dear to 
American internationalists, temporarily 
moved out of the democratic camp, the 
whole postwar vision of the way the 
world would develop seemed bankrupt, 
and many wanted to withdraw from the 
area of the world we never understood 
very well in the first place — the de- 
veloping world, the Third World, the 
nonaligned world. 

So many Americans in recent years 
came home like Garry Davis. Yet once 
home, they soon faced a paradox. They 
no sooner retired from the developing 
world — declared it was outside the 
"core of U.S. interests" — than 
everyone began hinting it was impor- 
tant after all. Angola, Ethiopia, 
Rhodesia, and Namibia suggested that 
not only [former U.S. Ambassador to 
the U.N.] Andy Young considered Af- 
rica important. Many had downgraded 
the importance of Indochina until the 
Vietnamese occupied Cambodia and 
threatened Thailand. Commentators 
considered the Caribbean of secondary 
importance until revolutions began to 
sweep the area. South Asia was not 
even on the back pages until the coup in 
Afghanistan, the revolution in Iran, 
and the nuclear moves in Pakistan. 
Suddenly and surprisingly, everyone 
agreed the Third World was important. 

Suddenly everyone agreed we came 
home too soon. So I would like to spend 
the rest of my time discussing the fol- 
lowing questions. Who is in the Third 
World? Why do we have trouble talking 
to them? What should our policy be? 

Organization of the Nonaligned 
Movement 

Let's begin with the so-called 
nonaligned movement. What does it 
represent? What are its priorities? 
The current membership is 95. 
Burma having just detached itself in 
protest to Cuban intimidation tactics in 
Havana, the nonaligned movement now 
consists of 91 nations and four libera- 
tion movements, nearly two-thirds of 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 






■■ 



General 



the U.N. membership. The nonaligned 
movement has no charter, no executive, 
no secretariat. It is usually the host 
country for each summit meeting which 
assumes the presidency for periods of 3 
years. 

The summit remains the authorita- 
tive organ. It reviews events since the 
previous summit, debates and takes po- 
sitions on the issues, and then adopts 
action programs for a 3-year period. 
Each summit initiates a new 3-year 
cycle of nonaligned movement meet- 
ings. In the first year, there is a meet- 
ing of the 36 Non-Aligned Coordinating 
Bureau at the Foreign Minister level 
and there is a plenary meeting of 
Foreign Ministers. In the final year, a 
new round of plenary meetings of 
Foreign Ministers is followed im- 
mediately by the summit of heads of 
state and government. 

Membership criteria in the non- 
aligned movement are vague, largely 
determined by members' attitudes to- 
ward a particular applicant. So, one has 
major actors of international politics in 
the group such as India or Nigeria, im- 
portant ones such as Yugoslavia or 
Cuba, harried ones such as Kampuchea, 
and insigificant ones such as some of 
the smaller island states. It has Com- 
munist members such as North Korea, 
anti-Communists such as Argentina and 
Indonesia, Communists who fight each 
other such as Vietnam and Cambodia, 
rich ones such as OPEC [Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries], and 
poor ones who are most of the rest. 

How could, one might ask, such a 
group hold together? Their cohesive- 
ness is explained perhaps best by not 
what they are but what they are not. 
They are not white, though Yugoslavia 
was a founding member; they are not 
rich, though that has changed as far as 
the OPEC countries are concerned; 
they are not members of the big power 
blocs, though that must be taken with a 
grain of salt when one thinks of North 
Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam; they are 
not countries with democratic govern- 
ments, though its largest members such 
as India and Nigeria are, and the trend 
is somewhat more promising than a few 
years ago. 

Evolution of Causes 

The nonaligned movement was founded 
by Tito, Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasser, 
but its genealogy includes the Bandung 
conference; Zhou Enlai; and an assort- 
ment of attempts to seek third roads, 
third camps, and third worlds. While 
each of its founders had a pet big power 



to be wary of, this movement, as most 
movements do, emerged as a reaction 
to, rather than as an initiative for, 
something. 

Thus, the nonaligned were coun- 
tries situated in what used to be called 
"grey areas" of conflict in the cold war, 
from which they wanted to stay out. 
Trying to avoid overdependence on the 
superpowers and trying to enhance 
their own influence internationally 
through expressions of solidarity on 
major issues, the nonaligned movement 
began, with its first summit in Belgrade 
in 1961, as a concerted effort to mediate 
in the cold war. But it quickly emerged 
that this common denominator did not 
provide a sufficient impulse to unity. 
Over the next few years, therefore, 
nonaligned emphasis shifted to a cam- 
paign to speed up the decolonization 
process. This was the overriding 
nonaligned issue at the Cario summit in 
1964. 

The economic issues — always a 
concern — gained nonaligned attention 
on par with the cold war and decoloni- 
zation only at the Lusaka summit in 
1970. At Lusaka, a separate summit 
declaration on economic issues — the 
first such — emphasized self-reliance, 
mutual assistance, and cooperation. 
This thrust achieved new momentum at 
the Algiers summit in 1973 with the 
adoption of a comprehensive nonaligned 
economic program calling for funda- 
mental revision of the world economic 
order, the forerunner of the controver- 
sial new international economic order. 
Nearly one-half of the recent Havana 
summit's final declaration is devoted to 
aspects of these same economic issues, 
as was a major portion of the October 
12 U.N. General Assembly speech of 
Fidel Castro, the current chairman of 
the nonaligned movement. 

Is the evolution of causes of the 
nonaligned movement a theater in 
search of a play? The nonaligned 
movement, as most movements, does 
not define itself by strict rules of 
adherence to a core ideology. Nor is it 
an alliance based on contract with fine 
print. Faithfulness to the original spirit 
that spawned the movement is its best 
characteristic, and this is where the 
sharpest battles are fought — not unlike 
most denominational movements. The 
integrity of original principles is where 
Tito put most of his efforts at the re- 
cent Havana summit. It is to his credit 
that the section on principles and on 
philosophy of the movement in the final 
declaration was largely satisfactory to 
those members who attach special im- 
portance to the independence of the 



movement. The Yugoslavs and others 
succeeded at Havana in rebuffing the 
Cuban drive toward a nonaligned 
movement-Soviet "natural alliance" and 
in gaining confirmation of the move- 
ment's traditional posture as an inde- 
pendent nonbloc force. 

Yet this should not be viewed as a 
defeat of the Soviets, much less a vic- 
tory for the West, nor should it be dis- 
missed as an inconsequential victory of 
principles over expediency. It was a 
battle fought for reasons hardly flat- 
tering to any major military power. 

The raison d'etre of the nonaligned 
movement, at least in the minds of its 
founders, was to raise as high as possi- 
ble the psychological barriers to the use 
of force in international relations since 
Third World countries were the most 
probable victims of the use of force. 
The reason the Yugoslavs and others 
resisted the Cuban drive to support 
Vietnam in its campaign to occupy 
Cambodia is precisely because they fear 
Vietnam's success will lower the bar- 
riers for many even more powerful 
countries to intervene in Third World 
affairs. 

Anticolonialism 

One will notice I referred to interven- 
tion in Third World affairs. Nonaligned 
movement members have concentrated 
their criticism and joint opposition to 
the historic ability of the colonial coun- 
tries to intervene in Third World inter- 
nal affairs. They have denounced the 
least threatening action of former colo- 
nial countries in their region while re- 
maining silent on more threatening de- 
velopments in other parts of the 
world — for example, Soviet actions in 
Eastern Europe. The global reach of 
the Soviet Union, using Cuban and 
Vietnamese proxies, has increasingly 
called into question this double stand- 
ard which has understandably troubled 
us. 

The nonaligned movement concen- 
tration on principles does not obviate 
the continuing search of the movement 
for animating causes. The movement's 
earlier emphasis on anticolonialism and 
traditional stand against the cold war 
no longer serve effectively to insure 
solidarity of the nonaligned countries. 
There are reasons for this. 

• The decolonization process is 
nearly concluded; indeed, we are 
working with our allies and with the 
front-line African states to bring about 
internationally acceptable solutions in 



February 1980 



33 



General 



southern Africa, the final bastion of 
colonialism. 

• We have tried where we could to 
lower the level of East-West confronta- 
tion, but we have been prepared to re- 
spond vigorously to protect our inter- 
ests. 

While neither colonialism nor the 
cold war provides a single unifying 
raison d'etre, nonaligned movement 
members now discuss nearly every im- 
portant international issue. At the re- 
cent Havana summit, for example, the 
nonaligned movement: 

• Strongly supported liberation 
groups in Rhodesia and Namibia while 
pointing to the importance of efforts 
toward negotiated settlements; 

• Was on record in favor of a politi- 
cal settlement of the Kampuchea prob- 
lem, consistent with the principles of 
noninterference and withdrawal of 
foreign forces and also came down for 
humanitarian efforts to deal with the 
refugee and famine issues in Indochina; 

• Was critical of U.S. policy in 
Latin America while rebuffing Castro's 
efforts to condemn the Rio pact and the 
Inter-American system; 

• Condemned the Camp David 
agreements, thanks largely to Cuban 
intimidation and manipulation tactics at 
the summit. I might add that this deci- 
sion was not sustained in a meeting of 
nonaligned Foreign Ministers a couple 
of weeks later in New York. 

But while the nonaligned move- 
ment at Havana considered a broad 
range of international political ques- 
tions, summit discussions of them have 
demonstrated a significant lack of con- 
sensus. In the post-Havana period, this 
lack of consensus has been even more 
notable; for example, the Havana decla- 
ration's position on the representation 
of Kampuchea was promptly revised by 
the U.N. General Assembly. 

The key point I am trying to make 
is that none of these many issues has 
provided the movement with an effec- 
tive replacement for colonialism or for 
the cold war as unifying themes. 

The New International 
Economic Order 

That leaves the movement with the eco- 
nomic issues — the new international 
economic order — as the cause which can 
again bring unity and results. But there 
are differences between decolonization 
and development as issues for con- 
fronting the industrialized world. 



Anticolonialism involved a clearly 
identifiable opponent who accepted part 
of the nonaligned critique. The same is 
not true with respect to the new inter- 
national economic order. Admittedly, it 
can be said — and it is being said — that 
so-called neocolonialism is the main 
evil. After all, the former colonialists 
who once controlled foreign territory 
continue to control much of the capital, 
resources, technology, and information 
which flow in international channels. 
The difficulties reside in the differ- 
ences. In the case of colonialism, West- 
ern nations admitted to behavior in 
conflict with Western values. This ethi- 
cal disjuncture engendered a feeling of 
guilt; and in fact, Western nations could 
neither legitimize nor hold on to their 
colonial empire — which in time, and in 
any event, they considered a burden, 
not an asset. 

Over the issues where the battle is 
now joined, however, most in the West 
do not see any fundamental conflict be- 
tween Western behavior and Western 
value systems. They, therefore, feel no 
sense of guilt. Moreover, unlike the 
case with colonialism, they believe that 
this time around the West is being 
asked to shed policies bringing it not 
weakness but ultimately strength. Con- 
sequently, while the West does not 
seek victory in the battle, it does not 
want to come out a loser. It, therefore, 
offers formulas for compromise and 
stresses mutual advantages. In this re- 
spect, although some portions of Fidel 
Castro's speech did stress mutual advan- 
tage, his recent U.N. call on the North 
to aid the South as an act of retribution 
for past sins represents for the North- 
South dialogue a dead end and a dis- 
service. The call cannot be received be- 
cause the language is not understood. 
Castro is trying to apply a strategy 
which brilliantly succeeded on one 
issue — colonialism — but which will in- 
evitably fail on another — North-South 
relations. 



Cumulative Impact of LDCs 
on Western Countries 

Yet if all this is true, it is also incon- 
testable that the Third World is much 
more important to U.S. security and 
welfare than it has ever been. In the 
past, less developed countries (LDCs) 
commanded superpower attention be- 
cause they were weak and breeding 
grounds for East-West conflict. That 
concern remains and in some regions of 
the world even grows. But in addition, 
they now command attention because, 
collectively, they have on some issues 



more strength than before and are 
raising questions relevant to the West's 
own future economic welfare. Thus, 
many LDCs have acquired the capacity 
to affect international events in signifi- 
cant ways. Some of them, like Brazil, 
India, and Nigeria, have potentially 
preponderant regional influence be- 
cause of location, population, and mili- 
tary power. Others, such as Saudi 
Arabia and Venezuela, have substantial 
oil power. Particularly, the countries in 
East Asia play major roles in interna- 
tional trade. There are, in short, new 
loci of political and military power in 
the Third World, and the cumulative 
impact of unified action in many areas 
is, at least on paper, considerable. 

Yet, like us, the members of the 
nonaligned movement confront many 
contradictions in the foreign policy 
goals they pursue. Together with the 
need for unity, they share the impor- 
tance of maintaining direct and respon- 
sive relationships with industrialized 
states for reasons that are economic, 
military, and political or a combination 
of all these. For example, some oil 
states have an indisputable ability to 
shake the foundations of the interna- 
tional financial system and wield con- 
siderable political influence in the 
Mideast and Persian Gulf regions. Yet 
they remain vulnerable to military at- 
tack from their neighbors, and their 
wealth depends on Western stability. 
They cannot act alone. For them, as for 
us, close bilateral and multilateral re- 
lationships are crucial to their security 
and economic viability. 

These considerations underscore 
the compelling argument for some sort 
of world order vision which can replace 
the one we have lost. If neither the tra- 
ditional powers nor the newly emerging 
centers of influence can impose their 
will on the others, nor survive without 
each other, then we need to strive for 
some common framework, some neutral 
understanding. 

Yet it is not enough to underscore 
the mutuality of interests between the 
developing countries and the indus- 
trialized world. Nor is it enough to ap- 
peal to fear, since apocalyptic warn- 
ings, unless real and immediate, remain 
unconvincing. Rather we must pa- 
tiently strive for common ground. 

"Moderation" — Key Objective to 
World Order Politics 

The objective of world order politics, to 
use Stanley Hoffman's phrase, must be 
"moderation plus" — neither Utopia nor 
resignation. Notwithstanding the disci- 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



General 



pline it requires, we must begin with 
moderation. Rhetorical fulminations 
against the Third World are no more 
effective with them than their rhetori- 
cal excesses are with us. This is not to 
say that we should not expose rhetori- 
cal posturing when it takes place and 
adjust our bilateral relationship ac- 
cordingly. Nor does it mean that the 
United States should not respond vig- 
orously to countries that unfairly abuse 
or challenge our legitimate interests. If 
for no other reason than self-respect, 
that will be necessary. But we should 
not expect more from confrontation 
than it can yield. Even when we are 
forced to act vigorously, we should 
make clear that the U.S. bias is to re- 
turn to moderation and dialogue. 

If we can maintain moderation and 
provided that others maintain it too, 
then the "plus" we need can be intro- 
duced into the new global politics. That 
"plus" requires that we go beyond 
thinking of the current dilemma as an 
essentially North-South dichotomy or 
as a question of economics. 

In a way, we have to go back to the 
drawing board and negotiate not about 
who gets what and who yields what but 
whether the rules which all in the end 
can accept can be applied more equita- 
bly to all the players. 

Several examples come to mind 
which suggest that, in fact, we are — 
with the Third World — haltingly doing 
precisely that already. In recent 
months and even days, the United 
States has joined, and is participating 
in, international conferences and 
negotiations which specifically deal 
with the equitable application of the 
rules of access to global wealth, re- 
sources, and power. 

The Law of the Sea negotiations, 
the Vienna Conference on Science and 
Technology for Development convened 
by the United Nations, and the World 
Administrative Radio Conference, now 
in process in Geneva, each deal with 
this issue. In each of these fora, delega- 
tions and negotiating teams are con- 
fronting extremely difficult challenges 
in devising international regimes which 
regulate access and utilization of global 
resources. 

In all of the debates on equity of 
access and utilization of the global 
commons, sides have been drawn along 
pluralistic lines. Across the board, the 
problem has been whittled down to one 
basic point — after the consensus is 
reached on objectives, are the rules of 
the game being fairly applied? 



System of Rules 

This has been in almost every instance 
the crux of the negotiating process. In 
every case, we have supported a strict 
policy of rule-adherence, where they al- 
ready existed, and rulemaking, when 
they did not, as the basis for negotia- 
tion. We have defended or sought fair 
and impartial rules. 

In all these questions of equitable 
access and sharing, we, for our part, 
have maintained that it is inherently 
unfair for the developing countries to 
share in the proceeds without sharing 
in the effort according to their abilities. 
The developing countries in turn have 
maintained that they cannot accept a 



system under which they may share in 
the benefits but do not share in the op- 
eration and management. 

So for all practical purposes, 
"charity" is out, but common interest is 
in, as it should be where one is 
negotiating over "rules" which must 
rest on common interest and not "re- 
lief which must develop from shared 
compassion. 

In the Law of the Sea negotiations, 
we see the operative example of how 
this new system of rules may work, 
where developed and developing na- 
tions have exhausted debate and have 
gotten down to compromise. The prod- 
uct is a relatively strong model of co- 



95 MEMBERS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT 



Afghanistan 


Iraq 


Algeria 


Ivory Coast 


Angola 


Jamaica 


Argentina 


Jordan 


Bahrain 


Kampuchea 


Bangladesh 


Kenya 


Benin 


Korea (North) 


Bhutan 


Kuwait 


Bolivia 


Laos 


Botswana 


Lebanon 


Burundi 


Lesotho 


Cameroon 


Liberia 


Cape Verde 


Libya 


Central African Republic 


Madagascar 


Chad 


Malawi 


Comoros 


Malaysia 


Congo 


Maldives 


Cuba 


Mali 


Cyprus 


Malta 


Djibouti 


Mauritania 


Egypt 


Mauritius 


Equatorial Guinea 


Morocco 


Ethiopia 


Mozambique 


Gabon 


Nepal 


Gambia 


Nicaragua 


Ghana 


Niger 


Grenada 


Nigeria 


Guinea 


Oman 


Guinea-Bissau 


Pakistan 


Guyana 


Panama 


India 


Peru 


Indonesia 


Qatar 


Iran 


Rwanda 



Sao Tome and Principe 

Saudi Arabia 

Senegal 

Seychelles 

Sierra Leone 

Singapore 

Somalia 

Sri Lanka 

Sudan 

Suriname 

Swaziland 

Syria 

Tanzania 

Togo 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Tunisia 

Uganda 

United Arab Emirates 

Upper Volta 

Vietnam 

Yemen (Aden) 

Yemen (Sana) 

Yugoslavia 

Zaire 

Zambia 

African National Congress 

Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization 

Patriotic Front of Zim- 
babwe 

South West Africa People's 
Organization 






February 1980 



35 



General 



operative, joint venture — of fairness, if 
you will. 

The basis of this treaty dealing 
with the mining of seabeds calls for the 
creation of parallel regimes. A private 
firm winning a concession must help the 
international community mine a parallel 
track. 

I was particularly intrigued by the 
analysis of one of the major architects 
of this tentative agreement — Ambas- 
sador M.C.W. Pinton from Sri Lanka. 
In describing the rationale for this in- 
ternational regime, he stated: ". . . the 
'common heritage' of these resources is 
not 'res nulius' to be had for the taking; 
is not 'res communis' simply for en- 
joyment or use in common; it is more 
akin to property held in trust — held in 
trust for 'mankind as a whole,' for the 
public. It is, therefore, closest to 'res 
publicae,' the property of the people to 
be administered by the people and for 
the people." 

His prescription is a rejection of 
social Darwinism in global politics yet 
does not make the opposing error of 
Utopian regimes. In an age of di- 
minishing resources, growing scarcities 
but also growing threats, I am re- 
minded of Jefferson's words that such 
'res publicae' is the only form of gov- 
ernment which is not eternally at open 
or secret war with the rights of man- 
kind." 

In the continuing dialogue on the 
rules for a new international order, as 
in a republic, even the rules must be 
debated according to the rules. Neither 
the demands of the Third World nor our 
interests can be satisfied in conditions of 
global anarchy. 

But within the rules we have inter- 
ests to protect and principles to uphold. 
We cannot agree to rules that unfairly 
tax our interests just as we cannot ex- 
pect the developing world to abide by 
rules which unfairly violate theirs. 

We are conscious of the unfair 
treatment history has given some coun- 
tries or groups within countries, in- 
cluding our own. But both at home and 
abroad the sins of the past cannot be 
the foundation of the future. We must 
lay aside charges of guilt and focus on 
the duty of common obligations. 

There is no other way to forge the 
global coalition necessary for achieving 
the reforms we need to make the world 
safer and more prosperous. As Fidel 
Castro, speaking as the chairman of the 
nonaligned, acknowledged in his report 
to the General Assembly on the Havana 
conference, worldwide economic crisis 
will harm everyone — from Socialist 
state to capitalist investor. 



Consequently, everyone according 
to his abilities must participate in the 
solution. In today's integrated world 
economy, we can no longer allow the 
choice of opting out of one's respon- 
sibilities. 

Common obligations in a new world 
order imply a division of labor but not a 
division of the world into competing 
blocs plus one more bloc to remain on 
the sidelines. If the Third World has 
obligations and interests, if the West 
has obligations and interests, so do the 
Soviets and their allies. If they are af- 
fected by the cycles of economic reces- 
sion, so must they share in offering 
concrete remedies to avoid them. 

This is not to say that we will al- 
ways be able to communicate with the 
nonaligned as a movement. Just as 
NATO members speak with one voice 
multilaterally yet often differ bilater- 
ally, so do the nonaligned. Precisely for 
this reason, the Administration has not 
sought relations with the nonaligned as 
a movement but with countries in the 
movement which have power to influ- 
ence problems we believe must be re- 
solved. 

We have, therefore, established 
close relations with some members of 
the nonaligned and maintain strained 
relations with others. We will continue 
to act accordingly. We will judge the 
nonaligned movement as a movement. 
We regard the movement's record as 
very mixed, with commendable balance 
displayed on some issues and high ir- 
responsibility in evidence on others. 
Nevertheless, we will judge its mem- 
bers as individual countries and will 
find we can work with some and must 
resist others. To do otherwise — either 
to reject the nonaligned countries in 
their entirety or to embrace them in 
their collectivity — would only damage 
U.S. interests. 

Conclusion 

Where then does this leave us in 
terms of U.S. policy toward the Third 
World? I would like to suggest a policy 
based on three components: responsi- 
bility, resources, and realism. 

Responsibility in the sense that 
the Third World must show it as well as 
expect it. Colonialism was a historic 
mistake which had to be eradicated. So 
long as it existed, the primary respon- 
sibility was on the shoulders of the 
powers which were called on to decol- 
onialize. But we are approaching the 
end of that era. 



With the new issues there are — 
there must be — reciprocal obligations 
for all parties. These obligations may 
take into account different circum- 
stances, but reciprocity is critical to 
final agreement. 

Resources in the sense that the 
Third World needs help and we must 
play a larger role in providing that 
help. The way that we have allowed our 
aid program to deteriorate is a national 
disgrace. It is time we stated the issue 
starkly. There is no way that the 
United States can compete for influence 
in the world, as the critics of the Ad- 
ministration are urging, without the re- 
source commitment which those same 
critics are denying. 

Realism in the sense that we look 
at the Third World as it really is — as an 
area in flux, of concern, and with im- 
portance. In flux, because the popular 
stereotypes of a region headed for au- 
thoritarian darkness are wrong. Some 
of the most heartening developments of 
the Third World have been the 
liberalizing trends in the powerhouses 
of the Third World — in India, in 
Nigeria, in Brazil, and even in China. 
Indeed, were it not for the tragedy in 
Kampuchea, the past year would be 
seen as a banner year for human rights 
in the Third World as four of the most 
vicious tyrants since Hitler and Stalin 
have been overthrown — Idi Amin, Pol 
Pot, Bokassa, and Macias. 

Of concern because the thesis that 
American security need only be con- 
cerned with the industrial heartlands of 
Western Europe and Japan was wrong 
when it was formulated and clearly is 
wrong today. 

With importance because issues 
such as oil, nonprolife ration, strategic 
location, and trade document the vital 
nature of the Third World to our secu- 
rity and well-being. 

A policy built on responsibility, re- 
sources, and realism can succeed. It 
will not give us the world government 
Garry Davis sought, but it can make 
the world safer and the United States 
more secure. And that, in the end, is 
what a sound foreign policy is all 
about. ■ 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Missing and Disappeared Persons 



by Patricia M. Derian 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations of the 
House Foreign Affair* Committee on 
October 18. 1979. Ms. Derian is Assist- 
ant Secretary for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs. ' 

I welcome this opportunity to appear 
before you and your colleagues and 
commend the committee for its initia- 
tive in conducting these hearings on 
missing or disappeared persons. We 
consider this problem to be one of the 
most serious human rights issues con- 
fronting the world today, necessitating 
attention and action not only by the 
United States but by all members of the 
international community. This was the 
view expressed by the U.S. Represen- 
tative to the Human Rights Commis- 
sion to Committee III of the United 
Nations last December and reiterated 
by him at the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission earlier this year. It re- 
mains our view today. 

In your previous hearings, distin- 
guished witnesses from a variety of 
nongovernmental human rights organi- 
zations have provided considerable de- 
tail on the disappearance phenomenon. 
We believe their accounts were care- 
fully researched and accurate. I do not 
intend to rehearse those details at any 
great length. Previous testimony has 
made them painfully familiar to all of 
us. 

What I should like to do today, in 
accordance with your letter to Secre- 
tary Vance requesting my appearance, 
is to: 

• Provide you the Administration's 
views and response to this relatively 
new violation of human rights; 

• Discuss some of the remedies 
being proposed both on the bilateral 
and multilateral levels; and 

• Examine the role of our embas- 
sies and human rights officers in those 
countries where disappearances are re- 
liably reported. 

Finally, I shall give you a status 
report on our efforts to give effect to 
U.N. Resolution 33/173 on disappeared 
persons adopted by the General As- 
sembly on December 20, 1978. 



Views on and Response to 
Disappearances 

As I stated at the outset, the 
United States views the use of officially 
sanctioned political kidnappings as one 
of the most serious problems confront- 
ing the international community. Dis- 
appearances have become one of the 
more tragic and insidious instances of 
human rights abuse occurring in today's 
world. Coupled with the failure of gov- 
ernments to account for those missing, 
this disturbing development has been 
causing intense anguish and suffering 
for countless individuals and families in 
many parts of the world. As you know, 
the word "disappeared" itself has be- 
come a euphemism for what often ap- 
pears to or does amount to political 
murder, preceded by intensive interro- 
gation and torture of those not charged 
with any crime. 

Forms of Disappearances 

I would like to review very briefly the 
forms that disappearances take. In one, 
governmental policy directs the secu- 
rity forces, military, and/or police to 
round up all persons suspected of 
subversion to get them out of circula- 
tion, to obtain information, to halt spe- 
cific acts, and to demoralize the "op- 
position." There are no constraints of 
any kind placed on those charged with 
the roundup. 

In another, security or police 
forces operate "unofficially," generally 
in civilian clothes, with the tacit ap- 
proval or acquiescence and under the 
umbrella of protection from the state. 

In a third, groups of "civilians," 
often with official urging or approval, 
operate their own terrorist forces. 
(When "unauthorized" groups bring too 
much embarrassment to the govern- 
ment or when the government wishes 
to end their actions, it often finds that 
is has set in motion a force which eludes 
its control. They are then faced with 
the problem of trying to contain a group 
which is nominally its own.) 

In all forms, people are abducted 
from their homes, offices, or while 
moving about in public. Sometimes op- 
erations are strictly clandestine — no 
one sees the pickup, no phone calls or 
messages are delivered; people simply 
vanish. On other occasions, a street or 
an area is blocked off by unmarked 
cars, a force of armed men — nearly al- 



ways in civilian clothes — storms a 
building or house and emerges with the 
person or persons who are taken away. 
Or a group of armed men stops their car 
in traffic, leaps onto the street with 
drawn guns, and wrestles the victim 
into a car and speeds away. 

The victims are taken to secret 
places of detention, often military in- 
stallations, and tortured for periods 
ranging from hours to months. Some- 
times they die as a consequence of tor- 
ture, sometimes they are killed in de- 
tention, and sometimes they are set up 
for death in a flamboyant and public 
way. They may be loaded into a car or 
van, told to drive away after being 
given arms without ammunition, fol- 
lowed, and killed in a "shootout." A few 
endure and eventually find themselves 
in a regular place of detention. These 
people may be held indefinitely without 
trial or charges or they may be 
charged, tried, and sentenced to official 
jail terms by military or civilian courts. 
A miniscule number are released at 
some stage of the process. 

At no point do any parts of the sys- 
tem of justice or the rule of law or due 
process operate on behalf of the disap- 
peared. They disappear not only liter- 
ally but also as legal entities. 

They do not disappear from the 
thoughts of their families, however. 
And what becomes of them? Sometimes 
they are too frightened to take any ac- 
tion or tell anyone what has happened; 
this is often the case in the first period 
of disappearances. 

Sooner or later, though, an inquiry 
is made to some official unit. They are 
told that there is no record of an arrest; 
there is no information. Occasionally, 
the family will receive an anonymous 
phone call which might say that the dis- 
appeared person will be released soon, 
is all right, or if an infant or child has 
been taken, might request some item for 
the child or tell where the child can be 
picked up if the child is not to be held. 
But the search is fruitless unless a body 
is found or the person finally surfaces in 
prison. Otherwise, the family members 
wait in tense anguish for months or 
years. For some there will probably 
never be an answer. 

Responsibility for remedying the 
tragic phenomenon of disappearances 
rests with the government which shuts 
its eyes to or colludes in or engineers 
disappearances. Whether these disap- 
pearances are the result of authorized 
actions, unauthorized excesses by law 
enforcement and security agencies, 



February 1980 



37 



Human Rights 



paramilitary or private groups, gov- 
ernments are responsible for bringing 
them under control, even in times of 
emergency. In confronting domestic 
violence or terrorism, there is no jus- 
tification under domestic or interna- 
tional law for such violations. 

Governments furthermore cannot 
argue that they do not know. Govern- 
ments are custodians of the law. When 
they engage in their own campaign of 
terror, they jeopardize the rule of law 
and their right to govern. They are no 
different at those times than the worst 
of their opponents. 

International law, as set forth in 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (article 4), the Euro- 
pean Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Free- 
doms (article 15), and the American 
Convention on Human Rights (article 
27) prohibits states, even in times of 
public emergency, from abandoning 
certain fundamental guarantees af- 
forded the individual. 

Under no circumstances can a state 
arbitrarily deprive its citizens of their 
lives or subject them to torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punish- 
ment. Death sentences can be imposed 
only in accordance with due process of 
law. Governments are responsible for 
the safety and protection of those de- 
tained. They are also responsible for 
rendering an accounting of the where- 
abouts and fate of those apprehended. 

There is now available a well- 
developed body of human rights stand- 
ards and precedents. It is up to indi- 
vidual countries to realize them. The 
United States tries to influence other 
nations to live up to common interna- 
tional obligations. In the final analysis, 
the decision to comply with international 
law — and to do what is right — rests 
with the individual country. While our 
ability to influence other nations' 
human rights performance varies from 
country to country, I can assure you we 
are assiduous in our efforts to persuade 
governments to halt disappearances 
and accompanying excesses and to in- 
sure that those guilty of such practices 
must be punished in accordance with 
law. 

We urge all governments in whose 
countries there are disappeared per- 
sons to release prisoners arbitrarily de- 
tained, to provide the guarantee of fair 
trial, to publish lists of those missing, 
and to provide death certificates for 
those known to be killed. We also urge 
that they return remains to relatives 



and establish governmental 
mechanisms, together with the courts, 
to trace missing people and clarify their 
status for their relatives. 

In my discussions with the families 
of the disappeared — both here in 
Washington and abroad — they em- 
phasize that it would be easier for them 
to suffer the knowledge of the death of 
their relatives than to suffer continuous 
uncertainty about their fates. In most 
countries, this would represent an act 
of strength and courage on the part of 
the government and indicate a desire 
for national reconciliation, peace, and 
return to the rule of law. 

In our discussions with a variety of 
governments, we have pointed out that 
ample precedents exist in international 
law for dealing with the problem of ac- 
counting for those taken prisoner as a 
result of domestic and international 
conflicts. During periods of armed con- 
flict and occupation, the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War and the 1949 
Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War require parties to implement a 
variety of reporting and other 
mechanisms to account for prisoners of 
war and "protected persons." 

More recently in July 1977, addi- 
tional protocols to the Geneva conven- 
tions set forth, in the context of armed 
conflict, even more detailed provisions 
for tracing the missing and the dead 
and for protecting the human rights of 
those held in captivity. 

Protocol I asserts "the right of 
families to know the fate of their rela- 
tives," requires governments to gather 
and transmit all relevant information 
concerning persons reported missing by 
an adverse party, and imposes several 
obligations concerning the remains of 
all persons who have died for reasons 
related to hostilities. These legal re- 
quirements make available to countries 
standards and procedures for dealing 
with prisoners of war and other de- 
tained or interned persons and for hand- 
ling the problem of missing persons in 
a humane manner. 

Let me digress for a moment and 
explain a dilemma with which we are 
sometimes faced. In certain countries 
there have been efforts by some au- 
thorities to eliminate the disappearance 
phenomenon. The numbers of disap- 
peared may decline dramatically. The 
question then arises of how the United 
States should respond. Quite clearly, 
even one person disappearing is one too 
many. But if we elect not to recognize 
this "progress," we may perhaps run 
the risk of strengthening the hands of 
individuals in or outside a repressive 



government who may argue that the 
U.S. human rights appetite is insati- 
able. If, on the other hand, we choose 
to recognize the "progress" that has 
been made, certain governments may 
incorrectly conclude that we are recon- 
ciled to some irreducible minimum of 
disappearances or other human rights 
violations. These are not easy questions 
to resolve. Difficult judgments and 
hard choices are required. We confront 
such problems every day, and in almost 
every case there are honest differences 
of opinion on how we can best resolve 
them. 

It is also appropriate to note here 
that this, like other forms of official 
human rights violations, is not endemic 
to any country and is not an inevitable 
concomitant of political unrest or insta- 
bility. Some of today's worst offenders 
have long previous histories of high re- 
spect for individual rights, even in 
times of crisis, which gives us hope that 
they can return to their best traditions. 
And in recent times, some whose prac- 
tices have been most deplored have, in- 
deed, done so and thereby not only re- 
gained the respect of the world commu- 
nity but also set an example for others. 

Role of Embassies and 
Human Rights Officers 

Permit me now to speak about the 
role of our embassies and the human 
rights officers in embassies in countries 
where disappearances take place. 

Each embassy has a human rights 
officer usually in the Political Section 
whose responsibility is to report on 
human rights conditions and to present 
the U.S. Government's views to the 
host government. Our Ambassadors are 
charged with human rights respon- 
sibilities as personal representatives of 
the President. They are deeply con- 
scious of the priority he has assigned to 
human rights in our foreign policy. As 
the President noted in his remarks to 
the Hispanic Caucus on September 
13th: "From the day that I took office, I 
have sought to place at the top of my 
agenda and to awaken the conscience of 
the world and to bring that conscience 
about human rights to bear on the 
world's leaders." 

An important part of a human 
rights officer's responsibilities is to 
maintain contact with individuals and 
groups most aware of human rights con- 
ditions in the country in which he/she 
works. He or she must be active and 
energetic in seeking out these contacts. 
These include private human rights 
groups; representatives of the religious 
community, the legal profession, politi- 
cal opposition, and dissident groups; 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 






SPECIAL 



State of the Union Address 



Following is the text of President 

Carter's add)-ess before a joint session 
of the Congress on January 23, 1980. l 

These last few months have not been an 
easy time for any of us. As we meet to- 
night, it has never been more clear that 
the state of our union depends on the 
state of the world. And tonight, as 
throughout our own generation, freedom 
and peace in the world depend on the 
state of our union. 

The 1980s have been born in turmoil, 
strife, and change. This is a time of chal- 
lenge to our interests and our values, and 
it's a time that tests our wisdom and our 
skills. At this time in Iran 50 Americans 
are still held captive, innocent victims of 
terrorism and anarchy. Also at this mo- 
ment, massive Soviet troops are attempt- 
ing to subjugate the fiercely independent 
and deeply religious people of Afghanis- 
tan. These two acts — one of international 
terrorism and one of military aggression 
— present a serious challenge to the 
United States of America and indeed to 
all the nations of the world. Together, we 
will meet these threats to peace. 

I am determined that the United 
States will remain the strongest of all na- 
tions, but our power will never be used to 
initiate a threat to the security of any na- 
tion or to the rights of any human being. 
We seek to be and to remain secure — a 
nation at peace in a stable world. But to 
be secure we must face the world as it is. 
Three basic developments have helped to 
shape our challenges: 

• The steady growth and increased 
projection of Soviet military power be- 
yond its own borders; 

• The overwhelming dependence of 
the Western democracies on oil supplies 
from the Middle East; and 

• The press of social and religious 
and economic and political change in the 
many nations of the developing world — 
exemplified by the revolution in Iran. 

Each of these factors is important in 
its own right. Each interacts with the 
others. All must be faced together — 
squarely and courageously. 

We will face these challenges. And 
we will meet them with the best that is in 
us. And we will not fail. 

In response to the abhorrent act in 
Iran, our nation has never been aroused 
and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our 
position is clear. The United States will 



not yield to blackmail. We continue to 
pursue these specific goals: 

• First, to protect the present and 
long-range interests of the United States; 

• Secondly, to preserve the lives of 
the American hostages and to secure as 
quickly as possible their safe release; 

• If possible, to avoid bloodshed 
which might further endanger the lives of 
our fellow citizens; 

• To enlist the help of other nations 
in condemning this act of violence which 
is shocking and violates the moral and the 
legal standards of a civilized world; 

• To convince and to persuade the 
Iranian leaders that the real danger to 
their nation lies in the north in the Soviet 
Union and from the Soviet troops now in 
Afghanistan and that the unwarranted 
Iranian quarrel with the United States 
hampers their response to this far greater 
danger to them. 

If the American hostages are 
harmed, a severe price will be paid. We 
will never rest until every one of the 
American hostages is released. But now 
we face a broader and more fundamental 
challenge in this region because of the re- 
cent military action of the Soviet Union. 
Now, as during the last three and one- 
half decades, the relationship between 
our country — the United States of Amer- 
ica — and the Soviet Union is the most 
critical factor in determining whether the 
world will live in peace or be engulfed in 
global conflict. 

Since the end of the Second World 
War, America has led other nations in 
meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet 
power. This has not been a simple or a 
static relationship. Between us there has 
been cooperation, there has been compe- 
tition, and at times there has been con- 
frontation. 

• In the 1940s, we took the lead in 
creating the Atlantic alliance in response 
to the Soviet Union's suppression and 
then consolidation of its East European 
empire and the resulting threat of the 
Warsaw Pact to Western Europe. 

• In the 1950s, we helped to contain 
further Soviet challenges in Korea and in 
the Middle East, and we re-armed, to as- 
sure the continuation of that contain- 
ment. 

• In the 1960s, we met the Soviet 
challenges in Berlin and we faced the 
Cuban missile crises, and we sought to 



engage the Soviet Union in the important 
task of moving beyond the cold war and 
away from confrontation. 

• And in the 1970s, three American 
Presidents negotiated with the Soviet 
leaders in attempts to halt this growth of 
the nuclear arms race. We sought to es- 
tablish rules of behavior that would re- 
duce the risks of conflict, and we 
searched for areas of cooperation that 
could make our relations reciprocal and 
productive — not only for the sake of our 
two nations, but for the security and 
peace of the entire world. 

In all these actions, we have main- 
tained two commitments: to be ready to 
meet any challenge by Soviet military 
power and to develop ways to resolve 
disputes and to keep the peace. 

Preventing nuclear war is the fore- 
most responsibility of the two superpow- 
ers. That is why we've negotiated the 
strategic arms limitation talks — treaties 
SALT I and SALT II. Especially now in a 
time of great tension, observing the 
mutual constraints imposed by the terms 
of these treaties will be in the best inter- 
est of both countries and will help to pre- 
serve world peace. I will consult very 
closely with the Congress on this matter 
as we strive to control nuclear weapons. 
That effort — to control nuclear weapons 
— will not be abandoned. 



The 1980s have been born in turmoil 
and change. This is a time of 
challenge to our interests and our 
values, a time that tests our wisdom 
and our will. 



We superpowers will also have the 
responsibility to exercise restraint in the 
use of our great military force. The integ- 
rity and the independence of weaker na- 
tions must not be threatened. They must 
know that in our presence they are se- 
cure. But now the Soviet Union has taken 
a radical and an aggressive new step. It's 
using its great military power against a 
relatively defenseless nation. The impli- 
cations of the Soviet invasion of Af- 
ghanistan could pose the most serious 
threat to the peace since the Second 
World War. 

The vast majority of nations on 
Earth have condemned this latest Soviet 



February 1980 



Special 



attempt to extend its colonial domination 
of others and have demanded the im- 
mediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The 
Moslem world is especially and justifiably 
outraged by this aggression against an Is- 
lamic people. No action of a world power 
has ever been so quickly and so over- 
whelmingly condemned. 

But verbal condemnation is not 
enough. The Soviet Union must pay a 
concrete price for their aggression. While 
this invasion continues, we and the other 
nations of the world cannot conduct busi- 
ness as usual with the Soviet Union. 

That's why the United States has 
imposed stiff economic sanctions on the 
Soviet Union. 

I will not issue any permits for 
Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters 
of the United States. 

I've cut Soviet access to high- 
technology equipment and to agricultural 
products. 

I've limited other commerce with the 
Soviet Union, and I've asked our allies 
and friends to join with us in restraining 
their own trade with the Soviets and not 
to replace our own embargoed items. 

And I have notified the Olympic 
Committee that with Soviet invading 
forces in Afghanistan, neither the Ameri- 
can people nor I will support sending an 
Olympic team to Moscow. 

The Soviet Union is going to have to 
answer some basic questions: Will it help 
promote a more stable international envi- 
ronment in which its own legitimate, 
peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will 
it continue to expand its military power 
far beyond its genuine security needs, 
and use that power for colonial conquest? 

The Soviet Union must realize that 
its decision to use military force in Af- 
ghanistan will be costly to every political 
and economic relationship it values. 

The region which is now threatened 
by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of 
great strategic importance. It contains 
more than two-thirds of the world's ex- 
portable oil. The Soviet effort to domi- 
nate Afghanistan has brought Soviet mili- 
tary forces to within 300 miles of the In- 
dian Ocean and close to the Straits of 
Hormuz — a waterway through which 
most of the world's oil must flow. The 
Soviet Union is now attempting to con- 
solidate a strategic position, therefore, 
that poses a grave threat to the free 
movement of Middle East oil. 

This situation demands careful 
thought, steady nerves, and resolute ac- 
tion, not only for this year but for many 
years to come. It demands collective ef- 
forts to meet this new threat to security 
in the Persian Gulf and in southwest 
Asia. It demands the participation of all 



those who rely on oil from the Middle 
East and who are concerned with global 
peace and stability. And it demands con- 
sultation and close cooperation with coun- 
tries in the area which might be 
threatened. 

Meeting this challenge will take na- 
tional will, diplomatic and political wis- 
dom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, 
military capability. We must call on the 
best that is in us to preserve the security 
of this crucial region. 

Let our position be absolutely clear: 
An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital inter- 
ests of the United States of America, and 
such an assault will be repelled by any 
means necessary, including military force. 

During the past 3 years you have 
joined with me to improve our own secu- 
rity and the prospects for peace, not only 
in the vital oil producing area of the Per- 
sian Gulf region but around the world. 

• We've increased annually our real 
commitment for defense, and we will sus- 
tain this increase of effort throughout the 
5-year defense program. It's imperative 
that the Congress approve this strong de- 
fense budget for 1981 encompassing a 5% 



. . . / have notified the Olympic 
Committee that with Soviet invading 
forces in Afghanistan, neither the 
American people nor I will support 
sending an Olympic team to Moscow. 



real growth in authorizations without any 
reduction. 

• We are also improving our capabil- 
ity to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly 
to distant areas. 

• We have helped to strengthen 
NATO and our other alliances. And re- 
cently we and other NATO members 
have decided to develop and to deploy 
modernized intermediate-range nuclear 
forces to meet an unwarranted and in- 
creased threat from the nuclear weapons 
of the Soviet Union. 

• We are working with our allies to 
prevent conflict in the Middle East. The 
Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 
is a notable achievement which repre- 
sents a strategic asset for America and 
which also enhances prospects for re- 
gional and world peace. We are now en- 
gaged in further negotiations to provide 
full autonomy for the people of the West 
Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian 
issue in all its aspects, and to preserve 
the peace and security of Israel. Let no 



one doubt our commitment to the secu- 
rity of Israel. In a few days we will ob- 
serve an historic event when Israel 
makes another major withdrawal from 
the Sinai and when ambassadors will be 
exchanged between Israel and Egypt. 

• We've also expanded our own 
sphere of friendship. Our deep commit- 
ment to human rights and to meeting 
human needs has improved our relation- 
ship with much of the Third World. Our 
decision to normalize relations with the 
People's Republic of China will help to 
preserve peace and stability in Asia and 
in the western Pacific. 

• We've increased and strengthened 
our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, 
and we are now making arrangements for 
key naval and air facilities to be used by 
our forces in the region of northeast Af- 
rica and the Persian Gulf. 

• We've reconfirmed our 1959 
agreement to help Pakistan preserve its 
independence and its integrity. The 
United States will take action — 
consistent with our own laws — to assist 
Pakistan in resisting any outside aggres- 
sion. And I'm asking the Congress specif- 
ically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also 
working, along with the leaders of other 
nations, to provide additional military 
and economic aid for Pakistan. That re- 
quest will come to you in just a few days. 

• In the weeks ahead, we will fur- 
ther strengthen political and military ties 
with other nations in the region. 

• We believe that there are no ir- 
reconcilable differences between us and 
any Islamic nation. We respect the faith 
of Islam, and we are ready to cooperate 
with all Moslem countries. 

• Finally, we are prepared to work 
with other countries in the region to 
share a cooperative security framework 
that respects differing values and political 
beliefs, yet which enhances the independ- 
ence, security, and prosperity of all. 

All these efforts combined emphasize 
our dedication to defend and preserve the 
vital interests of the region and of the na- 
tion, which we represent, and those of 
our allies in Europe and the Pacific and 
also in the parts of the world which have 
such great strategic importance to us, 
stretching especially through the Middle 
East and southwest Asia. With your 
help, I will pursue these efforts with 
vigor and with determination. You and I 
will act as necessary to protect and to 
preserve our nation's security. 

The men and women of America's 
Armed Forces are on duty tonight in 
many parts of the world. I'm proud of the 
job they're doing, and I know you share 
that pride. I believe that our volunteer 



B 



Department of State Bulletin 



Special 



forces are adequate for current defense 
needs. And I hope that it will not become 
necessary to impose the draft. However, 
we must be prepared for that possibility. 
For this reason, I have determined that 
the selective service system must now be 
revitalized. I will send legislation and 
budget proposals to the Congress next 
month so that we can begin registration 
and then meet future mobilization needs 
rapidly if they arise. 

We also need clear and quick passage 
of a new charter to define the legal au- 
thority and accountability of our intelli- 
gence agencies. We will guarantee that 
abuses do not recur, but we must tighten 
our controls on sensitive intelligence in- 
formation. And we need to remove un- 
warranted restraints on America's ability 
to collect intelligence. 

The decade ahead will be a time of 
rapid change, as nations everywhere seek 
to deal with new problems and age-old 
tensions. But America need have no 
fear — we can thrive in a world of change 
if we remain true to our values and ac- 
tively engage in promoting world peace. 
We will continue to work as we have 
for peace in the Middle East and southern 
Africa. We will continue to build our ties 
with developing nations, respecting and 
helping to strengthen their national inde- 
pendence, which they have struggled so 
hard to achieve. And we will continue to 
support the growth of democracy and the 
protection of human rights. 

In repressive regimes, popular frus- 
trations often have no outlet except 
through violence. But when peoples and 
their governments can approach then- 
problems together — through open, demo- 
cratic methods — the basis for stability 
and peace is far more solid and far more 
enduring. That is why our support for 
human rights in other countries is in our 
own national interest as well as part of 
our own national character. 

Peace — a peace that preserves 
freedom — remains America's first goal. 
In the coming years as a mighty nation, 
we will continue to pursue peace. But to 
be strong abroad we must be strong at 
home. And in order to be strong, we 
must continue to face up to the difficult 
issues that confront us as a nation today. 
The crises in Iran and Afghanistan 
have dramatized a very important lesson: 
Our excessive dependence on foreign oil 
is a clear and present danger to our na- 
tion's security. The need has never been 
more urgent. At long last, we must have 
a clear, comprehensive energy policy for 
the United States. 

As you well know, I have been work- 
ing with the Congress in a concentrated 
and persistent way over the past 3 years 
to meet this need. We have made prog- 



ress together. But Congress must act 
promptly now to complete final action on 
this vital energy legislation. Our natioh 
will then have a major conservation ef- 
fort, important initiatives to develop* 
solar power, realistic pricing based on the 
true value of oil, strong incentives for the 
production of coal and other fossil fuels in 
the United States, and our nation's most 
massive peacetime investment in the de- 
velopment of synthetic fuels. 

The American people are making 
progress in energy conservation. Last 
year we reduced overall petroleum con- 
sumption by 8% and gasoline consump- 
tion by 5% below what it was the year 
before. 

Now we must do more. After consul- 
tation with the governors, we will set 



Second, as we continue to work with 
business to hold down prices, we will 
build also on the historic national accord 
with organized labor to restrain pay in- 
creases in a fair fight against inflation. 

Third, we will continue our success- 
ful efforts to cut paperwork and to dis- 
mantle unnecessary government regula- 
tion. 

Fourth, we will continue our prog- 
ress in providing jobs for America, con- 
centrating on a major new program to 
provide training and work for our young 
people, especially minority youth. It has 
been said that "a mind is a terrible thing 
to waste." We will give our young people 
new hope for jobs and a better life in the 
1980s. 

And fifth, we must use the decade of 



The Soviet Union is going to have to answer same basic questions: Will it 
help promote a more stable international environment in which its own 
legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand 
its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power 
for colonial conquest? 



gasoline conservation goals for each of 
the 50 States, and I will make them man- 
datory if these goals are not met. I've es- 
tablished an import ceiling for 1980 of 8.2 
million barrels a day — well below the 
level of foreign oil purchases in 1977. I 
expect our imports to be much lower than 
this, but the ceiling will be enforced by an 
oil import fee if necessary. I'm prepared 
to lower our imports still further if the 
other oil consuming countries will join us 
in a fair and mutual reduction. If we have 
a serious shortage, I will not hesitate to 
impose mandatory gasoline rationing im- 
mediately. 

The single biggest factor in the infla- 
tion rate last year — the increase in the in- 
flation rate last year — was from one 
cause: the skyrocketing prices of OPEC 
oil. We must take whatever actions are 
necessary to reduce our dependence on 
foreign oil and at the same time, to re- 
duce inflation. 

As individuals and as families, few of 
us can produce energy by ourselves. But 
all of us can conserve energy — every one 
of us, every day of our lives. Tonight I 
call on you — in fact all the people of 
America — to help our nation. Conserve 
energy. Eliminate waste. Make 1980 in- 
deed a year of energy conservation. 

Of course, we must take other ac- 
tions to strengthen our nation's economy. 

First, we will continue to reduce the 
deficit and then to balance the federal 
budget. 



the 1980s to attack the basic structural 
weaknesses and problems in our economy, 
through measures to increase productiv- 
ity, savings, and investment. 

With these energy and economic 
policies, we will make America even 
stronger at home in this decade — just as 
our foreign and defense policies will make 
us stronger and safer throughout the 
world. 

We will never abandon our struggle 
for a just and a decent society here at 
home. That's the heart of America, and 
it's the source of our ability to inspire 
other people to defend their own rights 
abroad. Our material resources, great as 
they are, are limited. Our problems are 
too complex for simple slogans or for 
quick solutions. We cannot solve them 
without effort and sacrifice. Walter 
Lippmann once reminded us: 

You took the good things for granted. 
Now you must earn them again. For every 
right that you cherish, you have a duty which 
you must fulfill. For every good which you 
wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice 
your comfort and your ease. There is nothing 
for nothing any longer." 

Our challenges are formidable. But 
there's a new spirit of unity and resolve 
in our country. We move into the 1980s 
with confidence and hope and a bright 
vision of the America we want: 

• An America strong and free; 

• An America at peace; 



February 1980 



Special 



• An America with equal rights for 
all citizens and for women guaranteed in 
the United States Constitution; 

• An America with jobs and good 
health and good education for every citi- 
zen; 

• An America with a clean and 
bountiful life in our cities and on our 
farms; 

• An America that helps to feed the 
world; 

• An America secure in filling its 
own energy needs; 

• An America of justice, tolerance, 
and compassion. 

For this vision to come true, we 
must sacrifice, but this national commit- 
ment will be an exciting enterprise that 
will unify our people. Together as one 
people let us work to build our strength 
at home. And together as one indivisible 
union, let us seek peace and security 
throughout the world. Together let us 
make of this time of challenge and dangei 
a decade of national resolve and of brave 
achievement. ■ 

l Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980. 



State of the Union Message 



Following are excerpts relating to 
foreign policy from President Carter's 
message to the Congress of January 21 , 
1980. i 

My State of the Union Address will be 
devoted to a discussion of the most im- 
portant challenges facing our country as 
we enter the 1980s. 

Over the coming year, those chal- 
lenges will receive my highest priority 
and greatest efforts. However, there will 
also be many other significant areas 
which will receive my personal commit- 
ment, as well as that of my Administra- 
tion, during the 2nd Session of the 96th 
Congress. 

It is important that Congress, along 
with the public, be aware of these other 
vital areas of concern as they listen to my 
State of the Union Address. In that way, 
the context of the Address, and my Ad- 
ministration's full message for 1980, can 
best be understood. 

For that reason, I am sending this 
State of the Union Message to the Con- 
gress today, several days before my 
State of the Union Address. 



• the decline in defense spending has 
been reversed; defense spending has in- 
creased at a real rate of over 3% in 1979, 
and I am proposing a real increase in the 
defense spending level of more than 20% 
over the next 5 years; 

• the NATO Alliance has been re- 
vitalized and strengthened through 
substantially increased resources, new 
deterrent weapons, and improved coordi- 
nation; increased emphasis has also been 
given to conventional force capabilities to 
meet crises in other areas of the world; 

• Egypt and Israel have ended more 
than 30 years of war through a Peace 
Treaty that also established a framework 
for comprehensive peace in the Middle 
East; 

• the commitment of our Nation to 
pursue human rights throughout the 
world, in nations which are friendly and 
those which are not, has been made clear 
to all; 

• our resolve to oppose aggression, 
such as the illegal invasion of the Soviet 
Union into Afghanistan, has been 
supported by tough actions. 



RECORD OF PROGRESS 

When I took office in 1977, our Nation 
faced a number of serious domestic and 
international problems: 



• no national energy policy existed, 
and our dependence on foreign oil was 
rapidly increasing; 



• our defense posture was declining 
as a result of a continuously shrinking 
defense budget; 

• the strength of the NATO Alliance 
was at a post-World War II low; 

• tensions between Israel and Egypt 
threatened another Middle East war; and 

• America's resolve to oppose inter- 
national aggression and human rights 
violations was under serious question. 

Over the past 36 months, clear prog- 
ress has been made in solving the chal- 
lenges we found in January of 1977: 



LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES 

In the coming legislative session, the last 
in this Presidential term, I am deeply 
committed to finishing the agenda that -I 
have placed before the Congress. That 
agenda has been comprehensive and de- 
manding, but it has also been absolutely 
essential for our Nation's well-being. 

I do not plan to add significantly to 
the agenda this year. Because of the im- 
portance of enacting the proposals al- 
ready before the Congress, and the rela- 
tively short Congressional session facing 
us. I will be limiting my major new pro- 
posals to a critical few: 



• Initiatives implementing my re- 
sponse to the Soviet invasion of Afghanis- 
tan. 

I am convinced that these new initia- 
tives, along with the major proposals I 
previously made to the Congress, can be 
enacted this year, if we have a dedicated, 
all-out effort on the part of the Adminis- 
tration and the Congress. I pledge such 
an effort on my part, and that of my Ad- 
ministration. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Special 



As in the previous three years. I will 
be working with you toward the basic 
goals of: 



• Building America's military 
strength; 

• Working to resolve international 
disputes through peaceful means; 

• Striving to resolve pressing inter- 
national economic problems; 

• Continuing to support the building 
of democratic institutions and protecting 
human rights; and 

• Preventing the spread and further 
development of nuclear weapons. 

My highest legislative priorities in 
each of these areas this year will be: 



Building America's Military Strength 

• Defense Department Authoriza- 
tions and Appropriations — I will be 
proposing a defense budget containing a 
3.3% real growth in outlays. It is essen- 
tial that the Congress support an increase 
of that amount if we are to strengthen 
our defense capabilities. 

Working to Resolve International Dis- 
putes 

• Refugee Legislation and 
Funding — This legislation is necessary 
to improve our refugee program and to 
provide needed domestic assistance to 
refugees. Prompt House action would as- 
sure that we have a sound framework 
within which to accommodate the in- 
creasing flow of refugees. 



Striving to Resolve International Eco- 
nomic Problems 

• Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign 
Assistanee — I will be proposing foreign 
assistance legislation which provides the 
authority needed to carry forward a co- 
operative relationship with a large 
number of developing nations. Prompt 
Congressional action is essential. 

• China Trade Agreement — I will 
be seeking early approval by the Con- 
gress of the Trade Agreement reached 
with China; the Agreement represents a 
major step forward in the process toward 
improved economic relations with China. 

Continuing to Support the Building of 
Democratic Institutions and Protecting 
Human Rights 

• Special International Security 
Assistance for Pakistan — I am sending 



to Congress a military and economic as- 
sistance program to enable Pakistan to 
strengthen its defenses. Prompt enact- 
ment will be one of my highest legislative 
priorities. 

•Human Rights Conventions — I 
will continue to press the Senate to 
ratify five key human rights treaties — 
the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the Convention on Racial Dis- 
crimination, the UN Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights, and on Economic 
and Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
Genocide Convention. 



Preventing the Spread and Further 
Development of Nuclear Weapons 

• SALT II— I firmly believe that 
SALT II is in our Nation's security 
interest and that it will add signifi- 
cantly to the control of nuclear 
weapons. But because of the Soviet in- 
vasion of Afghanistan, I do not believe 
it is advisable to have the Senate con- 
sider the Treaty now. 



I. ENSURING ECONOMIC 
STRENGTH 



Trade 

This past year was one of unmatched 
and historic achievement for a vital 
component of the U.S. economy — 
exports and trade. In 1979, nearly 3 
million jobs in our manufacturing indus- 
tries, or one out of every seven jobs in 
manufacturing, depended upon our ex- 
port performance in overseas markets. 
Our exports were a key contributor to 
the growth of the U.S. economy in 
1979. 

Exports of agricultural and indus- 
trial goods grew by an unparalleled $35 
billion, reaching a level of $180 billion. 
This represented an increase of 25% 
over exports in 1978. This record in- 
crease in exports, coupled with a slower 
rate of growth of imports, resulted in 
substantial improvements of $5 billion 
in our balance of trade. Furthermore, a 
rapid growth of service exports in 1979 
led to a $13 billion improvement in the 
current account, bringing that account 
from a deficit in 1978 to near balance in 
1979. 

I expect that in 1980 our exports 
will continue to strengthen and that, if 
we can continue to further conserve and 
limit imports of oil, we will further im- 



prove our trade balance position and 
that of the dollar. The future for 
American exports is bright, and will 
remain so, despite the necessity of 
suspending certain exports to the 
Soviet Union. 

This Administration has accom- 
plished several goals in the last year in 
assuring that there will continue to be 
greater exports and, therefore, job 
possibilities for U.S. workers and 
farmers. 

To improve the condition of access 
of U.S. exports to foreign markets, I 
signed into force in July of last year a 
new trade act which reflected two years 
of hard bargaining in the recently con- 
cluded round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. These negotiations, which 
included all major developed and lesser 
developed countries, resulted in 
agreements to strengthen the rules of 
conduct of international trade and open 
new markets to U.S. exports. These 
negotiations were of historic impor- 
tance in their scope and accomplish- 
ment, and their success is attributable 
to close cooperation that existed during 
and after the negotiations between the 
Congress, the private sector and the 
Administration. 

Our negotiating success now chal- 
lenges us to take advantage of the op- 
portunity for improving further our ex- 



. . . / am proposing a real increase 
in the defense spending level of 
more than 20% over the next 5 
years. 



port performance. To meet this chal- 
lenge, I proposed in 1979 a major reor- 
ganization of the government's trade 
policy and export promotion activities. 
That reorganization will strengthen 
government coordination in the trade 
field and provide an improved basis for 
protecting American interest in the re- 
cently negotiated trade agreements. I 
put this reorganization into effect, with 
Congressional approval, earlier this 
month. With the changes initiated in 
my trade reorganization, we will ensure 
that trade between the United States 
and its trading partners will be con- 
ducted fairly and openly. 

Consistent with my decisions on 
suspending certain types of trade with 
the Soviet Union, my Administration 
will be seeking this year to find addi- 
tional ways to foster U.S. export ex- 



February 1980 



Special 



pansion. We arc studying the possibil- 
ity of further agreements on expanded 
trade with both traditional and newer- 
trade partners, including China. I look 
forward to working with the Congress 
on ways we can continue to improve our 
trading position which, in turn, will 
help maintain a prosperous American 
economy. 



II. CREATING ENERGY SECURITY 

Since I took office, my highest 
legislative priorities have involved the 
development of our Nation's first com- 
prehensive energy policy. The struggle 
to achieve that policy has been difficult 
for all of us, but the accomplishments of 
the past three years leave no doubt that 
our country is finally serious about the 
problems caused by our overdepen- 
dence on foreign oil. The accom- 
plishments can be lost, however, and 
the progress stopped, if we fail to move 
forward even further this year. There 
is no single panacea that will solve our 
energy crisis. We must rely on and en- 
courage multiple forms of production — 
coal, crude oil, natural gas, solar, nu- 
clear, synthetics — and conservation. 

It is therefore essential that Con- 
gress enact the major energy bills I 
proposed last year; and their enactment 
will be my most immediate and highest 
legislative priority this year. 



III. ENHANCING BASIC HUMAN 
AND SOCIAL NEEDS 



Refugees 

In 1979 my Administration made sig- 
nificant progress in resolving a number 
of problems arising from the increase in 
refugees. Last March, I proposed com- 
prehensive refugee legislation, and I 
regard its passage as a high priority 
this year. The legislation — which is the 
first comprehensive reform of our refu- 
gee immigration and domestic reset- 
tlement policies in twenty-eight 
years — will bring common sense and 
cohesion to an unnecessarily frag- 
mented approach to international and 
domestic refugee needs. Under vigor- 
ous new leadership, the Office of the 
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, 
which I created last year, will aggres- 
sively address the needs of refugees at 
home and abroad. We will also encour- 
age greater cooperation with the pri- 



vate sector and other actions to ensure 
successful refugee resettlement. 



VI. PROTECTING AND 
DEVELOPING OUR NATURAL 
RESOURCES 



AGRICULTURE 

Agricultural Progress 

While much work remains to be-done, 
America's agriculture is by far the best 
in the world. Efforts made by my Ad- 
ministration, in cooperation with Con- 
gress, to secure economic stability for 
the farmer, have produced results. 

In 1979, we experienced another 
record year for farm production. Net 
farm income jumped to $32 billion in 
1979, a $4 billion increase over 1978. 
Agricultural exports also reached new 
highs, rising 18% in 1979 to $32 billion. 
Despite the suspension of exports to 
the Soviet Union, we can expect a con- 
tinued healthy export picture for our 
Nation's farmers. 

Last year the Secretary of Agricul- 
ture travelled around the country and 
conducted an extraordinarily detailed 
and creative dialogue with the Nation's 
farmers. He obtained invaluable 
suggestions on economic and social is- 
sues concerning farm life; as we pre- 
pare our farm program for this year and 
beyond, the advice of our Nation's 
farmers will clearly be reflected in the 
policies we develop with the Congress. 

Soviet Grain Suspension 

In response to the Soviet armed inva- 
sion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve, 
I took several actions to demonstrate 
our Nation's resolve to resist such hos- 
tile acts of aggression against a 
sovereign, independent nation. One of 
the most important of these actions was 
the suspension of grain sales to the 
Soviet Union beyond the 8 million tons 
provided under our 1975 grains agree- 
ment. The Soviet Union had intended to 
purchase an estimated 25 million tons of 
U.S. wheat and feed grains. Thus, the 
suspension of sales above the 8 million 
ton agreement level is expected to re- 
sult in the freeing of about 17 million 
tons. 

My decision to suspend these sales 
was a difficult one, but a necessary one. 
We could not continue to do business as 
usual with the Soviet Union while it is 
invading an independent, sovereign na- 
tion in an area of the world of strategic- 



importance to the United States. I am 
fully committed to a policy of promoting 
international trade, and particularly the 
expanded export of U.S. agricultural 
products. I am proud of my Administra- 
tion's record in this regard. Because of 
the aggressive efforts of American 
farmers and businessmen, working in 
cooperation with Federal representa- 
tives, and the provision of new au- 
thorities by Congress, we have set new 
trade export records in each of the past 
3 years. Even with the Soviet suspen- 
sion, we intend to set still another rec- 
ord in the coming year. In making my 
decisions on the suspension, I believed 
it would be unfair to ask the American 
farmer to bear a greater share of the 
burden and sacrifice than their fellow 
Americans were asked to bear. Farm- 
ers should not be penalized simply be- 
cause they are part of an agricultural 
machine that is of growing strategic- 
importance in the world. 

To protect American farmers from 
the price depressing effects of the grain 
suspension, I directed the Secretary of 
Agriculture to take several actions: 

• The Commodity Credit Corpora- 
tion will assume the contractual obliga- 
tions for grain previously committed for 
shipment to the Soviet Union. 

• The Department of Agriculture, 
acting through the Commodity Credit 
Corporation, will purchase wheat con- 
tracted for export to the Soviet Union 
for the purpose of forming an emer- 
gency international wheat reserve. In 
this connection, I will propose legisla- 
tion authorizing release of this wheat 
for international aid purposes. 

• To encourage farmers to place 
additional grain in the farmer-held 
grain reserve, the Secretary of Agricul- 
ture has made several modifications in 
that important program. 

• The Commodity Credit Corpora- 
tion will purchase corn at the local level 
to alleviate the congestion within the 
transportation system caused by the 
refusal of the International Long- 
shoremen's Association to load grain up 
to the 8 million metric ton level. 

In combination, these actions are 
expected to isolate from the market an 
amount of grain equivalent to that not 
shipped to the Soviet Union, thereby 
avoiding a decline in grain prices. I am 
pleased to report that these actions 
are having the desired results and that 
American farmers are being protected 
from the effects of the suspension. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Special 



If further actions are necessary to 
insure that American agriculture does 
not bear a disproportionately large 
share of the burden associated with this 
action, I will not hesitate to take them. 



International Emergency Wheat 
Reserve 

The Congress has not yet acted on the 
proposal I made in the last Session to 
create an International Emergency 
Wheat Reserve. This reserve of up to 4 
million tons of wheat would be used to 
assure recipient nations that we will 
meet our international food aid com- 
mitments. The suspension of further 
grain sales to the Soviet Union pro- 
vides an appropriate opportunity to 
provide this authority, and thereby 
establish guidelines for the release of 
wheat now being acquired by the Com- 
modity Credit Corporation. 

FOREIGN POLICY 

From the time I assumed office three 
years ago this month, I have stressed 
the need for this country to assert a 
leading role in a world undergoing the 
most extensive and intensive change in 
human history. 

My policies have been directed in 
particular at three areas of change: 

• the steady growth and increased 
projection abroad of Soviet military 
power — power that has grown faster 
than our own over the past two 
decades. 

• the overwhelming dependence of 
Western nations, which now increas- 
ingly includes the United States, on 
vital oil supplies from the Middle East. 

• the pressures of change in many 
nations of the developing world, in- 
cluding the year old revolution in Iran 
and uncertainty about the future in 
many other countries. 

As a result of those fundamental 
facts, we face some of the most serious 
challenges in the history of this Nation. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a 
threat to global peace, to East-West 
relations, and to regional stability and 
to the flow of oil. As the unprecedented 
and overwhelming vote in the General 
Assembly demonstrated, countries 
across the world — and particularly the 
non-aligned — regard the Soviet inva- 
sion as a threat to their independence 
and security. Turmoil within the region 
adjacent to the Persian Gulf poses risks 
for the security and prosperity of every 
Western nation and thus for the entire 
global economy. The continuing holding 
of American hostages in Iran is both an 



affront to civilized people everywhere, 
and a serious impediment to meeting 
the self-evident threat to widely-shared 
common interests — including those of 
Iran. 

But as we focus our most urgent 
efforts on pressing problems, we will 
continue to pursue the benefits that 
only change can bring. For it always 
has been the essence of America that 
we want to move on — we understand 
that prosperity, progress and most of 
all peace cannot be had by standing 



We face a broad range of threats 
and opportunities. We have and should 
continue to pursue a broad range of 
defense, diplomatic and economic 
capabilities and objectives. 

I see five basic goals for America in 
the world over the 1980s: 

• First, we will continue, as we 
have over the past three years, to build 
America's military strength and that of 
our allies and friends. Neither the 
Soviet Union nor any other nation will 



Exports of agricultural and industrial goods grew by an unparalleled $35 
billion, reaching a level of $180 billion. This represented an increase of 
25% over exports in 1978. 



still. A world of nations striving to pre- 
serve their independence, and of peoples 
aspiring for economic development and 
political freedom, is not a world hostile 
to the ideals and interests of the United 
States. We face powerful adversaries, 
but we have strong friends and depend- 
able allies. We have common interests 
with the vast majority of the world's 
nations and peoples. 

There have been encouraging de- 
velopments in recent years, as well as 
matters requiring continued vigilance 
and concern: 

• Our alliances with the world's 
most advanced and democratic states 
from Western Europe through Japan 
are stronger than ever. 

• We have helped to bring about a 
dramatic improvement in relations be- 
tween Egypt and Israel and an historic 
step towards a comprehensive Arab- 
Israeli settlement. 

• Our relations with China are 
growing closer, providing a major new 
dimension in our policy in Asia and the 
world. 

• And across southern Africa from 
Rhodesia to Namibia we are helping 
with the peaceful transition to majority 
rule in a context of respect for minority 
as well as majority rights. 

The central challenge for us today 
is to our steadfastness of purpose. We 
are no longer tempted by isolationism. 
But we must also learn to deal effec- 
tively with the concentration of the 
world — the need to cooperate with po- 
tential adversaries without euphoria, 
without undermining our determination 
to compete with such adversaries and if 
necessary confront the threats they 
may pose to our security. 



have reason to question our will to 
sustain the strongest and most flexible 
defense forces. 

• Second, we will pursue an active 
diplomacy in the world, working — 
together with our friends and allies — to 
resolve disputes through peaceful 
means and to make any aggressor pay a 
heavy price. 

• Third, we will strive to resolve 
pressing international economic 
problems — particularly energy and 
inflation — and continue to pursue our 
still larger objective of global economic 
growth through expanded trade and 
development assistance. 

• Fourth, we will continue vigor- 
ously to support the process of building 
democratic institutions and improving 
human rights protection around the 
world. We are deeply convinced that 
the future lies not with dictatorship but 
democracy. 

• Fifth, we remain deeply com- 
mitted to the process of mutual and 
verifiable arms control, particularly to 
the effort to prevent the spread and 
further development of nuclear 
weapons. Our decision to defer, but not 
abandon our efforts to secure ratifica- 
tion of the SALT II Treaty reflects our 
firm conviction that the United States 
has a profound national security inter- 
est in the constraints on Soviet nuclear 
forces which only that treaty can pro- 
vide. 

Continuing close cooperation be- 
tween the Congress and the Executive 
Branch will be required to achieve these 
goals. My most immediate legislative 
priorities include: 



February 1980 



Special 



(1) Defense Department Authoriza- 
tion and Appropriation Bills 

(2) Special International Security 
Assistance, for Pakistan and other 
countries 

(3) Bilateral and Multilateral 
Foreign Assistance Bills, including 
Central America supplemental 

(4) The China Trade Agreement 

(5) Intelligence Charters 

(6) Refugee Legislation and Fund- 
ing 

(7) Human Rights Conventions 

(8) And, when appopriate, the 
SALT II Treaty. 

One very immediate and pressing 
objective that is uppermost on our 
minds and those of the American people 
is the release of our hostages in Iran. 

We have no basic quarrel with the 
nation, the revolution or the people of 
Iran. The threat to them comes not 
from American policy but from Soviet 
actions in the region. We are prepared 
to work with the government of Iran to 
develop a new and mutually beneficial 
relationship. 



in which democracy and freedom are 
still challenged, a world in which peace 
must be re-won every day." 

We must have both the military 
power and the political will to deter our 
adversaries and to support our friends 
and allies. 

We must pay whatever price is re- 
quired to remain the strongest nation 
in the world. That price has increased 
as the military power of our major ad- 
versary has grown and its readiness to 
use that power been made all too evi- 
dent in Afghanistan. 



The U.S.-Soviet Relationship 

We are demonstrating to the Soviet 
Union across a broad front that it will 
pay a heavy price for its aggression in 
terms of our relationship. Throughout 
the last decades U.S.-Soviet relations 
have been a mixture of cooperation and 
competition. The Soviet attack on Af- 
ghanistan and the ruthless extermina- 
tion of its government have highlighted 
in the starkest terms the darker side of 



As the unprecedented and overwhelming vote in the General Assembly 
demonstrated, countries across the world — and particularly the 
non-aligned — regard the Soviet invasion as a threat to their independence 
and security. 



But that will not be possible so long 
as Iran continues to hold Americans 
hostage, in defiance of the world com- 
munity and civilized behavior. They 
must be released unharmed. We have 
thus far pursued a measured program 
of peaceful diplomatic and economic 
steps in an attempt to resolve this issue 
without resorting to other remedies 
available to us under international law. 
This reflects the deep respect of our 
Nation for the rule of law and for the 
safety of our people being held, and our 
belief that a great power bears a re- 
sponsibility to use its strength in a 
measured and judicious manner. But 
our patience is not unlimited and our 
concern for the well-being of our fellow 
citizens grows each day. 



ENHANCING NATIONAL 
SECURITY— AMERICAN MILI- 
TARY STRENGTH 

The maintenance of national security is 
my first concern, as it has been for 
every President before me. 

As I stated one year ago in Atlanta: 
"This is still a world of danger, a world 



their policies — going well beyond com- 
petition and the legitimate pursuit of 
national interest, and violating all 
norms of international law and practice. 

This attempt to subjugate an inde- 
pendent, non-aligned Islamic people is a 
callous violation of international law 
and the United Nations Charter, two 
fundamentals of international order. 
Hence, it is also a dangerous threat to 
world peace. For the first time since 
World War II, the Soviets have sent 
combat forces into an area that was not 
previously under their control, into a 
non-aligned and sovereign state. 

On January 4 I therefore an- 
nounced a number of measures, includ- 
ing the reduction of grain sales and the 
curtailment of trade and technology 
transfer, designed to demonstrate our 
firm opposition to Soviet actions in Af- 
ghanistan and to underscore our belief 
that in the face of this blatent trans- 
gression of international law, it was 
impossible to conduct business as usual. 
I have also been in consultation with 
our allies and with countries in the re- 
gion regarding additional multilateral 



measures that might be taken to regis- 
ter our disapproval and bolster security 
in Southwest Asia. I have been heart- 
ened by the support expressed for our 
position, and by the fact that such 
support has been tangible, as well as 
moral. 

The destruction of the independ- 
ence of Afghanistan government and 
the occupation by the Soviet Union has 
altered the strategic situation in that 
part of the world in a very ominous 
fashion. It has brought the Soviet 
Union within striking distance of the 
Indian Ocean and even the Persian 
Gulf. 

It has eliminated a buffer between 
the Soviet Union and Pakistan and pre- 
sented a new threat to Iran. These two 
countries are now far more vulnerable 
to Soviet political intimidation. If that 
intimidation were to prove effective, 
the Soviet Union might well control an 
area of vital strategic and economic 
significance to the survival of Western 
Europe, the Far East, and ultimately 
the United States. 

It is clear that the entire 
subcontinent of Asia and specifically 
Pakistan is threatened. Therefore, I am 
asking Congress, as the first order of 
business, to pass an economic and mili- 
tary aid package designed to assist 
Pakistan defend itself. 

Defense Budget 

For many years the Soviets have 
steadily increased their real defense 
spending, expanded their strategic 
forces, strengthened their forces in 
Europe and Asia, and enhanced their 
capability for projecting military force 
around the world directly or through 
the use of proxies. Afghanistan 
dramatizes the vastly increased mili- 
tary power of the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet Union has built a war 
machine far beyond any reasonable re- 
quirements for their own defense and 
security. In contrast, our own defense 
spending declined in real terms every 
year from 1968 through 1976. 

We have reversed this decline in 
our own effort. Every year since 1976 
there has been a real increase in our 
defense spending — and our lead has en- 
couraged increases by our allies. With 
the support of the Congress, we must 
and will make an even greater effort in 
the years ahead. 

The Fiscal Year 1981 budget would 
increase funding authority for defense 
to more than $158 billion, a real growth 
of more than 5% over my request for 
Fiscal Year 1980. Therefore, requested 
outlays for defense during Fiscal Year 



H 



Department of State Bulletin 



Special 



1981 will grow by more than 3% in real 
terms over the preceding year. 

The trends we mean to correct 
cannot be remedied overnight; we must 
be willing to see this program through. 
To ensure that we do so I am setting a 
growth rate for defense that we can 
sustain over the long haul. 

The defense program I have pro- 
posed for the next five years will re- 
quire some sacrifice — but sacrifice we 
can well afford. 

The defense program emphasizes 
four areas: 

(a) It ensures that our strategic nu- 
clear forces will be equivalent to those 
of the Soviet Union and that deterrence 
against nuclear war will be maintained; 

(b) It upgrades our forces so that 
the military balance between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact will continue to 
deter the outbreak of war — conven- 
tional or nuclear — in Europe; 

(c) It provides us the ability to 
come quickly to the aid of friends and 
allies around the globe; 

(d) And it ensures that our Navy 
will continue to be the most powerful 
on the seas. 

Strategic Forces 

We are strengthening each of the three 
legs of our strategic forces. The cruise 
missile production which will begin 
next year will modernize our strategic 
air deterrent. B-52 capabilities will also 
be improved. These steps will maintain 
and enhance the B-52 fleet by improv- 
ing its ability to deliver weapons 
against increasingly heavily defended 
targets. 

We are also modernizing our 
strategic submarine missile force. The 
first new Trident submarine has al- 
ready been launched and will begin sea 
trials this year. The second Trident will 
be launched in the spring of 1980. The 
first of our new Trident missiles, with.a 
range of more than 4,000 miles, have 
already begun operational patrols in 
Poseidon submarines. 

The new MX missile will enhance 
the survivability of our land-based in- 
tercontinental ballistic missile force. 
That is why I decided last spring to 
produce this missile and selected the 
basing mode best suited to enhance its 
capability. Further the MX will 
strengthen our capability to attack a 
wide variety of Soviet targets. 

Our new systems will enable U.S. 
strategic forces to maintain equivalence 
in the face of the mounting Soviet chal- 
lenge. We would however need an even 
greater investment in strategic systems 



to meet the likely Soviet buildup with- 
out SALT. 



Forces for NATO 

We are greatly accelerating our ability 
to reinforce Western Europe with 
massive ground and air forces in a 
crisis. We are undertaking a major 
modernization program for the Army's 
weapons and equipment, adding armor, 
firepower, and tactical mobility. 

We are prepositioning more heavy 
equipment in Europe to help us cope 
with attacks with little warning, and 
greatly strengthening our airlift and 
sealift capabilities. 

We are also improving our tactical 
air forces — buying about 1700 new 
fighter and attack aircraft over the 
next five years — and increasing the 
number of Air Force fighter wings by 
over 10%. 

We are accelerating the rate at 
which we can move combat aircraft to 
Europe to cope with any surprise at- 
tack, and adding to the number of shel- 
ters at European airbases to prevent 
our aircraft from being destroyed on 
the ground. 

Rapid Deployment Forces 

We are systematically enhancing our 
ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO 
contingencies wherever required by our 
commitments or when our vital inter- 
ests are threatened. 

The rapid deployment forces we 
are assembling will be extraordinarily 
flexible: They could range in size from a 
few ships or air squadrons to forma- 
tions as large as 100,000 men, together 
with their support. Our forces will be 
prepared for rapid deployment to any 
region of strategic significance. 

Among the specific initiatives we 
are taking to help us respond to crises 
outside of Europe are: 

• the development and production 
of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft 
with intercontinental range; 

• the design and procurement of a 
force of Maritime Prepositioning Ships 
that will carry heavy equipment and 
supplies for three Marine Corps 
brigades. 

In addition, responding to the 
Soviet military presence in Cuba and 
the proxy role of Cuba on behalf of the 
USSR, we have taken or are taking the 
following actions in support of the rapid 
deployment force: 

(1) We are substantially increasing 
our ability to monitor Cuban and 
Soviet/Cuban activities; 



(2) We have established a Carib- 
bean Joint Task Force Headquarters 
which improves our ability to respond 
to events in the region; 

(3) We are increasing regional mili- 
tary exercises; and, 

(4) We are intensifying assistance 
to countries in the region that are 
threatened by Soviet or Cuban 
intervention. 

Naval Forces 

Seapower is indispensable to our global 
position — in peace and also in war. Our 
shipbuilding program will sustain a 
550-ship Navy in the 1990s and we will 
continue to build the most capable ships 
afloat. 

The program I have proposed will 
assure the ability of our Navy to oper- 
ate in high threat areas, to maintain 
control of the seas and protect vital 
lines of communication — both military 
and economic — and to provide the 
strong maritime component of our rapid 
deployment forces. This is essential for 
operations in remote areas of the world, 
where we cannot predict far in advance 
the precise location of trouble, or pre- 
position equipment on land. 

Military Personnel 

No matter how capable or advanced our 
weapons systems, our military security 
depends on the abilities, the training 
and the dedication of the people who 
serve in our armed forces. I am deter- 
mined to recruit and to retain under 
any foreseeable circumstances an ample 
level of such skilled and experienced 
military personnel. 

We have enhanced our readiness 
and combat endurance by improving the 
Reserve Components. All reservists 
are assigned to units structured to 
complement and provide needed depth 
to our active forces. Some reserve per- 
sonnel have also now been equipped 
with new equipment. 

Mobilization Planning 

I have also launched a major effort to 
establish a coherent and practical basis 
for all government mobilization plan- 
ning. Begun last May, this is the first 
such effort conducted at Presidential 
level since World War II. It involves 
virtually every Federal agency, with 
the aim of improved efficiency and 
readiness. 



I 



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February 1980 



Special 



Our Intelligence Posture 

Our national interests are critically de- 
pendent on a strong and effective intel- 
ligence capability. We will not 
shortchange the intelligence 
capabilities needed to assure our na- 
tional security. Maintenance of and con- 
tinued improvements in our multi- 
faceted intelligence effort are essential 
if we are to cope successfully with the 
turbulence and uncertainties of today's 
world. 

The intelligence budget I have 
submitted to the Congress responds to 
our needs in a responsible way, pro- 
viding for significant growth over the 
Fiscal Year 1980 budget. This growth 
will enable us to develop new technical 
means of intelligence collection while 
also assuring that the more traditional 
methods of intelligence work are also 
given proper stress. We must continue 
to integrate both modes of collection in 
our analyses. 

It is imperative that we now move 
forward promptly within the context of 
effective Congressional oversight to 
provide America's intelligence commu- 
nity with Charters which can permit it 
to operate more effectively and within a 
national concern codified by law. 



REGIONAL POLICIES 

Every President for over three decades 
has recognized that America's interests 
are global and that we must pursue a 
global foreign policy. 

Two world wars have made clear 
our stake in Western Europe and the 
North Atlantic area. We are also inex- 
tricably linked with the Far East — 
politically, economically, and militarily. 
In both of these, the United States has 
a permament presence and security 
commitments which would be automati- 
cally triggered. We have become in- 
creasingly conscious of our growing 
interests in a third area — the Middle 
East and the Persian Gulf area. 

We have vital stakes in other major 
regions of the world as well. We have 
long recognized that in an era of inter- 
dependence, our own security and 
prosperity depend upon a larger com- 
mon effort with friends and allies 
throughout the world. 



The Atlantic Alliance 

At the outset of this Administration I 
emphasized the primacy of our Atlantic 
relationship in this country's national 
security agenda. We have made impor- 



tant progress toward making the Atlan- 
tic Alliance still more effective in a 
changing security environment. 

We are meeting the Soviet chal- 
lenge in a number of important ways: 

First, there is a recognition among 
our allies that mutual security is a re- 
sponsibility to be shared by all. We are 
each committed to increase national 
defense expenditures by 3% per year. 
There remains much work to be done in 
strengthening NATO's conventional 
defense; the work proceeding under the 
Alliance's Long Term Defense Program 
will help achieve this objective. 

Last month, we and our NATO al- 
lies took an historic step in Alliance se- 
curity policies with the decision to im- 
prove substantially our theater nuclear 
capabilities. The theater nuclear force 
modernization (TNF) program, which 
includes the deployment of improved 
Pershing ballistic missiles and of 
ground-launched cruise missiles in 
Europe, received the unanimous 
support of our allies. The accelerated 
deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRVed 
missiles made this modernization step 
essential. TNF deployments will give 
the Alliance an important retaliatory 
option that will make clear to the 
Soviets that they cannot wage a nuclear 
war in Europe and expect that Soviet 
territory will remain unscathed. 

While we move forward with our 
necessary defense efforts in Europe, we 
are also proceeding with our efforts to 
improve European security through 
arms control. 

As an integral part of the NATO 
TNF decisions, the Alliance has made it 
clear that it is prepared to negotiate 
limitations on long-range theater nu- 
clear missiles. 

On our part, our TNF moderniza- 
tion efforts will make possible a 
streamlining of our nuclear weapons 
stockpile in Europe, allowing us to 
withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads over 
the next year. 

In the Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reduction talks, we and our allies have 
recently put forward new proposals 
that are designed to simplify the 
negotiations and improve the prospect 
for early progress in limiting conven- 
tional military forces in Europe. 

In a very real sense the accom- 
plishments of the past year answered a 
critical question concerning NATO's fu- 
ture: can the Western Alliance, which 
has provided the foundation for one of 
the longest periods of peace and pros- 
perity that Europe has ever enjoyed, 
still summon the essential cohesion, 
relevance, and resolve to deal with fun- 



damental security issues likely to affect 
its member nations well into the next 
century? NATO's consensus in favor of 
modernizing and negotiating about its 
nuclear arsenal while continuing to im- 
prove conventional forces, dramatized 
Allied capacity to respond effectively to 
both the military and political threats 
posed by the Soviet Union. 

Relations with our allies and 
friends in Europe are taking on ever 
broader dimensions. Our security 
agenda remains central; we are ad- 
dressing new concerns as well. 

I met with an unprecedented 
number of European statesmen in 
Washington during the year just past, 
including the leaders of Great Britain, 
West Germany, Austria, Norway, Fin- 
land, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Sweden, and the European Community; 
in all of these meetings a common 
theme was the changing realities of 
political and economic interdependence 
and, as we enter a new decade, the 
need to promote more equitable condi- 
tions of peaceful growth and stability 
throughout the world. 

This approach has achieved tangi- 
ble form in a number of ways. For 
example, every West European gov- 
ernment supports us as we have con- 
tinued by every peaceful means to seek 
the release of American hostages held 
in Tehran in defiance of universal 
standards of international law and de- 
cency. We are consulting and coop- 
erating closely in our responses to the 
Soviet Union's invasion and occupation 
of Afghanistan. 

In the NATO area itself, we moved 
together vigorously to meet the serious 
economic problems faced by Turkey and 
thereby strengthen a vital part of 
NATO's southern flank and we have 
signed a new base agreement with Tur- 
key. This action, though indispensible 
in its own right, also supported our con- 
tinuing efforts to promote a solution to 
the Cyprus problem and to bring about 
the reintegration of Greece within the 
military framework of the Atlantic Al- 
liance, objectives which retain high 
priority this year. 

Asia 

The United States is a Pacific nation, as 
much as it is an Atlantic nation. Our 
interests in Asia are as important to us 
as our interests in Europe. Our trade 
with Asia is even greater than our 
trade with Europe. We have pursued 
and maintained these interests on the 
basis of a stable balance of power in the 
region. Our partnership and alliance 



Department of State Bulletin 






Special 



with Japan is central to our Asian pol- 
icy. We are strengthening our new re- 
lationship with China. We have ex- 
panded our ties with the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and its member governments. 

My trip to the Far East helped 
forge closer working relationships with 
Japan and Korea. 

Asian Security 

The balance of power is fundamental to 
Asian security. We have maintained 
that balance through a strong United 
States military posture in the region, as 
well as close ties with our allies, Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand and Korea. 
Over the past year I have worked to 
stabilize the United States military 
presence in Asia by concluding an 
amended base agreement with the 
Philippines that will last until 1991. We 
have fostered the closest degree of se- 
curity cooperation with Japan in the 
history of our two nations — exemplified 
by joint planning for the defense of 
Japan, increased Japanese contribu- 
tions to United States base costs in 
Japan, and large-scale Japanese pur- 
chases of United States defense equip- 
ment. After examining in detail new in- 
telligence estimates of North Korean 
military strength, I decided to maintain 
our troop strength in the Republic of 
Korea at its present level until at least 
1981. The reaffirmation of our commit- 
ment to Korean security has been of 
great importance to the Koreans as 
they make necessary political adjust- 
ments in the wake of President Park's 
assassination. 

Response by nations in East Asia 
to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan 
has been gratifying. Australia in par- 
ticular deserves recognition for the 
forthright stand it has taken. Japan and 
the ASEAN nations have also been 
strongly supportive. 

China 

Over the last year we have expanded 
our new relationship with the People's 
Republic of China to ensure that where 
our interests coincide, our separate ac- 
tions will be mutually reinforcing. To 
this end we have enhanced our consul- 
tative relationship. We have also 
sought to develop an enduring institu- 
tional framework in the economic, cul- 
tural, scientific, and trade areas. 

This process has been facilitated by 
the successful visits of Vice Premier 
Deng to the United States and Vice 
President Mondale to China; through 
the signing of over 15 commercial, sci- 



entific, and cultural agreements; 
through numerous Cabinet-level visits; 
and through a significant expansion of 
trade and the flow of people between 
our two countries. 

During Secretary of Defense 
Brown's recent trip to the People's Re- 
public of China, wide-ranging talks 
were held on global and regional issues, 
arms control, technology transfer, and 
ways to sustain bilateral contacts. Al- 
though we may differ with the Chinese 
on some issues, our views coincide on 
many important issues, particularly 
with respect to the implications for the 
region of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. 

In 1980 I look forward to passage 
by Congress early in the year of the 
China Trade Agreement and of authori- 
zation of OPIC operations in China; we 
plan to conclude civil aviation, 
maritime, and textile agreements; and 
continue to expand our commercial, cul- 
tural, and scientific relations, particu- 
larly, through ExImBank credits to the 
People's Republic of China. 

Southeast Asia 

The countries comprising ASEAN are 
central to United States interests in 
Southeast Asia. 

Throughout the past year, our rela- 
tions with ASEAN have continued to 
expand as our consultative arrange- 
ments were strengthened. 



We are demonstrating to the Soviet 
Union across a broad front that it 
will pay a heavy price for its 
aggression in terms of our 
relationship. 



The stability and prosperity of 
Southeast Asia have been severely 
challenged by Soviet-supported Viet- 
namese aggression in Cambodia. Dur- 
ing this year we will continue to en- 
courage a political settlement in Cam- 
bodia which will permit that nation to 
be governed by leaders of its own 
choice. We have taken all prudent steps 
possible to deter Vietnamese attacks on 
Thai territory by increasing our 
support to the Thais, and by direct 
warnings to Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. 
The other members of ASEAN have 
stood firmly behind Thailand, and this 
in great measure has helped to contain 
the conflict. We have been gratified by 
Thailand's courageous and humane ac- 
ceptance of the Cambodian refugees. 



Middle East— Persian Gulf- 
South Asia 

Events in Iran and Afghanistan have 
dramatized for us the critical impor- 
tance for American security and pros- 
perity of the area running from the 
Middle East through the Persian Gulf 
to South Asia. This region provides 
two-thirds of the world's oil exports, 
supplying most of the energy needs of 
our allies in Europe and Japan. It has 
been a scene of almost constant conflict 
between nations, and of serious internal 
instability within many countries. And 
now one of its nations has been invaded 
by the Soviet Union. 

We are dealing with these multiple 
challenges in a number of ways. 

Middle East. First, it has been a key 
goal of my Administration since 1977 to 
promote an enduring resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict — which is so es- 
sential to bringing stability and peace 
to the entire region. Following the 
Camp David Summit of August 1978, in 
March 1979, I helped bring about the 
signing of a peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel — the first time in 30 
years of Middle East conflict that peace 
had shined with such a bright and 
promising flame. At the historic signing 
ceremony at the White House, Prime 
Minister Begin and President Sadat re- 
peated their Camp David pledge to 
work for full autonomy for the West 
Bank and Gaza. 

Since then Egypt and Israel have 
been working to complete this part of 
the Camp David framework and to pro- 
vide an opportunity for the Palestinian 
people to participate in determining 
their future. I strongly support these 
efforts, and have pledged that we will 
be a full partner in the autonomy 
negotiations. We will continue to work 
vigorously for a comprehensive peace in 
the Middle East, building on the un- 
precedented achievements at Camp 
David. 

At the same time, I have reinforced 
America's commitment to Israel's secu- 
rity, and to the right of all nations in 
the area to live at peace with their 
neighbors, within secure and recog- 
nized frontiers. 

Persian Gulf. In recent years as our 
own fuel imports have soared, the Per- 
sian Gulf has become vital to the 
United States as it has been to many of 
our friends and allies. Over the longer 
term, the world's dependence on Per- 
sian Gulf oil is likely to increase. The 
denial of these oil supplies — to us or to 
others — would threaten our security 



■ 



I 






I 



J< 



February 1980 



Special 



and provoke an economic crisis greater 
than that of the Great Depression 50 
years ago, with a fundamental change 
in the way we live. 

Twin threats to the flow of oil — 
from regional instability and now po- 
tentially from the Soviet Union — 
require that we firmly defend our vital 
interests when threatened. 

In the past year, we have begun to 
increase our capacity to project military 
power into the Persian Gulf region, and 
are engaged in explorations of in- 
creased use of military facilities in the 
area. We have increased our naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean. We have 
been working with countries in the re- 
gion on shared security concerns. Our 
rapid deployment forces, as described 
earlier, could be used in support of 
friendly governments in the Gulf and 
Southwest Asian region, as well as in 
other areas. 

South Asia. The overwhelming chal- 
lenge in this region will be dealing with 
the new situation posed by Soviet ag- 
gression in Afghanistan. We must help 
the regional states develop a capability 
to withstand Soviet pressures in a 
strengthened framework for coopera- 
tion in the region. We want to cooper- 
ate with all the states of the region in 
this regard — with India and Pakistan, 
with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. 

In this new situation, we are pro- 
posing to the Congress a military and 
economic assistance program to enable 
Pakistan to buttress its defenses. This 
is a matter of the most urgent concern, 
and I strongly urge the earliest possible 
approval by the House and Senate. We 
are also working closely with other 
friends of Pakistan to increase the re- 
sources available for Pakistan's de- 
velopment and security. 

We are also pursuing the possibil- 
ity of gaining access to military 
facilities in the region in time of trou- 
ble. We are prepared to work closely 
with our friends in the region, on a co- 
operative basis, to do whatever is re- 
quired to ensure that aggressors would 
bear heavy costs so that further ag- 
gression is deterred. 

A high priority for us in the region 
is to manage our nuclear concerns with 
India and Pakistan in ways that are 
compatible with our global and regional 
priorities. The changed security situa- 
tion in South Asia arising from the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan calls for 
legislative action to allow renewed as- 
sistance to Pakistan. But this in no way 
diminishes our commitment to work to 
prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, 
in Pakistan or elsewhere. 



Steady growth of our economic as- 
sistance is also essential if the countries 
of South Asia are to achieve growth and 
true stability. 

Africa 

A peaceful transition to majority rule in 
Southern Africa continues to be a major- 
goal of the United States. We gave our 
fullest support to the successful British 
drive to reach an agreement among all 
parties in Rhodesia. The process of im- 
plementation will not be easy, but the 
path is now open to a peaceful outcome. 
With our European allies, Canada and 
the African states directly concerned 
we also are making progress toward in- 
dependence and majority rule for 
Namibia. The momentum resulting 
from successful resolution of the 
Rhodesian conflict should aid in these 
initiatives. 

Congressional support for the 
Executive Branch decision to maintain 
sanctions on Rhodesia until the parties 
reached agreement on a ceasefire and 
an impartial elections process had 
begun was instrumental in creating the 
conditions necessary for agreement. 
Now that the United States, European 
trading partners and the surrounding 
African states have lifted sanctions, the 
process of economic reconstruction in 
Rhodesia — soon to be Zimbabwe — can 
begin. 

With the creation of an independ- 
ent Zimbabwe after many years of 
fighting, we will be prepared to cooper- 
ate in a coherent multi-donor develop- 
ment plan for the poor nations in the 
Southern Africa region. 

Our active support for self- 
determination and racial equality in 
Southern Africa has enabled the United 
States to develop a continuing and ef- 
fective dialogue with governments 
throughout the continent. As Africa 
grows more important to us for eco- 
nomic, political and strategic reasons, 
we will be strengthening our ties of 
mutual interest with Africans. We will 
continue to participate in their first 
priority — economic development — and 
to help Africans resolve their political 
problems and maintain stability in their 
continent. 

Whether in the Horn or in other 
areas of the continent, we will also pro- 
vide to friendly nations security assist- 
ance when needed for defense of their 
borders. 

North Africa 

In 1979 the United States moved to 
help a long-standing friend by 



strengthening our arms supply re- 
lationship with Morocco. In assisting 
Morocco to deal with attacks inside its 
internationally recognized frontiers, we 
seek conditions of greater security and 
confidence in which a political settle- 
ment of the Western Sahara conflict can 
be effectively pursued. Though not it- 
self a mediator, the United States in 
the months ahead will encourage the 
countries in the area to resolve their 
differences peacefully in order that the 
vast economic potential of North Africa 
can be exploited for the well-being of 
the people living there. 

Latin America 

Since my inauguration, I have worked 
hard to forge a new, collaborative re- 
lationship with the nations of Latin 
America and the Caribbean — one rest- 
ing on a firm commitment to human 
rights, democratization, economic de- 
velopment and non-intervention. The 
events of 1979 — even the turbulence in 
Central America and the Caribbean — 
presented us with opportunities to 
move toward these goals. 

There was encouraging progress in 
the area of human rights and democ- 
ratization in the Western Hemisphere 
this past year. The inauguration of a 
new democracy in Ecuador, and the 
strong effort by the Andean countries 
to preserve democracy in Bolivia were 
positive steps. 

During 1979, I met with the Presi- 
dent of Mexico twice to discuss the op- 
portunities and difficult issues before 
our two countries. We have taken 
worthwhile steps, including an agree- 
ment on natural gas and on. trade. 

On October 1, Vice President Mon- 
dale and many leaders from Latin 
America traveled to Panama to cele- 
brate the coming into force of the 
Panama Canal Treaties. The transition 
to a new relationship and a new struc- 
ture to manage the Canal was smooth 
and effective because of the contribu- 
tions and the mutual respect between 
Panamanians and Americans. 

The Vice President also traveled to 
Brazil and Venezuela. The Secretary of 
State met with leaders in Quito at the 
inauguration of the new democratic 
President of Ecuador and in La Paz at 
the OAS General Assembly. These 
meetings have helped us to develop fur- 
ther the close consultative ties which 
are so important to a free and balanced 
community of nations in the hemi- 
sphere. 

Also, in 1979, the United States 
moved to a much closer economic and 



Department of State Bulletin 



Special 



political relationship with the increas- 
ingly significant Andean Pact countries. 
A memorandum of understanding on 
economic relations was signed in 
Washington in November. 

Central America and the Carib- 
bean region are undergoing a period of 
rapid social and political change. There 
is a threat that intervention by Cuba 
may thwart the desire of the people of 
the region for progress within a demo- 
cratic framework and we have been 
working closely with the governments 
in the region to try to aid in the de- 
velopmental process of the region and 
are prepared to assist those threatened 
by outside intervention. 

The Caribbean Group, which is 
coordinated by the World Bank and 
which we helped establish, has now be- 
come an important factor for develop- 
ment in the region, adding $260 million 
in concessionary resources to the re- 
gion. We have increased our aid to the 
Caribbean, reprogrammed loans, and 
are seeking prompt Congressional ac- 
tion on a supplemental of $80 million for 
Nicuaragua and Central America. 

My Science Advisor, Dr. Frank 
Press, led a large delegation of scien- 
tists and educators to Barbados, Peru, 
Venezuela and Brazil to forge new and 
fruitful ties between our countries 
in important areas of science and 
technology. 

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 

A growing defense effort and a vigor- 
ous foreign policy rest upon a strong 
economy here in the United States. 
And the strength of our own economy 
depends upon our ability to lead 
and compete in the international 
marketplace. 

Energy 

An essential lesson to be drawn from 
Iran is that there are compelling 
foreign policy as well as domestic eco- 
nomic reasons for lessening our de- 
pendence on foreign oil. 

In response to a series of United 
States proposals, the industrial coun- 
tries adopted in 1979 a cooperative 
energy strategy for the 1980s. Its main 
elements are collective restraint on oil 
imports; intensified efforts to conserve 
oil and boost production of conventional 
substitutes for oil; and collaborative 
research, development and commer- 
cialization of new fuel technologies. 

At the Tokyo Economic Summit in 
June, the heads of government of the- 
seven major industrial democracies 
agreed that they must take responsi- 



February 1980 



bility for curbing oil demand. By the 
end of the year, 20 industrialized na- 
tions, members of the International 
Energy Association, had agreed not 
only to enforce equitably allocated 
ceilings on their oil imports, but to 
create a system for quickly adjusting 
the ceilings to changes in world oil 
supply. Completion of the detailed 
agreements to execute the global oil 
demand-allocation process is at the 
head of the international energy agenda 
for 1980. 

At the 1980 Economic Summit in 
Venice, I intend to propose further 
joint action to smooth the transition 
from oil to more abundant fuels and to 
slow the growth in oil prices. 

In support of the international oil 
strategy, the Administration and the 
United States coal industry are 
launching joint marketing efforts to 



provement. Of course the outcome de- 
pends in part also upon responsible 
pricing behavior by OPEC and other oil 
producers. 

We support the efforts under way 
to strengthen the international mone- 
tary system. I urge the Congress to 
enact promptly legislation permitting 
the United States to increase its quota 
in the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) as part of the general expansion 
of Fund resources. We welcome the 
measures being taken by the IMF to 
improve its ability to promote sound 
economic and exchange rate policies 
in all member countries. We also wel- 
come the study of the possible estab- 
lishment of a "substitution account" to 
strengthen the international monetary 
system by promoting the role of the 
Special Drawing Right as the principal 
reserve asset in the system. 



m 



We have long recognized that in an era of interdependence , our own 
security and prosperity depend upon a larger common effort with friends 
and allies throughout the world. 



make this country a major exporter of 
steam coal. With assurance of reliable 
United States coal supply at competi- 
tive prices, many of the electric power 
plants to be built in the 1980s and 1990s 
can be coal-fired rather than oil- 
burning. Coal exports will help us pay 
for our declining but costly oil imports. 

A new source of natural gas supply 
for the United States — Mexico — was 
opened through the conclusion of 
government-to-government negotia- 
tions. Through close cooperation with 
our northern neighbor, Canada, the 
Administration cleared the way for ex- 
panding the flow of Canadian natural 
gas to the United States and for private 
development of the Alaskan gas 
pipeline across Canada to the lower 48 
states. 

We continue to believe that nuclear 
power will play an essential role in 
meeting the energy needs of many na- 
tions, but with effective safeguards 
against the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 

International Monetary Policy 

We are moving forcefully to establish 
the fundamental economic conditions 
for a strong dollar. In 1979 the balance 
of payments was in approximate bal- 
ance for the first time in three years, 
despite substantially higher oil import 
costs. Our anti-inflationary economic 
policies and strong energy program 
should provide a basis for further im- 



Trade 

Under the direction of my Special 
Trade Representative, we brought to a 
successful conclusion the multilateral 
trade negotiations, the most ambitious 
set of negotiations to reduce barriers to 
international trade in a decade. The re- 
sulting "MTN" agreements, covering a 
broad spectrum of trade issues, were 
concluded and ratified by overwhelming 
majorities of the United States Con- 
gress. These binding commitments, 
signed by all the major trading nations, 
provide the framework for a new era in 
international trading relations with 
them and with the developing nations. 
This makes clear my resolve and that of 
the American people to resist the dan- 
gers of protectionism. 

The reorganization of the Federal 
government trade agencies which I di- 
rected will assure more effective and 
prompt governmental action to exploit 
the export opportunities afforded by 
the MTN. The plan, approved by Con- 
gress this fall, establishes a strong, au- 
thoritative voice in the Executive Of- 
fice of the President to provide coher- 
ence and leadership to United States 
trade policy, negotiations, and the im- 
plementation of the MTN trade codes. 
The reorganization establishes the Of- 
fice of the U.S. Trade Representative 
and strengthens the Commerce De- 
partment. 



M 



■ 



■ 

■ 



■ 



* 



Special 



Sugar 

In 1979, Congress ratified the Interna- 
tional Sugar Agreement, thus fulfilling 
a major commitment of this Adminis- 
tration. The agreement is an important 
element in our international commodity 
policy with far-reaching implications for 
our relations with developing countries, 
particularly sugar producers in Latin 
America. This agreement and other 
measures my Administration has taken 
already have helped to stabilize sugar 
prices and bring high domestic prices 
into line with those prevailing in the 
world marketplace. Producers and con- 
sumers alike will benefit from a more 
stable market for this essential com- 
modity. We need prompt enactment of 
implementing legislation for this 
agreement. 

Tin 

At year's end. Congress approved 
stockpile disposal legislation which will 
permit the General Services Adminis- 
tration to sell 30,000 metric tons of tin 
from our strategic stockpile and con- 
tribute up to 5,000 metric tons to the 
International Tin Organization's (ITO) 
buffer stock. This fulfills a United 
States pledge made during the Confer- 
ence on International Economic Coop- 
eration and represents a major step 
forward in our relations with producing 
countries in the developing world. We 
will consult with other members of the 
ITO to ensure that our tin disposals do 
not disrupt markets and take into ac- 
count the needs of both producers and 
consumers. 



Common Fund 

The United States joined members of 
the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, both de- 
veloped and developing nations, in 
negotiating an agreement on the 
framework of a Common Fund to help 
international commodity agreements 
stabilize the prices of raw materials. 
Negotiations are now underway on the 
final articles of agreement of the Fund. 
The United States also participated 
in successful negotiations of an interna- 
tional rubber agreement. 

Economic Cooperation With 
Developing Nations 

Our relations with the developing na- 
tions are of central importance to the 
United States. The fabric of our rela- 
tions with these countries has both 
political and economic dimensions, as 
we witnessed in recent weeks when na- 



tions of the Third World took the lead 
in condemning the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Our ability to work to- 
gether with developing nations toward 
goals we have in common — their politi- 
cal independence, the resolution of re- 
gional tensions, and our growing ties of 
trade for example — require us to main- 
tain the policy of active engagement 
with the developing world that we have 
pursued over the past three years. 

The foreign assistance legislation 
which I will be submitting to you for 
FY 81 provides the authority and the 
funds to carry on a cooperative re- 
lationship with a large number of de- 
veloping nations. Prompt Congressional 
action on this legislation is essential in 
order to meet our treaty and base 
rights agreements, continue our peace 
efforts in the Middle East, provide eco- 
nomic and development support to 
countries in need, promote progress on 
North-South issues, protect Western 
interests, and counter Soviet influence. 

We will also be asking Congress to 
enable us to honor our international 
agreements for multilateral assistance 
by authorizing and appropriating funds 
for the International Financial Institu- 
tions. 

Finally, the Administration and the 
Congress agreed in 1979 on fundamen- 
tal changes in the way the United 
States government is organized to con- 
duct economic and technical relations 
with the developing nations. I sub- 
mitted and the Congress approved a 
plan to consolidate in a small policy- 
coordination body, the International 
Development Cooperation Agency 
(IDCA), responsibility for direct 
United States development assistance, 
for guidance to United States represen- 
tatives in multilateral development 
agencies, and for presenting our long- 
term development interests in Federal 
government policy bodies dealing with 
trade and other economic relations with 
developing nations. I also submitted, 
and the House approved in the 1979 
session of Congress, a plan to establish 
the Institute for Scientific and Techno- 
logical Cooperation (ISTC), a con- 
stituent element of the IDCA group of 
agencies. Once approved, the ISTC will 
carry out research as well as support 
research by foreign scientists on tech- 
nological means of reducing poverty in 
developing nations. 

Food — The War on Hunger 

One of the main economic problems 
facing developing countries is lagging 
food production. We must help these 
countries meet this problem — not only 
so that their peoples will be free from 



the threat of continuing hunger, but 
also so that their societies will be 
strong enough to resist external pres- 
sure. I have directed that United 
States bilateral and multilateral aid be 
geared increasingly to this goal, as rec- 
ommended by our Hunger Commission, 
chaired by Sol Linowitz; we are urging 
other donor countries to join in more 
effective efforts to this end. 

Good progress has been made since 
the Tokyo Economic Summit called for 
increased effort on this front. The 
World Bank is giving this problem top 
priority, as are some other donor coun- 
tries. The resources of the consultative 
Group on International Agricultural 
Research will be doubled over a five- 
year period. The work of our own Insti- 
tute of Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation will further strengthen the 
search for relevant new agricultural 
technologies. 

The goal of freeing the world from 
hunger by the year 2000 should com- 
mand the full support of all countries. 

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF 
FOREIGN POLICY 

Human Rights 

The ultimate aim of our foreign policy 
must be to preserve freedom for our- 
selves and to expand freedom for others. 
This is a matter both of national princi- 
ple and of national interest. For we be- 
lieve that free and open societies are 
not only better able to meet the rising 
expectations of their people; they are 
also better able to accommodate often 
conflicting internal pressures before 
popular frustrations explode in violent 
and radical directions. 

We do not seek to impose our sys- 
tem or institutions on others. Rather, 
we seek to support, in practical and 
concrete ways, the efforts of other na- 
tions to build their own institutions in 
ways that will meet the irrepressible 
human drive for freedom and justice. 

Human rights policy commands the 
strong support of our citizens, and of 
the Congress. The world climate 
increasingly favors human rights 
progress. 

Despite new turbulence and con- 
flict, the past year featured some en- 
couraging positive developments. We 
cannot and should not claim credit for 
them. But it is clear that we are part of 
a growing movement. During 1979. we 
saw: 

• The further strengthening of 
democratic practices in Spain and Por- 
tugal, with free elections in both coun- 
tries; 



Department of State Bulletin 



Special 



• The disappearance of several of 
the world's most repressive regimes; 

• The freeing of political prisoners 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; 

• A return to democratic rule in 
several Latin American countries and 
widespread progress in reducing human 
rights violations in the region; 

• The growing strength of interna- 
tional human rights institutions. The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
held its first meeting. Preparations 
began for another conference to review 
compliance with the Helsinki accords, 
to be held in Madrid this November. 
The OAU took long strides toward 
establishing a human rights commission 
for Africa. UN bodies became increas- 
ingly active in their human rights 
efforts. 

The United States is still not a 
party to the key human rights treaties 
that establish world standards and im- 
plementing machinery. In early 1978, I 
sent for Senate approval four such 
treaties, the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the Convention on Ra- 
cial Discrimination, and the UN Cov- 
enants on Civil and Political Rights and 
on Economic and Social and Cultural 
Rights. Hearings were held in 1979. No 
single action by this country would do 
more to advance the cause of human 
rights than Senate approval of these in- 
struments and a fifth human rights 
treaty sent to Congress previously, the 
Genocide Convention. I urge the ear- 
liest possible Senate action. 



Humanitarian Aid 

The mass exodus of refugees from 
Vietnam reached a crescendo in 
summer 1979 with over 65,000 people a 
month fleeing repression and economic 
privation. Most fled by boat, and many 
were lost at sea. In July, at a special 
UN meeting on refugees. Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale presented a major United 
States program to rescue and help 
support and resettle the new refugee 
population. I doubled to 14,000 a month 
the number of Indochinese refugees the 
United States, in accord with our finest 
traditions, would absorb over the year 
ahead. 

The Vietnamese invasion of Kam- 
puchea in late 1978 gravely jeopardized 
the supply of food for the already deci- 
mated and brutalized Khmer people. In 
October, I announced that the United 
States would pay one-third of the costs 
of the international relief program 
mounted jointly by UNICEF and the 
International Committee of the Red 



Cross. Leaders of thirty-five church 
and voluntary agencies, with White 
House encouragement, are engaged in 
their own large fund-raising program 
for refugees. 

In early November, Mrs. Carter 
visited refugees on the Thai-Cambodian 
border and reported back to me, the 
United States voluntary agencies, and 
the American people. In response, our 
efforts to avert a mass famine were 
accelerated. 

The obstacles remain daunting — 
continued warfare and aggression by 
Vietnam, non-distribution by the 
Phnom Penh authorities of much of the 
UNICEF-ICRC aid, movement of up to 
900,000 hungry Khmer to and across 
the Thai border where they can be fed 
and helped. 

But Americans will continue their 
efforts both public and private to avert 
the famine that looms. New help for our 
efforts will come from the National 
Committee formed in early 1980 by 
leading citizens to help in mobilizing 
and supporting the sustained effort es- 
sential to achieve this humanitarian 
goal. 



THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 

Together with our friends and allies, we 
are striving to build a world in which 
peoples with diverse interests can live 
freely and prosper. But all that human- 
kind has achieved to date, all that we 
are seeking to accomplish, and human 
existence itself can be undone in an 
instant — in the catastrophe of a nuclear 
war. 

Thus one of the central objectives 
of my Administration has been to con- 
trol the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to those nations which do not 
have them, and their further develop- 
ment by the existing nuclear powers — 
notably the Soviet Union and the 
United States. 

Non-Proliferation 

I entered office committed to assert 
American leadership in stemming the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons — 
which could create fundamental new in- 
stabilities in critical regions of the 
world, and threaten the security of the 



An essential lesson to be drawn from Iran is that there are compelling 
foreign policy as well as domestic economic reasons for lessening our 
dependence on foreign oil. 



As the year began, we are also con- 
sidering new means of helping, through 
our contribution to the UN High Com- 
missioner for Refugees and in other 
ways, the mounting Afghan refugee 
population in Pakistan and other des- 
perate refugee situations such as 
Somalia. 

It cannot be ignored that the de- 
structive and aggressive policies of the 
Soviet Union have added immeasurably 
to the suffering in these three tragic 
situations. 

I have asked the heads of the ap- 
propriate departments of the Executive 
Branch to play an active role in the 
Select Commission on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy to formulate a new ap- 
proach to deal with sensitivity with the 
difficult subject of people arriving on 
our shores from Latin America. 

My meeting with Pope John Paul II 
during his historic and unprecedented 
visit to the United States helped raise 
the world's consciousness in connection 
with pressing problems of famine, 
homelessness, and human rights. Our 
talks spurred positive action in many of 
these areas, notably Indochina, and set 
the stage for further action in 1980. 



United States. This should not and can- 
not be done unilaterally. The coopera- 
tion of other suppliers of nuclear tech- 
nology and materials is needed. This 
issue must not become a North-South 
confrontation. 

We have been proceeding on a 
number of fronts: 

• We have been seeking to encour- 
age nations to accede to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, or to accept full- 
scope international safeguards. The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act calls for 
such safeguards in connection with 
United States nuclear exports. 

• The International Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) has demon- 
strated that suppliers and recipients 
can work together. Its results will be 
published in a month. While differences 
remain, it will provide a broader inter- 
national basis for national decisions 
which must balance energy needs with 
non-proliferation concerns. 

• Finally, we are working to en- 
courage regional cooperation and re- 
straint. Protocol I of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco which will contribute to the 
lessening of nuclear dangers for our 



February 1980 



Special 



Latin American neighbors has not yet 
been ratified by the United States 
Senate. 

Working together with Congress, I 
remain committed to vigorous pursuit 
of our non-proliferation objectives. 

Limitations on Strategic Arms 

The most prominent of our nuclear 
arms control efforts is, of course, 
SALT II. 

The signing of the Treaty brought 
to an end painstaking negotiations car- 
ried out under three administrations of 
both parties. 

• SALT II is in our mutual inter- 
est; it is neither an American favor to 
the Soviet Union nor a Soviet favor to 
the United States. 

• Ratification of the SALT II 
Treaty would represent a major step 
forward in restraining the continued 
growth of Soviet strategic forces. 

Because SALT II reduces 
superpower competition in its most 
dangerous manifestation, this Treaty is 
the single most important bilateral ac- 
cord of the decade: 

• SALT II will permit us better to 
maintain strategic equivalence in nu- 



clear weapons and devote our defense 
increases more heavily to our highest 
priority needs for conventional force 
improvements; 

• Without it, the Soviets can add 
more power to their forces and better 
conceal from us what they are doing; 

• Without SALT II, and the begin- 
ning of SALT III, deeper cuts would 
take many more years to achieve; 

• Without SALT II, our efforts to 
control the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons will be more difficult. 

I believe that the Senate will ratify 
SALT II because the Treaty is, in its 
simplest terms, in the interest of our 
Nation's security. 

But I do not believe it advisable at 
this time to bring up the Treaty for 
consideration on the Senate floor. The 
Congress and the Executive Branch 
must first deal with the pressing mat- 
ters arising from the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. 



CONCLUSION 

As we enter the decade of the 1980s, we 
face challenges both at home and 
abroad which will test our qualities as a 



people — our toughness and willingness 
to sacrifice for larger goals, our courage 
and our vision. 

For this Nation to remain secure, 
for this country to prosper, we must 
rise above narrow interests. The dan- 
gers of disunity are self-evident in a 
world of major power confrontation. 
The rewards of a new national consen- 
sus and sense of purpose are equally 
clear. 

We have new support in the world 
for our purposes of national independ- 
ence and individual human dignity. We 
have a new will at home to do what is 
required to keep us the strongest na- 
tion on earth. 

We must move together into this 
decade with the strength which comes 
from realization of the dangers before 
us and from the confidence that to- 
gether we can overcome them. 

Jimmy Carter ■ 



*Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Human Rights 



and the families and friends of victims 
of human rights abuses including the 
disappeared. Often as important, but 
sometimes more difficult to manage, 
are contacts with government agencies 
responsible for the judicial system, the 
management of detention centers, and 
the general administration of justice. 

In countries where disappearances 
have been commonplace, we have regis- 
tered our disapproval of this phenome- 
non in the strongest possible terms, 
emphasizing as well the damage it does 
to our bilateral relationship and the 
negative effects it may have on all as- 
pects of our relationship including the 
assistance we provide. 

We talk on two levels; one on the 
principles concerned the problem itself, 
clearly and specifically, and we make 
formal and informal representations 
about the disappeared on our own ini- 
tiative and at the behest of the families 
and friends of the disappeared. Mem- 
bers of the Congress, private citizens, 
and human rights organizations. We 
present representation lists containing 
the names of the disappeared. 

The sad reality is that even when a 
repressive government reaches a stage 
of willingness to look for certain of the 
disappeared, or when an individual offi- 
cial is disposed to be helpful in such a 
search, it is often unable to determine 
the whereabouts of an individual who 
may have been picked up by security 
agencies operating without the knowl- 
edge of other agencies or operatives 
acting independently without the 
knowledge of their superiors. 

In some instances, during the early 
stages, our representations are dispar- 
aged. We are told that the disappear- 
ances, while unfortunate, are the una- 
voidable byproduct of the "war" against 
subversion or terrorism. We are asked 
why we are interested at all since the 
disappeared are not U.S. citizens but 
terrorists and criminals. It is suggested 
to us, and not obliquely, that we have 
no business meddling in another na- 
tion's internal affairs. As we enter the 
third year of this policy, however, 
these efforts to escape discussion of the 
issue have by and large been aban- 
doned. 

Needless to say, we reject 
categorically such self-serving and fun- 
damentally erroneous distortions of the 
international human rights obligations 
of all countries. We are prepared to 
demonstrate, and indeed have demon- 
strated, our concern on this issue in a 
tangible way using the variety of 



foreign policy instruments provided by 
law and policy to the conduct of our 
foreign affairs. 

U.S. Support for U.N. 
Resolution 33/173 

There is much the United States can 
and does do bilaterally in our efforts to 
attenuate and eventually eliminate this 
problem. Our efforts are enhanced 
when other states join in our represen- 
tations and express concerns similar to 
our own. 

At times world public opinion may 
seem ephemeral, but no country — no 
matter how unenlightened or repres- 
sive its regime — enjoys being the 
target of international scorn and ob- 
loquy. In nations where disappearances 
occur, we have joined with like-minded 
friends and allies to urge an end to this 
dreadful human rights violation. We 
work closely with other free nations to 
foster our international human rights 
objectives. There still is no more ap- 
propriate forum for such cooperation 
than the United Nations. 

On December 20, 1978, the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 
33/173, on disappeared persons. Its 
genesis can be found in a growing 
awareness that in various parts of the 
world, enforced or involuntary disap- 
pearances of persons, as a result of ex- 
cesses by law enforcement or security 
authorities, unhappily had become a 
common phenomenon. The resolution 
called upon governments to search for 
missing persons, hold law enforcement 
and security authorities fully accounta- 
ble for disappearances, and to cooper- 
ate with other governments in locating 
or accounting for persons who disap- 
pear. The resolution also requested the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission to 
consider the question of the disap- 
peared. It urged the U.N. Secretary 
General to use his good offices in disap- 
pearance cases and to draw the con- 
cerns expressed in the resolution to the 
attention of governments with a view 
toward disinterested humanitarian ac- 
tion. 

The United States strongly 
supported this resolution, and is work- 
ing to insure that it is implemented in 
the spirit which animated its adoption. 
In late August of 1979 in Geneva, the 
Subcommission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities discussed the human rights 
of detained persons with special em- 
phasis on the disappeared. The outcome 
of this discussion was a resolution 
adopted by the subcommission on Sep- 
tember 5. 



The subcommission considers that 
the resolution in question places not 
merely a legal but also a moral obliga- 
tion, based on the principles of elemen- 
tary humanity which inspire the inter- 
national community on all those par- 
ticipating in U.N. activities. Nations 
are asked to take account at every ap- 
propriate opportunity of disappear- 
ances brought to their knowledge and 
to combine their efforts to try to locate 
the missing and dissappeared persons. 

The subcommission also proposes 
for Human Rights Commission approval 
the creation of a group of experts who 
would be given all the information 
available for locating disappeared and 
missing persons in various regions of 
the world and who would make neces- 
sary contacts with government and 
families concerned. 

The subcommission also transmit- 
ted to the U.N. Secretary General sev- 
eral lists of missing persons with a view 
toward his exercising the good offices 
role urged in the General Assembly 
resolution of last December. 

Finally, the subcommission 
suggests that if the disappearance 
phenomenon continues, its extreme 
gravity would justify some form of 
emergency remedy based on the notion 
of habeas corpus designed to induce 
governments to search for the disap- 
peared. 

What is striking about the 
subcommission's actions is that we are 
witnessing the beginning of the forging 
of machinery and procedures within the 
U.N. system to handle the disappear- 
ance phenomenon. The U.N. Human 
Rights Commission will consider the 
subcommission's recommendations at 
its meeting in Geneva in early 1980. I 
promise you the United States will do 
all it can to insure constructive action 
on the subcommission's proposals. 

Let me conclude by reiterating my 
appreciation for the opportunity to ap- 
pear before your committee, my admi- 
ration for the tremendous international 
public service this forum provides, and 
my assurances that this Administration 
remains totally committed to finding 
ways to mitigate and eliminate the e- 
gregious violation of human rights that 
"disappearances" represent. ■ 



1 The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 






February 1980 



39 



MIDDLE EAST 



World Court Rules on American Hostages 



Following are introductory remarks by 
the President of the International Court 
of Justice, Sir Humphrey Waldock, and 
the oral argument to the Court by the 
United States, on December 10, 1979, and 
the order of interim measures of protec- 
tion issued by the Court on December 15, 
1979, in the case United States Diplo- 
matic and Consular Staff in Tehran. 

The oral argument was presented to 
the Court at The Hague by U.S. Attorney 
General Benjamin R. Civiletti and the 
Legal Adviser of the Department of State, 
Roberts B. Owen. The U.S. Government 
was represented by Roberts B. Owen, as 
Agent; Benjamin R. Civiletti and 
Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Ad- 
viser of the State Department, as Coun- 
sel; and David H. Small, Assistant Legal 
Adviser for Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs of the State Department, 
as Adviser. Mr. Civiletti was assisted by 
Jack Goldklang, Attorney- Adviser, Office 
of the Legal Counsel of the Justice De- 
partment, and by Robert Smith, Special 
Assistant to the Attorney General. 

Texts of the U.S. application to the 
Court instituting proceedings against 
Iran, its request for interim measures 
of protection, and a letter from Secre- 
tary of State Vance to the President of 
the Court were printed in the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin of January 1980, 
p. 37. ' 

PRESIDENT WALDOCK 

The Court meets to consider the request 
for the indication of provisional measures, 
under Article 41 of the Statute of the 
Court, and Articles 73 and 74 of the 
Rules of Court, made by the Government 
of the United States of America, in the 
case concerning United States Diplo- 
matic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
brought by the United States of America 
against Iran. 

The case was brought before the 
Court by an application filed in the Regis- 
try of the Court on 29 November 1979. In 
that application the U.S. Government 
claims to found the jurisdiction of the 
Court on the Vienna Convention on Dip- 
lomatic Relations of 1961 and Article I of 
the Optional Protocol thereto concerning 
the compulsory settlement of disputes; 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- 
tions of 1963 and Article I of the Optional 
Protocol thereto concerning the compul- 
sory settlement of disputes; Article XXI, 
paragraph 2, of a Treaty of Amity, Eco- 



nomic Relations, and Consular Rights of 
1955 between the United States of 
America and Iran; and Article 13, para- 
graph 1, of the Convention of 1973 on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Per- 
sons, Including Diplomatic Agents. 

The United States then alleges a 
sequence of events beginning on 4 
November 1979 in and around the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran, involving invasion of 
the Embassy premises and the seizure 
and detention of U.S. diplomatic and con- 
sular staff. On the basis of these allega- 
tions, it formulates a number of legal 
claims and asks the Court to adjudge and 
declare that the Government of Iran, in 
tolerating, encouraging, and failing to 
prevent and punish the conduct described 
in the application, violated its interna- 
tional legal obligations to the United 
States under the provisions of a number 
of international treaties and conventions; 
that the Government of Iran is under a 
particular obligation immediately to 
secure the release of all U.S. nationals 
currently being detained and to assure 
that they are allowed to leave Iran safely; 
that the Government of Iran should pay 
reparation for the alleged violations of 
Iran's international legal obligations; and 
that the Government of Iran should sub- 
mit to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution the persons re- 
sponsible for the crimes committed 
against the premises and staff of the U.S. 
Embassy and Consulates. 

On 29 November 1979, the day on 
which the application itself was filed, the 
United States of America submitted the 
present request for the indication of pro- 
visional measures. I now ask the Regis- 
trar to read from that request the state- 
ment of the measures which the United 
States asks the Court to indicate. 



THE REGISTRAR 

The Government of the United States of 
America requests that pending final 
judgment in this suit the Court indicate 
forthwith the following: 

(i) that the Government of Iran immedi- 
ately release all hostages of United States na- 
tionality and facilitate the prompt and safe de- 
parture from Iran of these persons and all 
other United States officials in dignified and 
humane circumstances; 

(ii) that the Government of Iran immedi- 
ately clear the premises of the United States 
Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all per- 
sons whose presence is not authorized by the 



United States Charge d' Affaires in Iran, and 
restore the premises to United States control; 

(iii) that the Government of Iran ensure 
that all persons attached to the United States 
Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, 
and protected in, full freedom within the Em- 
bassy and Chancery premises, and the free- 
dom of movement within Iran necessary to 
carry out their diplomatic and consular 
functions; 

(iv) that the Government of Iran not place 
on trial any person attached to the Embassy 
and Consulate of the United States and refrain 
from any action to implement any such trial; 

(v) that the Government of Iran ensure 
that no action is taken which might prejudice 
the rights of the United States in respect of 
the carrying out of any decision which the 
Court may render on the merits, and in par- 
ticular neither take nor permit action that 
would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being 
of the hostages. 



PRESIDENT WALDOCK 

The Government of Iran has not ap- 
pointed an Agent. On the other hand, by 
a letter telegraphed to the President and 
received in the Registry in the late eve- 
ning of yesterday, 9 December 1979, the 
Government of Iran has informed the 
Court of its view that on various grounds 
the Court cannot and should not take 
cognizance of the case submitted to it by 
the U.S. Government, or indicate the 
provisional measures formulated in the 
Request. A copy of that letter was com- 
municated immediately to the Agent of 
the United States of America. I shall 
therefore ask the Registrar now to read 
the text of that letter. 



THE REGISTRAR 

[Translation from French] 

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of 
the telegrams concerning the meeting of the 
International Court of Justice on 10 December 
1979, at the request of the Government of the 
United States of America, and to submit to 
you below the position of the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran in this respect. 

1. First of all, the Government of the Is- 
lamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its 
respect for the International Court of Justice, 
and for its distinguished members, for what 
they have achieved in the quest for just and 
equitable solutions to legal conflicts between 
States. However, the Government of the Is- 
lamic Republic of Iran considers that the Court 
cannot and should not take cognizance of the 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 






Middle East 



case which the Government of the United 
States of America has submitted to it, and in 
a most significant fashion, a case confined to 
what is called the question of the "hostages of 
the American Embassy in Tehran". 

2. For this question only represents a 
marginal and secondary aspect of an overall 
problem, one such that it cannot be studied 
separately, and which involves, inter alia, 
more than 25 years of continual interference 
by the United States in the internal affairs of 
Iran, the shameless exploitation of our coun- 
try, and numerous crimes perpetrated against 
the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict 
with all international and humanitarian norms. 

3. The problem involved in the conflict be- 
tween Iran and the United States is thus not 
one of the interpretation and the application of 
the treaties upon which the American Applica- 
tion is based, but results from an overall situa- 
tion containing much more fundamental and 
more complex elements. Consequently, the 
Court cannot examine the American 
Application divorced from its proper context, 
namely the whole political dossier of the rela- 
tions between Iran and the United States over 
the last 25 years. This dossier includes, inter 
alia, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the 
American Government, in particular the coup 
d'ttat of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the 
CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national gov- 
ernment of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of 
the Shah and of his regime which was under 
the control of American interests, and all the 
social, economic, cultural, and political conse- 
quences of the direct interventions in our 
internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and 
continuous violations of all international 
norms, committed by the United States in 
Iran. 

4. With regard to the request for provi- 
sional measures, as formulated by the United 
States, it in fact implies that the Court should 
have passed judgment on the actual substance 
of the case submitted to it, which the Court 
cannot do without breach of the norms govern- 
ing its jurisdiction. Furthermore, since pro- 
visional measures are by definition intended to 
protect the interests of the parties, they can- 
not be unilateral, as they are in the request 
submitted by the American Government. 

In conclusion, the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully draws the 
attention of the Court to the deep-rootedness 
and the essential character of the Islamic revo- 
lution of Iran, a revolution of a whole op- 
pressed nation against its oppressors and their 
masters; any examination of the numerous re- 
percussions thereof is essentially and directly a 
matter within the national sovereignty of Iran. 

I have the honour, etc. 

Tehran, 9 December 1979 



MR. OWEN 

I have the honor to appear before the 
Court today as Agent of the United 
States of America in support of the re- 
quest of the United States for provisional 
measures of protection against the Gov- 
ernment of Iran. Mr. President, in view 
of the extraordinary nature of the matter 
which is to be argued before the Court 
this afternoon, the President of the 
United States has requested the Attor- 
ney General of the United States to ap- 
pear before the Court as Counsel in 
support of our request for provisional 
measures. With the Court's permission, 
therefore, I would like at this time to in- 
troduce to the Court the Attorney Gen- 
eral, Mr. Benajmin R. Civiletti, who will 
commence the presentation on behalf of 
the United States. 



MR. CIVILETTI 

I appear today as Attorney General of 
the United States and advocate in sup- 
port of its request for provisional meas- 
ures of protection from illegal acts of the 
Government of Iran. I feel privileged to 
appear on behalf of my government. I 
should also say that the United States is 
grateful to the Court for providing a 
hearing at this time. 

If I may be permitted a personal in- 
troduction. I have spent my working life 
as a trial lawyer in the United States. I 
have been an advocate both for the gov- 
ernment and for those who oppose the 
government, in both civil and criminal 
suits. Anyone who has been a trial advo- 
cate in any country would approach this 
Court with respect and awe. In a real 
sense this Court represents the highest 
legal aspiration of civilized man. 

Yet I find myself addressing this 
Court with awe but with restrained an- 
ger. More than 50 of my countrymen are 
held prisoners, in peril of their lives and 
suffering even as I speak. This im- 
prisonment and this suffering are illegal 
and inhuman. It takes no advocate to 
bring this cause to you. The facts are 
known worldwide, and every citizen of 
the world — trained in the law or not — 
knows the conduct to be criminal. 

I come to this Court, my government 
comes to this Court, not so that yet an- 
other body will reiterate the fact that 
what we are witnessing in Iran is il- 
legal. The United States comes here so 
that this tribunal may demonstrate that 
international law may not be tossed 
aside, that the international fabric of 
civility may not be rent with impunity. 

My government asks this Court to 
take the most vigorous and most speedy 



action it can not to settle a minor bound- 
ary dispute with regard to a small bound- 
ary, not to give to one national treasury 
from another, but to save lives and set 
human beings free. This is what people 
everywhere — not just monarchs and pres- 
idents, not just lawyers and jurists — 
expect of what a judge in my nation 
called the "omnipresence" that we know 
to be the law. 

If I come to you with anger, I also 
come to you with urgency. We who speak 
the sober language of jurisprudence say 
the United States is seeking the "in- 
dication of provisional measures." What 
we are asking this Court for is the quick- 
est possible action to end a barbaric cap- 
tivity and to save human lives. 

For the first time in modern diplo- 
matic history, a state has not only ac- 
quiesced in, but participated in and is 
seeking political advantage from the il- 
legal seizure and imprisonment of the dip- 
lomatic personnel of another state. It 
even threatens to put these diplomatic 
personnel on trial. If our international in- 
stitutions, including this Court, should 
even appear to condone or tolerate the 
flagrant violations of customary interna- 
tional law, state practice, and explicit 
treaty commitments that are involved 
here, the result will be a serious blow not 
only to the safety of the American diplo- 
matic persons now in captivity in Tehran, 
but to the rule of law within the interna- 
tional community. 

To allow the illegal detention and 
trial of U.S. diplomatic personnel and 
other citizens to go forward during the 
pendency of this case would be to encour- 
age other governments and individuals to 
believe that they may, with impunity, 
seize any Embassy and any diplomatic 
agent, or indeed any other hostage, any- 
where in the world. Such conduct cannot 
be tolerated; every civilized government 
recognizes that. We therefore submit that 
this Court has a clear obligation to take 
every action to bring this conduct to an 
immediate end. 

We shall this afternoon discuss the 
simple, clear issues presented in the fol- 
lowing order. I shall review the applicable 
basic principles of international law which 
bind both Iran and the United States, not 
only under customary international law 
but also under four treaties to which both 
states are parties. These treaties are di- 
rectly in point. Mr. Owen will then briefly 
summarize the facts to demonstrate to 
the Court that the Government of Iran 
has committed, is committing — and is 
proposing to commit — clear, flagrant vio- 
lations of these principles of international 
law. 












February 1980 



41 



Middle East 



We will next demonstrate that the 
Court has jurisdiction over this dispute 
and the authority to indicate the pro- 
visional measures requested by the 
United States. Finally, we shall explain 
why, on the basis of article 41 of the 
Court's Statute, an indication of interim 
measures is urgently needed and amply 
justified. 

The international legal standards 
here are of ancient origin. They have 
evolved over centuries of state practice, 
and in recent years have been codified in 
a series of international agreements. It is 
on four of those agreements that the 
Government of the United States relies 
here. 

Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 

Since the subject of this proceeding is 
focused largely on the status and im- 
munities of diplomatic agents, I shall 
refer at the outset to the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The 
purpose of that convention, to which both 
the United States and Iran are parties, 
was to codify a fundamental, firmly es- 
tablished rule of international law— that 
the immunity and inviolability of Embas- 
sies and diplomats must be absolutely re- 
spected and that in no circumstances may 
a state engage in the type of conduct that 
is involved here in this matter before this 
Court. 

The first relevant provision of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela- 
tions is article 22, relating to the physical 
premises of an Embassy or mission. The 
words of article 22 are clear: 

"1. The premises of the mission shall be 
inviolable. The agents of the receiving State 
may not enter them, except with the consent 
of the head of the mission. 

2. The receiving State is under a special 
duty to take all appropriate steps to protect 
the premises of the mission against any intru- 
sion or damage and to prevent any disturbance 
of the peace of the mission or impairment of its 
dignity. 

3. The premises of the mission, their fur- 
nishings and other property thereon and the 
means of transport of the mission shall be im- 
mune from search, requisition, attachment or 
execution." 

As to the personnel of such a diplo- 
matic mission, article 29 of the conven- 
tion goes on to provide that every diplo- 
matic agent "shall be inviolable" and that 
he shall be free from "any form of arrest 
and detention." The language is unqual- 
ified: It prohibits any form of arrest or 
detention, regardless of any grievance 
which the host state may suppose that it 
has against a particular diplomat. There 



42 



is a remedy available against a diplomat 
who a state believes has engaged in im- 
proper conduct — to require him to leave 
the country. But the Vienna convention 
excludes any form of physical arrest or 
detention for the purpose of prosecution 
or for any other reason. 

The convention reemphasizes the 
principle of diplomatic inviolability in 
several different ways. Article 29 re- 
quires the receiving state to prevent any 
attack upon the person, freedom, or 
dignity of a diplomatic agent. Article 31 
requires that each such agent enjoy un- 
qualified "immunity from the criminal 
jurisdiction of the receiving State." There 
is no exception; no matter what the 
cause, the receiving state is precluded 
from allowing the criminal prosecution of 
a diplomatic agent. In the last few days, 
as we will explain later in our argument, 
this absolute immunity from criminal 
prosecution has taken on an overwhelm- 
ing importance. 

Article 37 of the convention extends 
the same absolute inviolability and abso- 
lute immunity from assault and from 
criminal trial to the administrative and 
technical staff of an Embassy. All but two 
of the more than 50 Americans currently 
being held hostage in Tehran are either 
diplomatic agents or Embassy adminis- 
trative and technical staff, some of whom 
also perform consular functions. 

Other immunities and privileges per- 
tinent to this case are found in Articles 
24, 25, 26, 27, 44, 45, and 47 of the Vi- 
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
Among these are the inviolability of the 
archives and documents of the mission, 
the right of diplomatic agents and staff to 
communicate freely for official purposes, 
and the right to depart from the receiv- 
ing state at any time they wish. 

Over the hundreds of years that 
these principles have been recognized 
and honored throughout the international 
community, there have been occasions 
when a particular state has felt dissatis- 
fied or aggrieved by the conduct of a dip- 
lomatic agent of another state or his gov- 
ernment; and Iran is claiming some such 
grievances now. For hundreds of years, 
however, states have uniformly recog- 
nized that the only lawful course open to 
them is to declare the diplomatic agent 
persona non grata. When a state declares 
a diplomatic agent persona non grata, his 
government must withdraw him or suffer 
the eventual termination of his diplomatic 
status. 

These uniformly recognized princi- 
ples have been codified in article 9 of the 
Vienna convention. Under that treaty, a 
receiving state can in effect expel an ob- 
jectionable diplomat — but under no cir- 
cumstances may a state imprison an 
emissary or put him on trial. In diplo- 



matic history and practice there is no 
precedent or justification for the seizure 
of a diplomat, let alone an entire diplo- 
matic mission. There is also no precedent 
or justification of the imprisonment and 
trial of such persons in an attempt to 
coerce capitulation to certain demands. It 
is difficult to think of a more obvious, 
more flagrant violation of international 
law. 

Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations 

Both Iran and the United States are also 
parties to the second international con- 
vention on which the United States relies 
in this proceeding — the 1963 Vienna Con- 
vention on Consular Relations. This con- 
vention reflects many of the same princi- 
ples I have just described. Under the 
consular convention every state party, in- 
cluding Iran, has an international legal 
obligation to protect the consular facili- 
ties and members of the consular posts of 
every other state party. 

Of course, when personnel of a dip- 
lomatic mission are providing consular 
services, they are entitled to the full pro- 
tection afforded by the Vienna Conven- 
tion on Diplomatic Relations. The Con- 
vention on Consular relations also 
requires the receiving state to permit 
another state party's consular officers to 
communicate with and have access to 
their nationals. This right is manifestly 
violated when the consular officers are 
themselves held incommunicado by force. 

New York Convention 

Apart from these two Vienna Con- 
ventions, the United States and Iran also 
are parties to the New York Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. 
One of the essential premises of the New 
York convention is stated in its preamble. 
It is that crimes against such internation- 
ally protected persons, including diplo- 
matic agents, are "a serious threat to the 
maintenance of normal international rela- 
tions" and "a matter of grave concern to 
the international community." 

The convention defines a number of 
types of conduct as constituting crimes 
within its scope. Under article 2 it is a 
criminal act to participate as an accom- 
plice in an attack on the person or liberty 
of an internationally protected person or 
in a violent attack on official premises. 
Under article 4 of the convention, every 
state party, including Iran, is required to 
prevent such crimes. Under article 7, 
every state party must take steps to see 
that those responsible for such crimes are 
prosecuted. The Government of Iran has 

Department ot State Bulletin 






Middle East 



violated every one of these provisions in 
the plainest way. 

All three of the treaties I have dis- 
cussed were drafted by the U.N. Inter- 
national Law Commission. They were 
adopted by conferences of plenipoten- 
tiaries or by the U.N. General Assembly 
— and thus by the vast majority of the 
states of the world. They have been so 
widely ratified as to demonstrate that 
they reflect universally recognized rules 
of international law. 



Bilateral Treaty of Amity 

Finally, the United States relies in this 
case upon a bilateral treaty — the 1955 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, 
and Consular Rights between the United 
States and Iran. This treaty is in a sense 
even broader than the three multilateral 
conventions to which I have previously 
referred. Under article II, paragraph 4, 
of the treaty of amity, each party has a 
legal obligation to insure that within its 
territory the nationals of the other party 
shall receive "the most constant protec- 
tion and security." 

In addition, article II provides that, 
if any U.S. national is in custody in Iran, 
Iran must in every respect accord him 
"reasonable and humane treatment." 
Under articles II and XIX any such na- 
tional is entitled to communicate with his 
own government and avail himself of the 
services of his consular officials. Article 
XIII requires that the consular officers 
and employees themselves be accorded 
the privileges and immunities accorded 
by general international usage and that 
they be treated in a fashion no less favor- 
able than similar officer and employees of 
any third country. 

That completes my brief summary 
of the principles of international law that 
underlie the application of the United 
States. I could go on to discuss the pro- 
visions of Article 2, Paragraphs 3 and 4, 
of the Charter of the United Nations, 
under which Iran and all other U.N. 
members are obligated to settle their dis- 
putes by peaceful means and to refrain in 
their international relations from the 
threat or use of force. But the United 
States believes that the three multilateral 
conventions and the 1955 bilateral treaty 
provide as clear a legal predicate as can 
be rationally required for its request for 
an indication of provisional measures. 



MR. OWEN 

The Attorney General has summarized 
the treaty provisions which form the legal 
predicate for the United States' pending 



request for an indication of provisional 
measures — and I would like to open my 
portion of the argument by making one 
brief comment about those treaty pro- 
visions. 

In my judgment, the most striking 
feature of the legal principles involved in 
this case is their clarity and simplicity. 
All of the substantive principles involved 
are well known and familiar, and they are 
clear and unambiguous. This is not a case 
involving complicated legal considerations 
or difficult questions of interpretation; 
the only question here is one of the appli- 
cation of the four treaties — and I suggest 
that the application of the treaties will 
become very clear indeed from a brief re- 
view of the facts — to which I now turn. 
Like the legal principles involved, 
the facts are simple — and tragically so. I 
submit that a mere recitation of the 
events will demonstrate beyond any 
doubt whatever that the Government of 
Iran is today engaged, on a continuing 
basis, in gross and obvious violations of 
the international legal obligations which 
it owes to the United States and to the 
international community at large. 

The immediate factual story began 
on November 4 of this year. On that day, 
in the course of a demonstration of sev- 
eral thousand people immediately outside 
the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran, 
several hundred demonstrators broke 
away and commenced a physical assault 
on the Embassy. I will not burden you 
with the details of the 2-hour attack on 
the Embassy or the manner in which the 
attackers physically cut their way into 
the Embassy. But I should emphasize 
that throughout the attack, U.S. officials 
were in contact with the office of the 
Prime Minister of Iran and the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry — vigorously calling for 
security assistance — and yet the Gov- 
ernment of Iran made absolutely no effort 
to prevent the seizure of the Embassy 
and its personnel. 

Indeed, in the days and weeks that 
have followed the initial attack and the 
seizure of more than 50 American hos- 
tages, the chief of the Iranian Govern- 
ment and the members of his council have 
repeatedly praised and approved the con- 
duct of the captors. Instead of honoring 
its legal obligations and seeking to pre- 
vent or remedy the violations of the 
rights of the United States, the Govern- 
ment of Iran has actually ratified those 
violations and made them its own. 

Since this last point is important in 
fixing the responsibility of the Govern- 
ment of Iran, let me pause to emphasize 
that government's complicity in the con- 
duct involved. In response to a question 
from the President of the Court, we have 
submitted to the Court a collection of 
public statements made by Iranian offi- 



cials in the last few weeks, and I would 
like to refer to two or three of those 
statements. On November 4, the very 
day of the Embassy seizure by the so- 
called Iranian students, the Ayatollah 
Khomeini, then the de facto Chief of 
State, approved the students' action, and 
the next day, November 5, a number of 
Iranian officials did exactly the same. 

On that day, November 5, the 
Ayatollah Khomeini publicly refused to 
call upon the students to withdraw; the 
commander of the Revolutionary Guard 
congratulated the students and pledged 
the Guard's full support for the action; 
the public prosecutor and the judiciary 
announced their support; and then the 
Foreign Minister of Iran declared: "The 
action of the students enjoys the en- 
dorsement and support of the Govern- 
ment." On November 18 the Ayatollah 
Khomeini declared "what our nation has 
done is to arrest a bunch of spies, who, 
according to the norms, should be inves- 
tigated, tried, and treated in accordance 
with our own laws." He made clear at the 
same time that the hostages would be re- 
leased only if the United States first met 
certain specified demands of the Iranian 
Government. 

I ask the Court to bear in mind that 
these statements emanated from a gov- 
ernment which is under a solemn and 
continuing legal duty to provide the most 
constant protection and security to U.S. 
personnel. Indeed, as documented in the 
materials we have submitted to the 
Court, two senior members of the Iranian 
Government have publicly acknowledged 
this legal duty, while at the same time 
approving its violation. 

Continuing the story of the hostages, 
the fact is that since the time of their cap- 
ture they have been subjected to a har- 
rowing ordeal. Bound hand and foot and 
frequently blindfolded, they have been 
subjected to severe discomfort, complete 
isolation and threats, including repeated 
threats both by their captors and by the 
Iranian Government to the effect that, in 
certain cirumstances, they, the hostages, 
would be put on trial and even put to 
death. They have been paraded blindfolded 
before hostile crowds, denied mail and 
visitors, and essentially held incom- 
municado. Some time ago, it is true, 5 
non-American captives and 13 American 
hostages were released, but more than 50 
U.S. citizens continue to be held in these 
inhumane and dangerous circumstances. 
Moreover, recent reports suggest that 
some of the hostages may have been 
transferred from the Embassy compound 
to other places of confinement. We have 
no way of knowing the details of the con- 
ditions of their confinement or their 
treatment at any such new locations. 









February 1980 



43 



Middle East 



When these facts are held up against 
the standards of international law to 
which the Attorney General earlier re- 
ferred, including the principles that every 
diplomatic agent must be kept inviolate 
from any form of arrest or detention and 
from any attack upon his person, free- 
dom, or dignity, I suggest that it is not 
really possible to imagine any clearer vio- 
lations of the four applicable treaties than 
the violations presented in this case. On 
this score, I might also add, there is true 
unanimity among international legal 
scholars. Since early November there has 
been an outpouring of pronouncements 
from leading international legal scholars 
throughout the world, and all have unan- 
imously condemned the Iranian treat- 
ment of the American nationals in 
Tehran. 

In addition, the same view has re- 
ceived the public support of numerous 
well-known organizations of jurists, in- 
cluding various societies of international 
law, the International Law Association, 
and the International Commission of 
Jurists. Without exception, the scholars 
and learned societies have condemned the 
Iranian hostage-taking as the purest kind 
of violation of international law. To cite 
just a single example, the retired Presi- 
dent of this Court stated in a recent 
interview as follows: 

... the conduct of the Iranian authorities 
in this matter constitutes the most flagrant 
violation of the norms of international law hon- 
oring the privileges and immunity of diplo- 
matic missions and their officials. 

He went on to say that history will record 
Iran's actions as "the most complete list 
of infractions" against these universally 
recognized norms of international law. 

I know of no dissent. Moreover, we 
are not speaking in the past tense. The 
violations are going forward and continu- 
ing as I stand here this afternoon. With 
each passing day — indeed with each pass- 
ing hour — the rights of the United States 
and the rights of its citizens in Tehran are 
being assaulted in a manner which is to- 
tally inconsistent with the rule of law. 
That ongoing and continuing violation of 
plainly established rights is the essence of 
the problem before the Court this after- 
noon. 

Jurisdiction of the Court 

Having reviewed the substantive ele- 
ments, legal and factual, of the dispute 
with Iran which the United States has 
brought before this Court, I would like 
now to turn to the question of the Court's 
jurisdiction over the dispute. As I under- 
stand the teachings of the prior decisions 
of the Court with respect to the indica- 
tion of provisional measures, it is not 



44 



necessary for a state requesting such 
measures to establish conclusively that 
the Court has jurisdiction. The urgency 
of the situations which call for provisional 
measures is such that an effort to reach 
final and conclusive determinations with 
respect to jurisdiction could well defeat 
the purpose of Article 41 of the Court's 
statute. For these reasons, as I under- 
stand it, the Court follows the principle 
that if the Party requesting interim pro- 
tective measures makes a prima facie 
showing that the Court has jurisdiction 
over the dispute, that showing provides a 
sufficient jurisdictional predicate for the 
Court to act affirmatively on the request. 

In this case, I respectfully submit, 
the United States can make more than a 
prima facie showing. Indeed, I think I 
can demonstrate that the Court has 
jurisdiction over the present dispute be- 
yond any doubt at all. 

In this connection let me refer to the 
jurisdictional provisions of the Optional 
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations. Article I of the 
Protocol provides unequivocally: 

Disputes arising out of the interpretation 
or application of the Convention shall lie within 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice and may accordingly be 
brought before the Court by an application 
made by any party to the dispute being a 
Party to the present Protocol. 

Needless to say, the United States is a 
party to a dispute with Iran. It has re- 
peatedly called upon the Government of 
Iran to release the hostages pursuant to 
its international legal obligations, and 
Iran has repeatedly refused. Since both 
states are parties to the protocol, and 
since one of them (the United States) has 
presented an application to the Court, ar- 
ticle I confers mandatory jurisdiction 
upon the Court. 

It is true that articles II and III of 
the protocol go on to provide that the 
parties to the dispute may agree on other 
methods of settling the dispute, namely 
by arbitration or conciliation. That is to 
say, the compulsory jurisdiction of this 
Court under article I is unqualified, but 
under articles II and III the parties may 
mutually agree on arbitration or concilia- 
tion instead. I want to emphasize, how- 
ever, that the settlement procedures con- 
templated by articles II and III are 
purely optional. In the English version of 
the protocol this is indicated not only by 
the permissive word "may" as it appears 
in articles II and III, but also by the 
preamble to the protocol, which indicates 
explicitly the intention that the Court 
shall have jurisdiction "unless" arbitra- 
tion or conciliation have been agreed 
upon by the parties. Moreover, I am in- 



formed that the same conclusion flows 
from the equally authoritative texts of 
the protocol in French, Spanish, Russian, 
and Chinese. 

And, finally, the same conclusion — 
the conclusion that the Court has juris- 
diction if no such optional agreement on 
arbitration or conciliation has been 
reached — is confirmed by two articles by 
well-known scholars, both of which ap- 
pear in a volume whose English title is A 
Collection of Studies on International 
Law, In Honor of Paul Guggenheim, 
published in 1968. May I refer the Court 
respectfully to pages 634 and 695 of that 
volume, at which Herbert Briggs and 
Paul Ruegger emphasize that under 
treaty provisions of this kind the Court's 
jurisdiction is obligatory where the par- 
ties have not in fact resorted to other 
means of settlement. 

The Court will not be surprised to 
hear from me that no agreement on other 
means of settlement has been reached in 
this case. In response to questions pro- 
pounded by the President, the U.S. 
Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, Mr. Newsom, has provided the 
Court with a factual account of the efforts 
made by the United States to open nego- 
tiations with the Iranian authorities, and 
the total rejection of all such overtures by 
the Government of Iran. Specifically, in 
early November, after the seizure of the 
hostages, when the U.S. Government 
dispatched a distinguished emissary, a 
former U.S. Attorney General [Ramsey 
Clark], to visit Iran to discuss the 
hostage-taking with the Government of 
Iran, that government refused even to let 
him enter the country. He stayed in 
Istanbul for several days attempting as- 
siduously to open discussions, but even- 
tually he returned home without having 
been able to meet any representative of 
the Government of Iran. 

Moreover, as Mr. Newsom has 
stated, subsequent efforts by the United 
States to negotiate have been equally un- 
successful. In fact, every one of the 
United States' repeated efforts to open 
direct communications between the two 
parties has been rebuffed by Iran which, 
incidentally, has even refused to attend 
the relevant meetings of the U.N. Secu- 
rity Council. Under such circumstances 
the United States respectfully submits 
that, even if articles II and III of the pro- 
tocol required a prior attempt to arbi- 
trate or conciliate as a condition on this 
Court's jurisdiction — and we do not be- 
lieve that they do — that requirement 
would have been obviated by this Iranian 
conduct. I should add that exactly the 
same is true with respect to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations whose 
jurisdictional provisions are identical to 



Department of State Bulletin 






Middle East 



those of the Vienna Convention on Dip- 
lomatic Relations. 

Turning to the elements of the dis- 
pute which arise under the Treaty of 
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular 
Rights between the United States of 
America and Iran, the jurisdiction of the 
Court is again, I submit, crystal clear. 
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the treaty 
provides in its entirety as follows, and I 
quote: 

Any dispute between the High Contract- 
ing Parties as to the interpretation or applica- 
tion of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily 
adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to 
the International Court of Justice, unless the 
High Contracting Parties agree to settlement 
by some other pacific means. 

Again, in view of the fact that the re- 
peated efforts of the United States to 
deal with the dispute by diplomacy have 
been consistently rebuffed by the Gov- 
ernment of Iran, it seems indisputable 
that under the treaty of amity, this case is 
properly before this Court. 

A final jurisdictional issue arises 
under the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Inter- 
nationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents. With respect to that 
convention, the jurisdictional showing 
that we can make is admittedly less com- 
pelling than the showing we have made 
with respect to the other three treaties. 
In contrast with the Vienna Conventions 
on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations, 
article 13 of the convention on interna- 
tionally protected persons might be read 
as requiring a 6-months' effort by the 
parties to arbitrate the dispute as a pre- 
requisite to the Court's jurisdiction. 

It is the position of my government, 
however, that where, as in this case, one 
of the parties has closed down the Em- 
bassy of the other and has flatly refused 
even to open communications, either 
through the other's special emissary or in 
any other fashion, the arbitration re- 
quirement is rendered inoperable. It is 
our position, therefore, that we have 
made out a prima facie showing of juris- 
diction, even under the internationally 
protected persons convention. Moreover, 
even if no such showing had been made, 
all of the major claims presented in the 
Application of the United States are sol- 
idly based, I submit, upon the other three 
treaties — as to which, in our view, the 
Court's jurisdiction appears not merely 
prima facie, but beyond dispute. 

At this point, in response to a ques- 
tion raised by the President of the Court, 
I should make one final comment on the 
Court's jurisdiction. As the Court is 
aware, the Security Council of the United 
Nations has addressed the present dis- 



pute, and in Resolution No. 457, adopted 
6 days ago, the Council called upon the 
Government of Iran to bring about the 
immediate release of the hostages. In 
such circumstances it might conceivably 
be suggested that this Court should not 
exercise jurisdiction over the same dis- 
pute. 

I respectfully submit that any such 
suggestion would be untenable. It is, of 
course, an impressive fact that the 15 
countries represented in the Security 
Council — 15 countries of very diverse 
views and philosophies — have voted 
unanimously, 15 to nothing, in favor of the 
resolution to which I have referred. The 
fact remains, however, that the Security 
Council is a political organ which has re- 
sponsibility for seeking solutions to inter- 
national problems through political 
means. By contrast, this Court is a judi- 
cial body with the responsibility to em- 
ploy judicial methods in order to resolve 
those problems which lie within its juris- 
diction. There is absolutely nothing in the 
U.N. Charter or in this Court's Statute 
to suggest that action by the Security 
Council excludes action by the Court, 
even if the two actions might in some re- 
spects be parallel. 

By contrast, Article 12 of the U.N. 
Charter provides that, while the Security 
Council is exercising its functions respect- 
ing a dispute, the General Assembly shall 
not make any recommendation on that 
dispute; but the charter places no corre- 
sponding restriction on the Court. As 
Rosenne has observed at page 87 of his 
treatise, The Law and Practice of the In- 
ternational Court of Justice, the fact that 
one of the political organs of the United 
Nations is dealing with a particular dis- 
pute does not militate against the Court's 
taking action on those aspects of the same 
dispute which fall within its jurisdiction. 

To sum up on this point, the United 
States has brought to the Court a dispute 
which plainly falls within the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction, and I respect- 
fully submit that, if we can satisfy the 
Court that an indication of provisional 
measures is justified and needed in a 
manner consistent with Article 41 of the 
Court's Statute, the Court will have a 
duty to indicate such measures, quite 
without regard to any parallel action 
which may have been taken by the Secu- 
rity Council of the United Nations. As to 
whether the actions of the Security 
Council affect the need for provisional 
measures, I will have more to say a little 
later in my argument, but first I would 
like to explain the specific reasons which 
underlie our request for such an indica- 
tion of such measures. 



Nature of Interim Measures 

On this subject I start from the premise 
that an essential purpose of such pro- 
visional measures is to preserve the 
rights of the parties pending the final de- 
cision of the Court. Putting the matter in 
other terms, it is familiar jurisprudence 
that the Court may look to see whether 
any injury which may be done to one 
party or the other during the pendency of 
the case will be, on the one hand, an in- 
jury which can be remedied through the 
Court's final decision or, on the other 
hand, whether during the pendency of 
the case one party will be subject to an 
injury which is actually irreparable. 

An injury of the former kind may or 
may not justify an indication of pro- 
visional measures, but where an irrepar- 
able injury threatens or is actually being 
inflicted during the pendency of the case, 
there is clear justification — and indeed an 
urgent need — for interim protective 
measures. As the Court observed in the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the Nuclear 
Test cases, and the Aegean Sea cases, Ar- 
ticle 41 of the Court's Statute, and I 
quote, "presupposes that irreparable 
prejudice should not be caused to rights 
which are the subject of dispute in judi- 
cial proceedings". 

Applying this standard of irreparable 
injury to the present case, I submit that 
the United States is clearly entitled to 
interim measures of protection. The sim- 
ple fact is that the United States' rights 
of the highest dignity and importance are 
being currently and irreparably violated 
by the Government of Iran. Specifically, 
the international agreements upon which 
we base our claim have conferred upon 
the United States the right to maintain a 
working and effective embassy in Tehran, 
the right to have its diplomatic and con- 
sular personnel protected in their lives 
and persons from every form of interfer- 
ence and abuse, and the right to have its 
nationals protected and secure. 

As I indicated earlier, with each 
passing hour those rights are being de- 
stroyed, and the injury, once incurred, is 
plainly and completely irreparable. The 
trauma of being held hostage day after 
day in conditions of danger cannot be 
erased; the weeks of interruption of dip- 
lomatic functions cannot be repaired. If 
the hostages are physically harmed, this 
Court's decision on the merits cannot 
possibly heal them. Given the nature of 
the rights involved, an ultimate award of 
monetary damages simply could not make 
good the injuries currently being sus- 
tained as this case awaits the Court's 
judgment. 






February 1980 



45 



Middle East 



That being so, I would direct the 
Court's attention to an early and similar 
case decided by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. In that case, enti- 
tled The Case Concerning the Denuncia- 
tion of the Treaty of November 2, 1865, 
Between China and Belgium, interim 
measures were requested in order to pro- 
vide for the protection and security of na- 
tionals and property, the performance of 
consular functions and freedom from 
arrest and criminal penalties except in 
accordance with law. In indicating the 
requested protective measures, the Pres- 
ident of the Court emphasized that the 
injury expected to occur during the pen- 
dency of the case "could not be made 
good by the payment of an indemnity or 
by compensation or restitution in some 
other material form." In that case, given 
the threat of irreparable injury, interim 
measures were indicated, and we seek 
the same relief here. 

Moreover, I should emphasize that 
the threat of future irreparable injury is 
growing. The situation in Tehran is vol- 
atile in the extreme, and the danger for 
the hostages can sharply increase at any 
moment. The current chief of the Iranian 
state himself has spoken of the possible 
destruction of the hostages— the ultimate 
in irreparable injury. In this connection it 
should be recalled that in recent months 
over 600 Iranian nationals have actually 
been executed after peremptory trials by 
revolutionary councils. The defendants in 
those trials were denied the right to 
counsel, the right to present defensive 
evidence, the right to appeal — indeed, 
the right to any legal process at all — and 
the penalty was death. 

Against that background, the often 
repeated threats to put the American 
hostages on trial for alleged crimes 
creates an ominous and an unacceptable 
threat not only for the hostages and for 
the United States but for the entire in- 
ternational community. In the words of 
the Secretary General of the United Na- 
tions, "The present crisis poses a serious 
threat to international peace and secu- 
rity," a threat which may well be al- 
leviated if this Court promptly indicates 
the interim measures requested by the 
United States. 

I would like now to turn to an alter- 
native standard under which the United 
States in our submission is now entitled 
to the requested relief. As the Court is 
aware, in many legal systems it is recog- 
nized that interim relief of the kind re- 
quested here is appropriate in order to 
preserve the status quo pendente lite — 
and it is the position of the United States 
that this principle also cries out for im- 
mediate judicial action in this case. 



On this point, however, I do not wish 
to be misunderstood. Obviously I am not 
asking the Court to maintain the status 
quo as created by the Government of Iran 
over the past days and weeks. Obviously 
the status quo which we seek to preserve 
— or, more correctly, to which we seek to 
return — is the status quo ante, the situa- 
tion immediately prior to the Iranian sei- 
zure of the Embassy and the hostages. 

There is, I submit, clear authority 
for such relief, as noted in Dumbauld's 
treatise, Interim Measures in Interna- 
tional Controversies. Referring to the 
general principle of enforcing or sanction- 
ing the status quo through indications of 
interim measures — and citing cases and 
authorities — Judge Dumbauld states as 
follows (and I quote from page 187 of his 
treatise): 

It should be noted that the status quo thus 
sanctioned is not that at the time of the judg- 
ment, or at the date suit is brought, but the 
last uncontested status prior to the con- 
troversy. 

The controversy which we have brought 
before the Court arose with the seizure of 
the Embassy and the hostages in Tehran 
on November 4, 1979, and I submit that 
the situation cries out for interim meas- 
ures calling upon Iran to release the hos- 
tages and the Embassy and thus return 
to the status quo as of November 3, 1979. 

In order to test the validity of this 
conclusion, I should like to pose for the 
Court a simple hypothetical case. Let us 
assume that on November 4, 1979, in- 
stead of allowing the Embassy and the 
hostages to be seized, the Revolutionary 
Council of Iran had announced that, un- 
less certain demands were met by the 
United States by— let us say— December 
10, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran 
would then be attacked and its personnel 
taken hostage. 

If in that situation the Government 
of the United States had brought its case 
to this Court and requested an indication 
of provisional measures calling upon Iran 
to desist from its threat, I suggest that 
the Court would have acted affirmatively 
on that request. In that situation, I sub- 
mit, the Court would have called upon 
Iran to leave the American diplomatic 
staff in Tehran free and inviolable and 
immune from prosecution — and I want to 
emphasize that that, in essence, is 
exactly the basic provisional measure we 
are requesting from the Court now. 

In other words, we would have been 
entitled, in our view, to such a provisional 
measure if Iran had not yet violated its 
international legal obligations to the 
United States, and, in our view, that 



necessarily means that we are entitled to 
the same protective measures now — now 
that Iran has actually embarked upon a 
profound and continuing violation of our 
rights. To hold otherwise at this time — to 
withhold such protective measures — 
would be to allow Iran to benefit from ac- 
tually using force instead of merely 
threatening to do so. 

For the foregoing reasons, we be- 
lieve that we are clearly entitled, as a 
matter of law and logic, to the protective 
measures which we are seeking, and we 
submit that humanitarian considerations 
require no less. 

Possible Obstacles to the U.S. Request 

At this point I would like to turn to the 
question of whether there are any possi- 
ble legal obstacles to our request. We 
have considered that question with care, 
and we, at least, have concluded that 
there are none. 

On this subject I would refer at the 
outset to the telegraphic message which 
has just been received by the Court from 
the Government of Iran and reference to 
which was made by the President at the 
opening of the hearing. Since that mes- 
sage constitutes Iran's only response to 
the United States' request for provisional 
measures, I should like to reply thereto 
on behalf of my government. 

I think it is significant that the open- 
ing paragraph of the Iranian statement 
expresses great respect for this Court 
and its achievements in resolving legal 
conflicts between states. It is our hope 
and expectation that this respect will lead 
the Government of Iran to honor in full 
whatever action the Court may take in 
response to the pending U.S. request. 

The main theme of the telegraphic 
statement of the Government of Iran is 
that the question of the American hos- 
tages in Tehran is only one of several 
problems or disputes that now exist as 
between the two governments. It is al- 
leged in general terms that in various 
ways the Government of the United 
States has behaved improperly toward 
Iran in past years and that in this larger 
context the problem of the American hos- 
tages in Tehran is only a marginal and 
secondary problem. 

There are, I suggest, two short an- 
swers to this proposition. First of all, 
Iran's view of its treatment of the Ameri- 
can hostages as a secondary problem is 
not shared by the Secretary General of 
the United Nations or the Security Coun- 
cil of the United Nations. They have 
unanimously characterized the hostages' 
captivity as a major threat to interna- 
tional peace. Secondly, to the extent that 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



Middle East 



there are other disputes between Iran 
and the United States, Iran has made ab- 
solutely no effort to bring any such mat- 
ters before the Court. The fact is that the 
only dispute which has been brought be- 
fore the Court is the dispute relating to 
the taking of the American hostages, 
and, we submit, with the greatest re- 
spect, that that is the only dispute with 
which the Court can now deal. The Gov- 
ernment of Iran asserts that the Court 
should not take cognizance of the dispute 
relating to the hostages, but for the rea- 
sons I have previously indicated, that is 
simply incorrect as a matter of law. The 
hostage question clearly lies within the 
Court's jurisdiction and, we submit, is 
properly presented for your decision now. 

Paragraph 4 of Iran's statement of 
yesterday goes on to suggest — albeit 
somewhat indirectly — that the United 
States is now improperly seeking part or 
all of the relief which it seeks on the 
merits. In fact, if the Court compares our 
request for interim measures with the 
form of judgment that we are seeking, it 
will find that the two pleadings request 
different forms of relief — except in one 
respect. The only respect in which our 
request and our application overlap is 
that both pleadings ask in effect for an 
order calling for the immediate release of 
the hostages and their safe departure 
from Iran. 

I submit, however, that this con- 
vergence of the two requests results 
merely from an excess of caution on the 
part of the United States. Frankly, we 
are hopeful that this Court will indicate 
measures calling for immediate release of 
the hostages and that Iran, consistent 
with its asserted respect for this Court, 
will comply long before it becomes neces- 
sary for the Court to write its final judg- 
ment. It is our hope and expectation, 
therefore, that the request for a judg- 
ment requiring release of the hostages 
will have become moot long before the 
Court acts on our application for such a 
judgment. 

In a very real sense, therefore, our 
request for release of the hostages, being 
one of the very greatest urgency, should 
have appeared only in our pending re- 
quest for an indication of provisional 
measures — and should not have been in- 
cluded in our application for judgment. 
Nevertheless, not wishing to presume as 
to how the Court will rule as a result of 
today's hearing, we took the conservative 
course of including a similar request in 
our application. I earnestly submit, how- 
ever, that such conservatism on our part 
does not in any way militate against our 
request for an indication of interim meas- 
ures; the need for such relief is urgent in 
the extreme. 



This brings me to the final point 
made in yesterday's statement by the 
Government of Iran. It is there sug- 
gested that if provisional measures are 
indicated by the Court, they cannot 
properly be made unilateral — the implica- 
tion being that the Court could not 
properly call for the release of the hos- 
tages by Iran without calling for some 
equivalent action by the United States. 

That suggestion is simply, I submit, 
incorrect. Article 41 of the Court's Stat- 
ute authorizes the Court, where circum- 
stances so require, to indicate "any pro- 
visional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of 
either party." I submit that clearly con- 
templates that where one of two parties 
is unilaterally causing irreparable injury 
to the other, a unilateral provisional 
measure is entirely appropriate. As I 
shall indicate in a moment, the United 
States would have no objection if the 
Court were to include, in an indication of 
provisional measures, the conventional 
provisions calling upon both parties to 
avoid aggravation of the dispute and pre- 
serve their rights — but we nevertheless 
assert an urgent need for unilateral ac- 
tion by Iran to release the hostages. 

Having provided that response to the 
recent statement of the Government of 
Iran, I should now like to return to the 
question of whether there are any legal 
obstacles which might militate against 
our pending request. In this respect we 
have considered with care the possibility 
that the Court's 1976 decision in the Ae- 
gean Sea Continental Shelf case might be 
viewed as contrary authority against our 
request, having in mind the recent action 
of the U.N. Security Council. I respect- 
fully submit, however, that the facts and 
law of the Aegean Sea case are so distin- 
guishable that, far from militating against 
an indication of provisional measures in 
this case, they actually support the pres- 
ent position of the United States. 

In the Aegean Sea dispute between 
Greece and Turkey, both parties partici- 
pated in the Security Council debates on 
the dispute. Both parties agreed in the 
Security Council that a solution to the 
dispute could be achieved only through 
direct negotiations between the parties. 
After the Council called upon both par- 
ties to negotiate, both parties expressly 
agreed that they would do so. Moreover, 
in the Aegean Sea case the question 
whether violations of international law 
were occurring was open to legal ques- 
tion, and the jurisdiction of the Court 
was also in doubt. 

In that situation, when Greece re- 
quested that this Court indicate pro- 



visional measures calling upon Turkey to 
refrain from certain exploratory activities 
on the disputed Continental Shelf, the 
Court assumed that both states would 
honor their undertakings to negotiate and 
that aggravation of the dispute would 
thereby be avoided. Most importantly, 
the Court was not persuaded that the ac- 
tivities of which Greece complained were 
actually threatening irreparable injury. 
For those reasons, as we read that case, 
the Court concluded that an indication of 
provisional measures was unnecessary. 

The contrast with the present case, I 
submit, is very clear indeed. In the pres- 
ent case the Court plainly has jurisdic- 
tion; the authorities of Iran have refused 
to send a representative to take part in 
the proceedings of the Security Council; 
they have rejected the Council's resolu- 
tion as "an American plot"; they have re- 
fused to communicate with the U.S. Gov- 
ernment in any way at all; their violations 
of international law are clear; by 
threatening trials, they are continuing to 
aggravate the dispute; and truly irrepar- 
able injury is proceeding day by day. In 
the present case the need for protective 
measures, I submit, could not be more 
imperative. 

If there were any doubt about the 
distinctions between the Aegean Sea case 
and the present one, I think it is laid to 
rest by the terms of the resolution of the 
Security Council in this case and the de- 
bate which attended its adoption. Resolu- 
tion 457, to which the President of the 
Court has earlier referred, in its first 
operative paragraph, "Urgently calls on 
the Government of Iran to release imme- 
diately the personnel of the Embassy of 
the United States of America being held 
in Tehran, to provide them protection and 
to allow them to leave the country." The 
second operative paragraph "Further 
calls on the Governments of Iran and of 
the United States of America to take 
steps to resolve peacefully the remaining 
issues between them to their mutual 
satisfaction in accordance with the pur- 
poses and principles of the United Na- 
tions." That is to say, the resolution calls 
upon the parties to take steps directed 
not to the release of these hostages, but 
to "the remaining issues" between the 
two states. Those remaining issues, how- 
ever, are not before this Court, and the 
Court can take no responsibility for them. 
Under its Statute the Court's function "is 
to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to 
it . . ." and that is a judicial function 
which has not been, and, of course, could 
not be, undertaken by the Security 
Council. 



February 1980 



47 



Middle East 



In short, there is a clear division of 
responsibilities here and that division was 
clearly recognized during the proceedings 
in the Security Council. At that time 
U.S. Ambassador [to the United Nations] 
Donald McHenry stated as follows: 

The United States wishes to place on the 
record that the adoption of this resolution by 
the Security Council clearly is not intended to 
displace peaceful efforts in other organs of the 
United Nations. Neither the United States nor 
any other member intends that the adoption of 
this resolution should have any prejudicial im- 
pact whatever on the request of the United 
States for the indication of provisional meas- 
ures of protection by the International Court 
of Justice. 

Before making that statement Ambas- 
sador McHenry and his colleagues in- 
formed Council members that the United 
States would speak in this vein during 
the debates about this pending case be- 
fore the Court, and all of the members so 
consulted were in agreement with the 
statement. Moreover, after the statement 
was made, no member of the Council dis- 
agreed with the stated intention to the ef- 
fect that the Council's action should not 
impede the United States' pending re- 
quest before this Court. Thus all 15 mem- 
bers of the Security Council evidently 
agree that the Court is free to act affirm- 
atively on the pending request of the 
United States if it is inclined to do so. 

Requested Measures 

Let me conclude my argument in favor of 
interim protective measures by reciting 
exactly what measures are being re- 
quested. The Government of the United 
States respectfully requests that the 
Court, pending final judgment in this 
case, indicate forthwith the following: 

First, that the Government of Iran im- 
mediately release all hostages of U.S. na- 
tionality and facilitate the prompt and 
safe departure from Iran of these persons 
and all other U.S. officials in dignified 
and humane circumstances. 

Second, that the Government of Iran 
immediately clear the premises of the 
U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Consulate 
in Tehran of all persons whose presence is 
not authorized by the U.S. Government 
and restore the premises to U.S. control. 

Third, that the Government of Iran in- 
sure that all persons attached to the U.S. 
Embassy and Consulate should be ac- 
corded, and protected in, full freedom of 
movement necessary to carry out their 
diplomatic and consular functions. That is 
to say, to the extent that the United 
States should choose, and Iran should 



agree, to the continued presence of U.S. 
diplomatic personnel in Tehran, they 
must be permitted to carry out their 
functions in accordance with their privi- 
leges and immunities. 

Fourth, that the Government of Iran not 
place on trial any person attached to the 
Embassy and Consulate of the United 
States — and refrain from any action to 
implement any such trial. 

Now, in connection with this fourth 
request, I should like to draw the Court's 
attention to recent reports that Iran may 
intend to continue the captivity of these 
hostages so that they may appear before 
some sort of international commission. 
Whatever the purpose of the continued 
detention, of course, it remains totally 
unlawful. Accordingly, in light of these 
recent reports, with the Court's permis- 
sion, the United States wishes now to 
amend its fourth request for interim 
measures to add: that the Government of 
Iran must not detain or permit the deten- 
tion of these persons in connection with 
any proceedings, whether of an "interna- 
tional commission" or otherwise, and that 
they not be forced to participate in any 
such proceeding. 

Finally, the fifth request of the United 
States is that the Government of Iran in- 
sure that no action is taken which might 
prejudice the rights of the United States 
in respect of the carrying out of any deci- 
sion which the Court may render on the 
merits, and in particular neither take, 
nor permit, action that would threaten 
the lives, safety, or well-being of the 
hostages. 

This recitation of the provisional 
measures requested by the United States 
makes clear, we believe, that we are seek- 
ing an indication which is relatively spe- 
cific as to the measures to be taken. We 
recognize that in some cases it may be 
appropriate simply to indicate, in general 
terms, that each party should take no ac- 
tion to aggravate the dispute or prejudice 
the rights of the other party in respect of 
the carrying out of the Court's decision 
on the merits. As I indicated earlier, the 
United States has no objection to the in- 
clusion of such general provisions, sub- 
ject, of course, to the usual specification 
that such measures will apply on the 
basis of reciprocal observance. I earnestly 
submit, however, that, in the circum- 
stances of this particular case, any pro- 
visional measures indicated by the Court 
should be specific as to the release of the 
hostages, the clearing of the Embassy, 
and the inadmissibility of putting the hos- 
tages on trial, or bringing them before 
any international commission. Every ef- 
fort should be made to insure that the 
Court's message will be clearly under- 



stood in Iran, thus maximising the chance 
that it will be effective. 

There is ample precedent, I submit, 
for the specificity of our request. In the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the Court, in 
indicating provisional measures, included 
not only the usual language about avoid- 
ing prejudice to the rights of the parties 
and aggravation of the dispute; it also in- 
cluded particularized measures as to the 
method by which the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company should be managed during the 
pendency of the litigation. Similarly, as 
another example, in the Fisheries Juris- 
diction case, the Court indicated very 
specific provisional measures as to the en- 
forcement of fisheries regulations and 
even permissible annual catches offish. I 
respectfully submit that, if such specific 
measures were appropriate in the context 
of these commercial cases, they are the 
more appropriate in a case which involves 
the lives and liberties of some 50 human 
beings and in which, because of diver- 
gences in culture and language, misun- 
derstandings as to meaning may arise un- 
less any provisional measures indicated 
by the Court are as specific and hence as 
clear as possible. The specific measures 
indicated in the case between Belgium 
and China which I have earlier discussed 
are illustrative of what is required; the 
measures there indicated are not unlike 
those sought here. 

Conclusion 

In concluding my argument this after- 
noon, I would respectfully — most 
respectfully — urge that the Court rule on 
the request of the United States with the 
maximum possible expedition. We have 
taken the liberty of reviewing the timing 
of the Court's actions on requests for 
provisional measures in years past, and 
we have found that in one case, the Court 
indicated provisional measures 13 days 
after the request was filed; in another 
case the Court ruled on the request in 9 
days; and in a third case, the Court acted 
in only 6 days. Today is the 11th day since 
the pending U.S. request was filed, and 
we recognize, of course, that the Court 
will need some amount of additional time 
to deliberate and to act. 

Nevertheless, we respectfully re- 
quest that the Court act with the maxi- 
mum possible speed — because we are 
dealing here, again, not with commercial 
interests, but with the lives and liberties 
of persons who have now been under 
close confinement and imminent peril for 
more than 5 weeks. The danger for these 
50 or more lives increases as each day 
goes by. It is critically important to my 
government to achieve the immediate re- 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 






Middle East 



lease of these individuals, and I suggest 
that it is no less important to the world 
community and to the rule of law. 

Mr. President, distinguished and 
learned Members of the Court, we be- 
lieve that this case presents the Court 
with the most dramatic opportunity it has 
ever had to affirm the rule of law among 
nations and thus to fulfill the world com- 
munity's expectation that the Court will 
act vigorously in the interests of interna- 
tional law and international peace. The 
current situation in Tehran demands an 
immediate, forceful, and explicit declara- 
tion by the Court, calling upon Iran to 
conform to the basic rules of international 
intercourse and human rights. Only in 
that manner, I respectfully suggest, can 
the Court discharge its high responsibili- 
ties under the Charter of the United 
Nations. 

On behalf of the Government of the 
United States of America, I respectfully 
request that the Court indicate pro- 
visional measures calling upon the Gov- 
ernment of Iran to bring about the im- 
mediate release of the U.S. nationals now 
held captive in Iran and the transfer of 
control of the American Embassy in 
Tehran to the Government of the United 
States. 



TEXT OF COURT ORDER 

International Court of Justice 

Year 1979 
15 December 1979 

Case Concerning United States 

Diplomatic and Consular 

Staff in Tehran 

(United States of America v. Iran) 

Request for the Indication of 

Provisional Measures 



Present: President Sir Humphrey Waldock; 
Vice-President Elias; Judges 
Forster, Gros, Lachs, Morozov, 
Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, 
Tarazi, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, 
Sette-Camara, Baxter; Registrar 
Aquarone. 

The International Court of Justice, 

Composed as above, 

After deliberation, 

Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the 
Statute of the Court, 

Having regard to Articles 73 and 74 of the 
Rules of Court, 

Having regard to the Application by the 
United States of America filed in the Registry 
of the Court on 29 November 1979, instituting 
proceedings against the Islamic Republic of 
Iran in respect of a dispute concerning the 
situation in the United States Embassy in 
Tehran and the seizure and holding as hostages 
of members of the United States diplomatic 
and consular staff in Iran; 



Makes the following Order: 

1. Whereas in the above-mentioned Applica- 
tion the United States Government invokes 
jurisdictional provisions in certain treaties as 
bases for the Court's jurisdiction in the pres- 
ent case; whereas it further recounts a se- 
quence of events, beginning on 4 November 
1979 in and around the United States Embassy 
in Tehran and involving the invasion of the 
Embassy premises, the seizure of United 
States diplomatic and consular staff and their 
continued detention; and whereas, on the basis 
of the facts there alleged, it requests the Court 
to adjudge and declare: 

"(a) That the Government of Iran, in tol- 
erating, encouraging, and failing to prevent 
and punish the conduct described in the pre- 
ceding Statement of Facts [in the Application], 
violated its international legal obligations to 
the United States as provided by 

• Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 
47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re- 
lations, 

• Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36 and 40 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 

• Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, in- 
cluding Diplomatic Agents, and 

• Articles 11(4), XIII, XVIII and XIX 
of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, 
and Consular Rights between the United 
States and Iran, and 

• Articles 2(3), 2(4) and 33 of the Char- 
ter of the United Nations; 

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing inter- 
national legal obligations, the Government of 
Iran is under a particular obligation immedi- 
ately to secure the release of all United States 
nationals currently being detained within the 
premises of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran and to assure that all such persons and 
all other United States nationals in Tehran are 
allowed to leave Iran safely; 

(c) That the Government of Iran shall pay 
to the United States, in its own right and in 
the exercise of its right of diplomatic protec- 
tion of its nationals, reparation for the forego- 
ing violations of Iran's international legal obli- 
gations to the United States, in a sum to be 
determined by the Court; and 

(d) That the Government of Iran submit 
to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution those persons responsible for the 
crimes committed against the premises and 
staff of the United States Embassy and 
against the premises of its Consulates"; 

2. Having regard to the request dated 29 
November 1979 and filed in the Registry the 
same day, whereby the Government of the 
United States of America, relying on Article 
41 of the Statute and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of 
the Rules of Court, asks the Court urgently to 
indicate, pending the final decision in the case 
brought before it by the above-mentioned Ap- 
plication of the same date, the following pro- 
visional measures: 

"(a) That the Government of Iran imme- 
diately release all hostages of United States 
nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe 



departure from Iran of these persons and all 
other United States officials in dignified and 
humane circumstances. 

(b) That the Government of Iran immedi- 
ately clear the premises of the United States 
Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all per- 
sons whose presence is not authorized by the 
United States Charge d'Affaires in Iran, and 
restore the premises to United States control. 

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure 
that all persons attached to the United States 
Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, 
and protected in, full freedom within the Em- 
bassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom 
of movement within Iran necessary to carry 
out their diplomatic and consular functions. 

(d) That the Government of Iran not place 
on trial any person attached to the Embassy 
and Consulate of the United States and refrain 
from any action to implement any such trial. 

(e) That the Government of Iran ensure 
that no action is taken which might prejudice 
the rights of the United States in respect of 
the carrying out of any decision which the 
Court may render on the merits, and in par- 
ticular neither take nor permit action that 
would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being 
of the hostages"; 

3. Whereas, on the day on which the Appli- 
cation and request for indication of provisional 
measures were received in the Registry, the 
Government of Iran was notified by telegram 
of the filing of the Application and request, 
and of the particular measures requested, and 
copies of both documents were transmitted by 
express airmail to the Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs of Iran; 

4. Whereas, pursuant to Article 40, para- 
graph 3, of the Statute and Article 42 of the 
Rules of Court, copies of the Application were 
transmitted to Members of the United Nations 
and to other States entitled to appear before 
the Court; 

5. Whereas on 6 December 1979 the Regis- 
trar addressed the notification provided for in 
Article 63 of the Statute of the Court to the 
States, other than the parties to the case, 
which were listed in the relevant documents of 
the United Nations Secretariat as parties to 
the following conventions, invoked in the Ap- 
plication: 

(i) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations of 1961, and the accompanying Op- 
tional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes; 

(ii) the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations of 1963, and the accompanying Op- 
tional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes; 

(iii) the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents, of 1973; 

6. Whereas on 30 November 1979, pending 
the meeting of the Court, the President, in 
exercise of the power conferred on him by Ar- 
ticle 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, 
addressed a telegram to each of the two gov- 
ernments concerned calling attention to the 
fact that the matter was now sub judice before 
the Court and to the need to act in such a way 
as would enable any Order the Court might 
make in the present proceedings to have its 






February 1980 



49 



Middle East 



appropriate effects; and whereas by those 
telegrams the two governments were, in addi- 
tion, informed that the Court would hold pub- 
lic hearings at an early date at which they 
might present their observations on the re- 
quest for provisional measures, and that the 
projected date for such hearings was 10 De- 
cember 1979, this date being later confirmed 
by further telegrams of 3 December 1979; 

7. Whereas, in preparation for the hearings, 
the President put certain preliminary ques- 
tions to the Agent of the United States Gov- 
ernment by a telegram of 4 December 1979, a 
copy of which was communicated on the same 
date to the Government of Iran; whereas, in 
response to those questions the United States 
Agent on 7 December 1979 submitted to the 
Court a declaration by Mr. David D. Newsom, 
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
together with certain documents appended 
thereto; and whereas copies of that letter and 
the declaration and documents accompanying 
it were immediately transmitted to the Gov- 
ernment of Iran; 

8. Whereas on 9 December 1979 a letter, 
dated the same day and transmitted by tele- 
gram, was received from the Minister for For- 
eign Affairs of Iran, which reads as follows: 
[Translation from French] 

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt 
of the telegrams concerning the meeting of the 
International Court of Justice on 10 December 
1979, at the request of the Government of the 
United States of America, and to submit to 
you below the position of the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran in this respect. 

1. First of all, the Government of the Is- 
lamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its re- 
spect for the International Court of Justice, 
and for its distinguished members, for what 
they have achieved in the quest for just and 
equitable solutions to legal conflicts between 
States. However, the Government of the Is- 
lamic Republic of Iran considers that the 
Court cannot and should not take cognizance of 
the case which the Government of the United 
States of America has submitted to it, and in a 
most significant fashion, a case confined to 
what is called the question of the "hostages of 
the American Embassy in Tehran". 

2. For this question only represents a 
marginal and secondary aspect of an overall 
problem, one such that it cannot be studied 
separately, and which involves, inter alia, 
more than 25 years of continual interference by 
the United States in the internal affairs of 
Iran, the shameless exploitation of our coun- 
try, and numerous crimes perpetrated against 
the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict 
with all international and humanitarian norms. 

3. The problem involved in the conflict 
between Iran and the United States is thus not 
one of the interpretation and the application of 
the treaties upon which the American Applica- 
tion is based, but results from an overall situa- 
tion containing much more fundamental and 
more complex elements. Consequently, the 
Court cannot examine the American Applica- 
tion divorced from its proper context, namely 
the whole political dossier of the relations be- 
tween Iran and the United States over the last 
25 years. This dossier includes, inter alia, all 
the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the Ameri- 



can Government, in particular the coup d'e'tat 
of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, 
the overthrow of the lawful national govern- 
ment of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of the 
Shah and of his regime which was under the 
control of American interests, and all the so- 
cial, economic, cultural, and political conse- 
quences of the direct interventions in our 
internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and 
continuous violations of all international 
norms, committed by the United States in 
Iran. 

4. With re